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After a major natural disaster like the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, western democracies 
like New Zealand tend to enact top-down recovery statutes and regulations that are thought to enable 
a nimble response to national emergencies, save lives, and restore social order. But these statutory 
changes in governance not only determine the sustainability of the natural and built environments. 
They can also affect the wellbeing of those impacted, impairing their democratic ability to have a say 
and actively participate in the urban renewal processes taking place around them. What does this 
mean in terms of community action and resilience? This project is a case study of post-disaster housing 
recovery in Christchurch after the Canterbury earthquake of 2010 and 2011.  
Aims: 
In this qualitative study, I analysed the statutory framework governing the process of post-disaster 
housing recovery in Christchurch and its impact on local democracy. I also explored the role of 
communities and the third sector in housing and urban renewal. This aim was to contribute to the 
development of a critical theoretical understanding of community resilience as an inherently political 
concept. Community resilience is influenced by causal factors or generative mechanisms that impact 
upon the relations between people in a particular social context. I undertook this empirical study to 
develop a critical realist approach to understanding community resilience.  
Methods: 
I completed a narrative synthesis of textual data, derived from a thematic analysis of in-depth 
interviews with key informants, related policies, media, and fieldwork. 
Results: 
I found that a centralisation of government authority over housing recovery resulted in an erosion of 
democracy and representative government at a local level. This centralisation had a major impact on 
communities and their voice in the process of post-disaster housing recovery. Communities, however, 
never relented and worked tirelessly among themselves and with other social sectors to make a 
positive impact to post-disaster housing and urban recovery against difficult odds and stretched 
resources. This immense social capital and inspiring sense of community must be fostered and given 
the opportunity to democratically participate in the development of recovery policy as a key element 
of community resilience.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
I. Statement of the Problem: 
 As my supervisor, Professor Philippa Howden-Chapman once kindly said to me: “not everyone 
gets an earthquake to look at.”1 After all, large-scale urban disasters like the Canterbury earthquakes 
of 2010 and 2011 are thought of as reasonably uncommon events. However, ongoing seismic activity 
in the ring of fire, climate change-intensified weather (like increasingly stronger cyclones), pandemics, 
and social, political, and economic instability on a global scale, make adverse events of this magnitude 
something more common than one would like to think. For decades, cities have sought to become 
more healthy2,3 and resilient.4 It is necessary to study the intersections between these calamities, 
whether acute or more long-term,5 the mitigation efforts and the response and recovery strategies 
after the fact, the impacts on populations and their surrounding built and natural environments, and 
the sustainability of urban landscapes to these and any future adverse events. 6 
 In this PhD thesis, I focused on the community resilience, a highly influential concept in 
contemporary disaster recovery literature, in relation to the process of recovering housing as a key 
social determinant of health and wellbeing after the earthquakes. As I walked the streets of the city 
and met community key stakeholders and the policy makers working to develop the recovery strategy, 
I realised the idea of resilience would become fundamental in the recovery policies that ensued. The 
use (and, at times, overuse) of the concept prompted me to address it from a critical social science 
perspective. To critically examine community resilience in this context, requires being particularly 
attentive to the power relations embedded in the governance of post-disaster housing recovery and 
to the role played by communities (compared to other sectors) within it.  
 In the thesis, through a theory building process, I developed a framework to elucidate what is 
community resilience from a critical perspective and what role is played by housing in ensuring 
community resilience before and after a disaster. In so doing, I also examined the ways in which 
housing recovery was influenced (or not) by the democratic participation of communities as key 
stakeholders in the process and identified potential causal powers or generative mechanisms 
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accounting for my observations. I assessed the validity of this theoretical framework empirically, using 
qualitative research methods. I explored the policies of post-disaster housing recovery and urban 
renewal developed after the Canterbury earthquakes – without discounting the broader New Zealand 
housing policy context and significant evidence of housing conditions more broadly – as well as the 
perception of these policies by communities and other key stakeholders.  
 Decent and affordable housing is still a significant matter of social inequality for the residents 
of Christchurch and New Zealand. The role of communities has also been emphasised by all levels of 
government and communities themselves (if for different reasons). As such, I examined the formation 
of partnerships across the public, private, third, and community sectors of society, to build social and 
affordable housing. Here, I focused on the role played by communities in urban renewal in the local 
context of recovery. The study asks the following research question: 
What is community resilience & how is it shaped (or not) by post-disaster housing recovery & 
the democratic participation of communities themselves as key stakeholders in this process? 
 
 The study aims to achieve this broader goal through the following research objectives: 
1. Sharpen the current theoretical and evidence-based understanding of the concept of 
community resilience by crafting a theoretical framework emphasising the study of power 
and power relations; 
2. Empirically assess the applicability of this framework by mapping the complex & rapidly 
changing context of post-disaster housing recovery and the role of communities within it, 
using the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 as a case study. 
 
II. Background & Rationale: 
 From the perspective of community resilience and housing recovery, the case of Christchurch 
and Canterbury earthquakes presented a natural experiment and a unique research opportunity. The 
February 2011 aftershock was the first major natural disaster to hit a large urban centre in a developed 
country since Hurricane Katrina,7 and an “unprecedented situation of having to rebuild its entire 
central city in a First World economy in the twenty-first century.”8 With this massive recovery effort 
still underway, the full impact of the earthquakes and the recovery policies enacted are yet to be fully 
established. The unprecedented scale of the disaster and the daunting level of destruction have had 
many impacts on the city’s population. Although improving at the date of writing,9 the hardship on 
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“hearts and business”10 is palpable. These events were “generation shaping,” with the lives of 
thousands of people living and working in the city upended.11 In agreement with my findings, lives and 
social landscapes have been impacted on, not only by the disaster itself, but by the recovery strategy: 
“the earthquake response, recovery, and rebuild efforts have highlighted unheralded social strengths 
and vulnerabilities within individuals, organisations, communities, and country writ large.”12 
A. The Case for Christchurch & the Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010 & 2011: 
1. Historical Context: 
 Otautahi,13 or Christchurch, as it was named in English, was originally populated by the different 
Māori ancestors of today’s Ngāi Tahu Iwi, as evidenced by historical records of their presence in the 
area known as Kaiapoi to the north east for more than a thousand years.14  
 The brainchild of the Canterbury Association15 and underwritten by the Church of England,16 
Christchurch was established as a model of systematic private enterprise colonisation, with the arrival 
to the Canterbury Plains of New Zealand’s South Island of some 800 settlers from the United 
Kingdom17 in the first half of the 19th Century.18 Formally founded in 1850, the “Southern Capital”19 
“became New Zealand’s first city, by Royal Charter, in 1856.”20  




For some geographical orientation please refer to the map of New Zealand above.21 
2. The “State of Normalcy:” Pre-Disaster Urban Form & Governance: 
 Christchurch is said to have a special charm and unique character,22 often times described as a 
“celestial place,” and “the Garden City of New Zealand.”23 This colonial heritage is also reflected in 
Christchurch’s urban design. Pickles states that “the first European pioneers were trying hard to create 
God’s own country – a South Pacific garden paradise of enlightened minds.”24 With this “utopian 
dream,”25 a neo-Gothic revival ensued, with stone pointed arches and other dramatic architectural 
details “drawing the eye sharply and clearly to the heavens, and proclaiming Christian civilazation and 
improvement.”26 These principles are clearly implemented in 1850, with the drafting of The Black Map, 
Edward Jollie’s original survey27 and depiction of the city’s spatial structure, as below.28 




Brand and Nicholson describe this rational planning approach to urban design as “a grid laid out 
on a plain between the Souther Alps and the East coast of the South Island of New Zealand, adjusted 
to accommodate local rivers, and included diagonal transportation routes to the Port of Lyttleton and 
the overland route North.” Public squares and the Avon River, which was linked to a market and edged 
by parks and trees, offered collective spaces. Hagley Park, located at the grid boundary also 
“contributed a robust recreation area.” Characteristically, the central square of the city was designed 
as a Christian cross with a Gothic cathedral at its centre.29 The Anglican Christchurch Cathedral, 
“positioned at the historical heart of the city has become a symbollic marker of the devastation that 
took place between 2011 and 2012, as well as a symbol of hope for the future.”30  
 Overall, for Howden-Chapman and others, Christchurch’s suburbs reflected the urban 
settlement patterns of average New Zealanders, “shaped by traditional preferences for personal 
space, and a tendecy to small households and individual living.”31 The authors propose however, that 
there were indications that, prior to the earthquakes, these preferences were changing towards urban 
lifestyles and higher density inner-city living. These changes in social attitudes cloured the urban 
planning policy frameworks of the day, developed by local government before the natural disaster.  
 For Salmon, such was the case of the Urban Development Strategy (UDS), which established “a 
clear strategic direction over 35 years for the city and its peri-urban environment. Described in the 
plan was “where future housing was to occur; where to develop or enhance social and retail centres 
of activity; where areas of new employment were to occour; and how transport networks were 
integrated to service these areas.”32 My thesis proposes that the momentum toward a more compact 
city was challenged by the earthquakes and the recovery policies that followed.  
 This colonial past is also reflected in the evolution of the city’s governance. Pickles is “concerned 
with the connection between Christchurch’s spacial structure (the place), and its social structure (the 
people) as manifested together in landscapes.”33 For her, with colonialism in Christchurch, as in the 
rest of New Zealand, indigenous Māori “were expected to make way for progress, while settlers were 
expected to reproduce their old society in new and improved form” and this meant “importing 
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attitudes that confidently asserted superiority over local knowledge.”34 Indeed, “those who had be 
living on the canterbury Plains for hundreds of years were clearly on the margins of the proposed 
settlement.”35 Thus, from the disenmbarkment of the first settlers, to the efforts in modern times to 
devolve local government to the people, to the dramatic changes to these political structures with the 
emergency powers bestowed to central government to lead the recovery process after the Canterbury 
earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, the pendulum of power and democracy swung from one side to the 
other and back again. Below are some key developments in this history of colonial rule, representative 
democracy and self-determination: 
• The Crown Colony: In 1840, when New Zealand became a British colony, colonial government 
was already an established practice for the British Empire. Colonies were British territories ruled 
by a governor, appointed by the Colonial Office in London. The governor ruled with the aid of an 
executive and a legislative council (the former the forerunner of cabinet, the latter of 
Parliament). The principal government officials sat on the executive council, and officials plus 
some prominent men of affairs sat on the legislative council. Early governors were British 
military or naval officers.36  
 
• The New Zealand Constitution Acts 1846 & 1852: These Acts replaced the governor and 
unelected executive and legislative councils with a colonial assembly, provinces, and town 
councils. The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 established the Legislative Council, an upper 
house to which members were appointed; the House of Representatives, a lower house with 
elected representatives; and six provinces. With the Acts’ implementation in 1853–54 the Crown 
colony came to an end.37 
 
• The Provinces: The Constitution Act 1852 established six provinces - Auckland, New Plymouth 
(later to be renamed Taranaki), Wellington, Nelson, Canterbury, and Otago. Provinces had 
elected councils and an elected chief official, called a superintendent. Provinces were also like 
local governments because their independence was limited. The general assembly (the 
parliament for the whole colony) could change the status of the provinces.38  
 
• Māori Districts: Section 71 of the Constitution Act 1852 provided for the establishment of native 
districts within which Māori law, customs and usages should be observed. The Native Districts 
Act 1857 was to apply to areas where native title had not been extinguished. It had a “civilising” 
element. Provincial laws would not apply but the districts would lapse once there was no land 
under Māori title left in them.39 
 
• War & Debt: In the second half of 1863 British and colonial forces invaded Waikato. The colony 
borrowed £3 million to pay for the war. In late 1864 and early 1865 lands in Waikato, Taranaki 
and elsewhere were confiscated from their Māori owners. The government hoped the sale of 
these lands would pay for the loan. This inspired separatism among some of the wealthier 





• Abolition & Centralisation: These difficulties prompted an amended New Provinces Act 1865, 
which required the general assembly to approve new provinces. This made it much less likely 
they would be established. At the same time, the Post Office Act 1858 had created a uniform 
postal system throughout the colony. The establishment of the capital at a central location in 
1865 made the colonial government more accessible for most parts of New Zealand. Time was 
standardised throughout the country in 1868, a product in part of the advent of the telegraph, 
which linked Wellington and the South Island centres by 1866. Depressed economic conditions 
throughout most of the colony in the late 1860s made matters more difficult for the provinces.41 
 
• Towns & Cities: By the mid-1860s there were many towns, and both Otago and Canterbury had 
introduced systems of town government. The Municipal Corporations Act 1867 set up a template 
for towns throughout the colony. 42 From the late 19th century local authorities proliferated in 
New Zealand, with almost 4,000 bodies in 1912. In 1989 sweeping reforms consolidated around 
850 organisations into just 86. Another major change was the establishment of a “super-city” 
council for Auckland in 2010.43 
  
• Regional Authorities & Councils: Regions were previously seen as physical rather than human 
arrangements, but this changed in the 1960s. Influenced by developments in Europe, regions 
were forward looking and associated with planned development. The Auckland Regional 
Authority was set up in 1963 and other regional authorities were set up in subsequent years. 
When 14 councils with environmental responsibilities, covering the whole country, were 
established in 1989, they were called regional councils.44 Recent government intervention in 
Canterbury, leading to the replacement of Environment Canterbury’s (ECAN) elected council with 
government-appointed commissioners brought regional councils back into the spotlight.45 
 
• The Local Government Act 1974: This Act was a systematic attempt to rationalise the host of 
independent local government bodies. It abolished the historic distinction between urban local 
authorities (boroughs and towns) and rural authorities (counties) under a network of united 
councils. The 1974 act also gave increased powers to the Local Government Commission.46 
 
• Reforms of the late 1980s: The fourth Labour Government, elected in 1984, and its immediate 
successors, implemented the most sweeping reforms of local government in more than a 
century. It revised the Local Government Commission into a board appointed by the local 
government minister. In 1989 around 850 single- and multi-purpose local bodies were 
consolidated into 86 multi-purpose local authorities, including regional councils with broad 
environmental responsibilities. In this period central government services were restructured 
based on neo-liberal economic theory, and local authorities faced similar restructuring. In the 
past an elected mayor and councillors had controlled both the long-term policy and day-to-day 
operational functions of their local authority. From 1989 a non-elected chief executive officer 
became the employer of staff, leaving elected councillors to focus on policy. The commercial 
operations of councils were separated from their non-commercial activities.47 
 
• New financing for local bodies: The Local Government Amendment Act 1996 introduced new and 
more rigorous financial management of council activities and allowed local authorities to 
borrow directly from banks and financial institutions. They were required to prepare and follow 




• Local Government Act 2002: By about 2000 many of the operations of local authorities had 
become businesses. Many of their functions, such as ports and trading enterprises, were 
removed from the direct influence of the voting public. To counter this loss of democratic control, 
and encourage greater participation in local body decision-making, the Local Government Act 
2002 required local authorities to draw up and publicise long-term community plans, outlining 
in detail where they were heading, how they would fund their activities, and the rules and 
processes they would apply. This forced councils to pay greater attention to the needs and 
preferences of their citizens, while giving community members the information they needed to 
participate actively in local democracy. The Act aimed “to enable democratic local decision-
making and action by, and on behalf of, communities.” Any group of residents could apply to 
their city or district council to set up a community board. The functions of these community 
boards varied, but generally they represented the interests of their communities, and considered 
and reported on matters referred to them by the territorial authority.49 
 
 On reflection, it is safe to say that New Zealand’s system of government always reserved the 
right of Parliament to undertake a take-over of local government and the suspension of the business-
as-usual urban planning consenting processes and the residents’ right to be consulted as established 
by the Local Government Act 2002. In this sense, the regressive actions taken by the Government on 
the basis of a national emergency can be described as undemocratic, but certainly not as illegal.      
3. “Welcome to Darfield:”50 The Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010 & 2011: 
 Flash forward to the 21st Century when, according to Pickles, the rupture with this utopia began 
with the literal rupture of the city’s surface on 22 February 2011 when Christchurch and its nearby 
districts “were hit by a magnitude 6.3 earquake that was an aftershock from a 4 September 2010 
magnitude 7.1 quake.”51 Taking lives, homes, and the sense of belonging of many of the city’s 
residents, this major natural disaster “created a definitive endpoint to a history shaped by omission, 
by myth-making, and by ideological storytelling.” Thus, this rupture exposed the city’s colonial past 
like its “dominant Anglican tradition and Englishness, the denial of a Māori past, and the 
environmental pitfalls of building a city on a swamp.” Indeed, nothing would ever be the same and 
bouncing back to a perceived state of normalcy now seemed impossible. However, "the past can help 
make sense of the future,” one that is fresh and open-minded, if not more inclusive.52 For a timeline 
of events starting with the September quake, please consult Appendix 1.1: Timeline of Events.53 Most 




4. The Damage to Housing: 
 In Christchurch, the policy picture changed dramatically, but improvements on the ground 
particularly around the recovery of affordable, inner-city, and social housing) took much longer, as the 
houses lost in the city were not necessarily the houses gained. There exists evidence of increased 
social inequalities and sadly, those who can least afford to wait experienced much hardship.54 
 Ninety percent of an estimated total of 190,000 dwellings in the city suffered “major damage”55 
and most properties were insured under a government-sponsored scheme.56 “Overall, the aggregate 
cost of the earthquake to the New Zealand public insurer (the Earthquake Commission or EQC) was 
USD 6.2 billion.”57 The most compelling description of some of these effects at a population level was 
made by Goodyear in 2014.58 In her analysis camparing data from the 2006 and 2013 national censuses 
she establishes the following key findings:  
• The dwelling stock had changed; 
• The number of occupied private dwellings declined in Christchurch city from 2006 to 2013;  
• Housing issues have increased as a result of the earthquakes, although effects were 
smaller than anticipated;  
• There was a small but significant rise in household crowding;  
• The numbers of people living in “other private dwellings,” which include private dwellings 
in a motor camp, mobile dwellings not in a motor camp, increased from just under 1,500 
people in 2006 to just over 2,200 people in 2013.  
 In their further assessment of the state of housing recovery after the Canterbury earthquakes, 
Howden-Chapman and colleagues described it as “alarming” in terms of socio-economic deprivation 
and social mobility. Thus, they contend that the market or insurance-led approach to post-disaster 
housing recovery promoted after the earthquakes is an example of the “inverse care law.” This term 
is used to describe social care that is disproportionately accessed by the wealthy and “those who are 
most in need have the least resources to help themselves and are most likely to live in inadequate 
housing.”59 These findings are consistent with international evidence.60  
 They argue that, even though the care provided was not viewed by those who accessed it as of 
high quality, it was directed at homeowners and excluded those on low incomes who were more likely 
to be renting and, therefore, ineligible for core recovery services. Howden-Chapman and colleagues 
present some pressing, population health indicators, including an increase in household crowding, 
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which can increase psychological stress levels and, in turn, the risk of transmission of infectious 
diseases. They also report an increase of fifty-seven percent from the previous census in homelessness 
or “severe housing deprivation.”61  
5. The Toll on People & their Communities:  
 Stevenson and others established that, before the Canterbury earthquakes, the overall levels of 
social connectedness in Christchurch city were relatively high. Indeed, a high proportion of 
Christchurch residents have some connection within their communities and positive contact with their 
neighbours; have someone to turn to in times of stress or in times of need; are happy with 
Christchurch as a place to live, work and spend their spare time; and participate in community-based 
activities and one or more unpaid/voluntary activities.62 
 After the earthquakes, these social processes were dramatically impacted. The loss of so much 
housing, and its cascading effects on the regional property market, resulted in large numbers of 
internally displaced. More than ten thousand people reportedly left the city.63 Social dislocation was 
also produced by the managed retreat and dismantling of entire neighbourhoods in the residential 
red zone, forced school closures, the loss of much of the city’s social housing, and a crisis in the private 
rental market that displaced those on lower-incomes to outer suburbs or to bottom-of-the-cliff 
emergency housing without security of tenure.  
 Hogg and others have documented some of the impacts of internal displacement. They found 
that afer the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, “moving within the city showed a protective effect over 
time, whereas returning was a significant risk factor in the first post-disaster year.”64 Importantly, the 
authors identified that “out-of-city movers from minor, moderately or severely damaged 
Christchurch’s plain areas were identified as especially vulnerable two years post-disaster.”65  
 Documented too was the “quake brain” or impacts on people’s psychological wellbeing coping 
with this displacement and thousands of secodary aftershocks.66 Also, “Those from low income areas 
were more likely, post-earthquake, to start psychiatric medication and increase smoking. There was a 
uniform increase in alcohol use across participants. Those from the low income affected suburb had 
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greater general and relationship disruption post-quake. Average household income and damage 
exposure made unique contributions to earthquake-related distress and dysfunction.”67 
B. Power & the Governance of Recovery: 
In this study, I sought to gain a greater sense of the concept of community resilience from a 
critical perspective paying special attention to power relations in Christchurch after the earthquakes. 
This led me to inquire into the dramatic changes in governance in the Crown’s top-down recovery 
policy with the creation of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA).  
Contrary to expectations, this emergency response of central government of increased control 
over the recovery was used not to advance direct central government intervention (particularly in 
housing), but to promote deregulation of the business-as-usual urban planning frameworks. The 
apparent aim was to entice private investment in housing recovery in the city’s central business district 
(CBD) and surrounding greenfields by reducing red tape for rebuilding and increased development. 
This, however, was proposed at the expense of limiting the reach of local government and public 
consultation.68 This was described by the Government as a market-led or insurance-led approach to 
post-disaster housing recovery, a series of explicit and implicit Government policies that relied on 
private and developer interests and the individual insurance claims process. 
C. A Market-Led or Insurance-Led Approach: 
 My thesis proposes that this market-led or insurance-led approach to post-disaster housing 
recovery is a continuation of renewed structural adjustment policies in New Zealand. For nearly thirty 
years, there have been ongoing efforts by the Crown to restructure the New Zealand welfare state. 
The impact of Rogernomics,’69 the reforms implemented first by the Fourth Labour Government, and 
the following National-led Government in the 1980s and early 90s are well documented.  
 More recently, in synch with the Fifth National Government’s conservative economic ideology, 
this policy is an example of a framework that seeks to reduce the scope of what is seen as “big 
government” by emphasising individual responsibility for personal wellbeing and the efficiency of the 
free market.70 This policy can be described as neo-liberal, or based on “a theory of political economic 
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practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade.”71 Here, the role of the state is “to create and preserve 
an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.” These government reforms, however, have 
been shown to be associated with greater poverty and income and health inequality72  
D. Post-Disaster Housing Recovery:  
 Having a place to call home is a critical component of the social fabric73 and the local economy74 
of any city, and its recovery is necessary for revitalising urban centres and communities alike in a post-
disaster context. It is because of this, that policy decisions like the ones to demolish or repair “must 
also be considered alongside initiatives aimed at fostering social and cultural sustainability”75 and 
preserving the social ties and infrastructure pre-existing the disaster. In Christchurch, these social 
processes have been dramatically altered.  
 With this thesis, I want to bring across that post-disaster housing recovery needs to go beyond 
private interests to include the public good. People need houses and communities need people. That 
is, urban populations need affordable and secure housing to become embedded within a social 
context and develop a sense of belonging – a sense of place or community76 – and be engaged within 
their wider society.77 Decent housing78 needs to be considered an essential part of urban 
infrastructure79 and a key piece of the disaster recovery and resilience puzzle, a foundation upon 
which post-disaster urban renewal can begin to crystallise.  
E. Community Resilience in Action: 
 The structural impacts of this approach to post-disaster housing recovery notwithstanding, as 
explained the case of Christchurch also shows that geographical communities, communities of 
interest, and the third or non-governmental (NGO) sector organisations that represent them have 
been empowered to address the social impacts of the earthquakes. As explained, there have been 
many examples of leadership, with the third sector coming together based on common interests and 
revitalising the city, rescuing collective spaces from the rubble, and bringing back life to the badly 
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damaged and mostly empty central city. In doing so, they have been successful despite the governance 
framework created by CERA and the limits imposed on the government over the recovery process.  
 This raises the possibility that the close ties of established communities (and their 
representative organisations), are socially robust enough to adapt in the face of major collective 
adversity and can be trusted to have a meaningful stake in a process that is also theirs. How can a 
policy assert community resilience when it restricts the ability of communities and the third sector to 
influence the decision-making process of a recovery strategy?  
 Community resilience is described as “the sustained ability of a community to utilise available 
resources to respond to, withstand, and recover from adverse situations”80 and, importantly, it is the 
product of engagement, participation, and empowerment. In Christchurch, communities were 
considered important stakeholders in the monumental task of disaster recovery. They were not, 
however, sufficiently consulted or provided with enough opportunities to be involved in the 
conceptualisation and implementation of the policy that would guide this process. With the end of 
CERA and the establishment of the Regenerate Christchurch board this would begin to change with 
more public consultation in urban renewal.81  
F. A Critical Social Science Perspective:  
 How can coping and adaptation be promoted within a top-down approach to recovery that 
offers communities limited opportunities for participation? This has not been fully addressed by 
current academic scholarship.82 This study aimed to fill this gap by building on present theories of 
community resilience to further develop the concept with the introduction of a critical or powers-
based approach. Recently, McManus and others have reflected on what this disaster has meant for 
New Zealand from a social science perspective and called for a “critical exploration” of the Canterbury 
earthquakes. For them, “it is imperative that the social sciences stand up to be counted among the 
myriad of academic research, commentary, and analysis.”83 Constructing a theoretical framework 




III. Overview of Chapters: 
The structure of my thesis is organised around this focus on theory construction. Theory 
building, or the construction of theoretical scholarship has been described as a major pathway for 
innovation in the social sciences.84 Below, I describe how this research strategy was implemented and 
provide an outline of each chapter and how they link to this theory construction approach. In this first 
chapter, Chapter One: Introduction, I sought to describe how I carried out the first step of this 
methodological approach, that is, specify the topic about which the theory is to be constructed. This 
was achieved by outlining the research questions and objectives, as well as offering a background and 
rationale for addressing the research problem, a justification for its study, and describing the content 
of this and the chapters that follow.  
 Chapter Two: A Qualitative Methodology, picks up on these key research assertions established 
in the first chapter, by delineating the qualitative methodological structure of the study or how I 
addressed the topic selected. As such, it describes how I sought to follow through with my research 
goal of critically defining what is community resilience and constructing a theoretical framework upon 
which this understanding could be based. As indicated earlier, this methodological approach was 
informed by deductive theory construction and aided by a qualitative systematic review of the concept 
of community resilience. I also sought to increase the methodological rigour of my study through 
further data collection to empirically test this theoretical framework.  
 This assessment came about with a case study of community resilience and post-disaster 
housing recovery in Christchurch after the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. To this end, I 
used standard qualitative research methods for data collection and analysis and interpretation, 
including participant observation and fieldwork, semi-structured interviews with key-informants, 
document review of policy and media, and thematic and directed-content analysis of textual data. A 
description of these methods and a rationale for their use is also offered in this chapter. 
 Chapter Three: A Qualitative Systematic Review of Community Resilience, corresponds to the 
second element of deductive theory construction and rigorously examines the body of literature 
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related to community and neighbourhood resilience and specifies the range of phenomena under 
study. This chapter begins by describing how I applied the method of qualitative systematic review to 
this topic of interest (including the development of a concept map, a search strategy, and relevant 
inclusion and exclusion criteria) and explores the concepts’ effectiveness as interventions. Review 
results are presented in a narrative synthesis, which traces the development of these and other 
related concepts (like other types of resilience, sustainability, vulnerability, etc.), focusing on how 
community resilience has been defined to date. Importantly, the chapter also reviews the links 
between the phenomena under study and the matter of post-disaster housing recovery.  
 Chapter Four: The Theoretical Foundations of Community Resilience, corresponds to the third 
and fourth elements of deductive theory construction and seeks to identify major concepts and 
variables and what is known about those concepts and variables. As such, it presents and describes 
the theoretical framework of community resilience that, in respect to this theory building approach, I 
proposed to test empirically. The chapter also describes in detail the concepts and variables contained 
within this framework and the finer details of the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of this 
thesis. Here, I illustrate how these concepts and variables were applied to the case of post-disaster 
housing recovery and community resilience in Christchurch.  
 Chapters Five, Six, Seven, and Eight show how I continued to implement this exercise in 
deductive theory construction, this time empirically testing the concepts and variables in the 
theoretical framework of community resilience proposed in Chapter Four. These chapters are 
organised in a narrative synthesis, sourced through participant observation and fieldwork and textual 
data, obtained through semi-structured interviews with key informants and the review of documents, 
including policy and media. As such, this sequence of chapters addresses the fifth element of 
deductive theory construction, or the need to reason logically from the theoretical propositions to the 
topic examined. These chapters present what was said or talked about by interview participants and 
how this information is contrasted with the perceptions of others. This analytical process was iterative 
and not all relevant information was always found in the same place.  
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Chapter Five: People, Positionality, and Place, is a synthesis of participants’ personal and 
organisational backgrounds, and some personal reflections of experiences before, during, and after 
the disaster (including trauma). It also reflects on participant’s place attachment or sense of place and 
community. Chapter Six: The Overall Process of Recovery, is a synthesis of participants’ experiences 
and perceptions of the overall process of recovery and the role of central and local government. 
Chapter Seven: A Tale of Post-Disaster Housing Recovery, presents a detailed description of the policy 
of post-disaster housing recovery after the Canterbury earthquakes and the participants’ perceptions 
of this policy and how it was implemented. Chapter Eight: Displacement, Resilience, Participation, and 
Democracy, describes what happened to communities after the earthquakes, how they were engaged 
in the post-disaster housing recovery process, and what impact this had on this city’s democratic 
character and future urban resilience.  
Chapter Nine: Christchurch, the Powers that Be, is a directed content analysis and uses 
retroductive reasoning, as well as additional observations and textual data, to provide an outcome for 
my critical realist objective of shedding light on some of the causal powers or generative mechanisms 
of post-disaster housing recovery and community resilience in Christchurch after the earthquakes. 
Finally, Chapter Ten: Summary, Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations, offers a 
discussion of my study’s strengths and limitations, a summary of its findings, and a discussion of how 
these results were interpreted, considering my research goal of developing and testing a theoretical 
framework of community resilience. This chapter also provides recommendations and considers 
opportunities for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: A QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
I. Introduction: 
 Theory building, or the construction of theoretical scholarship has been described as a major 
pathway for innovation in the social sciences.1 My study asked what is community resilience and how 
is it shaped (or not) by post-disaster housing recovery and by the participation of communities as key 
stakeholders in the process? I constructed a social ecological and multi-level framework of community 
resilience, focused on power, democracy, and community-building efforts (such as public consultation 
and the formation of partnerships across the public, private, third, and community sectors) to respond 
after major natural disasters. I delineated the qualitative methodological structure of the study to 
appraise these research assertions.  
 This methodological approach was informed by deductive theory construction and aided by a 
case study of Christchurch and the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, which mapped the 
complex social and policy context of community resilience, post-disaster housing recovery, and the 
role of communities in it. To this end, I used standard qualitative research methods for data collection 
and analysis and interpretation, including participant observation and fieldwork, semi-structured and 
in-depth interviews with key-informants, document review, and thematic and directed-content 
analysis of textual data. A description of these methods, a rationale for their use, and the results 
achieved are also offered. 
 Qualitative research is described by Van Manen as an umbrella term that covers various 
interpretive methodological techniques employed “to describe, decode, translate and otherwise 
come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring 
phenomena in the social world.”2 In this search for meaning, I sought to take the concept of 
community resilience – a process by which communities adapt to adversity or risk – and untangle its 
social and political dimensions for urban sustainability. With this goal in mind, I ask: “What is 
community resilience and how is it shaped (or not) by the democratic participation of communities as 
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key stakeholders in a process of urban disaster recovery?” This paper provides an overview of the 
qualitative research methodology developed to answer this research question.  
 The paper describes how I developed and empirically assessed the validity of a new theoretical 
framework of community resilience through theory construction and a case study of the role of 
communities in the process of post-disaster housing recovery in Christchurch after the Canterbury 
earthquakes. This qualitative study consisted of a deductive theory construction research design, a 
case study, and the use of other ethnographic methods and data analysis and interpretation tools. 
Each element of this research design is described in the sections below. Table 2.1 ilustrates the overall 
structure of this study and its timeframe. 
Table 2.1: Summary & Timeframe of this Qualitative Research Methodology 
 
II. Deductive Theory Construction as a Qualitative Research Design: 
 Theory construction is at the heart of the scientific process. Indeed, “scientists formulate 
theories, test theories, accept theories, reject theories, modify theories, and apply theories as guides 
to understanding and predicting events in the world about them.”3 At the centre of many historical 
theoretical developments in the social sciences lies deductive theory construction. However, inductive 
reasoning casts great influence over qualitative inquiry through grounded theory.4 Making a strong 
argument for this deductive approach and against the “over-specialisation”5 and “scarce theoretical 
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innovation,”6 Turner proposes that a solution lies in theorists taking a more macro or holistic approach 
as opposed to a more discrete one. That is, “specialised theories are best developed within an all 
encompassing vision of how the social universe unfolds, a vision that only grand theory can provide.”7  
 For Babbie, contrary to inductive approaches that commonly reason from observations, a 
deductive approach reasons toward observations, with general theoretical principles which are later 
tested empirically.8 Supporting deduction in qualitative research, Bendassolli proposes that 
“researchers deductively draw upon concepts from an extant theory in order to explain, accommodate 
or embed their emergent substantive theory,” and go beyond to the development of new forms 
explanations that go beyond those available in existing theory.9 Tavory and Timmermans propose that 
this should be considered a creative and an ongoing process of “puzzling out and problem solving that 
draws on existing ways of understanding” what is the phenomenon.10 This deductive approach is 
particularly well suited to my study, which sought to develop a theoretical framework of community 
resilience developed as a hypothesis to be tested empirically.  
 According to Babbie, deductive theory construction begins with a set of far-reaching theoretical 
principles that are refined to more specific hypotheses that can be tested or appraised, iteratively, in 
the empirical research process. I identify this approach as top-down, because researchers start “at the 
top with a very broad spectrum of information and they work their way down to a specific conclusion.” 
These theories or hypotheses are posed at the onset of a study and are narrowed “when observations 
are collected to test the hypotheses with specific data, leading to a confirmation or not of the original 
theory and arriving at a conclusion.”11 This deductive approach, however, is not “a lock step affair,” 
and can start anew, with the circular development of new research questions and theoretical 
explanations to address them and that, in turn, can be tested empirically. Babbie, summarises the 
process in a list of elements and the use of Figure 2.1 below. 
[1] Specify the topic; 
[2] specify the range of phenomena your theory addresses; 
[3] identify and specify your major concepts and variables; 
[4] find out what is known (or what propositions have been demonstrated) about the 
relationship among those variables; 
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[5] reason logically from those propositions to the specific topic you are examining.12  
 










III. A Case Study of the Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010 & 2011: 
I endeavoured to empirically asses my theoretical framework of community resilience with a 
case study of policies of post-disaster housing recovery undertaken after the Canterbury earthquakes 
of 2010 and 2011. The case study focused on housing as a key social determinant of health and 
wellbeing and an ensuing matter of inequality and social dislocation. I focused on the role of 
communities as stakeholders in this disaster recovery process.  
Using a case study may seem a counter-intuitive methodological choice when working within 
deductive reasoning and theory construction. Indeed, case studies are often thought as inductive 
research tools and associated with the development of grounded theoretical principles that are de-
coupled from existing theories, obtained by extracting theoretical elements directly from data 
stemming from the study of a specific case. However, my study’s focus on developing a critical 
interpretation of community resilience, based on existing theories of power and power relations, 
allows a case study to be used to harness information on the applicability of the different concepts 
that are included in the theoretical framework.  
Empirical testing can also provide insights into how the framework can be applied across 
disciplines and social contexts, a genuine contribution to the resilience literature. This is contrary to 
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more quantitative approaches that seek to understand phenomena in isolation by controlling for 
context-laden confounding variables. In qualitative research, case studies emphasise the analysis of 
social context by pursuing concepts and variables as inextricable14 from their situation15 or milieu.16 
This method is suitable to answer both descriptive and explanatory research questions,17 and test 
assumptions,18 like my framework of community resilience, as hypotheses can also be generated and 
tested through context-dependent knowledge.19 
To conduct a case study, one must first sample a case or a small number of cases and gather a 
large amount of data for each one.20 A case study consists of an “in-depth investigation of a single 
individual, group, or event,”21 or a case,22 which is bound by social context.23 For Flyberg it is possible 
to generalise from a single case by force of example.24 My study theoretically sampled the case of the 
Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 as an important exemplar of community resilience and 
post-disaster housing recovery for the global literature on disaster risk reduction and urban resilience. 
On the question of generalisability, a challenge to theory building from cases concerns their selection 
“and the faulty assumption that cases should be representative of some population, as are data in 
large-scale hypothesis testing research.”25 Random sampling is not necessarily always appropriate and 
theoretically sampled cases are selected “because they are particularly suitable for illuminating and 
extending relationships and logic among constructs.”26  
Indeed, “just as laboratory experiments are not randomly sampled from a population of experiments, 
but rather, chosen for the likelihood that they will offer theoretical insight, so too are cases sampled 
for theoretical reasons,” such as an unusual revelation or the development of an emergent theory.27 
More than a matter of convenience,28 selecting Christchurch and nearby districts after the Canterbury 
earthquakes as a case was consistent with the relevant literature, as major natural disasters are largely 
framed by space and time. According to Eisenhardt and Graebner, theoretical sampling of single cases 
is straightforward and made on the basis of their unusually revelatory, opportune, and extreme 
nature. Such is the case of Christchurch. 
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IV. Qualitative Research Methods: 
 Standard qualitative research methods of data collection and analysis were used. These 
included theoretical sampling, semi-structured in-depth interviews with key-informants, participant 
observation and fieldwork, sytematic and other document review. Principal fieldwork for this study 
took place from late 2012 to late 2015. Data analysis and interpretation was iterative and updated 
until very recently. Textual analysis was both thematic and directed and employed various approaches 
to scientific reasonning including inductive, deductive, and retroductive reasoning.  
A. Sampling Procedures: 
1. Key Informants & Other Informants: 
a. Sample Composition & Study Population: 
 
I recruited a non-probability sample29 of ten key informants or information-rich participants30 
from a study population,31 defined as “all formal and informal community and third sector 
stakeholders of the Canterbury earthquake recovery process.” This was not a cross-section of 
Cantabrians, but “an expert source of information,”32 the product of a snow-ball sampling of the 
community and third sector participants with representation from other sectors of Cantabrian society, 
allowing for a variety of perspectives in the overall narrative. A description of these key informants is 
presented in Table 2.2. Most, if not all of sampled participants, were identified through participant 
observation, engagement and grassroots work carried out for “Five Hundred Houses for Christchurch,” 
a proposed public, private, community parnership led by the NZ Centre for Sustainable Cities.33  
Table 2.2: Description of Key Informants 
Participant Code Description Date 
KI01 Community Service Provider November 2013 
KI02 Community Service Provider November 2013 
KI03 Academic/Member NGO November 2013 
KI04 Community Service Provider November 2013 
KI05 Community Service Provider November 2013 
KI06 Community Service Provider November 2013 
KI07 Member NGO December 2013 
KI08 Academic/Former Regional & City Planner December 2013 
KI09 Senior Advisor, City Council February 2014 
KI10 Senior Analyst, NZ Central Government August 2014 
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 During fieldwork, I also conducted informal interviews with people beyond those recruited as 
key informants, as they preferred not to be formally interviewed. In a methodological sense, these 
“controlled conversations” are commonly associated with long-term fieldwork and can be described 
as informal, or unstructured interviews.34 These took place primarily from 2012 to 2015 in 
Chritschurch and Wellington. Some of the most salient of these interviews were conducted with a 
policy advisor from the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authory (CERA), a senior urban planner from 
the Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU), a senior manager from the Housing New Zealand 
Corporation (HNZ), a senior advisor from the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), 
three Maori Advisors (including one from the local tribe or Iwi, Ngāi Tahu), one insurance customer 
service representative, four real estate agents and salespeople, three builders or developers, three 
architects, several taxi drivers, and others encountered in the field and local communities. 
b. Sampling Strategies: 
In the first instance, key informants were sampled using a judgement or purposeful35 sampling 
strategy, a very common approach in qualitative research. Here, “the researcher actively selects the 
most productive sample to answer the research question and this can involve developing a framework 
of the variables that might influence an individual's contribution and will be based on the researcher's 
practical knowledge of the research area, the available literature and evidence from the study itself.”36 
For Marshall, “this is a more intellectual strategy than the simple demographic stratification of 
epidemiological studies, though age, gender and social class might be important variables.”37 
Moreover, when subjects are known to the researcher, it is possible for them to be stratified according 
to previously known attitudes or beliefs. In fact, it is appropriate to study people who have specific 
experiences or special expertise, with the caveat that emergent explanations are acknowledged when 
interpreting results,38 as I did in my study. 
I also made use of a theoretical sampling strategy in the selection of subjects39 because of the 
project’s focus on creating a theoretical framework of community resilience and the need to probe 
specific concepts and variables. For Marshall, “the iterative process of qualitative study design means 
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that samples are usually theory driven to a greater or lesser extent and can be used in some form in 
most qualitative investigations necessitating interpretation.” Theoretical sampling thus requires the 
use of emerging data to build interpretative theories or to select a new sample to examine and 
elaborate the relevant theory.40 This approach is also consonant with the study’s deductive stance and 
its research goal of using interviews as a method to empirically appraise aspects of the theoretical 
framework of community resilience.  
To more broadly document the voices of community and third sector stakeholders and their 
role in post-disaster housing recovery, I also practised snow-ball sampling. Under this approach, 
subjects can recommend other possible participants, by being asked if they knew of anyone else who 
should be interviewed. Snowball sampling is described by Lewis-Beck and others “as a technique for 
gathering research subjects through the identification of an initial subject who is used to provide the 
names of other actors, themselves open possibilities for an expanding web of contact.”41 According to 
Atkinson and Flint, “snowball sampling “offers real benefits for studies which seek to access difficult 
to reach or hidden populations, often obscured from the view of social researchers and policy makers 
who are keen to obtain evidence of the experiences of some of the more marginal excluded groups.”42  
Participants were recruited by email with a letter of introduction, and this invitation was 
followed up by another email or phone call. The composition of the sample was ultimately determined 
by the availability of those initially recruited to be interviewed. After undergoing the scrutiny of the 
previous sampling strategies, key informants were ultimately selected based on convenience, which 
involves “the selection of the most accessible subjects.”43 For Marshall, “there is an element of 
convenience sampling in many qualitative studies.”44 
c. Sample Size & the Principle of Saturation: 
Marshall associates the failure to understand the usefulness of small samples in qualitative 
research with “the misapprehension that generalisability is the goal of all good research.” This 
misapprehension often causes otherwise sound qualitative studies to use inappropriate sampling 
techniques. By contrast, he proposes that a good sample size is one “that adequately answers the 
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research question” of the study. In practice, the optimal number of subjects frequently becomes clear 
as the study progresses, when new categories, themes, and explanations stop emerging, that is, when 
the point of data saturation is reached. This calls for “a flexible research design and an iterative, cyclical 
approach to sampling, data collection, analysis, and interpretation.”45 
In this study, the principle of sufficiency or saturation was applied when sampling key 
informants and text to be included in the synthesis of results. Seidman describes the principle as “the 
point when all the concepts are well defined and explained”46 in the research. As suggested earlier, 
this made the sample size something flexible and dependent upon the “variety of ways” language was 
used”47 in the key informant interviews and other textual data. Because large variations in linguistic 
patterning can emerge from a small number of sources, a larger sample size may, rather than 
improving analytic outcomes, actually make the analytic task unmanageable.”48 
d. External Validity & Generalisability: 
This sample was not a cross-section of Cantabrians, but an expert source of information of the 
community and the third sector with representation from other sectors. This was done out of a desire 
to provide an outlet for community groups to express their views, perceived as marginalised by the 
policy structure of the process of post-disaster housing recovery and urban resilience. Thus, this study 
did not presume to be objective from a traditional quantitative approach of researching phenomena 
in terms of generalisable trends and frequencies, seeking instead to determine the meaning of 
phenomena through description.49 In recruiting such a sample I aimed to develop an in-depth 
understanding of the topics of interest (community resilience and post-disaster housing recovery in 
Christchurch). This in-depth understanding was used to produce “generalisations of similarity,” rather 
than cause-effect explanations.50  
This approach to sampling is based on the understanding that “the probability sampling 
techniques used for quantitative studies are rarely appropriate when conducting qualitative 
research.”51 For Marshall, “studying a random sample provides the best opportunity to generalise the 
results to the study population, but is not the most effective way of developing an understanding of 
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complex issues.” This is the case of people and their social, natural, and built environments, such as 
neighbourhoods and communities. 
e. Informed Consent & Other Ethical Considerations: 
There are important ethical issues that must be considered with semi-structured interviews 
with key informants. These mainly arise from the need to treat the identity and all the raw data 
derived from all respondents with the strictest confidentiality. The complex nature of the subject 
matter touched upon by the questions and the more relaxed data collection environment set by the 
method of semi-structured interviews (if compared to the more distant relationship between parties 
in a close-ended survey interview) allowed some of the respondents the opportunity to spontaneously 
and willingly vent about their disaster-related trauma, and that of family, friends, and neighbours. 
Clearly, this posed a risk to participants of being identified, given that they were key stakeholders in a 
relatively small and contentious social context. This information was very carefully removed from the 
final synthesis of results. The raw data is securely stored in accordance with the research ethics rules 
of the University of Otago.  
Even if key coded, all data produced in the process of conducting the semi-structured interviews 
with key informants were potentially identifiable or linked to an individual’s identity, which required 
ethics approval and informed consent from all interview participants. All data collected from informal 
interviews is only available in my field notes and are de-identified, or not linked to any individual’s 
identity and did not require a declaration of informed consent by the interviewee. People present at 
any events selected for observation were not considered study participants so any data was 
permanently de-identified and no informed consent was sought.  
All sample participants were adults, that is, twenty years of age or older. No children were 
recruited and the research topic was not specifically relevant to children. Health status was not 
considered at recruitment, so this information was not considered relevant subject to ethics review.  
I also aimed to recruit both men and women and people with diverse ethnic backgrounds. This 
was done not because of the population characteristics of the phenomena under study, but to seek 
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greater diversity of experience and points of view within my study. New Zealand is a multi-cultural 
country, with a vibrant and politically engaged indigenous people, the Māori. Since 2006, there has 
been a 14% increase in the urban Māori population in Christchurch and a 20% increase in Māori 
employed within the region.52 Fifty five percent of Ngāi Tahu whānui live in the region of their rohe 
(tribal lands), with 43.7 percent of Ngāi Tahu owning their own homes.53 The Māori value Ahi kā roa, 
ahi kā ora (keep the home fires burning) has contributed to an 11.7% increase in the number of Ngāi 
Tahu living in Christchurch since 2006.54  
Policy models in the area of community engagement need to take into account Māori cultural 
understandings about whanaungatanga,55 community, housing, and land. Achieving cultural diversity 
in my sample of key informants was nevertheless a research limitation of my study. This was due to 
my own cultural background as a recent immigrant and a need for cultural competency and authority 
(mana)56 to engage directly with Christchurch’s local Iwi (or tribe), Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu. As 
described below, I did engage two Māori advisors and others in Māoridom in informal interviews and 
project events. The next chapter, provides an overview of some of the key associated literature. 
2. Other Sampling: 
Besides key informants and informal interviewees, I also sampled events for observation as well 
as documents (like research records, laws, regulations, other grey literature, as well as news media) 
for review. The sampling of events for observation and of documents for review was also done 
purposefully and theoretically and was also determined by the principle of saturation. 
a. Events Observed:  
Participant observation and fieldwork was carried out in Christchurch throughout the duration 
of the study, through numerous visits to the city and participation in stakeholder events related to 
community resilience and post-disaster housing recovery. The information gained was used as an 
important supplementary source of data to develop a broader sense of the case of Christchurch.  
The events observed also offered an insider’s or emic perspective into the process of recovery. 
Public events were attended and observed to gain a greater sense of the city and the social and 
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political context of earthquake recovery. Public events were docemented in field notes. Project events 
were organised purposefully by 500 Houses for Christchurch, to engage public, private and community 
stakeholders in the development of affordable, healthy, and sustainable housing.57 These 
observations were documented in publications, meeting agendas, minutes, related media, and 
electronic correspondence. Sixteen salient project events conducted in three years are summarised in 
Table 2.3 below, within the confidentiality confines of research ethics. 
Table 2.3: Summary of Sampled Project Events 
Event Objective Location Date 
Consultation Meeting Engage Potential Partners 
(Academia & Industry) 
Wellington, NZ August, 2012 
Consultation Meeting Engage Potential Partners 
(Central Government) 
Wellington, NZ September, 2012 
Partner Meeting Begin Project Design Wellington, NZ September, 2012 
Partner Meeting Continue Planning Wellington, NZ October, 2012 
Project Presentation Local Engagement 
(City Council, Iwi & NGO) 
Christchurch, NZ October, 2012 
Key Stakeholder 
Consultation 
Land Use Recovery Plan 
(Regional Council) 
Christchurch, NZ December, 2012 
Partner Meeting Meeting Local Partners Christchurch, NZ  January, 2013 
Parner Meeting Design Consultation Wellington, NZ May, 2013 
Christchurch Housing Forum Research Presentation Christchurch, NZ October, 2013 
Seminar & Working Lunch Stakeholder Enagement 
(Transitional Architecture) 
Wellington, NZ March, 2014 
Signing of Parnership MOU Project Implementation Wellington, NZ June, 2014 
Book Launch Local Engagement 
Research Dissemination 
(Public, Private, & NGO’s) 
Christchurch, NZ August, 2014 
Book Launch Speaking Engagement 
Research Dissemination 
(Interdisciplinary) 
Wellington, NZ September, 2014 
Summer School Course Research Dissemination 
Stakeholder Engagement 
(Public, Private, & NGOs) 
Wellington, NZ February, 2015 
Working Breakfast Stakeholder Engagement 
(Māori & Urban Resilience) 
Research Dissemination 
(Interdisciplinary) 
Wellington, NZ November, 2016 
Presentation Research Dissemination 
(Central Government) 






b. Documents Reviewed: 
This study also conducted two document reviews. The first was a qualitative systematic review 
of research records. In a systematic review, much weight is placed on the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria for final analysis. When analysing the community resilience literature, there was a need to go 
beyond experimental and quasi-experimental methodologies to a rigorous inclusion of the qualitative 
research and theoretical bodies of work developed to appraise the concept.  
I went to great lengths to develop and implement criteria that draw on qualitative inquiry and 
theoretical quality standards, ensuring a diverse sample of bibliographical records that conforms to 
the exigencies of understanding the complexity of this interdisciplinary field. The outcome of this 
review process, is presented in the consort diagram in the systematic review in the next chapter.  
 In addition, I conducted a second document review that sampled salient laws, regulations, and 
other grey literature, as well as news media related to the Canterbury earthquake recovery process. 
These documents were classified as either “primary” or “secondary” data sources58 and were 
presented in the narrative synthesis using this analytical hierarchy. This review was done on an 
ongoing basis by keeping track of the publication of these documents. 
 Laws and regulations were identified thorugh several strategies, like watching or reading the 
proceedings of the New Zeland House of Representatives59 , New Zealand Parliament alerts and email 
updates,60 searches on New Zealand Law Reports database,61 citation chain, and fieldwork. In the end 
I reviewed 185 laws, regulations, an policy-related documents. Eleven of these key documents are 
listed in Table 2.4 below. 
Table 2.4: Summary of Key Laws & Regulations 
Law/Regulation/Policy Law-Making/Regulatory Body Date 
Canterbury Earquake Response & Recovery Act  New Zealand Parliament 2010 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act  New Zealand Parliament 2011 
Housing Accords and Special Housing Areas Act New Zealand Parliament 2013 
Civil Defense Management Act New Zealand Parliament 2002 
Earthquake Commission Act. New Zealand Parliament 1993 
Residential Tenancies Act & 
Ammendment Act 




Christchurch Central Recovery Plan. Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority 
2014 
Land Use Recovery Plan. Environment Canterbury 
(Regional Council) 
2013 
Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act. New Zealand Parliament 2016 
Better Urban Planning (Final Report) NZ Productivity Comission 2017 
 
Reviewed news articles were identified through strategies like the daily reading of the local 
newspaper, The Christchurch Press,62 settting Google Alerts,63 citation chain, and fielwork. At the time 
of submission I had reviewed in-depth at least 136 mostly national and local press articles . 
B. Data Collection Methods & Procedures: 
I chose the data collection and methods procedures based on the study’s qualitative inquiry line 
suggested by its research question and deductive theory construction research design. As previously 
mentioned, these approaches to qualitative data collection are qualitative systematic review, case 
study, participant observation and fieldwork in Christchurch; semi-structured interviews with key 
informants; and document review (of policies and media). The following sections offer a description 
of each method and a rationale for their use.  
1. Participant Observation & Fieldwork in Christchurch: 
 I conducted fieldwork in Christchurch and nearby districts to immerse in the social context of 
the Christchurch recovery. I carried out these activities from the onset of the research process, as an 
aid in the early stages of deductive theory construction and in the development of the theoretical 
framework of community resilience. I also engaged in fieldwork in Christchurch as part of the case 
study to empirically asses my framework. This additional information provided the basis for 
comparison with other data and enhanced the rigour of the study. 
 For Fetterman, fieldwork is “at the heart” of any qualitative research design and is its “most 
characteristic element.” Fieldwork or participant observation “combines participation in the lives of 
the people under study with maintenance of a professional distance that allows adequate observation 
and recording of data.” This method is “exploratory in nature and begins with a survey period to learn 
the basics: the language, the ties, census information, historical data, and the basic structure and 
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function of the system under study.” Moreover, “even when the research has specific hypotheses to 
test in the field, information gathering proceeds inductively and typically, the researcher generates 
more hypotheses than concrete findings.” Subsequently, “after this survey or get-acquainted period, 
the research begins to draw clearer geographic and conceptual boundaries, significant themes, 
problems, or gaps” in the understanding of the place or program.64  
 Fieldwork in Christchurch was an ongoing activity throughout my study, especially from 2012 to 
2013. Malinowski argues that long-term and continuous work in the field is “may be an overstatement 
for work conducted in one's own culture.” For Fetterman, “in many applied contexts, limited resources 
compel the researcher to apply these techniques in a set time frame rather than to conduct a full-
blown ethnography.” Fieldwork’s most important element “is being there – to observe, to ask 
seemingly stupid but insightful questions, and to write down what is seen and heard.” This raw data 
must be cross-checked, compared, and triangulated, and only then it can serve as the foundation to 
build a knowledge base. Of course, this process is also guided by the principle of saturation and the 
reason to leave the field “is the belief that enough data has been gathered to describe the problem 
convincingly and to say something significant about it.” 
 To engage in fieldwork, I had to gain entry into the social context under study. My aim was to 
recruit integral and powerful members of the communities being analysed while “establishing 
independence in the field to avoid prematurely cutting off other lines of communication.” On this 
subject, Fetterman maintains that “an introduction by a member is the best to ticket into the 
community and walking into a community cold can have a chilling effect on the research.” Since 
members of the community may have a lack of interest in the individual or her research, “an 
intermediary or go-between can open doors otherwise locked to outsiders.” This person “should have 
some credibility with the group – either as a member or as an acknowledged friend or associate.” For 
Fetterman, the “trust the group places in the intermediary will approximate the trust it extends to the 
researcher at the beginning of the study.”65 This was the case of my study. Table 2.5 below, offers a 
summary of these nine visits to the field. 
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Table 2.5: Summary of Visits to the Field 
Visit Activities/Events Date 
Visit 1 1. Local Stakeholder Engagement: 
Iwi, City Council, NGOs 
2. Project Presentation 
3. Participant Observation/Fieldwork: 
Visit to Housing Development Sites 
Visit to the Christchurch Central Business District 
(Red Zone & 911 Memorial)  
Visit to Victim Memorial, Latimer Square, & the East Frame 
October, 2012 
Visit 2 1. Stakeholder Engagement: 
Central Government, Local Government & Industry 
2. Participant Observation/Fieldwork: 
Participation in Stakeholder Consultation (Regional Council) 
December, 2012 
Visit 3 1. Partner Meetings: 
Central Government & NGOs 
2. Participant Observation/Fieldwork 
Informal Interviews 
Visit to ReStart Container Mall 
Visit to Housing Development Sites 
January, 2013 
Visit 4 1. Research Presentation/Dissemination 
2. Participant Observation/Fieldwork: 
Informal Interviews 
Visit to the Christchurch Central Business District  
(Cathedral Square & Surrounding Areas) 
Christchurch Housing Forum  
Visit to the Residential Red Zone 
October, 2013 
Visit 5 1. Semi-Structured/In-Depth Interviews 
2. Participant Observation/Fieldwork: 
Informal Interviews 
Visit to the Christchurch Central Business District 
(Community House & C4 Coffee Co.) 
Visit to Merivale, Shirley, Richmond, & Riccarton 
November, 2013 
Visit 6 1. Semi-Structured/In-Depth Interviews 
2. Participant Observation/Fieldwork: 
Informal Interviews 
Volunteer Work with 2 NGOs 
Visit to the Christchurch Central Business District & St. Albans 
December, 2013 
Visit 7 1. Semi-Structured/In-depth Interviews 
2. Participant Observation/Fieldwork: 
Book Launch Freerange Press 
Visit to the Christchurch Central Business District (Nightime)  
Visit to Latimer Square & the Carboard Cathedral 
Visit to Harewood 
August, 2014 
Visit 8 1. Participant Observation/Fieldwork: 
Informal Interviews 
Visit to the Christchurch Central Business District 
(East Frame, Old Calendar Girls Building, & Blue Lady Mural) 
Visit to Selwyn District (Including Darfield) 
April, 2015 
Visit 9 1. Research Presentation/Dissemination September, 2017 
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(National Science Challenge Contestable Funding Competition) 
2. Participant Observation/Fieldwork: 
Visit to the Christchurch Central Business District 
(Christchurch Tramway Excursion & Viewing New Regent Street) 
 
2. Semi-Structured & In-depth Interviews with Key Informants: 
Together with participant observation and fieldwork, I also proposed the use of semi-structured 
and in-depth interviews with key informants in conjunction with the case study of Christchurch. Thus, 
I relied on this data collection method to also assess the validity of the theoretical framework of 
community resilience developed at the start of the study. This included its emphasis on critical realism 
and its layered or nested ontological construction of reality with three domains, that of the empirical 
(experiences), the actual (events), and the real (causal powers or generative mechanisms). I achieved 
this by interviewing key informants about their perceptions and experiences with events in the 
recovery process and the reasons why these events may have taken place. With this, I gained in-depth 
insights into the recovery and the process of securing a more resilient city after the earthquakes.  
Interviews have been described as a qualitative researcher’s “most important data gathering 
technique,” as they “explain and put into a larger context” what the researcher observes and 
experiences in the field.66 Fetterman insists that the researcher needs to appraise words for their 
“cultural or subcultural connotations as well as for its denotative meaning.” Just as proposed by my 
research design, Fetterman agrees that semi-structured interviews “serve comparative and 
representative purposes – comparing responses and putting them in the context of common group 
beliefs and themes” sourced through other methods.  
Interviews are seen as a valuable tool to comprehend the fundamentals of a community from 
an insider's or emic perspective. The use of this method was thus consistent with my study’s 
theoretical focus on power and power relations. For Sayer, with the use of this method “respondents 
are not forced into an artificial one-way mode of communication in which they can only answer in 
terms of the conceptual grid given to them by the researcher.” This approach ensures learning what 
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respondents think is the significance of the relevant circumstances while controlling for my influence 
and bias on the research process.67 
This method prescribed the use of an interview guide (Appendix 1), developed especially for 
this study. This interview guide consisted of seven broad questions and twenty-four more specific sub-
questions (all open-ended). At the time of analysis, these questions and sub-questions became the 
basis of coding, with the creation of themes and sub-themes that were later presented and discussed 
in a narrative synthesis. 
Interviews took forty-five minutes to an hour to conduct. The question guide covered topics like 
the respondent’s personal and organisational background and their views and experiences with the 
earthquake recovery process; their thoughts on the market or insurance-led recovery of housing; their 
perceptions on the creation of the Christchurch residential red zone; their views on democracy and 
the role of communities in the recovery, and the causal powers underlying this state of affairs. All 
interviews were audio recorded, transcribed, and reported upon as part of the study results.  
3. Document Review: 
 As mentioned above, I conducted two document reviews: a qualitative systematic review of 
community resilience research and interventions on an interanational scale and another document 
review of national and local recovery policies and media. 
a. Qualitative Systematic Review: 
 A qualitative systematic review is a formal qualitative synthesis, pooling existing research that 
draws conclusions regarding its collective meaning. This is a structured process that required careful 
planning, the development and implementation of a formal search strategy and the criteria for 
inclusion and exclusion. I used this method to review the literature on community and neighbourhood 
resilience, increasingly the subject of theoretical, methodological, and interventions in urban and 
hazard planning and other fields. The review sought to “sum up the best available evidence”68 by 
assessing the quality of the diverse theoretical and methodological contributions to community 
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resilience. The aim was to develop a comprehensive account of the characteristics of a highly 
interdisciplinary concept. 
b. Other Document Review: 
As with the other selected methods, I also used the method of document review in connection 
with the case study to empirically appraise the proposed theoretical framework of community 
resilience. Fetterman states that “in literate societies, written documents are one of the most valuable 
and timse-saving forms of data collection.”69 The method of document review is a way of collecting 
data by reviewing “existing” documents70 and a “complementary eliciting device”71 of other forms of 
textual data in addition to scientific literature and interview transcripts. These documents can be 
internal or external to an organisation and available on hard copy or electronically.72 I used this 
method to review all the document-based textual data that was sampled as primary and secondary 
sources (laws, other policy documents, and press). This method was implemented throughout the 
duration of the study. The outcomes of this document review were presented together with the 
interview textual data in a narrative synthesis of results.  
4. Triangulation: 
The use of all these methods enabled the triangulation of the data. For Atkinson and Coffey, 
triangulation, “strengthens a study by combining methods or data,” reduces potential scientific 
inadequacies, and enhances scientific quality and rigour.73 Accordingly, the credibility74 or internal 
validity of the study was enhanced through cross-referencing sources of ideas75 and corroboration,76 
that is, when a hypothesis withstands serious and repeated attempts to refute it.77  
 The textual data from all methodological sources was analysed using the themes established in 
the question guide. By using the question guide as a conceptual structure for my analysis, I layered 
the textual data obtained through other sources (like my observations and my analysis of the other 
documents reviewed), on the textual data I gathered through the semi-structured in-depth interviews. 
My decision to use the question guide as a structure upon which I began my coding also helped surpass 
some of the major methodological criticisms made of thematic analysis, that is, that it “fractures” the 
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data and that it separates textual data from its context.78 I convey the way I brought together all these 
qualitative research methods in Figure 2.2 below.  











V. Qualitative Data Analysis & Interpretation:  
A. Deductive vs. Inductive Scientific Reasoning: 
As noted earlier, qualitative inquiry is increasingly thought of as inductive,79 as information is 
harnessed and classified according to patterns, in order to develop valid general inferences, by way of 
the gradual emergence of themes.80 Textual analysis is so linked to grounded theory that it seems 
inconsistent with the goal of understanding phenomena from a deductive point of view, the point of 
view of existing theory. Nevertheless, deductive logic can be introduced through the way I interpreted 
or assigned meaning to my textual data, in accordance with pre-established theoretical criteria and by 
determining if the data will be used to make theory or used to apply an existing body of theoretical 
work across contexts. This was the case with my focus on critical social theory. 
B. Implicit vs. Explicit Data Analysis & Interpretation: 
Qualitative data analysis and interpretation are most commonly described as concurrent or 
iterative,81 because it is accomplished implicitly during data collection, as information is revisited as 
new questions emerge, new connections are made, “and more complex formulations develop along 
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with a deepening understanding of the material.”82 This was the case here, where the explicit analysis 
of textual data was followed by more fieldwork, reading, and interviews. As I began immersing in the 
case details of Christchurch recovery and conducted fieldwork and other data collection, I became 
aware of the conceptual nuances of community resilience and its overuse, indeterminate nature, and 
the need for a critique, or an understanding of the power relations that underlie its implementation. 
The role of of post-disaster housing recovery in the city also became more and more important in my 
theory of community resilience, with housing being a major source of hardship and displacement for 
residents and the policies developed for the recovery.  
Data analysis and interpretation in qualitative inquiry also takes place explicitly, mostly in the 
shape of some type of textual analysis, which refers to forms of data analysis used to make sense and 
organise any form of written communication or text.83 The diversity of data collection methods used 
also came with a diversity of data analysis and interpretation strategies.84 I chose thematic and 
directed content analysis; although textual in nature, these are different approaches to qualitative 
data analysis and interpretation. I used them to explicitly analyse and interpret the textual data 
generated by my data collection efforts, including the sampled scientific literature, documents for 
review, and the transcriptions of semi-structured interviews with key informants. 
1. Thematic Analysis – Describing the Social Context of Recovery & Resilience: 
Thematic analysis is the “conventional,” or most common form, of textual data analysis in 
qualitative research, mostly linked to the grounded theory movement.85 For Braun and Clark, thematic 
analysis “emphasises pinpointing, examining, and recording patterns (or themes) within textual data 
that are important to the description of a phenomenon and are associated to a specific research 
question.” It also “involves counting and comparisons, usually of keywords or content, followed by 
the interpretation of the underlying context.”86 The goal is to organise raw data into coherent 
depictions of phenomena through a “process of identifying, coding, and categorising the primary 
patterns.”87 The data are preserved in textual form and “indexed to generate or develop analytical 
categories and theoretical explanations” that can be used to describe and explain social phenomena.88 
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I used this approach to describe the social context of post-disaster housing recovery and community 
resilience in Christchurch and the perceptions of key informants.  
2. Directed Content Analysis – An Emphasis on Theory: 
This thematic analysis was followed by the critical interpretation of the underlying context or 
the mechanisms influencing that which was described. This critical interpretation was achieved by 
seeking to assess the causal powers or power relations permeating my observations and those of 
participants. The study’s emphasis on deductive theory construction requires that the analysis and 
interpretation of the data goes beyond description and is directed to the understanding of key 
theoretical concepts associated with the framework of community resilience. Coding here started 
deductively, by construing the raw data from the perspective of established concepts, or variables 
derived from existing theory, or tested in previous studies. This was especially the case with the 
analysis of the interviews with key informants, which were probed on different aspects of the study’s 
ontological focus on power and power relations. Participant’s responses to these questions were 
analysed considering these theoretical principles and interpreted in terms of the applicability of the 
theoretical concept, or variable under study, for each question of the guide. My goal was to appraise 
the theoretical framework of community resilience and its transferability to other cases. 
3. Retroductive Scientific Reasoning – A Focus on Causal Powers & Generative Mechanisms:  
 Within this directed content approach, of particular interest was also the use of retroduction, a 
“creative form of reasoning which takes place retrospectively as mechanisms are postulated to 
account for observed phenomena via analogy, metaphor, and model building.”89 Historically 
associated with the identification of “specific relations of domination and oppression,”90 I used this 
approach to unpack91 the power relations of earthquake recovery and (in accordance with the critical 
realist approach) postulate retrospectively the causal powers or generative mechanisms92 to account 





VI. Positionality & Reflexivity: 
A critical approach to understanding post-disaster housing recovery and community resilience 
should also begin to “walk the talk”93 of power and power relations through the epistemological belief 
in science as a social practice. In qualitative research, this is achieved through an emphasis on 
positionality and reflexivity. For Hertz, the concept of positionality seeks to “out the self” and is 
defined as “the researcher’s own sense of location,” in relation to participants and within power 
hierarchies, the “constellation of gender, race, class, and citizenship”94 and ideological frames of 
reference. Positionality is emphasised by the critical social paradigm. According to Kincheloe and 
McLaren, “critical researchers enter into an investigation with their assumptions on the table, so no 
one is confused concerning the epistemological and political baggage they bring with them to the 
research site.”95 I also gained a sense of participants’ positionality by asking key informants about their 
personal and organisational background and their experiences with the earthquakes. 
Reflexivity is a “continual evaluation of subjective responses, inter-subjective dynamics, and the 
research process itself.”96 Based on the notion of “value mediated findings,”97 reflexivity is like “self-
conscious criticism.”98 Reflexivity is also essential to preserving methodological rigour in qualitative 
inquiry. Because it is a “continual evaluation of subjective responses, intersubjective dynamics, and 
the research process itself,” it involves a “shift in my understanding of data collection from something 
objective that is accomplished through detached scrutiny of what we know and how we know it, to 
recognising how we actively construct my knowledge.” Finlay argues that reflexivity should be 
employed throughout the research process and start when the research is envisaged.99  
Reflexivity is useful for qualitative researchers to “examine their motivations, assumptions, and 
interests in the research as a precursor to identifying forces that might skew the research in particular 
directions.”100 This is key to my study. As Finlay asserts, “the qualitative research process itself has the 
potential to transform the very phenomenon being studied and empower others by opening up a 
more radical consciousness.”101 For Deutsch, reflexivity examines “the larger rubric of social power.”102 
As researchers operating within the critical social paradigm, I sought to identify the power dynamics 
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present in the researcher-participant relationship and understand how that relationship was affected 
by my own subjective positions and those of participants. 
VII. Brief Summary of Results: 
 Using this innovative qualitative research methodology I conducted a qualitative systematic 
review of the concepts of community and neighbourhood resilience, in line with the research design 
of deductive theory construction. It rigorously examines the body of literature related to community 
resilience to specify the range of phenomena under study. Review results are presented in a narrative 
synthesis that traces the development of resilience and other related concepts (like sustainability and 
vulnerability), focusing on how community resilience has been defined to date. Importantly, this 
review addresses the links between community resilience and post-disaster housing recovery. 
Another outcome of the application of this research design was the identification of the framework’s 
related concepts and variables. A detailed illustration and description of this theoretical framework of 
community resilience is also presented.  
 I continued to reason logically from the theoretical propositions to the topic examined and 
empirically assessed my theory with a case study of community resilience and post-disaster housing 
recovery in Christchurch after the Canterbury earthquakes. This case study was prepared with the use 
of several qualitative research methods including participant observation and fieldwork, semi-
structured and in-depth interviews with key informants, and document review of relevant laws, 
regulations, and the press. The textual data harnessed with all these methods was analysed inductively 
and interpreted thematically and is presented in a narrative synthesis. 
To specifically apply the critical social theoretical foundations of my framework of community 
resilience, I analysed this textual data using the strategy of directed content analysis and retroductive 
reasoning, used to theorise on the causal powers or generative mechanisms of community resilience 
and post-disaster housing recovery in the case of Christchurch. I also examined how these powers and 
mechanisms can be interpreted to broaden my understanding of the concept more broadly and how 
it can be applied to other cases. 
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VIII. Concluding Remarks: 
This paper has offered a detailed description of the qualitative research methodology I used to 
construct and assess the validity of my conceptual framework of community resilience. This 
methodology was built on the basis of a deductive theory construction research design and a case 
study of community resilience and post-disaster housing recovery in Christchurch after the 
earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. The research design relied on the methods of qualitative systematic 
review, participant observation and fieldwork, semi-structured and in-depth interviews with key 
informants, and document review of related laws, regulations, press. The analysis and interpretation 
of results relied on thematic and directed content textual analyses. I also provided a reflection on my 
use of positionality and reflexivity as strategies to reduce bias and increase the rigour of this qualitative 
study. To demonstrate the degree of internal validity of my study, I conclude with a summary of study 





CHAPTER THREE – A QUALITATIVE SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF COMMUNITY RESILIENCE  
I.  Introduction: 
 As discussed in Chapters One and Two, considerable policy emphasis is placed on promoting 
resilient communities. However, when planning for an acute shock (like the Canterbury Earthquakes 
of 2010-2011) or addressing long-term or chronic urban stresses1 (like climate change, social 
deprivation, and other social and environmental harms), the theories and evidence we use to construe 
what we have to do, have an important impact on the way we structure our strategic responses. In 
contrast to other terms used to describe communities in the natural hazards context, the concept of 
community resilience (much like the sister concepts of sustainability and empowerment) has been 
developed based on significant academic scholarship and empirical research. It is, therefore, necessary 
to clearly understand what we mean by it, to gauge the success of these interventions in a precise 
manner and in lieu of desired outcomes. 
 In this chapter I discuss the important ways in which our understanding of the concept of 
resilience has changed. Initially, when the concept was largely associated with the physical sciences, 
resilience was mostly seen as the capacity of returning to an original state of rest or inertia, after being 
acted upon by an unbalanced force, explained in light of Newton’s First Law of Motion (for example, 
a spring is almost by definition a resilient object).2 When this world view is applied to the study of 
communities, and more specifically, to communities that want to mitigate, or recover from disaster, 
it presupposes that these groups of people (bounded together by space and interest) are able to re-
create or come back to a perceived state of normalcy in terms of their wellbeing, their social 
relationships, and their natural and built environments.  
 It is not difficult to see why this approach can be subject to strong criticism, as it does not 
consider the importance of the contemporary sociological imperative that what we mean by normal 
should be analysed critically. In this sense, the main challenge comes from the ontological argument 
that reality is not constant, but randomly undergoing change. Resilience, then, is not the ability to 
return to normal, but to change with change. In the context of the study of communities and disaster, 
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resilience would refer to their ability to use their collective experience, knowledge, and power to 
recover and adapt to be able to confront and thrive when presented with similar events in the future. 
 Due to the genesis of the concept of resilience in the physical sciences, this chapter places an 
emphasis on tracing its philosophical and theoretical lineage and its migration to the disciplines of 
ecology, psychology, urban planning, and the social sciences more broadly. From its use to describe 
the physical properties of a spring, to establishing a somewhat abstract framework for addressing 
disaster preparedness and urban sustainability, this chapter reviews the major authors and 
propositions associated with these scholarly developments. The chapter synthesises available 
definitions of what is meant by community and neighbourhood resilience and how the concept can 
be interpreted critically, with the purpose of shedding light on power relations, the discourse, and 
participatory and democratic approaches to implementing it in practice.  
 In consonance with my research objective of constructing a theoretical framework, this chapter 
also reflects on how this literature informs the development of my theory of community resilience. In 
line with my study’s deductive theory construction research design presented in Chapter Two, this 
qualitative systematic review thus constitutes the second element of theory construction, that is, 
defining the range of phenomena under study to aid in the development of a new way of 
understanding what is meant by community resilience.  
II. The Method of Qualitative Systematic Review: 
 A qualitative systematic review is a formal synthesis of the available literature “pooling” 
qualitative and mixed-methods research to draw conclusions regarding collective meaning and 
narratives of applicable research.3 A well-honed method used by many scholars, this was a structured 
inquiry process that required careful planning, including the development and implementation of a 
formal search strategy and inclusion and exclusion criteria to narrow down the number of references 
to be reviewed in detail. A description of how this method was applied and implemented by my study 




A. The Question, Problem, or Issue under Review: 
 This chapter presents a review of the literature on community resilience or “resiliency” (as 
prominently used by US President Barack H. Obama in his address commemorating the 10th 
anniversary of Hurricane Katrina4), increasingly the substance of theoretical, methodological, and 
policy development in urban and hazards planning, as well as other fields. The review seeks to “sum 
up the best available” information5 by assessing the quality of this diverse body of literature and 
developing a comprehensive account of the characteristics of this highly interdisciplinary concept.  
1. The Intervention under Review: 
a. Community Resilience as an Intervention: 
Standards for traditional systematic reviews like the Cochrane and Campbell Collaborations 
establish that systematic reviews should focus on interventions. This section seeks to describe 
community resilience as an intervention, in a way that does not pre-judge its value.6 In this context, 
according to Hawe and Potvin, population health interventions are understood as shifting “the 
distribution of risk by addressing the underlying social, economic and environmental conditions and 
capture the value and differential effect of these, the processes by which they bring about change, 
and the contexts within which they work best.”7  
Broadly speaking, community resilience interventions are thought to increase the capacity of 
communities to bounce-back or recover from sudden, large-scale shocks such as natural disasters and 
on-going stresses like climate change. Community resilience interventions can be manifold and involve 
different activities that enable communities and their members to adapt. Paton proposes that 
“research into community resilience is relevant to the continuum of hazard mitigation, preparedness, 
response and recovery, as well as to sustainable development.”8  
From a public health perspective, community resilience has the potential to increase the degree 
to which a population (or part of a population) experiences efficient recovery.”9 However, for van 
Kessel and others, even though there is increased understanding and measuring of resilience as an 
outcome after disaster, much less work has been devoted to understanding the process of applying 
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the construct of resilience into practice. As such, “the level of evidence for strategies to support the 
resilience of a population affected by disaster is not clear.”10 
 An important question arises in whether community resilience is an effective guiding principle 
for driving urban renewal and preventing populations from suffering the worst possible outcomes of 
natural disasters and other more gradual changes. Johnston and others would answer this question in 
the affirmative, as they maintain that “community-based programmes are an effective tool for 
building disaster resilience in communities.”11 Recently, van Kessel and others conducted a systematic 
review that examines the evidence “about community-based interventions that use the concept of 
resilience to increase positive health outcomes after disaster.” The results of the review were mixed 
in relation to the provision of information, but promising in terms of strategies to facilitate social 
interactions or develop community competence.  
 For the authors, further study should explore agential questions like “the ability of interventions 
to build the intrinsic capacity of a system, community, or society at risk of a disaster to adapt and 
survive.”12 In a study of community resilience and child health outcomes, Mykota and others studied 
community resilience from the perspective of “well-defined, geographically bounded neighbourhoods 
in relation to factors within them that mediate, either positively or negatively, child and youth health 
outcomes.” Their results provide empirical support for the need to explore beyond the intrinsic to the 
existence of structural risk and protective factors for child health.13 
b. Gauging the Effectiveness of Community Resilience:  
 Traditional systematic reviews establish that the highest quality evidence (and included for final 
analysis in the review) is obtained through randomised-controlled trials (RCTs) and quasi-experimental 
methodologies. These are described as the most rigorous research designs, with the richness in 
external validity necessary to generalise findings across study populations.14 Nevertheless, these ideas 
are not easily translated into qualitative research and present a challenge for appraising the quality of 
interventions in this diverse and interdisciplinary field of study. Reflecting on systematic reviews and 
qualitative inquiry, Hawe and Potvin argue that myths about what can and cannot be achieved with 
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systematic reviews have held qualitative inquiry back in this regard. A way forward, according to the 
authors, “integrates systematic inquiry approaches from a variety of disciplines.”15 Within the more 
constructivist and critical approaches, there is a plethora of transactional methodologies16 developed 
for research of, for, and with communities that emphasise empowerment,17 practical knowing,18 and 
co-construction or co-creation.19 Israel and others have reviewed community-based research.20 The 
outcomes of this review are summarised in the table below: 
Table 3.1: Review of Community-Based Research 
Factors Partnership-Related Methodological Broader Social/Cultural 
Challenges/Barriers  • Lack of trust, respect 
• Power inequities 
• Different perspectives 
• Funding 
• Task v. process 
• Time-consuming 
• Representation 
• Community definition 
• Scientific quality 
• Proving success 
• Predictability 
• Research v. action 
• Time demands 
• Multiple sources of 
Data 
• Competing demands 
• Academic 
achievement 
• Funder expectations 
• Social dynamics 
• Deterrents for change 
 
Facilitators/Lessons • Joint norms 
• Common goals 
• Democratic leadership 
• Community organised 
• Team involvement 
• Research competencies 
• Positive history 
• Cultural brokers 




• Joint principles 
• Education, training 
• Publishing 
• Interdisciplinary 
• Broad-based support 
• Financial incentives 
• Social action 
• Policy change 
 
 
2. Unresolved Questions & Controversies:  
 In Chapter One, I noted that while conducting fieldwork in Christchurch, it was clear that there 
was a need to gain greater understanding of what was community resilience, which I observed as 
significantly permeating the recovery policy discourse of the time. This was accompanied by a 
perceived limited involvement of communities and the third sector in the decision-making process. 
These observations form the basis for highlighting the importance of looking at the concept of 
community resilience from a critical social science perspective. This requires an analysis of the power 
relations between communities, their representatives, and other key stakeholders in the public and 
private sectors. Beyond questions of effectiveness, we need to ask what is meant by a concept that 
carries so much weight in contemporary approaches in hazards planning and how is it translated from 
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policy into community practice. This is because, as an equally abstract and much contested concept, 
the question of community as a setting for intervention creates the need to be critical and mindful of 
the imbalance in power relations between communities, their representatives, and the institutional 
stakeholders who plan and implement these interventions.  
 This review takes full advantage of its methodological links to a case study, by using the 
opportunity to crystallise its theoretical findings on community resilience from the perspective of a 
social context. This place-based frame of reference informed the process of including and excluding 
records and the synthesis of papers sampled for review. Moreover, the theoretical and 
methodological insights formed from an in-depth inquiry into this social context can be contrasted 
with evidence sourced from other case studies around the world. This makes this review “international 
in scope,” in line with the requirements of the Campbell Collaboration.21 
3. Objectives of this Systematic Review: 
 The “overarching aim” of a Campbell Review is “to gather, summarise, and integrate empirical 
research to help people understand the evidence and make practical decisions about social and 
behavioural interventions and public policy.” This aim “has important implications for deciding 
whether and how to undertake a review, how to formulate the problem that a review will address, 
and how to present the results of the review.” These objectives “should address the choices people 
face when deciding about whether or not to adopt a policy or practice and address outcomes that are 
meaningful to people making decisions about public policy.”22 This systematic review builds on these 
ideas by seeking to achieve the following objectives: 
• Trace the theoretical development of the concepts of resilience and community resilience; 
• Focus on how the concept of community resilience has been defined in the existing literature; 
• Identify the strategies that are used to study and enhance the state of resilience of 
communities, neighbourhoods, and suburbs; 







B. Collection & Review of Records: 
1. The Treatment of Qualitative Research: 
 For the Campbell Collaboration, in a systematic review, qualitative studies in an intervention 
domain and qualitative aspects of quantitative studies can contribute in important ways to 
determining the effectiveness of an intervention. Among these benefits are: helping to define the 
intervention, assisting in the choice of outcome measures and development of valid research 
questions, and providing insight into heterogeneous findings across studies. The review of qualitative 
research also addresses barriers and facilitators of intervention effectiveness and highlights 
requirements for successful implementation. Systematic reviews are therefore encouraged to draw 
on qualitative information “to address these important aspects of the intervention: implementation, 
external validity generalisability, and cost.”23 
To stay close to the ethos of systematic reviews, the treatment of qualitative research must be 
equally rigorous and clearly define the methods “required to bring its findings together for a wide 
audience – at the same time as preserving and respecting its essential context and complexity” of the 
literature. For Lloyd Jones, the emphasis and volume of qualitative research is increasing and “there 
is a need to integrate and disseminate qualitative research findings.”24 However, relatively little has 
been written about the “methodology of systematically reviewing and meta-synthesising qualitative 
research studies, and about the practical issues which arise during these processes.” The author 
maintains that conducting a systematic review of qualitative research is a rewarding but demanding 
activity, that requires adequate time and resources.25 
 Others too have made important contributions to elucidating the advantages of qualitative 
reviews. For Harden and Thomas, “including diverse forms of evidence is one way to increase the 
relevance of systematic reviews for decision makers and is one way to answer a number of questions 
in the same systematic review.”26 This approach “enables us to integrate quantitative estimates of 
benefit and harm with more qualitative understanding from people’s lives.” A qualitative focus aids in 
a systematic review, not only by determining the effectiveness of an intervention, “but also their 
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appropriateness, a concept similar to that of social validity.” Another way a qualitative approach 
reduces bias is that “it preserves the integrity of the findings of the different types of studies, not by 
converting qualitative findings into numbers or quantitative findings into words,” but by 
complementary frameworks for qualitative and quantitative research. Key in the context of my study, 
is that a qualitative systematic review facilitates a critical analysis of interventions from the point of 
view of the people the interventions are targeting.27  
2. Search Strategy for Finding Eligible Records: 
 The Campbell Collaboration proposes that systematic reviews “should be based on a 
comprehensive search for eligible studies that includes the relevant international literature and both 
formally published and unpublished research reports [referred to as grey literature] such as 
dissertations, technical reports, and conference presentations. In addition, multiple sources must be 
used to identify candidate studies, such as searches in electronic bibliographies, internet searches, 
review of citations in the relevant studies found.” The search strategies developed to aid in this 
process “should be explicitly documented in sufficient detail to permit replication.”28 The sections 
below describe the review’s search strategy considering these guidelines. 
a. Concept Map:  
 This search strategy began with the development of a concept map, a diagram that describes 
the relationships between the concept of community resilience and other concepts and search terms. 
Developing a concept map is particularly relevant for analysing qualitative research, as it not only 
guides the search process, but serves as the basis upon which a thematic analysis of search records 
can begin to take place. The concept map in this review offers a two-pronged approach to 
understanding the concept of interest within the wider literature.  
 Because the broader concept of resilience has been significantly researched since the 1970s, 
this review first sought to retrieve records that were related to its different interpretations (physical, 
engineering, ecological, psychological, socio-ecological, urban, and disaster) and how these relate to 
communities, neighbourhoods, and suburbs. The second search sought to retrieve records related to 
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community, neighbourhood, and suburb resilience or resiliency. It is also more specific in its intent of 
retrieving records that provided greater insights into the theory and the practice of this concept, as 
well as any critical or power-related approaches used to interpret it. (For the concept map, please 
refer to Appendix 3.1: Concept Map of Community Resilience.) 
b. Information Retrieval Procedures:  
This search strategy was implemented using the following databases: Scopus, Web of Science, 
Index NZ, Google Scholar, Books, News, and the Cochrane and Campbell Collaboration online libraries, 
and the process of citation chain. Records from all databases were saved and managed on EndNote 
(including the removal of duplicates). By applying the criteria for inclusion and exclusion presented 
below, I reviewed the titles and abstracts to identify records to be reviewed in full. 
3. Criteria for Inclusion & Exclusion of Records: 
 When conducting a systematic review, much weight is placed on the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria for selecting records for final analysis. Both leading international sets of review guidelines 
establish strict parameters for the development of these. According to the Campbell Collaboration, 
included papers should “identify factors that enable/impede the implementation process and they 
can describe the subjective experience of the people providing and/or receiving the intervention or 
the process of implementing a particular intervention. This evidence can come from studies using 
diverse methods, including both qualitative and quantitative data.”29  
 As explained, when analysing community resilience, there is a need to go beyond experimental 
and quasi-experimental methodologies to a rigorous inclusion of the qualitative research that is used 
to study it and the theoretical foundations that construe what can be understood by it. This presents 
important “epistemological challenges,”30 because the inclusion of qualitative research or so-called 
descriptive studies is seen as something at odds with the external validity standards of conventional 
systematic reviews.31 Accordingly, I went to great lengths to develop and implement a series of 
inclusion criteria that draw on qualitative inquiry and theoretical quality standards, without 
compromising the overall value of the review and ensuring that a diverse sample of bibliographical 
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records that conforms to the exigencies of understanding the complexity of this interdisciplinary field 
are included for final analysis.  
a. Inclusion Criteria: 
As described above, one of the objectives of this qualitative systematic review was to explore 
the theoretical foundations of community resilience to guide our understanding of the broad range of 
concepts and strategies that can be associated with its operationalisation. However, the inclusion 
criteria developed for traditional systematic reviews are in tension with community practice which, as 
shown in Chapter Four, requires the co-creation of research outcomes in deference to the relations of 
power that are implicit between institutional and community stakeholders. For Mays and Pope, there 
has been “considerable debate over whether qualitative and quantitative methods can and should be 
assessed according to the same quality criteria.” For the authors, this debate over the quality of 
qualitative research is part of a much larger debate about “the nature of the knowledge produced by 
qualitative research, whether its quality can legitimately be judged, and, if so, how.”32 The question 
became how to adjust to this methodological gap without compromising the overall integrity of this 
review. Helped along by Mays and Pope and Elliot and Lazenbatt,33 I developed a set of quality 
standards for qualitative research which were used to qualify or disqualify studies before the actual 
analysis begins.34 Table 3.2 summarises these qualitative inclusion criteria. 
Table 3.2 - Summary of Inclusion Criteria 
1.Theoretical Criteria 
 
• Grand (or Abstract) v. Substantive (or Applied); 
• Novelty & Consistency; 
• Cultural Competency; 
• Interdisciplinary; 
• Source or Positionality; 
• Participatory (Institutional v. Community-led); 
• Inclusive (Focus on Health Inequalities and Social Justice); 
2.Methodological Criteria • Degree of Transferability; 
• Iteration/Concurrent data collection & analysis; 
• Memoing/Member Checking; 
• Saturation; 
• Reflexivity; 
• Theoretical Sampling/Fit for Purpose/Relevance; 




Just like qualitative research itself, qualitative systematic reviews are centred on the notion that 
the inclusion of records should be based on the proposition that they are fit for purpose. For Pawson, 
there is “more than one way of doing a review and more than one way of doing it systematically,” and 
they challenge qualitative researchers to try to use different types of evidence. They argue that 
reviews of qualitative research would have “stalled on the starting blocks if the gold standard of 
randomised controlled trials had been a requirement.”35 In essence, this fit for purpose approach of 
appraising evidence constitutes what could be described as an application of “non-probability”36 
sampling in quantitative research and “theoretical” or “purposeful”37 sampling in qualitative research 
for selecting information-rich cases.  
This sampling approach and its use in qualitative systematic reviews is addressed by Pawson, 
who argues that evidence-based policy is the result of both “political calculation” and the 
“authoritative knowledge about society propagated within the groves of academe.”38 Because of this 
conflation, traditional reviews are “about public policy where vested interests sprawl” and proposes 
that these “are too focused on the generalisability of research findings.” These factors have had the 
unfortunate effect of excluding from traditional reviews other qualitative approaches, on the basis 
that they are “utilisation-focused,”39 or hindered in their ability to make claims of “transferability.”40 
Radically, he concludes that all interventions are theories, or “essentially complex, social interventions 
that are intentional change efforts inserted into pre-existing social relations.”41 In that sense, “it is not 
programmes that make things change, it is people, embedded in their context who, when exposed to 
programmes, do something to activate given mechanisms, and change.”42  
The epistemological effect of his proposal is a focus not on the question of which programmes 
work, but on unpacking the mechanisms that account for how they work or fail in particular settings.43 
This body of work is described by realists as a “theory of interventions” that proposes the “purposive, 
theoretical sampling of a wide variety of types and forms of evidence to shed light on the different 
generative mechanisms” thought to be at play in the intervention that is being reviewed. In this sense, 
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this approach links well with my research goal of developing a critical understanding of the concept of 
community resilience.  
b. Other criteria: 
 The Campbell Collaboration establishes these other criteria as “any restrictions by date, 
language, geography, publication status, or other study characteristics.” Moreover, “any criteria of 
this sort should take into consideration the Campbell standards for inclusion of the relevant 
international literature and unpublished research to avoid publication bias.”44 Based on these 
guidelines, this review established the following other criteria: 
• Dates Covered: 2008 to the present; 
• Languages Read: English and Spanish; 
• Sources Identified: Peer-reviewed articles (papers and reviews), book chapters, and grey 
literature (including government and non-governmental organisational reports and theses);  
• Human v. Non-Human;  
• Place or Social Context: International in scope, with an emphasis in the Canterbury and New 
Zealand experience; 
• Snowballing or Citation Chain: Records identified through other sources like fieldwork, study 
participants, and publications. 
 
c. The Process of Inclusion and Exclusion of Records: 
 The process of inclusion and exclusion of records was conducted as follows and is documented 
in a consort diagram (Appendix 3.2: Consort Diagram, Included & Excluded Records): 
• First, I established the total number records identified through the systematic search, including 
those identified through citation chain, the records in English and Spanish, the records related 
to humans, and excluding duplicate records;  
• After an initial screening, I established the number of potentially relevant records;  
• These records screened by title and those deemed more relevant were screened by abstract; 
• From this number of records, some were selected to be appraised in full-text;  
• After reviewing these, I determined which were selected or included for final analysis; 
• The final analysis of these records was conducted with the aid of the data extraction form 
described below. 
  
4. Data Extraction: 
 The Campbell Collaboration prescribes that these inclusion and exclusion criteria are explicitly 
described in a research instrument or data extraction form (Appendix 3.3), to be used by reviewers to 
assess each paper included for final analysis. This is a standardized form that facilitates the process of 
comparison. This form operationalises the inclusion criteria and should be “scored as positive, 
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negative or unclear [yes, no, and don’t know].” The goal is for the review to be based on “data that 
are extracted systematically and reliably from each eligible study using procedures that are sufficiently 
well documented to allow other researchers to replicate the production of those data from the same 
source studies.”45 Although I used a data extraction form in this qualitative systematic review, my 
review will not be reproducible as the interpretive quality of my analysis of the review results means 
that it is less likely that others will come to the same exact conclusions.46  
5. Qualitative or Thematic Meta-Synthesis: 
 Synthesising qualitative research is no easy feat, particularly in this vast and interdisciplinary 
field of research. For Thomas and Harden, synthesising “qualitative research means stepping into 
more complex and contested territory than is the case when only RCTs are included in a review.”47 
This is due to several reasons – “first, methods are much less developed in this area, with fewer 
completed reviews available from which to learn, and second, the whole enterprise of synthesising 
qualitative research is itself hotly debated, as qualitative research, it is often proposed, is not 
generalisable and is specific to a particular context, time and group of participants.” However, a strong 
argument can be made for the synthesis of qualitative research and its potential to inform policy and 
practice in community resilience due to its capacity to answer questions of how and why. This is 
achieved by staying “close to the results of the primary studies, synthesising them in a transparent 
way, and facilitating the explicit production of new concepts and hypotheses.”48  
 According to Nolbit and Hare, pioneers in this field, ethnographic research can be synthesised 
and the method for doing so is also applicable to qualitative inquiry more broadly.49 Beyond meta-
synthesis, we now have many other methods, like narrative review, narrative synthesis, qualitative 
synthesis, thematic synthesis, meta-study, critical interpretive synthesis, theory-driven systematic 
review, realist synthesis, and realist review.50 Unlike statistical meta-analysis, a qualitative approach 
proposes a logic of synthesis whose goal is that of thematic interpretation rather than aggregation. 
According to Thomas and Harden, thematic analysis is often used to interpret textual data in three 
stages: (1) coding text line-by-line; (2) developing descriptive themes; and (3) generating analytical 
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themes. In this third, interpretive stage, the reviewer needs to move beyond the sampled 
bibliographic and construct her own explanations or hypotheses on the subject. Indeed, “meta-
syntheses are integrations that are more than the sum of parts, in that they offer novel interpretations 
of findings not found in any one report but, rather, inferences derived from taking all of the reports in 
a sample.”51 This review’s meta-synthesis is presented below. 
III. Meta-Synthesis of Results: 
 This section aims to synthesise the results of this qualitative systematic review based on my 
analysis of all included records. The narrative is put together around the thematic elaboration of 
community resilience proposed in the concept map and the themes that emerged in my coding of the 
textual data associated with included records. The narrative commences with a review of the 
theoretical underpinnings of community resilience and how the notion of resilience has migrated from 
disciplines like physics and engineering to the social sciences. I continue with a detailed analysis of the 
concept of community resilience, how it has been defined to date, and what is implicated by these 
definitions. The narrative concludes with a review of records proposing a critical analysis of the 
concept of community resilience and what can be learned from a powers-based understanding of the 
factors that influence a community’s ability to thrive when faced with disaster.  
A. Theoretical Underpinnings of Community Resilience: 
 This section is a grand tour of the theoretical literature surrounding the concepts of resilience 
(or resiliency) and the more specific concepts of community and neighbourhood resilience. The origins 
of the concept of resilience are traced from the physical sciences to its applications to ecology, people 
and their societies, natural and human disasters, and to our understanding of cities and their natural, 
built, and social urban landscapes, of which housing is an integral part. The concept of community and 
neighbourhood resilience is studied in detail with a meta-synthesis of definitions. Throughout, I 
describe how this literature has informed the development of my own critical conceptualisation of 




1. Resilience or Resiliency: 
The concept of resilience or resiliency is interdisciplinary and needs to be understood as such if 
one wants to grasp its nuanced meaning. Indeed, for the Rockefeller Foundation, “resilience is a 
nascent concept that can be understood in various ways when viewed through the lens of differing 
disciplines or epistemologies and as both a process and an outcome.”52 To the author, a key proponent 
of the concept as it applies to sustainable urban landscapes, “resilience includes a number of 
intrapersonal and environmental factors and how resilience is defined and operationalised may affect 
the nature of intervention planning.” As described in Chapter Four, my theoretical framework of 
community resilience reflects the concept’s interdisciplinary nature and takes stock of both the 
psycho-social and the environmental factors that are highlighted in this review as significant.  
In a quest to establish a working definition, describes resilience as “the intrinsic capacity of a 
system, community or society predisposed to a shock or stress to adapt and survive by changing its 
non-essential attributes and rebuilding itself.”53 Stemming from the sciences of physics, 
mathematics,54 and mainstream economics,55 the term resilience was originally employed “to describe 
the capacity of a material or system to return to equilibrium after a displacement”56 and has since 
been applied to describe the adaptive capacities57 of ecosystems,58 individuals,59 human 
communities,60 and larger societies,61 and their institutions.62 Most of this literature can be grouped 
around the themes of (1) physical and engineering resilience, (2) ecological resilience, (3) psychological 
resilience, (4) socio-ecological resilience, (5) disaster resilience, (6) urban resilience, (7) housing and 
resilience, and (8) community and neighbourhood resilience (which as a later development, has 
considerably benefitted from this interdisciplinary ancestry to become a complex field in itself). These 
themes are further discussed below.  
a. Physical and Engineering Resilience: 
 Used in physics to describe the properties of a spring63 and rubber elasticity,64 a resilient 
material, according to Norris and others, “bends and bounces back, rather than breaks, when stressed 
and is more precisely the speed with which homeostasis is achieved”65 after a stress. Interestingly, 
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many articles trace back the development of the resilience paradigm to this physical or engineering 
conception. Gordon’s 1978 book, “Structures: Or why things don’t fall down,”66 is a key reference in 
the theoretical development of a concept that nearly 40 years later would become so common. It is 
very unlikely, however, that this was Gordon’s objective when, with clever prose, he embarked in a 
process of explaining to popular audiences “the importance and the properties of different structures 
in a way which will appeal to everyone.” Billed by Amazon as a book for “anyone who has ever 
wondered why suspension bridges don't collapse under eight lanes of traffic, how dams hold back – 
or give way under – thousands of gallons of water, or what principles guide the design of a skyscraper 
or a kangaroo, this book will ease your anxiety and answer your questions.”67  
 Gordon’s work presents itself as unassuming of the intellectual tide that it was about to help 
incite. He took a confusing technical term in the physical and engineering sciences and made it 
accessible, whimsically describing it as “bounciness” and starting with a poem by Cunningham about 
a wet sheet and a flowing sea.68 Here, Gordon describes resilience as the “quality of being able to store 
strain energy and deflect elastically under a load without breaking and the amount of strain energy 
which can be stored in a structure without causing permanent damage to it.”69  
 It is understandable that the concept of resilience captured the imagination of academics and 
policymakers at the end of the Twentieth Century, when after decades of war, unfettered industrial 
expansion, and social unrest, the Western world was becoming increasingly aware of the economic, 
environmental, and social impacts of these global processes. That something can flex and bounce back 
when stressed presents a very powerful image that entities and systems can adapt to sudden or 
progressive change. For Early and others, the concept’s extensive use in policy and everyday life is 
precisely based on this engineering view of bouncing back.70 My conceptual framework of community 
resilience is not exceptional in that it takes into consideration a gamma of physical and environmental 





b. Ecological Resilience: 
 With the publication of Rachel Carson’s “Silent Spring”71 and the birth of the environmental 
movement in the sixties, there was a real scientific and political preoccupation with bridging ecology 
with other disciplines in academia, government, and industry. In this historical juncture, unassuming 
is evidently not an adjective that should be used to describe Holling’s seminal article “Resilience and 
stability of ecological systems,” another key reference associated with the birth of the resilience 
paradigm. Holling’s far-reaching scientific propositions came at a time when the discipline of ecology, 
itself confronted by “concerns for pollution and endangered species,” was undergoing a paradigm 
shift between two “very different ways of viewing the behaviour of systems.”72  
 These ontological and epistemological preoccupations about the nature of ecological systems 
and how they should be understood lie at the heart of resilience-related science. The debate is nicely 
summarised by Holling, as follows. The standard view holds that individuals die, populations 
disappear, and species become extinct. The other view (which this author upholds) construes itself as 
a compelling critique of the concepts of homeostasis and equilibrium inherited from the physical 
sciences and focuses on adaptation on the dynamic properties of systems. Instead of viewing life as 
an inanimate object like a spring and emphasising homeostasis, the author proposes that ecology must 
view “the behaviour of ecological systems in terms of the probability of extinction of their elements 
and the conditions of persistence.”73  
 In so doing, Holling’s thesis questions the adoption by ecology of ontological principles inherited 
from classical physics, which propose a “quantitative view of the behaviour of a system,” in contrast 
to a qualitative one that goes beyond constancy to view this behaviour as “profoundly affected by 
changes external to it, and continually confronted by the unexpected.”74 The author rejects a 
necessary or deterministic view of consistent non-variable behaviour in which departures from this 
normal behaviour are limited by the object’s tendency to return to a state of rest. This world view, 
Holling argues, wrongly proposes that ecological systems have a “rather narrow range of predictable 
external conditions and critical events seem to be the amplitude and frequency of oscillations” in the 
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behaviour of a system at rest. Instead, the author embraces contingency, by arguing that the 
behaviour of systems is heterogeneous over time, and that they are not self-contained or closed, and 
their behaviour is greatly impacted by the random world.  
 Arguing that the concept of resilience is the basis upon which an alternative ecological paradigm 
can be built, Holling defines it as “a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state 
variables, driving variables, and parameters, and persist” and as “the magnitude of the disturbance 
that can be absorbed before the system changes its structure.”75 For Early and others, Holling’s focus 
“is on persistence, robustness, and ability to withstand shock and maintain function.” They concur 
that his approach goes beyond the idea of bouncing back, to describe “how much disturbance a system 
can take and remain within critical thresholds.”76  
This understanding of ecological resilience has been widely adopted and is an ongoing subject 
of discussion.77 Holling has been so persuasive that he made converts of engineers, with the 
development of the field of resilience engineering. According to the Resilience Engineering 
Association, this field “looks for ways to enhance the ability at all levels of organisations to create 
processes that are robust yet flexible, to monitor and revise risk models, and to use resources 
proactively in the face of disruptions or ongoing production and economic pressures.”  
In this view, failures are not equivalent to the breakdown of normal system functions, but rather 
point towards the opposite or the adaptation necessary to cope with the complexity of the real world. 
Emphasising adaptive capacities, “individuals and organisations must always adjust their performance 
to the current conditions; and because resources and time are finite, it is inevitable that such 
adjustments are approximate.” Success is therefore measured against “the ability of groups, 
individuals, and organisations to anticipate the changing shape of risk before damage occurs; failure 
is simply the temporary or permanent absence of that.”78  
My theoretical framework, in its search for a critical understanding of community resilience, 
embraces this ecological paradigmatic shift and its contingent ontological conception of the real as 
something that is changing and not an objective previous state of normalcy. Moreover, Hollings’ 
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emphasis on adaptive capacities is embodied in the framework’s contingent ontology as the outcome 
of the dialectical relationship between both human agency and social structure. My argument is 
discussed in detail in Chapter Four.  
c. Individual, Psychological & Personal Resilience: 
 This debate also carried through to contemporary understandings of individual, psychological, 
and personal resilience. A common definition of individual, psychological, and personal resilience is 
“the individual’s ability to recover quickly or adjust easily to adversity or change.”79 As explained by 
Early and others, there is a large body of research in both social and psychological sciences focusing 
on individual resilience in the context of poverty, shocks and disorder.80 For van Kessel and others, 
this is illustrated in the extent to which natural disasters can directly result in health problems and 
injuries and the immediate need for basic resources (like clean water, sanitation, shelter, food, and 
health care). Moreover, the long-term effects of a disaster frequently include higher rates of mental 
health conditions like depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress. In this context, individual, 
psychological, and personal resilience refers to “the individual’s ability to recover quickly or adjust 
easily to adversity or change.”81 It has been shown by van Kessel and others that “nearly one third of 
people exposed to a disaster” demonstrate individual, psychological, and personal resilience.”82 
 Another conceptualisation comes from Masten and others,83 who describe individual, 
psychological, and personal resilience as a “process of, capacity for, or outcome of successful 
adaptation despite challenging or threatening circumstances.” Egeland and others84 describe the 
concept as “the capacity for successful adaptation, positive functioning, or competence despite high-
risk status, chronic stress, or following prolonged or severe trauma.” Butler and others85 describe 
individual or psychological resilience as “good adaptation under extenuating circumstances; a 
recovery trajectory that returns to baseline functioning following a challenge.”  
 After the Canterbury earthquakes the issue of individual, psychological and personal resilience 
was addressed by the All Right? social marketing campaign, targeting the key issue of wellbeing of the 
region’s population. The campaign “used hoardings and flags in the city’s public spaces to convey the 
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people of Christchurch messages about mental health and the important of the support of family, 
friends, and the community during the stressful recovery period.”86  
 These views emphasise a personal capacity to cope with diversity in the event of acute or long-
term adversity and trauma. In Chapter Four, I propose a critical understanding of community resilience 
that acknowledges the importance of individual, psychological, and personal resilience, without 
discounting the influence of structural factors in a person’s adaptive capacities. This is illustrated in 
the model’s micro-sociological level of analysis.  
d. Socio-Ecological Resilience: 
Another key development in this body of literature is the concept of socio-ecological resilience, 
linking human experience with its social and physical environment. For Early and others, socio-
ecological resilience involves “the ability of human communities to withstand external shocks to their 
social infrastructure.”87 This development is widely associated with the work of Folke, who brought 
together the physical and a social dimensions of resilience to increase our understanding of the 
dynamics of socio-ecological systems. This body of work is consistent with the principles of ecological 
systems theory,88 as discussed in Chapter Four. 
However, Folke defines resilience within this social-ecological approach still very much from a 
physical perspective as the “speed of return time to equilibrium after disturbance,” and places 
substantial emphasis on predictability and on “maintaining efficiency of function and constancy of the 
system.”89 As does Holling, Folke still hopes to challenge the dominant view and emphasising “non-
linear dynamics, thresholds, uncertainty and surprise and how such dynamics interact across temporal 
and spatial scales.”90 With this, he seeks to systematically introduce a social dimension to the concept 
of resilience and multiple levels of analysis, to levarage “the large numbers of sciences involved in 
explorative studies and new discoveries of linked socio-ecological systems.” Several areas of research 
in this regard include greater understanding of social processes like “social learning and social 
memory,visioning and scenario building, leadership, agents and actor groups, social networks, 
institutional and organisational change, adaptive capacity, transformability, and governance.”91  
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As presented in Chapter Four, the theoretical framework of community resilience constructed 
as part of my study describes these dynamics across a temporal and spatial scale with a multi-level 
model consisting of three sociological levels of analysis: micro, meso, macro. It also has both a social 
and an ecological dimension that interact in a non-linear or contingent manner. Much like Folke, it 
places primacy on the social dimension of resilience, emphasising the people or human factor. Many 
of the theoretical elements proposed are contained within this social dimension of community 
resilience and were vetted empirically too. Inspired by the transformational approach put forward by 
Holling and Folke, my framework is also based on the notion of a dialectical relationship between 
social structure and human agency. Described below, people and their communities can be 
empowered to face adversity, promote social change, and gain control over their own future.  
e. Disaster Resilience & Climate Change Adaptation: 
The current popularity of the concept of resilience stems primarily from its use in natural 
hazards mitigation and disaster management, it being one of the so-called five Rs – reduction, 
readiness, response, recovery, and resilience.92 According to Norris and others, a resurgence of this 
work in the new millennium was prompted by recent major disasters such as the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, the tsunami in Southeast Asia in 2004, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
Accordingly, “efforts to improve disaster preparedness and response have increased dramatically 
since the turn of the century and, more recently, other major earthquakes, volcanic, one in one-
hundred years storms, other types of disasters, and war have brought a renewed interest in 
understanding how nations are able to confront this context of increased instability.”93  
Indeed, much resilience-building is related to post-disaster emergency planning for sudden 
large-scale events, rather than gradual or cumulative changes.94 For the purpose of this review, I have 
adopted McFarlane and Norris’ definition of disaster as a “potentially traumatic event that is 
collectively experienced, has an acute onset, and is time delimited; disasters may be attributed to 
natural, technological, or human causes.” This definition includes “acute acts of nature, such as 
hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes, large industrial, transportation, and nuclear accidents, and 
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episodes of mass violence, such as terrorist attacks and shooting sprees.” It excludes economic threats 
and “chronic environmental hazards, ongoing community and political violence, war, epidemics, and 
climate change adaptation.”95 My framework adopts a more expansive view of what is a disaster, 
including both acute and progressive events at a macro-sociological level of analysis and as structural 
aspects impacting human agency. As has been noted, I have tested the conceptual framework with a 
case study of the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, a major natural disaster and national 
emergency, as described in Chapter One. 
f. Urban Resilience & Sustainability: 
Urban landscapes can be thought of as complex and interdependent socio-ecological systems. 
It is therefore important to pay special attention to the quality of their social, natural, and built 
environments. From systems thinking,96 to the Healthy Cities movement97 and the sustainability 
paradigm of urban performance,98 urban ecologies have been a source of expansive scientific study 
for decades. The concept of urban resilience builds upon these socio-ecological traditions, as much as 
it links to other iterations of the concept like physical and engineering resilience.  
For Godschalk, cities are “extremely vulnerable to threats from both natural hazards and 
terrorism” and urban resilience should be construed as “a sustainable network of physical systems 
and human communities, capable of managing extreme events.”99 Davoudi notes that the notion of 
urban resilience has gained currency for dealing with an increasingly global state of uncertainty. When 
applied to the study of urban systems, resilience, with its rejection of the principle of equilibrium and 
its emphasis on uncertainty and insight into the dynamic of adaptability, provides a powerful 
framework for describing complex urban socio-ecological dynamics. Understood in this way, the 
concept of resilience becomes “a bridging concept between the natural and the social sciences and 
stimulates interdisciplinary dialogues and collaborations” in urban planning. As shown in Chapter 
Four, this belief is of clear influence to my framework of community resilience.  
But how do we translate the concept of urban resilience into urban planning practice100 is a 
source of much debate. Early approaches to implementing the concept of sustainability focused on 
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stability, effective management, and the control of change and growth, which Ahern has described as 
involving a “fail-safe mentality.” However, Holling’s paradigmatic rejection of resilience as bouncing 
back to a previous state of normalcy has prompted greater reflection on the notion of contingency as 
intrinsic to causation101 in urban planning. This ontological position is fundamental to the emerging 
science of urban resilience, defined as “the capacity of systems to reorganize and recover from change 
and disturbance without changing to other states – in other words, systems that are safe to fail.” For 
Ahern, there is a need to consider strategies that build urban resilience capacity in a context where 
change, uncertainty, and adaptability are always present.”102 As explained above and detailed in 
Chapter Four, this contingent ontological premise is also a mainstay of critical social science and as 
well as of my framework of community resilience.  
For Davoudi, this fundamental change in the way we approach the concept is responsible for 
understanding why the resilience paradigm is “replacing sustainability in everyday discourses in much 
the same way as the environment has been subsumed in the hegemonic imperatives of climate 
change.”103 Early and others also distinguish between urban resilience and sustainability: 
“In practice, unless resilience is interpreted in the narrow sense of engineering resilience, a more 
resilient city is likely to be a more sustainable city. Resilience does not necessarily imply 
sustainability, and sustainability does not necessarily imply resilience, but a city that is both 
resilient and sustainable has a range of qualities that are desirable. While resilience can 
emphasise a dynamic process of adaptation that a sustainable city would reasonably aspire to, 
sustainability emphasises the integration of a range of critical elements that support long-term 
quality of life. Resilience emphasises process, while sustainability emphasises goals. Both are 
aspirational and both are important concepts and they are strongly connected.”104 
 
This conceptual ambiguity has prompted Godschalk to argue for “a comprehensive strategy of 
urban hazard mitigation aimed at the creation of resilient cities, able to withstand both types of 
threats,” be it acute or long-term, and the development of evidence to inform the application of its 
principles to the physical and social elements of cities.105 The author recommends the creation of “a 
major resilient cities initiative, including expanded urban systems research, education and training, 
and increased collaboration among professional groups involved in city building and hazard 
mitigation,” in light of the failure of current hazard mitigation policy to deal with the particular aspect 
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of cities under stress.106 Such a view is reflected in the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities, 
an international initiative pioneered with the goal of “helping cities around the world become more 
resilient to physical, social, and economic shocks and stresses.”107  
There are other models of urban resilience but none with the buy-in at such a global scale. In 
New Zealand, both Wellington108 and Greater Christchurch109 have taken part, with the latter enacting 
the Resilient Greater Christchurch110 strategy, based on the model’s principles, as outlined by Arup 
and others.111 These authors stress the idea that all cities have unique aspects to their resilience. The 
City Resilience Framework takes this into account and “provides a lens through which the complexity 
of cities and the numerous factors that contribute to a city’s resilience can be understood.” It is 
comprised of twelve indicators of the “fundamental attributes of a resilient city,” that can be 
measured across different cities or case studies that aid our understanding of what is a resilient city. 
Ultimately, these considerations of urban resilience need to be translated into policy and urban 
planning. Urban planning refers to the “design and regulation of the uses of space that focus on the 
physical form, economic functions, and social impacts of the urban environment and on the location 
of different activities within it.”112 After all, it is through this process that many decisions that make or 
break a city’s resilience to natural and other hazards are made. Urban planning draws upon different 
academic disciplines and often intersects with social and political concerns. In fact, urban planning is 
many things: an academic discipline, a technical profession, and the realm of social activism, political 
will, and public participation”113  
This tension between the private and the public good is seen in my study as a key driver of urban 
and community resilience. It makes you wonder what are the short, medium, and long-term goals and 
objectives of urban planning and who sets these? How can we bring together public, private, and 
community interests in the implantation of these strategic approaches? How do these translate into 
land use and what are the rules and regulations that govern this urban development process? These 
questions are addressed by the literature on property rights and the urban commons, which argues 
that a commons or more collective perspective is “able to pull down official planning processes and 
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become an active counterpart to state market actors and capable of becoming bottom-up initiators” 
within urban participatory planning processes.114 A discussion of this follows at the end of the chapter.  
Traditionally, in the developed world, central governments have given local governments the 
power to make such decisions. In New Zealand “regional councils have primary responsibility for urban 
form and transport, as well as planning for water and air quality and city and district councils by 
contrast provide local services and local amenities, but also manage land subdivision and local housing 
development.”115 The matters of governance and public participation are essential to my theoretical 
framework of community resilience at its macro- and meso-sociological levels of analysis. This was 
further affirmed by the case study of the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011.  
As will be further discussed in Chapter Six, in Christchurch the central government took away 
many of these regulatory responsibilities from the local council and tasked itself with placing 
emergency restrictions on public access to urban spaces116 and drafting a recovery strategy that would 
ultimately change the direction of city planning in the region. The Government even ordered the 
council to re-draft a new district plan in light of its recovery strategy. This prompted some scholars to 
propose that “this has moved Christchurch away from a participatory democratic model.”117 This has 
been the case markedly in post-disaster housing recovery. 
g.  Housing & Resilience: 
 This section provides an overview of the literature linking housing to community resilience. The 
literature on housing building resilience is a body of work unto itself and intimately associated with 
engineering resilience. In this sense, it should be the subject of a traditional, systematic review of its 
own that assesses the efficiency of building technologies (for example, pre-fabricated housing, double-
glased windows, base-isolators, etc.) and their use as an intervention to improve housing resilience at 
a population level. As explained below, the intersections between safe, healthy, accessible, and 
affordable housing and community resilience are, nonetheless, considered essential to the 
development of social networks and a sense of safety, wellbeing, and of emplacement by residents, 
all key in sustaining the resilience of communities before, during, and after a disaster. This key role is 
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manifest in my theoretical framework of community resilience and an important feature of the 
empirical work carried out as part of the case study of the Christchurch recovery.  
 Reflecting on housing, climate change, and the resilient city, Howden-Chapman and colleagues 
emphasise that people spend much of their time at home, “so the quality and location of our indoor 
environment is important for our health and wellbeing.” Therefore, how houses are maintained, as 
well as their tenure, location, and the building technology used to construct them are “crucial, 
interrelated decisions,” that are fundamental to urban resilience.118 As discussed above, housing is a 
key social determinant of health and there is strong evidence to connect housing and health 
inequalities. For Gibson and others, this occurs through three main pathways: “internal housing 
conditions, area characteristics, and housing tenure.”119 These pathways are described below.  
• Housing Quality & Resilience: 
 In their application of the Resilience Index New Zealand (RINZ), Pearson and others argue that, 
although there is extensive research on the health impacts of poor housing quality, not much is known 
about the health benefits that high-quality housing can have in poor neighbourhoods. According to 
the authors, areas of high housing quality tend to have “higher median income, greater proportions 
of partnered people, and fewer shorter-term residents.” In other words, neighbourhoods can be 
resilient and have good health outcomes, despite social deprivation, and housing quality in these 
neighbourhoods may play a positive role in this regard. With this, the authors maintain that their 
findings support the hypothesis that an improvement in housing quality in areas that are similarly 
deprived and have poor health outcomes can result in health benefits.120  
 In New Zealand, substandard housing has been consistently identified as a “major public health 
hazard,”121 with leading scholars widely documenting the adverse health effects of poor housing from 
a population health perspective.122 The need for improved housing is based on “growing evidence that 
the physical aspects of housing and the indoor environment have a direct impact on health through a 
variety of mechanisms,”123 including its quality,124 design,125 air quality,126 heating,127 insulation,128 and 
area characteristics of the built environment.129 
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• Housing Tenure & Resilience: 
 People need houses and communities need people. For geographical communities to exist and 
be resilient they need people to populate them, but for this to happen, these people need healthy and 
secure homes to live in and be embedded in their immediate social context. For Zhang and Peacock, 
after a major natural disaster, restoring housing is one of the most important aspects of community 
recovery. The authors underline that “housing is not only the shelter and primary investment of most 
residents, it is also a critical component of the local economy and social fabric.” Through an 
examination of single-family housing recovery, housing sales levels, and property abandonment after 
Hurricane Andrew (US), the authors came to these conclusions about post-disaster housing recovery: 
“the effects of the disaster damage were long lasting; owner-occupied homes recovered faster than 
rental units; income not as important as expected; housing recovery in minority neighbourhoods was 
slower, leaving them relatively worse off in the long term; home sales increased markedly following 
Hurricane Andrew; and property abandonment increased.”130  
 With data of housing impacts after Hurricanes Andrew and Ike in Florida and Texas respectively, 
Peacock and others echo many of these findings. They too found long-lasting effects of damage in the 
affected population, and a link between housing tenure and whether housing suffers less damage and 
recovers more quickly. The authors propose that to make housing recovery efforts less inequitable, 
those responsible should “incorporate hazard mitigation and disaster recovery into comprehensive 
planning; increase housing choice; and direct recovery assistance.”131 
• Residential Mobility & Resilience: 
 When reflecting on the state of housing as a social determinant of health, the role of the home 
as the stake upon which much of our social networks and sense of belonging are tied to, and the 
important role that is played by these networks and a collective sense of place in a community’s state 
of resilience, required me to review the literature on displacement,132 transience,133 homelessness (or 
severe housing deprivation),134 and residential mobility.135 Internationally, this literature emphasises 
forced136 and climate migration,137 as well as the plight and resettlement of refugees.138 In particular, 
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this body of work centres on the impacts on the wellbeing of children living under these conditions: 
their experiences coping with trauma and their psychological resilience.139  
 Captured by my framework is the connection between residential mobility and people’s sense 
of community and place. This connection is particularly obvious in the case of children. According to 
the NZ Children’s Commissioner’s Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to Child Poverty “many children 
in poverty live in private rental accommodation where tenancy can be insecure.”140 A longitudinal 
study carried out in New Zealand found that half of private renters had moved before the age of one. 
In contrast, less than one in five homeowners and one in four households in social housing had moved 
before that age. Studies of transience in childhood indicate that negative behavioural and health 
outcomes are present especially when children move before the age of two.141 Children who 
frequently move, or who belong to a homeless household, have been found to be more at risk of poor 
academic achievement, even though other factors associated with high mobility may also contribute 
to that result.142 The impact of transience on education achievement for New Zealand children, in this 
sense, remains largely unexplored. 
 In New Zealand, as in other Western countries, many major cities are faced with an increasing 
problem of housing affordability.143 Contrary to what had been a cornerstone of nation-building in this 
country, home-ownership is now considered by many as something unattainable.144 Simultaneously, 
social housing was sold off to private investors and government policy was dominated, until very 
recently, by the Social Housing Reform Programme, which measured success in helping “more New 
Zealanders into housing independence” or by the speed with which its tenants find suitable 
accommodation outside the social housing system.145 As of December 2017, this policy was rescinded 
by the new Labour-led Government. Many living in poverty have turned to an under-regulated private 
rental market to supply their housing needs with limited security of tenure.146 
 Bierre has shown that, when considered in light of international standards, New Zealand's rates 
of residential mobility and associated measures are high.147 The average length of a New Zealand 
private rental tenancy ending in 2017 was just two years and three months.148 In the private rental 
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market, low income households are likely to experience the greatest levels of residential mobility,149 
but there is not enough information on the drivers of transience for low-income households in private 
rentals. Existing research emphasises residential mobility as a natural means of adjustment.150 
However, tenants in the private rental market are more likely than homeowners and social housing 
tenants to experience reluctant moves and expensive low housing quality which, as noted earlier, has 
significant impacts on human health and safety151 and over-all quality of life.152  
 Transience is also coupled with a statutory framework in which landlords enjoy a level of legal 
protection that is higher than that offered in many cases to vulnerable tenants.153 As captured by my 
framework and convincingly argued in Chapters Six and Seven, this framework was the product of a 
political context of ideologically-driven structural adjustment free-market reforms where property 
rights154 were increasingly enhanced155 over the social and economic rights of tenants. Such was the 
emphasis on the right to property over the right to housing that, in 2010, over sixty percent of 
applications to the Tenancy Tribunal were made by landlords seeking to terminate a tenancy, although 
this is beginning to change.156 With the new Labour-led Government, new laws have been put in place 
to promote increased private rental housing quality (Healthy Homes Guarantee Act 2017)157 and 
security of tenure for vulnerable tenants (Residential Tenancies Ammendment Act 2020).158 As 
explained, the issue of real property, our right to it, and how it is regulated by the state plays a 
important role in my framework of community resilience and its empirical assesment. 
• Housing & Community Resilience in Christchurch: 
 After the Canterbury earthquakes, Christchurch was deeply affected by displacement, 
transience and residential mobility. Study results presented in Chapters Five, Six, Seven, and Eight 
describe large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDP) & social dislocation after the earthquakes. 
Also discussed are an increase in homelessness or severe housing deprivation and a sharp hike in 
house prices and rents. There were also dramatic changes in the population make-up of the city, with 
entire neighbourhoods red zoned, a population shift from the east to the west,159 and the arrival of 
thousands of rebuild workers and international economic migrants. 
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 For Banwell, who analysed the perceptions of Christchurch residents on the role of housing in 
“planning for resilient communities, and every other day,” the existence of strong emotions and 
feelings among participants of “attachment to home” and “feeling safe there.”160 Home was described 
as “a place where people have control of their lives and a hub for family and friends.” As for the 
community context, Banwell’s study found gardens important and short-term renting was a problem 
across all suburbs. Moreover, displaced persons renting outside of their usual neighbourhoods did not 
connect (or did not want to connect) with temporary neighbours. Long-term residents reported being 
tired of having their new neighbours move away. In addition, the author found there was distrust of 
young renters and children and parents experienced difficulties in moving through different houses 
and schools. These findings suggest that security of tenure provides continuity across neighbourhoods 
and contributes to the development of trust and social networks, psycho-social processes that are 
critical for promoting and sustaining people’s sense of place and community resilience.161 This 
argument further supports my study’s conceptual and empirical focus on post-disaster housing 
recovery as a catalyst for community building.  
2. Community & Neighbourhood Resilience: 
With this summary of the literature related to the concept of resilience or resiliency, I now turn 
to the discussion on community and neighbourhood resilience, starting with how it is defined. 
a. Definitions of Community Resilience: 
 Early and others have maintained that there is no consensus about the meaning of resilience 
from a community perspective.162 According to Shea,163 community resilience is “a type of social-
ecological resilience that contains elements of engineering resilience and explicitly includes 
interactions among ecological and human subsystems.”164 As shown, it is these human subsystems 
that are of main interest to this study and my conceptual framework of community resilience. 
 Shea also notes that “much current work on community resilience draws on experiences from 
past disasters and on related work in the field of public health, emphasises the importance of social 
relationships in promoting desired outcomes for communities, and draws on ideas of communicative 
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planning and social capital.”165 Table 3.3 offers a review of how the concept of community resilience 
has been defined in the reviewed literature.  







Brown & Kulig, 1996166 The ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or 
sustained life stress. 
Lyons et al, 1998167 The capability of individuals or systems [such as families, groups, 
and communities] to cope successfully in the face of significant 
adversity and risk. 
Sonn & Fisher, 1998168 The process through which mediating structures [school peer 
groups, family] and activity settings moderate the impact of 
oppressive systems. 
Comfort, 1999169 The capacity to adapt existing resources and skills to new systems 
and operating conditions. 
Mileti, 1999170 The ability to withstand an extreme event without suffering 
devastating losses, damage, diminished productivity, or quality of 
life without a large amount of assistance from outside the 
community. 
Tobin, 1999171 Sustainable and resilient communities are defined as societies 
which are structurally organised to minimise the effects of 
disasters, and, at the same time can recover quickly by restoring 
the socio-economic vitality of the community.  
Adger, 2000172 The ability of communities to withstand external shocks to their 
social infrastructure. 
CCE, 2000173 Intentional action to enhance the personal and collective capacity 
of its citizens and institutions to respond to and influence the 
course of social and economic change. 
Chenoweth & Stehlik, 2001174 The ability to respond to crises in ways that strengthen community 
bonds, resources, and the community’s capacity to cope. 
Paton & Johnston, 2001175 The capability to bounce back and to use physical and economic 
resources effectively to aid recovery following exposure to 
hazards. 
Bruneau et al., 2003176 The ability of social units [e.g., organisations, communities] to 
mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when they occur, 
and carry out recovery activities in ways that minimise social 
disruption and mitigate the effects of future disasters. 
Ganor & Ben Lavy, 2003177 The ability of individuals and communities to deal with the state 
of continuous, long-term stress; the ability to find unknown inner 
strengths and resources to cope effectively; the measure of 
adaptation and flexibility. 
Kofinas, 2003178 A social system’s capacity to facilitate human efforts to deduce the 
trends of change, reduce vulnerabilities, and facilitate adaptation. 
Ahmed et al., 2004179 The development of material, physical, socio-political, socio-
cultural and psychological resources that promote the safety of 
residents and buffer adversity.  
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Kimhi & Shamai, 2004180 Individual’s sense of the ability of their own community to deal 
successfully with the ongoing political violence. 
Coles & Buckle, 2004181 A community’s capacities, skills, and knowledge that allow it to 
participate fully in recovery from disasters. 
Gunderson & Folke, 2005182 The return or recovery time of a socio-ecological system, 
determined by [1] that system’s capacity for renewal in a dynamic 
environment and [2] people’s ability to learn and change which is 
partially determined by the institutional context for knowledge 
sharing, learning, and management, and partially by the social 
capital among people. 
Pfefferbaum et al., 2005183 The ability of community members to take meaningful, deliberate, 
collective action to remedy the impact of a problem, including the 
ability to interpret the environment, intervene, and move on. 
Chaskin, 2007184 Resilient communities – communities that can act in response to 
adversity to protect and promote their well-being. 
Norris et al., 2008185 A process linking a network of adaptive capacities [resources with 
dynamic attributes] to adaptation after a disturbance or adversity. 
Ungar, 2008186 In the context of exposure to significant adversity, whether 
psychological, environmental, or both, resilience is both the 
capacity of individuals to navigate their way to health-sustaining 
resources, including opportunities to experience feelings of 
wellbeing, and a condition of the individual’s family, community, 
and culture to provide these health resources and experiences in 
culturally meaningful ways. 
Kirmayer et al., 2009187 The notion of community resilience has two interpretations: [1] It 
may look at how people overcome stress, trauma, and other life 
changes by drawing from social networks and cultural resources 
embedded in communities. [2] It may consider the ways in which 
communities themselves exhibit resilience, responding to stresses 
and challenges in ways that tend to restore their functioning. 
Cutter et al., 2010188 A set of capacities that can be fostered through interventions and 
policies, which in turn help build and enhance a community’s 
ability to respond and recover from disasters. 
Magis, 2010189 The ability of a system to sustain itself through adaptation and 
occasional transformation and resilient communities, hence learn 
to cope with, adapt, and shape change.  
Thornley et al., 2013190 The process of communities adapting positively to adversity or 
risk. 
 
 What follows is a synthesis of the major themes that emerged from this review of definitions of 
community and neighbourhood resilience. 
• Bouncing Back & the Dialectics of Social Structure & Human Agency: 
 This emphasis on bouncing back from collective experiences of adversity, misfortune, or trauma 
places paramount importance on human agency (being positive, inner-strength, knowledge, capacity, 
skills, flexibility, and vulnerabilities), while more critical approaches of conceptualising resilience 
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propose the need to view agency in the context of structural constraints. As explained, my framework 
of community resilience seeks to capture how both these notions interact dialectically to produce or 
reduce the resilience of communities and their residents.  
 A key contribution to this debate is made by Norris and others who, after an extensive review 
of the related literature, contend that communities “have the potential to function effectively and 
adapt successfully in the aftermath of disasters.” But, to build collective resilience, “communities must 
reduce risk and resource inequities, engage local people in mitigation, create organizational linkages, 
boost and protect social supports, and plan for not having a plan, which requires flexibility, decision-
making skills, and trusted sources of information that function in the face of unknowns.” Within this 
approach, community resilience can be viewed as an agential process of adaptation. For Norris and 
others, this process of community adaptation emerges from four sets of adaptive capacities, which 
offer a strategy for disaster resilience. These capacities are economic development, social capital, 
information and communication, and community competence.191  
 At the same time, some of these definitions of community and neighbourhood resilience 
propose the need to focus on context, mediating structures, institutions, and organisations. As such, 
they emphasise the role of social bonds, networks, social capital, and culture. In addition, some focus 
on social participation and action, as well as social change and transformation of oppressive systems. 
With its emphasis on the dialectical relationship between social structure and human agency, my 
framework goes to great lengths to bridging both approaches.  
• Community v. Neighbourhood Resilience: 
 In contrast to this emphasis on individuals and the social, the concept of neighbourhood 
resilience is place-based, concentrating on geographical communities and their built environment or 
the neighbourhood setting,192 including transport-oriented development (TOD), recreation and other 
amenities, as well as social infrastructure (understood as the “subset of the infrastructure sector and 
typically includes assets that accommodate social services”193). Pearson and others argue that, despite 
omnipresent geographical inequalities and socioeconomic deprivation places, “there are 
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neighbourhoods with unexpectedly good health outcomes regardless of their disadvantageous 
settings, or what might be considered resilient neighbourhoods.” Based on this evidence, the authors 
propose the Resilience Index New Zealand (RINZ) “to quantify neighbourhood levels of resilience 
across the country and a suite of built, physical, and social characteristics.”194  
 This framework, however, needs to place more emphasis on natural hazards. Indeed, as is 
described in the following chapters, entire neighbourhoods can be abandoned on account of these 
risks, even if they are resilient in other ways.195 In Christchurch, this was particularly the case with the 
residential red zone, where the risk of liquefaction had been mapped in the city since the early 90s.196 
After the February, 2011 aftershock in Christchurch is was reported that “developer fought to build 
on Christchurch land where liquefaction was likely to occur,” pretty much where Environment 
Canterbury (ECan) predicted.197  
 It is important to note that the concept of community formation198 is related to both community 
and neighbourhood resilience, as it straddles both the social and physical dimensions of resilience, 
concentrating on the physical urban infrastructure and “the pattern and relationship between blocks, 
streets, buildings, open space, and landscape.”199 It therefore focuses on the built environment of 
communities, but also examines the placed-based social relations200 within it and the ways in which 
trust is sustained within large groups of people.201  
 For Kearns and others, community, in the most literal sense, means “sharing attitudes and 
interests in common at a certain place and time.” The word community conveys notions of social 
relationships, shared cultural values, as well as that of belonging to a place. However, although these 
authors recognise that the study of communities of interest is important, community formation 
focuses on streets, neighbourhoods, and suburbs with the purpose of exploring what makes an urban 
locality a community.202 
• The Importance of Cultural Competence: 
 This is a topic of vast importance given New Zealand’s unique cultural heritage. As explained in 
Chapter Two, my study was limited in its ability to provide a cogent empirical analysis of Māori 
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resilience, although the theoretical framework it sought to create acknowledged the importance of 
indigenous culture and systems of kinship in the promotion of community resilience. This section 
summarises some of the key literature in this regard.  
 In proposing a contextualised definition of resilience, Ungar argues that even though the study 
of resilience has expanded to “account for community and cultural factors, these are most routinely 
evaluated from the perspective of western scientific discourse.” These cultural factors are yet to be 
incorporated in a “coherent definition of resilience that captures the dual focus of the individual and 
the individual’s social ecology and how the two must both be accounted for when determining the 
criteria for judging outcomes and discerning processes associated with resilience.” With this, Ungar 
proposes that resilience has global, cultural, and contextually specific aspects, which exert differing 
amounts of influence on the lives of individuals, depending on the context in which resilience is 
realised. How these tensions between individuals and their cultures are resolved will, according to the 
author, affect their resilience.203 The use of cultural practices are also proposed in tandem with 
community-based participatory research (CBPR) approach by Israel and others.204  
 Urban sustainability in New Zealand, importantly requires one to give expression to the 
country’s unique cultural context and heritage, and ensure that our built environment reflects Māori 
values and aspirations.205 For Howden-Chapman and others, a focus on culture can also be employed 
to “help a migrant community to adapt to a new country or rural communities to adapt to urban 
life.”206 Reflecting on the Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010-2011 and New Zealand’s unique cultural 
context, Thornley and others regard community resilience “as a capacity that grows out of people and 
communities rather than something that is imposed.” Providing culturally-competent insights 
promotes Māori resilience and incorporates Māori cultural processes such as whanaungatanga (sense 
of family connection) and manaakitanga (caring and hospitality). Such a process would also take into 
account mana whenua status and whakapapa obligations.207  
 According to Lambert, “the disastrous earthquakes that struck Christchurch in 2010 and 2011 
seriously impacted on the individual and collective lives of Māori residents.”208 Having studied, in 
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partnership with Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, “the way in which Māori cultural factors have facilitated 
disaster risk reduction and management in response to the earthquakes,” Phibbs and others present 
anecdotal evidence that Māori “responded effectively to facilitate community recovery and 
resilience.” However, “the form, content, and extent of that response has not been adequately 
recognised or documented.”209  
 The New Zealand Government has embedded its Vision Mātauranga policy across all priority 
investment areas to unlock “the science and innovation potential of Māori knowledge, resources and 
people.”210 A Vision Mātauranga interrelates Māori cultural maxims and participants’ voices to 
collaborate in establishing common understandings of phenomena and encompasses relationships 
between Māori communities and the general population. The explict goal of this approach is for the 
strengths of both cultures to inform the creation and dissemination of knowledge.  
 These research aspects should be led by Māori with whakapapa (genealogical connections) to 
iwi (or tribes). Māori researchers Kenny & Phibbs have relationships with Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu 
through previous research and provide specific insights regarding whanaungatanga or community 
wellbeing. The authors have put together a Cultural Toolkit211 and a Natural Hazards Research 
Platform project to gain greater understanding of factors that build Māori resilience.212 This body of 
work also included the development of manaaki tangata or ethical principles in collaboration with 
Ngāi Tahu and Ngā Māta Waka in Christchurch. These principles were developed to inform research 
design and implementation and should be conducted in partnership with Māori stakeholders. In 
addition, local marae-based consultation should ongoing for the duration of the research.213 As 
explained my study is limited in its cultural competency and as explained for further analysis remains 
the application of these principles to my thesis.  
• Communities as Intervention Sites: 
 Extensive research has been devoted to developing social metrics for assessing phenomena 
associated with the concept of community resilience. Represented in my theoretical framework of 
community resilience as the meso-sociological level of analysis, the community is an essential social 
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unit to my broader understading of the concept. The focus on communities compounds the theoretical 
complexity of resilience. As suggested, communities figure prominently in the study of psychology, 
social work, education, public health, nursing, etc. and, within the more constructivist and critical 
approaches to inquiry, there is a plethora of transactional methodologies that have been developed 
for research of, for, and with communities.214 That said, what do we mean by community and “why is 
it important to grasp the nuances within this seemingly ordinary term?”215  
 With a background in the social and behavioural sciences, community practice deals with 
abstract concepts. Much is written about geographical communities, or neighbourhoods or suburbs 
and their critical community size.216 For Statistics New Zealand, a key measure is the mesh block, the 
smallest defined geographic unit for which statistical data are collected and processed by the agency. 
Although it can vary in size “from part of a city block to large areas of rural land,” in terms of population 
size it ranges from 60 to 200 people.217 As a social unit, communities go beyond the geographical 
notion of neighbourhoods218 to form communities of interest.219  
 For any type of community to exist it needs critical mass, a term most closely associated with 
on-line communities and Dunbar's number,220 understood as the “cognitive limit to the number of 
people with whom one can maintain stable social relationships, in which an individual knows who 
each person is, and how each person relates to every other person.”221 No precise value has been 
proposed for Dunbar's number, although it is considered to lie between 100 and 230, with a commonly 
used value of 150 with numbers larger than this requiring more restrictive rules to maintain a stable 
and cohesive groups.222  
 For Chaskin, different types of communities “provide different kinds of environments for their 
members, and the extent to which the local community is used and considered important is different 
for people in different circumstances.” The author explains that “those who are less affluent, less 
mobile, and less well integrated into society rely more on their local community both for many basic 
goods and services and as an important source of instrumental relationships.” Indeed, Chaskin 
concludes that these different conceptions of what is community requires reflection “about different 
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sources of resilience [the kinds of risk and protective factors communities as context may provide] as 
well as resources for action [the mechanisms and capacities needed for communities to act].”223 
 Considering this, communities are considered by Boutillier and others as a more complex 
intervention setting than others because of these imprecise or idealised notions of community “that 
imply inclusivity and full community participation in project decision-making and implementation.” As 
further discussed in the next chapter, the term community is also invoked to describe a meso-
sociological level of analysis and anything that falls between the individual and society. A space that 
includes families, networks of friends, neighbourhoods, electorates, interest groups, and government 
and non-government organisations.224  
 Adding to the complexity of this intervention setting is the fact that communities are key foci 
for social change. Here, the value of interventions is attached to the degree to which they 
acknowledge and transform intrinsic power relations that exist between institutional and community 
stakeholders (or the research and the researched). Community resilience interventions should also 
promote democratic decision-making processes to build capacity among those targeted through 
greater inclusivity, participation, and actual control and responsibility over the interventions 
themselves. For Early and others, the literature emphasises “community-based or bottom-up efforts 
in building resilience, and discusses the capacities of communities to recover from disaster or adapt 
to change.”225 As proposed in the next chapter, this manifests itself in the existence of two distinct 
approaches to community practice, one top-down or based on a social planning model of community 
organising and another that can be described as bottom-up or based on a locality development or 
social action model of community organising.226  
 Upon closer inspection, this reinforces the need to develop a critical understanding of the 
concept of community resilience and the role played by more empowering and democratic 
approaches in enabling it. For Love and Vallance, there is “strong consensus in the disaster recovery 
literature that public participation is essential for a good recovery.” Nevertheless, the author writes 
that “there remains a gap in our understanding of a disaster recovery best practice of community 
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engagement, and how it might be undertaken amidst the chaos and dysfunction that accompanies – 
and indeed defines – disaster.” It is not enough to simply assume that communities will agree and be 
able to participate in the recovery process, and that governments will welcome and facilitate 
community participation.227  
 For Klein, post-disaster aspirations of communities “are deliberately denied through opaque 
decision-making pathways, the suspension of democratic rights, and government using post-disaster 
reconstruction as an opportunity to push their own agendas.” This highlights the importance of 
understanding the challenges facing community groups that direct their own recoveries, as well as the 
strategies they adopt to overcome them. Klein argues that, although the role played by community 
groups may vary, it seems clear that communities would rather than not have influence, and that this 
influence can take different forms.228 One of these is community empowerment, which is at the crux 
of crafting a critical or powers-based conceptualisation of community resilience. 
 This is echoed by Norris and others, who view collective efficacy and empowerment as key 
components of a community competence to respond to disaster.229 Similarly, Rich and others 
“examined the dynamic of community empowerment after discovery of environmental hazards and 
reasoned that meaningful participation in environmental action groups can be empowering and, 
conversely, that lack of opportunity for such participation can be disempowering.” In addition, the 
effectiveness of a community’s response to hazards is dependent on a combination of resources, a 
culture that allows challenges to authority, the existence of institutions that facilitate the coordination 
of responses, and mechanisms that enable citizen decision-making.230 Nevertheless, as proposed in 
Chapter Four, community empowerment requires that power relations among key stakeholders be 
analysed critically. The following section further contributes to this discussion. 
B. A Critical Lens for Community Resilience: 
 This section reviews the main themes found in the literature arguing for a critique of the 
concept of community resilience. It offers this synthesis of records as an evidence base to cement my 
study’s goal of constructing and assessing a conceptual framework of community resilience that 
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systematically embraces the critical social inquiry scientific paradigm and its emphasis on the study of 
power and power relations. My conceptual framework and a description of its theoretical elements 
and how they were empirically assessed are presented in chapters Four through Nine. 
1. Resilience – An Indeterminate Conceptual Nature: 
 Norris and others think that resilience “is fundamentally a metaphor,” when it is applied to 
people and their environments, that is, a compelling image that sparks and captures human 
imagination. The authors maintain that the concept of community resilience has much to offer current 
scholarship on urban and hazards planning and is probably a term that is here to stay.231 However, as 
references to the concept have continued to increase, “so too have criticisms that the concept may 
be inappropriate, imprecise, or “glittery.”232  
 For Early and others, resilience can be viewed as a policy catch-all phrase, one that is defined in 
different ways and can be used and applied in a wide range of disciplines.233 Understandably, one must 
ponder if it was appropriate for the social sciences to adopt the idea of resilience or, otherwise, 
establish their own frameworks of disaster management and hazard mitigation free from inherited 
meaning.234 With this in mind, Carpenter and Gunderson warn that “some caution needs to be 
exercised before the notion is wholeheartedly embraced as a major goal.” To be sure, the concept of 
resilience lacks a “clear theoretical underpinning, distortion of the concept by different users, 
measurement ambiguities, and structural barriers” that make such a lofty goal difficult to attain.235 
Echoing the work of Rissel,236 Tobin also critiques the concept of resilience as the “holy grail of hazards 
planning,” noting that the literature frequently refers to resilience (and sustainability) as guiding 
principles for effective hazard planning. Although organising communities to minimise the effects of 
disasters and to recover is commendable. Nevertheless, Tobin proposes that “while anticipating such 
outcomes is relatively easy from a theoretical standpoint, practical implementation of comprehensive 
plans is much more elusive.” Indeed, he concludes, the relationship between community and 
sustainability are complex and involves “many social, economic, political, and physical factors” and 
needs to be carefully analysed.237  
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2.  The Lens of Power & Power Relations & the Dialectics of Social Change: 
 For Davoudi, “resilience has as much to do with shaping the challenges we face as responding 
to them.” The author maintains that when one applies this ecologically-rooted concept to a social 
setting, one needs to “tread carefully” and make sure to not lose the insights offered by a critical social 
science perspective.238 As proposed by my study, a critical social science perspective is essential in 
highlighting the need for meaningful community input and equitable power relations among 
communities and government and private sector stakeholders.  
For Prater and Lindell, formulating, adopting, and implementing recovery measures is a 
“political process” that needs to be understood to reduce community hazard vulnerabilities.239 For 
McManus and others, this can only be achieved by exploring both human agency and its relationship 
to structural facilitating or limiting factors. This approach acknowledges the adaptive capacities of 
existing and deeply embedded communities and the limits posed to them by the “underlying power 
relations of existing models and practices of preparedness.”240 This is the ultimate object of research 
for the critical realist philosophy of science upon which my theoretical framework of community 
resilience has been constructed. Based on empirically sourced textual data, Chapter Nine applies this 
notion and offers a theory of what were these power relations in the context of my case. 
Reinforcing contingency and the acknowledgement of social context in my study of resilience, 
Cote and Nightingale also propose “need to engage with the insights of the social sciences about 
agency, power, and knowledge, where power and knowledge are conceptualised as dynamic and 
situated process – inherent to socio-environmental systems rather that externalities that need to be 
controlled.” Indeed, by reconceptualising human agency away from self-determining and rational 
notions, the focus of research and theoretical development shifts to other more emancipatory notions 
and political actions to effect socio-ecological outcomes.241 This transformational and emancipatory 
foundations of critical theory are essential to my framework of community resilience. 
As discussed earlier, the literature’s emphasis on psychological resilience and personal 
responsibility is sometimes used as an instrument of policy for government to retreat from social 
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welfare commitments or, in a disaster recovery setting, from addressing complex issues like housing 
recovery. It is not an accident that this community rhetoric has arisen in times where the welfare state 
is in crisis and the influence of neoliberal ideology is increasing.242 This view is supported by the work 
Evans and Reid, who criticise the concept of resilience and its rise in popularity to contend “that 
policies of resilience can put the onus for disaster response on individuals rather than publicly 
coordinated efforts.” This devolution to the people “draws attention away from governmental 
responsibility and towards localised, laissez faire responses.” In this sense, the authors argue that 
“self-organisation in ecological systems can be mis-translated into self-reliance in social systems and 
so resilience is used to advocate an unrealistic autonomy or the withdrawal of state support for 
vulnerable communities.”243 Indeed, only by exploring the relationship between institutional factors 
and communities, can we bring to the surface the underlying power relations of existing models and 
practices of preparedness.244  
This focus on an interplay between structure and agency is best articulated by Fraker. For him 
human agency, that is, the involvement of residents in the process, of recovery, is essential for 
achieving the goals of system design at the neighbourhood scale with more distributed and resilient 
infrastructure.245 The question of human agency in this context is a question of “who is to deal with 
such a task and how,” or the dialectic interplay of the state and civil society.246 As explained, this 
ontological belief in a dialectical relationship between social structure and human agency is essential 
to the development of a critical social science approach to understanding community resilience and is 
a key feature of my theoretical framework, as presented in Chapter Four.  
For Dagdeviren and others, the concept of community resilience can in fact be empowering 
within this dialectical conception of structure and agency. They argue that “rather than designating 
those who are facing hardship as passive victims,” it can recognise them instead as “resourceful” and 
with “enhanced agency,” able to adapt to ongoing change.247 It is argued by Sonn and Fisher that 
“oppressed groups do not always capitulate or assimilate to oppressive systems, but in alternative 
settings these groups experience a sense of community and find ways to protect and propagate what 
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is valued and central for their survival.”248 Under these conditions, the idea of resilience can indeed 
be used to challenge power structures through community-led initiatives. In fact, Nelson proposes 
that the development of resilience and adaptive capacities requires one to challenge the status quo 
and so be considered “subversive.”249 This philosophical and theoretical connection to the concept of 
empowerment is widely explored by community practice and by my framework of community 
resilience in the model’s meso-sociological level of analysis. 
3. The Discourse of Community Resilience: 
“This is my fight song; 
Take back my life song; 
Prove I’m alright song. 
My powers turned on. 
Starting right now I’ll be strong. 
This is my fight song. 
And I don’t really care if nobody else believes, 
 ‘cause I still got a lot of fight left in me. 
A lot of fight left in me.”250 
 
Most appropriate to the spirit of the times and her all too public life as a woman at the highest 
levels of American politics, this personal resilience-themed song was used as the musical score to 
Hillary Rhodham Clinton’s unsuccessful 2016 campaign for President of the United States.251 But, much 
like the emptiness of her and the other candidates’ political rhetoric,252 it is argued that the concept 
of resilience can be equally vacuous and indeterminate.  
As noted by McGreavy, resilience as a framework “is increasingly appearing in grant funding, 
news stories, academic journals, and organisation missions, positioned as an ability to cope, 
characterised by bouncing back.” But the question, of course, is how did resilience became to be 
understood in this way, and what issues emerge from its practice?253  
This unshakeable feeling that a concept as influential as community resilience is just too vague 
and potentially subject to manipulation, led me to think about it in light of the “hermeneutics of 
suspicion”254 and to propose, like McGreavy, that the concept is a discursive one that can be analysed 
through the study of language as an “instrument of oppression” or as an agent for the reproduction 
of dominant (and usually hidden) ideologies, belief systems, or social structures.255 Indeed, the focus 
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on ideologies associated with the term, is central to identifying the underlying values within it. The 
“buzzword”256 reputation of the concept of resilience is indicative of immanent or entrenched 
approaches to social practice, as well as existing power relations.  
 This seems confirmed by Early and others’ review of the literature, which situates “the most 
recent trends in the application of the notion of resilience within the realm of neoliberal thinking about 
the modern, turbulent world of shifting transnational capital.”257 This infusion of market ideals is also 
evident in the definitions of community resilience reviewed above, which are laden with language like 
socio-economic vitality and an emphasis on resources, losses, productivity, and investment. To some 
this might seem freeing and a recognition that the nanny state stifles innovation258 and the market is 
able to supply this demand for addressing urban and community resilience. To others, nevertheless, 
the raison d’etre of the constitutional state is to secure the rights and wellbeing of its population over 
and above the solutions the market can offer, and its intervention is essential in ensuring that 
everyone is protected from the harm that can come from disaster and that recovery strategies are 
implemented in the public good. A discourse analysis of these ideological conceptualisations of 
community resilience remains for further study. 
 In liberal democracies like New Zealand, this debate in urban planning259 is crystallised around 
the matter of property rights. Prominently, Barnes considers how resilience can be promoted using 
property rights and how these policies “can manifest the attributes of flexibility, responsiveness, 
optionality, and scalability associated with resilient systems.”260 The author concludes that “different 
regulatory regimes such as domestic law and international law have differing capacities to 
accommodate property rights, and this in turn affects the capability of property to sustain resilience.” 
The varying nature of resilience and property systems, however, requires caution against simple 
conclusions about property rights’ influence on resilience. It is, nonetheless, possible to make some 
general observations on how well-suited different types of property (such as private and community-
based holdings) might be. Barnes argues that a “complex combinations of private and community 
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property can coexist in the same resource regime.”261 This approach views urban planning as more 
than a tool to regulate the use of private and public space. 
 However, tracing a critique of resilience and property rights can reveal the social structure and 
power relations implications of this approach. How can community resilience be more inclusive, 
considering the rights of those who don’t own property, but live, work, and play in our cities? Indeed, 
how can we “become resilient differently” and propose discursive changes that promote “more 
effective ways of becoming resilient.”262 As suggested, a community empowering discourse can be 
found in the notion of urban commons, or the collective city resources and “governance mechanisms 
that seek out alternative economic and political models beyond market and state.”  
 For Kip and others, “urban movements today have lost confidence in the state as the 
trustworthy steward for collective consumption, and in the market as the optimal and equitable 
provider of goods and services.” In the face of a declining welfare state, as well as the aggressive 
economic adjustment and austerity measures that have accompanied these processes, “the struggle 
for urban resources has become an explicit struggle over the commons, as it promises participatory 
self-governance, as well as more equity in addressing human needs” like housing.263 Chapter Four 
discusses the concepts of collective governance and participatory democracy in detail. 
 Discursively speaking, the notion of urban commons represents the city “as a key location for 
the struggle”264 for resources, the people making use of those resources, and the decision-making 
processes that establish how those resources are used. For Castillo-Ulloa, these rules of appropriation 
correspond to “the level of access to it to ensure an adequate use” of the urban commons. The 
discourse of urban commons is critical of urban planning. In this context, urban planning is viewed as 
“the mechanism used by the state, to control access” to the public spaces and shared goods that 
communities build and maintain, like amenities, roads, and social infrastructure.  
 For Castillo-Ulloa, this is a question of power relations: the language of urban planning 
“circumscribes the urban commons by determining, through master plans, the principles of 
exclusion/inclusion” in an urban social context. In line with post-modernist notions of discourse 
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(reviewed in the next chapter), Castillo-Ulloa proposes that the language of urban planning promotes 
the development of a governmentality among the commoners, through the production of “specific 
materialities, spatialities, and subjectivities,” that organise and spacialise power.265  
 Some commoners believe there could be common ground between a property rights’ 
framework and the idea of urban commons, particularly around the question of housing as a unique 
kind of good and commodity. Balmer and Bernet offer a clever background that anchors the debate: 
“Housing is something intimate. One could say that our homes represent a third skin after 
clothing. Like clothes, shelter is regarded as a basic human need. Since this does not 
automatically translate into universal access in a less-than-perfect world, the provision of such 
basic goods is a fundamental political issue. Answers to the housing question have been 
developed in different times and places depending on the economic conditions and political 
hegemony. Both the market and the state have been hailed as the primary provider of housing 
and, even though the third sector has mostly played a marginal role, there are noteworthy 
traditions of philanthropic and especially of self-help [cooperative] initiatives in housing.”266 
 
 Indeed, many believe that, in setting urban territorial limits, public policy has been a crucial 
driver of housing commodification and the problem of affordability in our urban centres.267 But it is 
also the case where policy can aide in the process of decommodification, or the “withdrawal of 
housing provision from the market sphere” as a benchmark of housing policies and regulations.268 
Even though the new Government aims to change this trend, this is potentially the case in New 
Zealand, where the previous National-led Government enacted social housing reforms that devolved 
responsibility for social housing to civil society and the third sector. According to Balmer and Bernet, 
however, before we can judge how such arrangements enhance the sustainability of more common 
approaches of housing provision, we must contemplate some basic terms of reference: 
• Housing is a basic urban resource, like infrastructure or land [but unlike the latter it is and 
artificial resource, and costly]. 
• Different actors play different roles in any arrangement of housing provision. We may 
broadly speak of owners and users, but we might be better off analysing the specific incidents 
of ownership, i.e. the rights, powers, privileges, and immunities which individuals, groups or 
organisations hold about a dwelling. 
• This bundle of rights perspective points to the importance of institutions that regulate the 
allocation of housing. These mainly encompass proper policies. i.e. legislative and financial 




 This struggle between the right to property and what is determined to be the common or public 
good is at the core of my critical conceptualization of community resilience and its links to post-
disaster housing recovery. The conceptual links between the ownership of property and the study of 
power are captured by my framework and discussed more broadly in Chapter Four. These links were 
also the subject of empirical study in the case of Christchurch. For further research remains an analysis 
of the normative framework regulating the right to property and its relation to the increased 
commodification of housing in New Zealand.  
 As seen in Chapters Six and Seven, in Christchurch, the property rights discourse permeated the 
recovery statutory framework established by central government after the Canterbury Earthquakes 
of 2010 and 2011. In developing a plan for the redevelopment of housing in the central city, the 
Christchurch City Development Unit (CCDU), in its plan “A Liveable City,”270 proposed the suspension 
of the right to public consultation (guaranteed by the Local Government Act 2002) to promote 
increased housing development in the central city. This was justified as a measure to counteract a 
perceived problem with NIMBYsm (or a not-in-my-back-yard mentality), the “protectionist attitudes 
and oppositional tactics adopted by community groups facing an unwelcome development in their 
neighbourhood.”271 This prioritises the property rights of developers over the ability of the broader 
community to have a say. At the same time, Christchurch experiences a struggle for the urban 
commons in the efforts of communities and the third sector, who have taken it upon themselves to 
bring back life to the central city by designing and building transitional spaces for the collective use 
and enjoyment of all the city’s residents.272  
IV. Concluding Remarks: 
 This chapter has presented a qualitative systematic review of community resilience. Therefore, 
its primary objective was to summarise the best available literature about the concept. The chapter 
began by describing the method of systematic and qualitative review and how it was implemented in 
my analysis of this interdisciplinary body of work. The chapter also presents the outcomes of this 
review in the form of a narrative synthesis of results. This synthesis began by tracing the foundations 
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of the concept of resilience or resiliency and its varied iterations in physical and engineering resilience; 
ecological resilience; individual, psychological, and personal resilience; socio-ecological resilience; 
disaster resilience; urban resilience; and housing and resilience. The narrative synthesis continued on 
to provide a detailed review of the concept of community and neigbourhood resilience with a thematic 
analysis of concept definitions. The section concluded with a review of records arguing for a critical 
analysis of the concept. Importantly, this chapter also provided an analysis of how this literature 
review informed the construction of my theoretical framework of community resilience and how this 
framework was tested empirically.  
 As described in the next chapter, my framework reflects the review’s conclusion that resilience 
is an interdisciplinary and bridging concept between the natural and social sciences. Indeed, my 
framework describes both psycho-social and envrionmental factors associated with resilience. As 
presented in Figure 4.1, my framework is a multi-level model describing these factors across two 
dimensions – one social and one ecological – and a temporal and spatial scale with a multi-level model 
consisting of three sociological levels of analysis: micro, meso, macro. Thus the framework takes into 
account physical and environmental factors like the natural and built environments but, in line with 
this socio-ecological perspective, the framework and its empirical application emphasises the social 
dimension of resilience. My framework has therefore adopted a more expansive view of what is a 
disaster, including both acute and progressive events.  
 When applied to the study of urban environments and urban planning, this socio-ecological 
conception of resilience requires inclusion, collaboration, and cultural competency from the public, 
private, and community sectors of society. These aspects of governance and participation are essential 
to my theoretical framework of community resilience. Of particular inportance in this regard is the 
post-disaster recovery and renewal of housing. As explained, access to decent and affordable housing 
is considered a protective factor within the broader resilience framework and is essential to the 
development of social networks and a sense of community among residents. This emplacement of 
people within a city is essential to sustain the resilience of communities before, during, and after a 
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disaster. This key role played by post-disaster housing is an important feature of my framework and 
my case study of the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011.  
 Present in my theory and confirmed by its empirical testing is a tension between the private 
and the public good or the property rights of home owners and the notion of urban commons. As will 
be further revealed by my critical analysis in the following thesis chapters, this tension is a key driver 
(or power) of urban and community resilience. An analysis of the normative framework regulating the 
right to property and its relation to the increased commodification and decreased access to decent 
and affordable housing in New Zealand, as well as a discourse analysis of the ideology behind this 
neoliberal and rights-based discourse, remains for further research.  
 My theoretical framework of community resilience acknowledges the importance of individual, 
psychological, and personal resilience, whithout discounting the influence of structual factors in a 
person’s adaptive capacities. It thus embraces Hollings’ contingent ontological conception of reality 
as something constantly changing and not of bouncing back to an objective previous state of normalcy. 
My framework also invites Holling’s transformational principle of adaptive capacities. This is 
addressed by my adoption of the critical ontological principle of a dialectical relationship between 
social structure and human agency. As explained, my critical approach proposes the need to view 
these personal adaptive capacities in the context of structural constraints on how these interact 
dialectically to produce or reduce the resilience of communities and their residents.  
 This transformational approach is, nevertheless, emancipatory. As argued, people and their 
communities can be empowered to face adversity, promote social change, and gain control over their 
own future. This philosophical and theoretical connection to the concepts of power and 
empowerment is explored by my critical approach analysing underlying power relations and is the 
ultimate object of research for the critical realist philosophy of science used as a foundation for my 
theoretical framework of community resilience. 
 With this reflection on the findings of this qualitative systematic review, I now wish to present 
my own definition of community resilience as follows: 
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The capacity of communities, their members, and representatives to respond actively and 
collectively to adversity and take control of their urban futures. This requires democracy, and 
actual community and third sector participation in the policy-making processes. Community 
resilience also promotes the consideration of the wellbeing of people in all urban planning and 
recovery policies, especially those related to housing. 
  
 This definition and the theoretical framework and its components are further described and 
operationalised in the chapter that follows. The further chapters provide a narrative of results 








  This chapter addresses the third and fourth elements of deductive theory construction, that is, 
identifying the major concepts and variables interrelated to the one analysed (in this case, community 
resilience) and finding out what is known about them. In putting forward what is community 
resilience? as a research question, I wished to clarify what is meant by this increasingly common, but 
abstract concept. Considerable academic scholarship in the social sciences has been devoted to 
understanding other individual and community-level concepts that are interrelated to community 
resilience in a psycho-social, cultural, and political sense. In this chapter, I describe this body of work, 
including the relevant critical social theory to support my focus on power and power relations. Once 
more, this meant engaging in a deductive approach to scientific reasoning: an analysis of existing 
theory to develop a new theoretical framework as a proposition or hypothesis to be further refined 
and tested empirically. Below, I present this framework and some of its theoretical foundations. 
II. A Theoretical Framework of Community Resilience: 
 This section continues to chart the method of deductive theory construction, by presenting a 
new theory, or general explanation of the phenomena under study, as a hypothesis, or a supposition, 
or proposed explanation made on the basis of evidence for further empirical investigation. This 
framework was developed early on in the research process and was informed by my fieldwork and the 
previous qualitative systematic review. As such, it proposed a new understanding of community 
resilience – one that is built upon existing behavioural, social, and political theories and emphasises 
community development, and its inherent powers-based intricacy. It is intended to be used as a 
community assessment tool of a wide range of socio-ecological factors that influence community and 
neighbourhood resilience, including the matter of power and power relations.  
 Figure 4.1 illustrates this framework of community resilience features. As explained, this 
framework describes how a series of psycho-social and envrionmental interrelated factors are 
associated with resilience. The framework is presented as a multi-level model with these factors 
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displayed across two dimensions – one social and one ecological – and a temporal and spatial scale 
consisting of three sociological levels of analysis: micro, meso, macro. This social and ecological 
dimensions and levels relate dialectically (as shown in the model by interlocking arrows) and this 
dialectical relationships cause a community and its residents to move along a continuum from 
vulnerability and sustainability. The sections that follow describe in detail these concepts and variables 
as presented in the figure below. 




III. The Psycho-Social/Cultural/Political Theoretical Foundations of Community Resilience: 
As established in the systematic review, essential to the development of my socio-ecological 
theory is the need to better understand what role is played by the social dimension or people or 
human factors in community resilience. Thus, this chapter seeks to describe and operationalise this 
related, theoretical body of work. The following sections describe the psycho-social/cultural 
theoretical foundations of the framework. Contrary to the physical, natural, and material aspects of 
resilience, these theories are particularly underserved by the associated body of literature, as I showed 
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in the previous chapter. The study of these concepts is crucial for distinguishing the concept of 
community resilience from other visions of resilience more associated with the natural and 
engineering sciences, as opposed to the social sciences.1 Highlighting the role of community practice 
requires that I also acknowledge a community development or powers-based approach to 
understanding resilience. Thus, this section also aims to describe the theoretical foundations that 
underlie a critical understanding of the concept of community resilience. 
A. A People-Centred Perspective: 
 In focusing on the psycho-social and cultural aspects of community resilience I consider the 
human factor and look at it from a people-centred perspective. For Rayburn and Rootman, a people-
centred perspective goes beyond statistical and economic factors to understand people and 
community processes in value enterprises (including both geographical and communities of interest, 
as well as the non-governmental or third sector organisations that represent them). Emphasising the 
human factor should “not only start with the experience of people, but also that experience needs to 
be grounded in the everyday contexts in which we all find ourselves” – the community, the “every day 
setting, the nexus in which people live out their lives from moment to moment.”2 In 2015, the United 
Nations committed to a people-centred3 agenda in its Sustainable Development Goals.4 In developing 
“a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity,”5 this global agenda is “determined to take the 
bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world onto a sustainable and 
resilient path.” This new wellbeing agenda l inks “the concerns of people and planet – 
recognising the interdependence of human wellbeing and healthy ecosystems.” 6 
B. Multilevel Analysis & Socio-Ecological Systems Theory – People in Context: 
 Given the complexity of this undertaking, I have organised this theoretical framework and the 
synthesis that follows based on a multilevel analysis or hierarchical modelling. For Diez-Roux, this 
approach permits “the simultaneous examination of the effects of group-level and individual-level 
variables.” This analytical approach is particularly useful to examine “the potential ecological, macro, 
or group level determinants of health.”7 The discussion below is structured around these three 
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sociological levels of analysis – the micro, meso, and macro levels – which explore social problems 
depending on their scale. The chosen theories are presented below depending on whether they relate 
to the study of the individual or the self (and her relationships), groups like neighbourhoods and 
communities, or large-scale social patterns8 and structures like power and power relations.  
 By looking at the case of Christchurch, I aimed to apply these theories in an empirical sense to 
gain greater understanding of community resilience at the level of individuals, their relationships, 
communities, and the wider context. Often thought of as confounding within standard 
epidemiological reasoning, social context, the “milieu,”9 is described as the circumstances in the 
environment in which something exists. For Poland and others, that something can be “health 
behaviour, another health determinant, an intervention, or an evaluation.” These authors underline 
“the scientific importance of investigating the ways people are differently affected by the environment 
in which they find themselves, or how psychological and social processes are mediated by the context 
in which they occur.” The embeddedness of roles in context is what offers “their special power to 
influence and compel how a person behaves in a given situation, the activities she engages in, and the 
relations that become established between that her and others in the setting.”10 
Ecological systems theory is mostly linked to the work of Bronfenbrenner on person-
environment and programme-environment interactions, the ecology of human development, and the 
phenomenon of “development-in-context.” His thesis, “that human abilities and their realisation 
depend in significant degree on the larger and institutional context,” prescribes that research should 
be dedicated toward the study of the social context in which behaviours are observed, and its 
outcomes interpreted “with systematic regard to contextual variables and their influence on observed 
behaviour.”11 As shown, my theoretical framework of community resilience is based on the principles 
of ecological systems theory and consists of two dimensions, one psycho-social and cultural and one 
natural, physical, and material. This chapter discusses the theoretical concepts that populate all 
analytical levels of the psycho-social/cultural dimension.  
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In their application of an ecological perspective to public health and health promotion, McLeroy 
and others famously argued (amid landmark Reaganesque conservative social and economic reforms 
to the US Federal Government), that an emphasis on disease prevention in advancing life-style 
interventions and health behaviour change promotes a “victim blaming ideology, by neglecting the 
importance of social influences on health and disease.” The authors proposed a new, “ecological 
model for health promotion,” that is focused on social inequalities in health12 and “both individual and 
social environmental factors as targets for health promotion interventions.” This model explores 
“interventions directed at changing interpersonal, organisational, community, and public policy, and 
factors which support and maintain unhealthy behaviours.”13 
The work of Bronfenbrenner and McLeroy and others in crafting and applying an ecological 
approach has now become a staple of health promotion interventions. Accordingly, Green and others 
reflect on the fields of human and social ecology and the role of the Ottawa Charter for Health 
Promotion14 in giving “international impetus to a purposefully ecological approach.”15 In applying an 
ecological approach to the community setting, Sallis and others propose that “multilevel interventions 
based on ecological models and targeting individuals, social environments, physical environments, and 
policies must be implemented” to achieve health behaviour change.16 More recently, Bentley 
examines an ecological public health approach as a viable way to gain greater understanding of the 
environmental determinants of public health and social equity and the challenges to urban 
sustainability. The author explores the “underlying mechanisms that link urban environments to public 
health and social equity.”17 Beyond the study of human behaviour, this approach is broad enough to 
be applied to other disciplines,18 like those associated with community practice and a critical social 
science perspective and the study of power and power relations. 
C. Individual/Relationships (Micro-Sociological Level of Analysis): 
 This section presents a theoretical discussion of key concepts that I view as intimately related 
to the study of community resilience and how it manifests at the level of individuals and their 
relationships. This synthesis begins with a description of the concepts of wellbeing and trauma, before 
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turning to a discussion of the concepts of sense of place, place attachment, and sense of community. 
I continue with Durkheim’s work on social integration and its relation to more contemporary literature 
on social connectedness and social cohesion. 
1. Sense of Place or Place Attachment: 
 Assessing whether people have a sense of place or place attachment is essential to 
understanding what community resilience is and why people respond collectively after a large-scale 
adverse event like a natural disaster to mitigate its impacts. Although difficult to operationalise,19 the 
concept of sense of place or place attachment, is defined as “an affective bond or link between people 
and specific places”20 and their residential environment.21 Much is said about this “affective 
association” or “emotional involvement with places”22 with a particular setting or “milieu”23 as a key 
factor in people’s development of a sense of place or place attachment. This idea is, in turn, connected 
to the concept of residential satisfaction, defined by Weidemann and Anderson as “the positive or 
negative feeling that the occupants have for where they live.”24 
 For Winstanley and others, just as resilience is dynamic, so are individual and collective 
meanings of sense of place or place attachment. These meanings are constantly informed by questions 
of individual and collective identity and associated social interactions. Additionally, the authors 
maintain that, in a post-disaster context (like that of Christchurch after the earthquakes), the 
importance of sense of place or place attachment as “determinants” of community resilience “appears 
to be intuitively recognised, but poorly translated into evidence because of its complexity and 
difficulties of quantification or representation to inform decisions and intervention strategies.” This is 
the case precisely given the concept’s “significant social, cultural, psychological and symbolic 
dimensions, as well as the multiple spatial scales to which sense of place applies.” Indeed, the authors 
argue that the Canterbury earthquakes “severely damaged natural and built environments in ways 
that transcended, but deeply affected the meanings, experiences, collective and individual symbolism, 
and behaviours associated with place attachment and identity in relation to residents’ homes, 
neighbourhoods, the city and surrounding natural environments.”25 
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2. Sense of Community: 
 Although an overarching value of community psychology and other disciplines like public health, 
the concept of sense of community has not enjoyed as much attention as sense of place or place 
attachment. This may be attributed to the fact that sense of community is more specific, as it focuses 
on how sense of place and place attachment are manifest toward geographical communities and other 
types of groups. It is described as an individual’s assessment of their ties and their role within a 
broader community. It also relates to the safety net or the strengths of interpersonal relationships, 
which people can rely upon in the event of a disaster. Ahlbrant and Cunningham considered sense of 
community as “an integral contributor to one's commitment to a neighbourhood and satisfaction with 
it.” Those who were “satisfied, saw their neighbourhood as a small community within the city, were 
more loyal to the neighbourhood than to the rest of the city, and thought of their neighbourhood as 
offering particular activities for its residents.”26  
 Chavis and Wandersman have studied the concept of sense of community in relation to health 
promotion and the urban environment. For these authors, the concept is a “phrase commonly used 
by citizens, politicians, and social scientists, to characterise the relationship between the individual 
(agent) and the social structure,” and it fosters the development of the social relations critical for 
sustaining community resilience. Naturally, when people’s sense of community is strong, they are 
more likely to interact with their neighbours. At the same time, “the positive face-to-face contact 
continues to enhance the shared emotional connection” to maintain a sense of community. For the 
authors, the concept plays a catalytic role in mobilising individuals to participate in neighbourhood 
voluntary organisations when they are faced with a problem. Indeed, it is this “problem-oriented 
coping” that is essential for sustaining personal and community resilience in the event of adversity 
and increasing the effectiveness and community buy-in of social programmes.27 
 Importantly for my study of the case of Christchurch, having a sense of community increases 
one’s ability to cope in a disaster context. Bachrach and Zautra have studied coping responses after 
disasters and found that those neighbourhoods with a stronger sense of community led to what they 
120 
 
called “problem-focused coping human behaviours” which seek to counter the relevant threats. These 
authors also maintained that sense of community affects in a positive way the level of individual’s 
involvement in their community and lead to an increase in people’s “sense of purpose and perceived 
control in dealing with an external threat.”28  
3. Social Connectedness & Cohesion: 
 
 Social connectedness and social cohesion are interrelated (and oftentimes interchangeable) 
concepts essential to the study of communities as geographical and social spaces. These concepts 
derive from the work of Emile Durkheim on the collective conscious, or the “totality of beliefs and 
sentiments common to the average members of a society that forms a determinate system with a life 
of its own”29. The collective conscious reflects a shared way of understanding and behaving in the 
world that brings people together and forms social integration. As a father to the discipline of 
sociology, Durkheim was focused on analysing how a society preserved its integrity in modernity, a 
new era where common or shared understandings of the social, like religion and kinship, could no 
longer be taken for granted as unifying factors in Western societies: 
“For if society lacks the unity that derives from the fact that the relationships between its parts 
are exactly regulated, that unity resulting from the harmonious articulation of its various 
functions assured by effective discipline and if, in addition, society lacks the unity based upon 
the commitment of men’s [sic.] wills to a common objective, it is no more than a pile of sand 
that the least jolt or the slightest puff will suffice to scatter.”30 
 
 As a realist, Durkheim viewed individual acts as rooted in the social31 and he sought to find 
empirical evidence of this – the social mechanisms or facts that structure society and the individual 
behaviours that are embedded within them.32 For Berkman and others, Durkheim's contributions are 
immeasurable, particularly those related to our understanding of mortality and social integration and 
cohesion. Durkheim’s “Suicide” aimed to explain individual pathology as a function of social dynamics 
and “how the patterning of one of the most psychological, intimate, and, on the surface, individual 
acts rests not upon psychological foundations, but upon the patterning of social facts.”33  
 Currently, much scholarship is devoted to the study of social connectedness and social 
cohesion. For Lee and others, social connectedness refers to an attribute of the self that “reflects 
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cognitions of enduring interpersonal closeness with the social world in toto.” In this perspective, social 
connectedness is “a type of relational schema or cognitive structure representing regularities in 
patterns of interpersonal relatedness.”34 It is associated with the discipline of psychology and human 
development. Lee and other argue that social connectedness begins to emerge during adolescence 
and continues to manifest through adult life. Once a mature person has successfully “maintained 
companionship and affiliation” without a threat to her self-esteem, she will be able to feel comfortable 
in a larger social context beyond that formed by family and friends.” It allows people to see others as 
fellow humans, even though they may be otherwise perceived as different.35  
 In New Zealand, social connectedness is measured in the General Social Survey, which contains 
statistics about people's relationship to family and friends, social support, loneliness, tolerance of 
diversity, trust in others, and volunteer work.36 The Ministry of Social Development’s (MSD) Social 
Report states that when “people enjoy constructive relationships with others in their families, 
whänau, communities, iwi and workplaces and families support and nurture those in need of care,”37 
they experience social connectedness. 
 For its part, social cohesion has been defined as “the willingness of members of a society to 
cooperate with each other to survive and prosper.”38 Importantly, for Speer and others, social 
cohesion not only manifests in participatory experiences within the community, but also in the levels 
of trust and connectedness among individuals. In this sense, the authors maintain that social cohesion 
is related to what they call “intrapersonal empowerment.”39 In New Zealand, social cohesion is also 
measured in the General Social Survey. It is understood as a sense of national unity or people's sense 
of belonging to New Zealand, their experiences of discrimination, tolerance of diversity, and ability to 
express their own identity. It applies to different groups of New Zealanders, such as recent migrants, 
people with different ethnicities, and individuals belonging to different age groups. For the Ministry 
of Social Development (MSD), this approach addresses a gap in information on “attitudes towards 
others; how people see themselves and their place in society in terms of acceptance of others; levels 
of trust between people; and what values people feel they have in common by virtue of living in New 
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Zealand.”40 The Ministry sees social cohesion as a social policy goal, associated with immigrant 
settlement and outcomes for immigrant and host populations.41  
 The topic of social cohesion is addressed from a disaster recovery perspective by Kawachi, who 
provides a two-fold definition of the concept. First, as “the absence of latent social conflict,” the 
author proposes that social cohesion should focus on “income/wealth inequality; racial/ethnic 
tensions; disparities in political participation; and other forms of polarisation.” Second, Kawachi 
contends that social cohesion is also related to “the presence of strong social bonds,” defined as 
“levels of trust and norms of reciprocity social capital; the abundance of associations that bridge social 
divisions [civil society]; and the presence of institutions of conflict management [e.g. a responsive 
democracy].”42 Working with a long-term cohort of Japanese older adults, the author has made 
important contributions to the understanding of the relationship between the health impacts of 
disasters and social cohesion. This research suggests that social cohesion is as capable of promoting 
health “through reciprocity exchanges, the maintenance of norms among community members, as 
well as the lubrication of collective action through trust.” Kawachi’s current project based in Iwanuma 
city, Japan, and consists in an examination of the longitudinal impacts of community social cohesion 
on resilience and recovery after the March 11, 2011 Great Eastern Japan earthquake and tsunami. 
Importantly, under acute circumstances like a natural disaster or long-term adaptation processes like 
migration, both approaches to measuring social cohesion highlight relationships of trust to ensure 
population health and wellbeing, as well as urban resilience.43 
 According to the Christchurch Community Mapping Project, “a high proportion of Christchurch 
residents have some connection within their communities and positive contact with their neighbours; 
have someone to turn to in times of stress or in times of need; are happy with Christchurch as a place 
to live, work, and spend spare time; and participate in community-based activities.”44  
D. Community/Neighbourhood (Meso-Sociological Level of Analysis): 
In line with my approach of organising the theories reviewed in this chapter within the three 
sociological levels of analysis mentioned above, I continue this synthesis with an analysis of theories 
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that address the concept of community in community resilience. That is, the meso-level theoretical 
constructs that view communities, neighbourhoods, and other groups as units of analysis. These are 
many but, in this section, I only review the ones I consider essential for developing a bottom-up or 
community development approach to understanding community resilience.  
1. Anomie & Social Fragmentation: 
 A good point of departure is to examine what happens to communities in the absence of social 
integration? Scholarly developments in this regard are inspired by Durkheim’s concept of anomie, “a 
social condition in which there is a disintegration or disappearance of the norms and values that were 
previously common to a society.”45 After a period characterised by anomie, what Crossman refers to 
a state of “normlessness,” might occur. This idea describes the moment of transition from drastic 
social, economic, or political change, where the norms or values commonly held by a society are no 
longer valid, but new ones have not emerged yet.46 For Crossman: 
“People who live during periods of anomie typically feel disconnected from their society because 
they no longer see the norms and values that they hold dear reflected in society itself. This leads 
to the feeling that one does not belong and is not meaningfully connected to others. For some, 
this may mean that the role they play [or played] and/or their identity is no longer valued by 
society. Because of this, anomie can foster the feeling that one lacks purpose, engender 
hopelessness, and encourage deviance and crime.” 
 
 In his study of suicide as an indicator and graphic representation of the absence of social 
integration, Durkheim proposed that anomie is inextricably related to adaptation as a socio-
psychological process and results from an individual’s somehow impaired capacity to cope. When 
people feel connected to established cultural norms and society, they engage in behaviour considered 
conventional and tend to have a more positive conception of themselves. During times of anomie, 
people feel detached and that they do not belong. 
“In order to understand anomie, one must understand, not only how society and culture is 
organised [structured], but also the subjective [experiential] nature of society and culture. This 
poses a challenge to members of society; the need to change, to adapt, to fit in. Social 
institutions play an important role in this regard, of keeping society organised and efficient, that 
members of society feel included. Anomie is a by-product of society; that varied access to 




 Indeed, according to Strole, at the core of the concept of anomie there is a “self-to-others 
alienation.” This is also a common element to psycho-social interpretations of the concept. The author 
views Durkheim’s conceptualisation of anomie “as referring to the breakdown of those moral norms 
that limit desires and aspirations.” Diversifications of the concept have resulted in the convergence 
with broader concepts, such as social dysfunction and malintegration.48 As it applies to groups like 
communities and neighbourhoods (i.e., the meso-sociological level of analysis), Durkheim’s concept 
of anomie has found a home in constructs and measures like social deprivation and social 
fragmentation. Social deprivation generally refers to a combination of socio-economic factors 
preventing a person from accessing the many different aspects of their culture and society.49 In New 
Zealand, small-area socio-economic deprivation is measured by the Ministry of Health with the NZDep 
Index, across established living standards.50  
 For its part, social fragmentation describes a state of disconnect where different groups form 
parallel structures within a single society, with little interaction between them. Even though they 
recognise the difficulty of measuring social disorganisation, fragmentation, and isolation, Allardyce 
and others explain that these phenomena “have long been posited as influencing the rate of psychoses 
at area level,” but measuring these is difficult.51  
 Social fragmentation has been measured in New Zealand by Ivory and others. Their study 
investigates the relationship between mental health and residential area and concludes that “certain 
characteristics of neighbourhood environments matter and show that increasing neighbourhood-level 
social fragmentation is associated with poorer mental health.”52 This link of neighbourhood-level 
social fragmentation and mental health was explored in Christchurch after the Canterbury 
earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 by Hogg and others, who found that people living in the widely affected 
central and eastern suburbs of the city had a “23% higher risk of developing a mood or anxiety disorder 





2. Social Capital: 
 This synthesis cannot overlook the literature on social capital, a key body of work in this meso-
sociological level of analysis. With social capital we look to social networks and social support.54 Here, 
one of the preeminent theorists is Pierre Bourdieu, who crafted an account of social stratification and 
class distinction, defining the concept as “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or to membership in a group – which provides 
each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a credential which entitles 
them to credit, in the various senses of the word.”55 Bourdieu emphasised that these relationships 
only exist in a practical sense, and “may also be socially instituted and guaranteed by the application 
of a common name [the name of a family, a class, or a tribe or of a school, a party, etc.] and by a whole 
set of instituting acts designed simultaneously to form and inform those who undergo them.”  
 As such, they are maintained and reinforced in the context of relations of proximity (including 
proximity in a geographical space, or an economic or social one).56 Bourdieu thought that the volume 
of social capital possessed by an agent “depends on the size of the network of connections they can 
effectively mobilise and the capital [economic, cultural, or symbolic] possessed in their own right by 
each of those to whom he [sic.] is connected.” Moreover, “the profits which accrue from membership 
in a group are the basis of the solidarity” that makes possible these relationships and connections. For 
the author, these processes of social stratification are perpetuated by taste and aesthetics, which are 
instituted in the self through habitus.57  
 According to Mohnen and others, neighbourhood social capital “is positively associated with 
health.”58 Szreter and Woolcock have attempted to increase the concept’s specificity by identifying 
three distinct aspects of social capital: bonding (which includes things such as cohesion, trust, and 
belonging); bridging (which includes mutual respect and heterogeneous relationships); and linking 
(which includes political participation and activism).59 These different types of social capital are 
explored from the perspective of community resilience and health by Poortinga, who found that the 
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aspects of bonding, bridging, and linking are significantly associated with neighbourhood deprivation 
and subjective wellbeing. The study shows that indicators of these types of social capital are not 
strongly interrelated, which suggests that they also capture other aspects of the social environment. 
Social cohesion, trust, heterogeneous socio-economic relationships, and political participation 
“appeared important for community health after controlling for neighbourhood deprivation.”60  
 This finding is complemented by Kawachi and others’ work on social capital, which defines the 
concept as consisting of “features of social organisation – such as trust between citizens, norms of 
reciprocity, and group membership – that facilitate collective action.“61 In a study of social capital, 
income inequality, and mortality, the authors conclude that “income inequality was strongly 
correlated with both per capita group membership and lack of social trust” and that these, in turn 
“were associated with total mortality.” These results give credence to the idea that “income inequality 
leads to increased mortality via divestment in social capital.”62 Furthermore, a later study by Kawachi 
and others found that “individual-level factors were strongly associated with self-rated poor health 
and, even after adjustment for these proximal variables, a contextual effect of low social capital on 
risk of self-rated poor health was found.”63 
 Social capital is also well studied in relation to post-disaster recovery and community resilience. 
In a paper examining how social capital supports post-disaster community recovery and 
redevelopment, Chamlee-Wright and Storr focus on “how social capital in the form of collective 
narratives affects post-disaster recovery” by shaping the recovery strategies adopted by individuals. 
In their qualitative study with residents of post-Katrina St. Bernard Parish, a neighbourhood of New 
Orleans devastated by flooding caused by the hurricane, the authors found that a collective narrative 
of “shared identity as a close-knit, family-oriented community comprised of hard workers led 
community members to adopt a strategy that emphasized self-reliance.”64 Social capital is also a 
prominent concept in refugee integration. For Elliott and Yusuf, social capital is “the invisible glue 
holding society together.” The authors maintain that “resettled refugees need a network of 
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relationships to ensure they can live meaningful lives.” The authors describe these relationships as 
complex and between individuals and communities both at the local and the national levels.65  
 Bourdieu’s work has been compelling enough, and the concept of social capital is now 
ubiquitous, even if a disputed and multivalent term. For the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), social capital refers to the “networks together with shared norms, values 
and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups.” In this definition, we can 
think of networks as real-world links between groups or individuals. In this sense, human and social 
capital are connected to each other in complex ways. Indeed, the OECD maintains that “social capital 
promotes the development of human capital.”66 In New Zealand, social capital is referred to but not 
measured by the Treasury’s Higher Living Standards Framework, “as one of four types of capital stock 
identified in the framework as underpinning living standards.”67 For Karacaoglu, there is evidence that 
communities with a good stock of social capital are more likely to have better health, lower crime, and 
better education outcomes, and economic growth. Investment in social capital “affects the 
productivity of individuals and groups and have a measurable rate of return.”68  
 Nevertheless, the Treasury’s recognition of the importance of social capital was not reflected in 
many of the recovery policies enacted early on in Christchurch after the Canterbury earthquakes, as 
communities lacked decision-making power to significantly shape the development of the central 
government’s top-down policy of recovery. This approach prioritised the physical and economic 
dimensions of resilience and not the social relationships that took place in Christchurch’s urban 
landscape. This was done even when there was an understanding before the Canterbury earthquakes 
that increased collaboration between government and other sectors was needed to address 
increasingly complex and multi-factorial social problems, and that this required knowledge of the 
networks between public servants and their business, and community counterparts.69  
 From the bottom-up, however, there were countless examples of a mobilised civil society in the 
public good from the immediate aftermath of the earthquakes. One key example of the deep-rooted 
social relationships and how they were put in service of the community was that of Māori. Māori 
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experiences and their impacts in the recovery have been studied by Kenny and others. For the authors, 
the social cohesion present in Māori cultural identity and genealogy forms the basis for the “intra and 
extra-tribal relationships to mobilise resources and activate social support networks” necessary in the 
recovery response.70 These capacities are, therefore, strongly determined “by the forms of social and 
economic capital available.”71  
 “In the post-earthquake context of Christchurch New Zealand, cultural strengths were 
collaboratively operationalised by Māori to facilitate the recovery and resilience of the wider 
Christchurch community. However, to date Māori resources and cultural strengths have not 
been integrated into pre-disaster planning and emergency response strategies at the local or 
national levels, in any meaningful way.  
 
The prompt and effective Māori response to the Christchurch quakes has acted as the genesis 
for increased engagement and collaboration between Iwi, local authorities, government and 
private parties who are engaged in civil/disaster preparedness planning and urban rebuilding in 
Christchurch. Māori epistemological perspectives and bodies of historical knowledge have been 
acknowledged by key stakeholders and are informing integrated approaches to urban 
redevelopment as well as shaping innovative strategies for ensuring the social and 
environmental resilience of the Canterbury region in the longer term.  
 
The Māori response to the Christchurch earthquakes has wider relevance for how governments 
and international agencies may think about cultural strengths as a mechanism for mitigating 
disaster risk, reducing vulnerability following a natural hazard event and facilitating recovery 
and resilience.”72 
 
3. Community Practice: 
 These diverse theoretical accounts of how people liaise with others beyond their immediate 
relations have had an impact on how community practice is structured. From these differences stem 
real challenges that are the product of the ambiguity of the term community73 and the complexities 
inherent in working with, and within, this setting. The synthesis below seeks to shed light on the 
politics of the term community and the different approaches to community interventions. Indeed, 
community resilience is consistently described as an interdisciplinary concept,74 which requires a more 
refined understanding of the links between theory, research, and professional practice.  
 A relative newcomer to the study of communities as research and intervention localities, the 
development of best practice in community resilience has a lot to gain. For nearly fifty years, and 
before the birth of the concept community resilience as a subject of academic inquiry, communities 
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have figured prominently in the social and behavioural sciences. Considerable scholarly work is 
devoted to community research and practice in public health disciplines like health promotion, health 
education, as well as the study of the social determinants of health. Crucial, too, has been the input 
from the fields of nursing, social work, community psychology, adult education, cultural anthropology, 
and indigenous science,75 decolonising methodologies,76 and indigenous knowledge.77 Collectively, 
these bodies of work have delved consistently into elucidating some of the complexities posed by the 
community setting, contributing to the establishment of research standards and best practices for 
engaging communities, their members, and representatives.  
 This section discusses theoretical developments in the politics of the community, community 
action for health, the top-down and bottom-up approaches to community-oriented health promotion 
practice, other models of community organising, and participation. It also examines the multi-level 
concept of empowerment, described as a social action process by which “people, organisations, and 
communities gain mastery over their lives.”78  
a. The Politics of Community: 
 Of importance to this debate is the politics of the term community.79 To the despair of many 
academics, according to Boutillier and others, most “initiatives fail to define community explicitly and 
infer its existence as a geographic space with relatively stable and homogeneous values, in which 
consensus is not only possible, but desirable and easily achieved and there is little or no 
acknowledgement of conflict or power struggles among community members.”80 For the authors, two 
key concerns stem from such an abstract or idealised conception of community. First, its implications 
for the realities of citizen participation and, second, the relation between the use of community 
rhetoric, limited public investment, and the predominance of neoliberal ideology. In terms of citizen 
participation, the authors state that abstract notions of community tend to imply inclusivity and full 
community involvement, but these are not often realised in meaningful ways in actual decision-
making and policy implementation. Furthermore, the use of community rhetoric as an instrument of 
policy is seen by Poland and others as “central to understanding the production, consumption and 
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social geography of health.”81 When policies are increasingly neo-liberal,82 the concept of community 
becomes ideological and used to further a political and economic agenda. 
b. Community Action for Health: 
 Community action for health has been a staple priority action area of public health for nearly 
thirty years, when in 1986, the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion declared that a new public health 
would work through “concrete and effective community action in setting priorities, making decisions, 
planning strategies and implementing them to achieve better health.”83 In so doing, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) significantly expanded this body of work through theoretical approaches on 
comprehensive analyses of how work with communities (geographical and of interest, alike) is 
conducted within the frame of reference of public health research and practice.  
c. Models of Community Organising: 
 A cornerstone of community practice are community-organising models like Rothman and 
Topman’s community-organising triptych.84 According to this approach, community organising is 
categorised into three distinct models: social planning, locality development, and social action.85 For 
Minkler and Wallerstein, the social planning model focuses on the relationship between government 
and community groups along resource and service dimensions. Social planning is generally understood 
as task oriented, and emphasises rational-empirical problem solving, usually led by an outside 
expert.86 According to Boutillier and others, this model is associated with the community-based 
approach to practice.87 It is also tokenistic, emphasising behaviour change instead of structural 
change, which can lead to victim blaming.  
 The locality development, or asset or competence-based model, is characterised by reliance 
on the ideas of mutual and self-help present in the idealised or romanticised notions of community.88 
It is established on the basis of significant and meaningful community input and more equitable power 
relations among communities and other stakeholders involved.89 It is associated with capacity building 
and collaboration (understood as a discreet and mutually beneficial relationship of two or more 
organisations to achieve common goals)90 between a broad cross-section of the public and established 
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institutions.91 The locality development model is also seen as “process-oriented, stressing consensus 
and cooperation and aimed at building group identity.”92 
 Finally, the social action model is primarily concerned with changes in social power 
relationships. It is characterised by the use of conflict and confrontation as an organising style”93 and 
by seeing communities as immersed in collective struggles against conditions of inequality.94 The social 
action model is both task and process oriented and “concerned with increasing the problem-solving 
ability of the community with achieving concrete changes to redress imbalances of power and 
privilege between an oppressed or disadvantage group and the larger society.”95 In the US, this model 
of community organising is associated with the work of self-described radical, Saul Alinski.96 
 More recently, authors like Labonté97 and Wallerstein and Sanchez-Merki have developed other 
models of collaborative empowerment and community-building practice, which present alternative 
approaches to self-help and collaboration.98 These models are primarily derived from the locality 
development approach, but move beyond its externally-driven nature to become community-driven, 
where the process of creating more healthy and equal power relations is propelled by communities 
themselves.99 Bracht and others also delve into this theoretical pursuit in their development of a five-
stage community organising model for health promotion that involves an applied process of citizen 
and organisational mobilisation in a way that facilitates the empowerment of communities for social 
change.100 Minkler and Wallerstein have also compiled a list of key concepts in community organising 
and community building: 
1. Empowerment – Social action process to gain mastery over their lives/lives of their 
communities;  
2. Critical consciousness: a consciousness based on reflection and action in making change; 
3. Community capacity: community characteristics affecting its ability to 
identify/mobilise/address problems;  
4. Issue selection: identifying winnable/specific targets of change that unify and build 
community strength.101 
 
d. Top-Down & Bottom-Up – Two Distinct Approaches: 
 For Wallis and Dollery, “both the government failure paradigm, with its top-down emphasis, 
and the social capital theory, with its stress on bottom-up approaches, provide analytical frameworks 
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that can be used to comprehend the symptoms of state incapacity reported by the much broader 
literature on policy implementation.”102 In public health, this debate has been prominently addressed 
by Boutillier and others. In their integrative review of the literature on community practice, the 
authors adopt Labonté’ s work on categorising two distinct approaches103 to community-oriented 
health promotion practice.104 The first represents its biomedical and disease prevention positioning 
and the second its socially critical socio-environmental direction. Drawing on Felix and others, the 
authors expand this argument and identify these two broad categories as community-based and 
community development.105 In the community-based or top-down106 approach, the community is seen 
as a venue for health behaviour programmes107 that are primarily concerned with professionally 
determined norms. These interventions are often initiated by experts and other stakeholders that are 
external to the community and mostly outreach to facilitate the implementation of previously 
identified strategies. In Christchurch, evidence for the application of this top-down approach can be 
seen in the enactment of emergency legislation that bore fruit in the creation of Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA).  
 In the community development, or bottom-up approach,108 the community is seen as a locus 
for organising efforts to change socioeconomic policies and practices.109 Here, programmes are 
concerned with empowerment and capacity building. Outside agents are called to support the 
community in the identification of issues that it considers important, and to enable the community to 
develop strategies in order to address them.110 Indeed, despite the establishment of CERA and its 
takeover of local government responsibilities after the Canterbury earthquakes, civil society mobilised 
in service of those in need and to create liveable urban common spaces for the people in Christchurch 
and nearby districts after the destruction of its central business district (CBD). My framework of 
community resilience is constructed from this community development or bottom-up approach to 
community practice, as it stresses community participation and empowerment, or enabling 
communities to increase control over their lives.111 As such, it acknowledges these power disparities 
between communities and institutional actors and seeks to emphasise theoretical concepts that, if 
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taken seriously, would help carve out more decision-making power for communities in the context of 
top-down recovery and urban regeneration interventions.  
e. Civil, Public, Popular, Social & Community Participation: 
I now consider the question of community participation and engagement. Many quantitative 
studies are devoted to the metrics of social engagement. In the political sciences and the law, there is 
considerable emphasis on public opinion/political preference, as well as voter enrolment and turn-out 
patterns. In New Zealand too, considerable effort is devoted to the collection of this information by 
the Electoral Commission, Elections New Zealand, Statistics New Zealand, and the NZ Election Study. 
These sources, however, have limited measures of engagement by just focusing on voting and 
volunteerism. Other formal sources of information on civil engagement include documentation in the 
public domain, such as written submissions to resource consent applications and consultations, 
Parliament, councils, and other Crown and quasi-governmental entities/commissions. These are of 
particular interest in relation to proposed reforms or stream-lining the regulatory frameworks for 
urban planning in New Zealand. Nevertheless, these formal sources of data can suffer from selection 
bias, as people who vote and write submissions, could be more engaged in the first place from a socio-
demographic perspective, than those who do not participate – those who are more vulnerable and 
arguably harder to reach. Because it is precisely these disadvantaged population groups, that are the 
target of these interventions, attention must also be given to other qualitative and participatory 
approaches that build capacity at a local level.  
 Reflecting during the fiftieth anniversary of the student protests in the streets of Paris that 
echoed around the world and ushered in dramatic social changes to create more socially just systems 
of governance,112 I have been inspired by the work of Arnstein and her ladder of citizen participation. 
That is a typology of eight levels: manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, 
partnership, delegated power, and citizen control. These levels are organised “with each rung 
corresponding to the extent of citizens’ power in determining the end-product.”113 Widely discussed 
by public participation theorists, this model focuses on the degree of discrimination among citizens 
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throughout consultative processes, including the roles played by power, racism, and sexism. For 
Ombler and colleagues, “Arnstein was adamant that many forms of participation are tokenistic at best, 
and oppressive at worst, and people of lower socio-economic class are more likely to be subject to 
sham consultation and are less likely to be listened to.” Under that view, any real increase in citizen 
decision-making power and government accountability would be the result of a political struggle since, 
“the powerful will not willingly relinquish power.”114 
A common way of harnessing community participation and promoting collaboration between 
the community, the third sector, business, and institutional stakeholders is the development of 
coalitions and partnerships,115 or organisations of individuals that, in turn, represent diverse 
organisations and constituencies who decide to work together to achieve a common goal.116 In so 
doing, institutional stakeholders seek increased community involvement and embrace aspects 
associated with a community development approach. New Zealand’s statutory framework is mainly 
derived from the Treaty of Waitangi, which emphasises the use of partnerships to work together 
with iwi, hapū, whānau and Māori communities” to develop strategies and promote Māori 
wellbeing.117 Riger highlights the importance of participation by noting that a sense of community is 
associated with participation and a personal sense of place and commitment, which are related to the 
development of psychological empowerment.”118 Israel and others also demonstrate some concrete 
advantages of community participation: 
“[1] enhances the relevance, usefulness, and use of the research data by all stakeholders 
involved, [2] joins together partners with diverse skills, knowledge, expertise and sensitivities to 
address complex problems; [3] improves the quality and validity of research by engaging local 
knowledge and local theory based on the lived experience of the people involved; [4] 
acknowledges that knowledge is power and the knowledge gained can be used by all partners 
involved to direct resources and influence policies that will benefit the community; [5] 
strengthens the research and programme development capacity of the stakeholders; [6] 
increases the possibility of overcoming the understandable distrust of research on the part of 
communities that have historically been the subjects of such research; [7] has the potential to 
bridge the cultural gaps that may exist between the stakeholders involved.” 119 
 
Nevertheless, the use of community participation as an engagement strategy needs to be 
further explained and more attention must be given to the question of “substantive representation.” 
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Substantive representation refers to a situation when members of a decision-making body are 
selected by the community and accountable to community interests, to ensure a high degree of 
democratic participation of community members.120 Participation, however, does not always result in 
the acquisition of collective influence or control. This is the result of larger socio-political forces that, 
if not addressed, may doom interventions to transitory and ineffective actions. Put differently, 
community empowerment (as discussed below) is not possible in the absence of a redistribution of 
power. More recently, Cornwall has recognised that there seems to be an increasing response by 
public institutions to the demands of activists, development practitioners, and progressive thinkers 
for greater public involvement in the making of important decisions and for the holding of 
governmental institutions accountable for following through with relevant commitments.121 Below, I 
reflect on this point more broadly when discussing the concept of democracy. 
f. Community Empowerment: 
Beyond the question of participation and engagement, the differences between approaches to 
community practice are centred on whether they promote the empowerment of communities – their 
ownership and control of their own endeavours and destinies. In public health, this emphasis on 
community empowerment begins with the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion,122 which lent 
“further support to the legitimacy of community development as a health promotion strategy and 
relied on the empowerment of communities, their ownership and control of their own endeavours 
and destinies”123 at its strategic heart.124 In this approach, public health must reject the portrayal of 
community members as passive recipients of professionally-developed interventions associated with 
social planning, or community-based, top-down community practice.125 Moreover, this emphasis on 
empowerment is characterised by a move from medical and behavioural health determinants, to 
those defined in social, environmental, and political terms.126 As such, empowerment lies at the core 
of community resilience, because it is a comprehensive social and political process through which 
people increase their control over decisions and actions127 that affect their health and wellbeing. 
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Empowerment is also seen as promoting a community’s capacity or competency to respond 
assertively in the advent of a large-scale disaster by working collectively with other sectors.  
In the broadest sense, empowerment is “the process by which disadvantaged people work 
together to increase control over events that determine their lives.”128 Discussing the complementary 
relation between empowerment and prevention, Rappaport justifies its use as the subject of an 
ecological theory of community psychology from the perspective of which we can “define, understand, 
explain, predict, create, or facilitate our interventions and policies.”129 For Rappaport, empowerment 
involves self-determination over one’s life, as well as democratic participation in the life of one’s 
community. This will often occur through mediating structures such as schools, churches, and the 
others in the third sector. As such, the concept “conveys both a psychological sense of personal control 
or influence and a concern with actual social influence, political power, and legal rights.” 
Empowerment has also been described as “a multilevel construct” which can be applied to individuals, 
their relationships, as well as to organisations and neighbourhoods with an emphasis on the study of 
social context. In this respect, Rappaport notes: 
“There is built into the term a quality of the relationship between a person and his or her 
community or something outside oneself. Part of our task must be to specify what these 
relationships are like for people, organisations, and communities. What is the nature of the 
settings in which empowerment is developed or inhibited? Empowerment is not only an 
individual psychological construct it is also organisational and sociological. Empowerment is 
expected to be found in a diversity of apparently contradictory settings and programmes, 
especially those in which the people of concern have a large and controlling voice in determining 
what takes place and how it is done. Such settings and programmes can be expected to be found 
on a local rather than a grand scale.” 
 
According to Green and others, empowerment not only embraces individual and collective 
actions directed at strengthening the skills and capabilities of communities and their constituents, but 
actions that aim to change adverse social, environmental, and economic conditions and mitigate their 
impact on health and wellbeing. The process of empowerment brings people together “to work 
collectively to change those things that are beyond the control of individuals, small groups, or specific 
geographic communities, through broader-based coalitions and social movements.”130 As a multilevel 
construct, empowerment is concerned with “radiating effects of interventions at one level of analysis 
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and influences the other levels.” Here, empowerment is influenced by social context and is seen as a 
process or mechanism through which people, organisations, and communities become masters over 
their affairs. Naturally, the idea of empowerment looks different depending on the perspective of 
different people, organisations, and settings.131 
 According to Rissel, psychological or personal empowerment is the first level of community 
empowerment and is an analogue to perceived self-efficacy,132 understood as an increased sense of 
control over one’s life or the “confidence in performing a behaviour and in overcoming barriers to that 
behaviour.”133 In this sense, it is like the concept of psychological or personal resilience discussed in 
the previous chapter. Empowerment also has a political action component, according to which 
members, using this sense of personal power, actively participate in the achievement of redistribution 
of resources or in the making of decisions favourable to the relevant community or group.134 For their 
part, Raeburn and Rootman’s people-centred approach emphasises an experiential perspective of 
empowerment as the centre of gravity135 and emphasises the role of personal empowerment and 
participation as “the single most important contribution to the development of a sense of 
empowerment.” For Lord and Farlow, the goal is to understand how empowerment is experienced by 
individuals who sense they are, or not, in control of their lives. The authors maintain that the nature 
of actual participation may vary, and that merely being accepted as a member of a group is considered 
as an important factor. However, the authors also refer to “the strength of participation as a force in 
producing a sense of personal empowerment.”136  
Considering this, they propose that empowerment is a process that evolves over time. From 
this developmental perspective, people gain participatory competence as they undergo a long and 
labour-intensive process consisting of four stages: era of entry, era of advancement, era of 
incorporation, and era of commitment. This developmental approach is contrasted by the structural 
perspective of empowerment, where the concept is seen as an abstraction “having to do with a 
commodity called power and closely allied to a conflictual or political agenda.” Hence, the authors 
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developed an approach incorporating the experiential, developmental, and structural aspects of 
empowerment by placing it within a people-centred health promotion approach.  
 Israel and others emphasise personal empowerment and political action as essential for 
community empowerment and make an important contribution to this body of literature by 
considering an intermediary level, that of organisational empowerment. In so doing, they define an 
empowered organisation as one that is “democratically managed, its members share information and 
control over decisions and are involved in the design, implementation and control of efforts toward 
goals defined by group consensus.” An empowered organisation works as “an essential link between 
empowered individuals and effective political action.”137 Based on the notion of power-with, 
Robertson & Minkler also contribute to the intermediary level of organisational empowerment by 
developing a “professional empowering relationship,” one that facilitates the identification of 
requirements and necessary actions to achieve solutions by communities and individuals.138 
 In unpacking the assumptions about community work and empowerment-related social change 
processes in an article that has since set the standard for professional practice in health promotion, 
Labonté has noted that, while the community is often presented as the vehicle of empowerment and 
the engine of health promotion, it may be more accurate to say that small groups are the locus of 
change. It is in small groups where individuals forge identities and create purpose. Indeed, it is “only 
in interacting with others that people gain those healthful characteristics essential to empowerment: 
control, capacity, coherence, connectedness, and critical thinking, and conscientisation”139 (the latter 
understood as the process of becoming critically aware of one’s social reality through reflection and 
action (the Freirean iteration of this key Marxist concept).140  
 Community empowerment consists therefore of three levels: personal empowerment, 
organisational empowerment, and political action.141 For Wallerstein, the interactions among these 
levels are synergistic, making community empowerment both an individual and a group phenomenon. 
In this sense, empowerment refers to a dynamic process, which involves continual oscillations in 
personal empowerment and power-over relations between different social groups.142 
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 From a programme planning and evaluation perspective, community empowerment is viewed 
as both a process, used to accomplish a particular objective, and an outcome, where it is the objective 
itself.143 As an outcome, community empowerment can vary and can be thought of as a “broad longer-
term goal,” that involves a redistribution of resources, a decrease in individual or group 
powerlessness, or success in achieving set goals.144 However, community empowerment is mostly 
viewed in the literature as a social change process.145 For example, Minkler describes community 
empowerment as “a process of assisting communities in setting goals, mobilising resources, and 
developing action plans for addressing shared public health concerns.”146 Wallerstein also describes 
community empowerment as a “social action process that promotes participation of people, who are 
in positions of perceived and actual powerlessness, towards goals of increased individual and 
community decision-making and control, equity of resources, and quality of life.”147  
 In his theoretical framework, the “empowerment holosphere,”148 Labonté also views 
community empowerment as a “continuum representing progressively more organised and broadly-
based forms of social and collective action” and breaks the concept down in the following nodes or 
sub-spheres: personal action, development of small mutual groups, community organisations, 
partnerships, and social and political action. These nodes or sub-spheres are interconnected and all of 
them are important in creating a complete picture of community empowerment.149 But planning 
based on such lofty objectives would normally require significant structural changes in society.150 
Much like community resilience, authors like Torre,151 Swift & Levin,152 Rissel,153 and Rappaport, have 
argued that empowerment is viewed as the “holy grail” of community practice and as “a pervasive 
positive value in American culture.”154 However, the over-use and misuse of empowerment rhetoric 
has arguably diminished its significance and meaning.155 As with community resilience, the authors 
argue that it is hard to replace in community practice because there is no other term that synthesises 
what the discipline is trying to say and achieve.156 Labonté and Lavarack articulate this caveat:  
“The empowering discourse of health promoters has evolved as a bureaucratic response to 
progressive social movements and to contemporary health discourses of the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s. This has contributed to one of the major tensions in health promotion today: many health 
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promoters continue to exert power over the community through top-down programmes whilst 
at the same time using the emancipatory discourse of the Ottawa Charter. This tension between 
discourse and practice continues because there has been little clarification of how to make the 
concept of empowerment operational in the more conventional, or top-down, programme 
context within which many health promoters work.”157 
 
 For Rappaport, community empowerment is precisely the process of “becoming able or allowed 
to do some unspecified thing because there is a condition of dominion or authority regarding that 
specific thing, as opposed to all things.” It follows that, to understand its meaning, “one must know 
something more than individuals; one must also know what, or who, one has authority over”158 and 
how people “experience shifts in their relations of power.”159 This implies a critical exploration of the 
conditions of dominion or authority and a need to better understand how power infuses relationships 
between different stakeholders. At the same time, one needs to examine how programmes can 
transform unhealthy power relationships into healthy ones. It becomes necessary to move towards 
greater equality in social relations, which would affect which issues are targeted, how available 
resources are allocated, what strategies are chosen, and who will have the power to make these 
decisions.160 An exploration of power and power relations follows. 
E. Wider Context (Macro-Sociological Level of Analysis): 
 This section is also written in line with my approach of organising this integrative review of 
various theoretical approaches within a multilevel analysis and socio-ecological framework (as 
explained above). As such, I now assess theories that address the broader or larger scale social 
dynamics, structures, and forces that impact upon communities and their members, or the macro 
sociological level of analysis. Of interest in this context are theories concerned with the study of power 
and power relations. These theories are of significant relevance to understanding community 
resilience as a social action process where communities are empowered to fully participate in the 
decision-making processes of recovery, which are traditionally top-led and heavily rely on private 
investment and the outsourcing of public services to the market and the third sector. My thesis is that 
this is well illustrated by the case of Christchurch and the top-down structure of the recovery policies 
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enacted in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquakes and the role of CERA, to the detriment of 
local democracy and limited participation in the decision-making for communities. 
1. A Focus on Power, Power Relations - A Critical Understanding of Community Resilience: 
 So, what are power relations and why incur additional complexities by analysing community 
resilience from this perspective? How can the development of the concept of community resilience 
benefit from the recognition of power and power relations between institutions, communities, and 
the market? More importantly, how is this approach of any use to communities seeking to gain greater 
resilience for their members and their cities? This study sought to provide viable answers to these 
questions by adopting the ontological and epistemological foundations of the critical paradigm161 or 
the critical theory inquiry paradigm.162 This understanding of community resilience is a radical 
departure from the positivist paradigm, which informs much current research and practice in the field 
of resilience. The use of a critical approach can be justified based on the need to describe the delicate 
balance between the control exercised by these vertically organised policies associated with disaster 
recovery, the role of the market, and the need for community participation and empowerment. As 
discussed above, these community development strategies require a change in power relations to 
become more enabling of communities in a top-down intervention context.  
But, to rehabilitate power relations in practice, so that they are more empowering for 
communities, power relations need to be properly understood. In fact, it has been argued that in a 
policy development context, “power relations are frequently acknowledged, but rarely adequately 
unpacked,”163 let alone transformed with a more empowering outlook for communities and their 
members. Much evidence underpins the study of power and power relations,164 as it is an increasingly 
common undertaking in other disciplines, even if this theoretical trend is yet to make a mark on 
current interpretations of the concept of community resilience. Such an attempt to systematically 
apply the main ideas of the critical social paradigm to public health is found in the critical social science 
perspective (CSSP) for health promotion research. A CSSP starts with a reflexive posture toward 
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knowledge and the research process, as well as to the ideological assumptions underlying it. It looks 
at the role of power, contradiction, and dialectical relationships.165  
2. Community Practice, Power & Powerlessness: 
Reflecting on power, power relations, and community practice, Lavarack summarises the 
existing body of literature into two broad analytical categories: zero-sum and non-zero-sum forms of 
power. For this author, the zero-sum form of power “exists when one can only possess x amount of 
power to the extent that someone else has the absence of an equivalent amount.” In this category of 
power, “there are dominant forms of status or privilege which tend to structure power-over relations 
in most social situations.” Here, power-over describes “social relationships in which one party is made 
to do what another party wishes them to, despite their resistance and even if it may not be in their 
best interest.” According to Lavarack, the role of community practice with respect to this classical form 
of power is to assist groups in their efforts to gain power and control from other groups over resources 
or decision-making processes that influence their health.166  
The non-zero-sum constructions of power focus on participation, caring, sharing, and 
responsibility to others, addressing the exercise of power in a way in which all groups can benefit. 
Community practice is more closely identified with this construction of power and seeks “to use these 
attributes to engender them in others and to transfer power between groups by encouraging 
individuals to access information by themselves, in part by providing better access to resources and 
information.” This non-zero-sum construction of power is also associated with the notions of power-
from-within and power with. For Labonté, power-from-within is described phenomenologically as an 
“experience of self, a personal power or some inner sense of integrity or truth.”167 Power-from-within 
is also known as personal or psychological empowerment168 and it is about gaining a sense of control 
over one’s life.169 For Lavarack, power-with is a “set of social relationships, in which power-over is used 
deliberately to increase other people’s power-from-within, rather than to dominate or exploit them.” 
Most definitions of community empowerment embody the notion of power-with by proposing that 
empowerment is not given and must come from within a group or community.170 
143 
 
In contrast to the concept of power, powerlessness is described as “the absence of power, 
whether imagined or real.”171 According to Freire, writing in the context of the Latin American post-
colonial fray, powerlessness is also a result of alienation (much like ideology, itself a Marxist 
concept172), and involves a “passive acceptance of oppressive cultural givens, or the surrender to a 
culture of silence.” For Freire, individuals become powerless when they assume roles of objects acted 
upon by the environment, rather than acting as subjects in and on the world.173 In a situation of 
powerlessness, according to Wallerstein, the individual “alienates himself or herself from participation 
in the construction of reality.”174 The process of moving from powerlessness to empowerment is that 
of emancipation or conscientisation – “the cultivation of critical consciousness to not only provide a 
stimulus for better understanding of the root causes of human suffering and dehumanisation or the 
loss of humanity, but also brings full effect to humanisation, an effective approach to address 
dehumanisation problems.”175 As Marxist principles,176 these concepts are philosophical grounds to 
strive for and are, in turn, the outcome of a dialectical relationship between the social and cultural 
givens and individual action or agency. 
In summary, discussions on power and power relations in community practice indicate that 
community development relationships are created through people, between groups, organisations, 
and institutions.177 Accordingly, they are seen as structured upon inherent power relations between 
practitioner and client and institutions and community groups. In this context, social change is 
understood as a difficult pursuit,178 that requires attention to the values of “humanity, impartiality, 
neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality”179 and a “spirit of social justice.”180 
This is particularly true in disaster settings where human and environmental vulnerability come starkly 
into light. It is based on these values and the fundamental rights they aim to preserve, that structural 
changes can be proposed to co-construct community resilience. 
3. Modern & Post-Modern Interpretations of Power & Power Relations: 
It has been noted by Dahl that the fact “that some people have more power than others is one 
of the most palpable facts of human existence,” and makes the concepts of power and power relations 
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“as ancient and ubiquitous as any that social theory can boast.”181 In this section, I provide a brief 
scoping of this vast theoretical body of work and how it has been applied to community practice. 
Understanding what is power, and what are power relations, has occupied the minds of some of the 
Western world’s most influential social and political thinkers. For Knapp, “the theoretical origins of 
the conflict, functionalist, and organisational paradigms in sociology are usually seen as distinct.” 
Nevertheless, “common elements in the social theories of Marx, Durkheim and Weber are usually 
seen as common responses to the development of industrial, capitalist, democratic, bureaucratic 
structures.” Indeed, Hegel's social theory of the break-up of feudal society is a common point of 
reference.182 In this context, the classical or widely accepted definition of power was provided by the 
German philosopher Max Weber, who described it in line with his preoccupation with understanding 
the nature of social authority and rule based on the presence or absence of conflict. Power, under his 
view, is connected to “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position 
to carry out his own will, despite resistance.”183  
I started this discussion with this definition because of Weber’s impact on our modern 
understanding of power, authority, and bureaucracy or public administration of government in 
capitalist societies.184 Weberian reflections on governance, life chances, and the role of property can 
be applied to my understanding of the case of the Christchurch recovery. As suggested by my 
qualitative systematic review and explored empirically in Chapter Seven, this particularly the case with 
real property and homeownership. The statutory nature of the right to property in New Zealand is 
quite complex and requires further research.  
As important as Weber and other modern authors are to the study of power,185 there is another, 
equally important, approach to understanding of power and power relations. This more post-modern 
approach links ideology, hegemony, and discourse. Based on the Marxist concept of ideology, “which 
describes how the dominant ideas within a given society reflect the interests of a ruling economic 
class,” this post-modern conception of power is focused on the “theory and practice to rid our consent 
to power,” or the “ways in which ideology and discourse function to convince people to accept 
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systems of social inequality as acceptable and inmune from social transformations.” For Stoddard, in 
analysing why people consent to unequal power relations, this approach also illuminates possibilities 
for resistance and social change.  
From the Frankfurt School in Germany, to the halls of Paris’ École Normale Supérieur in the hot 
summer of 1968, to a cold and dark prison cell in Italy, for over a century, social theorists have “long 
attempted to explain why those who lack economic power, consent to hierarchies of social and 
political power.” These theorists have used the concepts of ideology, hegemony, and discourse to 
explain the links between “the social production of knowledge and the perpetuation of power 
relations.” In doing so, they connect, “ideology to a vision of society dominated by economic class as 
a field of social power and offer a more complex understanding of how our consent to networks of 
power is produced within contemporary capitalist societies.”186 This hegemonic conception of power 
and power relations is mostly associated with the work of Gramsci.187 
 Here, however, I choose to expand on the work of Foucault, who describes hegemonic power 
as the power that is “invisible and internalised such that it is structured into our everyday lives and 
taken for granted”188. Through this conception of power as hegemonic, Foucault presents the subject 
as embedded in her or his social context – “a being-in-the-world,” or a middle ground between the 
subject as the product of structural forces (like power relations) that impinge upon them and their 
freedom, or “the possibility of escape from the constraints of power.” Indeed, in one of his later 
interviews, Foucault logically proposes that “one must observe also that there cannot be relations of 
power unless the subject is free, for in the relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of 
resistance, for if there were no resistance – there would be no power relations.”189 
Although, as described, hegemonic power is invisible, Foucault proposes that it can be revealed 
through discourse, which is anchored in language and involves a particular way of talking and 
understanding the world or “a group of ideas or patterned way of thinking,”190 located within wider 
social structures. According to Allan, language is structured in accordance to different verbal and 
textual patterns derived from interactions with social life.191 By establishing that discourse is the 
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manifestation of hgemonic power, Foucault describes how social structure, is affected by different 
actors or “sources of power.”192 The author argues that discourse is, above all, a “systems of thoughts 
composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the 
subjects and the worlds of which they speak,”193 developed by these actors or sources of power. For 
Foucault, the “pre-existing forms of continuity, that are accepted without question, must remain in 
suspense” to make a precise assessment of the object of research. For the author, “the tranquillity 
with which they are accepted must be disturbed and we must show that they do not come about of 
themselves, but are always the result of a construction of the rules of which must be known, and the 
justifications of which must be scrutinised.”194  
Foucault describes the ontology of discourse as a “pluralist” one; one of coexistence of various 
“units of discourse”195 (like medicine and his other well researched case studies, for example). As a 
possible unit of discourse, resilience (as suggested in the previous chapter) “coexists” with other units 
of discourse like humanitarianism,196 urban197 and environmental planning198 concepts like renewal 
and regeneration,199 and neo-liberalism and welfare state “adjustment,”200 For Foucault, these units 
of discourse can be studied on the basis of the “individualisation of discourse,” the idea that “there 
exist criteria for individualising discourses which are known and reliable: the linguistic system to which 
these units belong and the subject which holds them together.” Moreover, according to Foucault, 
“these criteria make it possible to substitute differentiated analyses for the theme of totalising history, 
the spirit of a century, or the episteme of a period.”201  
This Foucauldian concept of episteme, has been likened to Kuhn’s concept of paradigm, which 
refers to “the orderly unconscious structures underlying the production of scientific knowledge in a 
particular time and place,”202 an epistemological field forming the conditions of possibility for 
knowledge in that given time and place.” For Foucault, this is “not the sum of its knowledge, nor the 
general style of its research, but the divergence, the distances, the oppositions, the differences, the 
relations of its various scientific discourses.” Indeed, “the episteme is not a sort of grand underlying 
theory, it is a space of dispersion, it is an open and doubtless indefinitely describable field of 
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relationships.”203 Resilience could also be viewed as such an episteme, one that arose as a mutation 
(or paradigm shift) from a rational planning perspective, one that sought to use all the resources 
necessary to find the best solution to a problem, to one that relies on human agency to bounce-back 
and the market to provide the necessary solutions with minimum public investment. 
 Sharp and Richardson propose that discourse analysis is becoming increasingly common in 
planning and environmental policy research and conclude “that this emerging approach promises 
considerable insights as it is applied more widely.” Indeed, for these authors discourse analysis is able 
to “engage with the complexities of policy making in ways that other approaches do not and may be 
helpful in explaining some of the difficult dynamics of policy making which may be of particular 
relevance to practitioners exploring empowerment approaches.”204  
 Nevertheless, although insightful and dominant in qualitative research, this post-modern 
theoretical body of work linking power and power relations with ideology, hegemony, and discourse 
is, however, outside the bounds of my research project. Nevertheless, they are in no way unimportant. 
An exercise in discourse analysis would be invaluable to the critical evaluation of the concept of 
community resilience. As explained in Chapter One, I focused instead on a third approach to 
understanding power and power relations: that of critical realism. For Maxwell, critical realism is 
consonant with some post-modern propositions, including “the idea that difference is fundamental 
rather than superficial, a scepticism toward general laws, an anti-foundationalist stance, and a 
relativist epistemology.”205 These ideas are considered below. 
4. A Focus on Critical Realism:  
 What radically distinguishes my framework of community resilience is its reliance on critical 
realism and its quest to apprehend causal powers, or generative mechanisms, as the ultimate objects 
of research, in addition to any observations gained empirically. As Maxwell has noted, “although a 
substantial amount of qualitative research is implicitly realist in its assumptions and methods, there 
have been relatively few explicit statements of realist approaches to qualitative research.”206 This 
study employs critical realism because “it embraces naturalistic explanations in the social sciences” 
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without discounting that people “actively reproduce their social world, in contrast with natural 
phenomena.207 Its theoretical elegance and rigour208 and overarching explanatory programme allows 
me to address the research question of what is community resilience and how it can be understood 
from the perspective of power and power relations.  
 Critical realism achieves this in a non-reductionist way and accounts for the complexity of 
potential causal factors of influence with the aim to discover and validate causal explanations.209 
Critical realism invites us to consider a third way to understand the notion of power and power 
relations in a way that transcends the dichotomy of other modern and post-modern theoretical 
approaches. This is achieved by examining both what is empirically apprehended and identifying the 
forces or powers that underlie such observations.  
a. Ontology – Generative Mechanisms & Causal Powers as Intransitive Objects of Research: 
 What are these forces or powers at play in the process of post-disaster housing recovery and 
community resilience, as seen in the case of Christchurch after the Canterbury Earthquakes? I believe 
the answer to this question lies in an ontological shift or a different way of understanding what is real 
and what is the object of scientific inquiry. I have chosen to focus on critical realism instead of other 
theories because of its unique capacity to operationalise power and power relations themselves as 
the objects of research, by focusing on the possible underlying causes of empirical observations and 
human experience.  
 With this, I hope to go beyond the descriptive and conduct an analysis of how power and power 
relations drive the process of disaster recovery and identify how these relations may be transformed 
to engender greater democratic openness after an emergency. Indeed, by making power and power 
relations, not just observations, the objects of research, critical realism provides an explanatory 
account of the phenomenon under study based on factors that can be apprehended empirically, as 
well as the causes that underlie these observations. However, what are these underlying causes, these 
final objects of research? What is real in critical realism? 
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 According to Bhaskar, critical realism does not regard phenomena as the ultimate objects of 
knowledge, but “the structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena; and this knowledge as 
produced in the social activity of science.” That is, for the author, these structures or generative 
mechanisms are neither experiences nor our interpretation of those experiences, “but real structures 
which endure and operate independently of our knowledge.” These real structures are “powers that 
are or not activated” and, to ascribe a causal power, “is to say that a thing will do [or suffer] something, 
under the appropriate conditions, in virtue of its nature.”210 Sayer describes these generative 
mechanisms as “particular causal powers or ways of acting and particular susceptibilities” and as 
“powers and liabilities capable of generating events.”211 Generative mechanisms have also been 
described as the causal powers and liabilities of objects or relations,212 capacities for behaviour,213 and 
tendencies of structures.214  
 For me, it is this ontological claim that is the most attractive feature of critical realism to the 
study of power and power relations. These causal powers are intransitive, or “real and causal 
structures that operate outside our knowledge” and independent of the experiences through which 
they are observed. In this manner, structures and mechanisms are, according to Bhaskar, real and 
distinct. In fact, for Bhaskar, these causal structures and generative mechanisms “must exist and be 
assumed to be independent of the patterns of events and the actions of people.215 This is a 
precondition of social science, “without which there could be no explanatory programme.”216  
 For Volkof and Strong, those who adopt critical realism in their effort to undertanding 
organisations and the ways they operate assume as their main research objective the uncovering of 
generative mechanisms. For the authors, going below what can be observed on the surface, and 
identifying generative mechanisms is what provides causal explanations for the way things happen. 
These mechanisms are decribed by Volkof and Strong as “capacities or tendencies, not powers with 
deterministic effect.” In other words, they have the potental to cause an event (even though they may 
not) by enabling and constraining action.  
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 These authors also maintain that these generative mechanisms “may arise from a structure [or 
an agent], or from the relations between structures, or from the relations between structures and 
actors.”217 As explained, this belief in a dilectical relationship between social structure and human 
agency is essential to the development of a critical understanding of resilience. The problem, however, 
is that there has been little discussion in the literature about exactly what these mechanisms are and 
how they can be identified by researchers. The authors have suggested that generative mechanisms 
can be identified at any level of specificity that is empirically useful,218 but urge researchers to provide 
“fine grained explanations of causality.”219 The goal, they insist, should be to develop middle-range 
theories rather than trying to identify universal social laws. This approach is supported by the 
framework developed by Bygstad and Monkvold, which discussess the steps involved in identifying 
the structural and agential components and how they interact to produce to an outcome.220 
 This is clarified by McEvoy and Richards, who emphasise that, if these generative mechanisms 
or causal powers are real even if they are not directly observable or experienced, critical realism’s 
ontological proposition is founded upon a layered or nested view of reality.221 Under this view, 
experiences/observations and events are set upon these mechanisms or powers which, for Bhaskar 
“constitute three overlapping domains of reality, viz. the domains of the real, the actual, and the 
empirical.”222 For Archer, “ontological depth necessarily introduces verticality into causal explanation 
which simultaneously entails temporality: when we ask what needs to be the case for x to be possible, 
we predicate its realisation on the prior materialisation of the conditions of its possibility.”223 These 
three domains of the real are represented in the theoretical model below. 
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Figure 4.2: Critical Realist Ontology 
b. The Dialectic between Structure & Agency: 
When a locality is faced with the prospect of current and future disasters, the resulting body of 
policy carries through the thinking of pre-existing social structures and prevalent patterns of social 
and cultural reproduction.224 Without knowledge of this, relations among stakeholders that have 
power and those who do not cannot be understood or acted upon, to purposefully increase a 
community’s competence and empowerment to be resilient. Holding a critical perspective to 
community resilience also contemplates that given the opportunity, communities can summon up the 
power needed to respond, cope, adapt, and make a recovery process their own. A focus on power 
relations analyses how communities carve out a role, even when faced with the overwhelming 
decision-making clout of other stakeholders. This ascribing of a certain level of agency to communities 
seems consonant with the notion of resilience as bouncing-back, or as having an immanent capacity 
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to adapt in the face of disasters. Nevertheless, it goes beyond it by identifying opportunities and 
barriers of democratic participation, so communities are increasingly able to play a meaningful role in 
securing a more resilient setting for their members.  
 Thus, critical realism is characterised by its emphasis in the dialectical relationship between 
social and physical structure and human agency. This charts a conciliatory or middle ground to this 
academic debate, where the subject possesses a certain immanent capacity to thrive and change its 
environment.225 Indeed, from a critical realist perspective, structure and agency are “existentially 
interdependent but essentially distinct”226 and views phenomena as “co-created by mind and the 
given cosmos.”227 These are the product of “neither the result of unencumbered agency nor purely of 
structural constraints and opportunities.” They are a result of the relationship between them.228  
 It has been hypothesised by Williams that health outcomes, behaviours, and social relations 
result both from human agency and social structures, which, in a dialectical relationship, inform, 
produce, and reproduce each other. In this sense, Williams maintains that critical realism, by 
attempting to identify the structures, which constrain and enable activities and how individual actions 
reinforce, challenge, or transform social structures offers to “remedy the tendency to either strip 
agency of structure or structure of agency.”229 For critical realism, these structures or generative 
mechanisms are trans factual because “causal laws operate as tendencies of things expressed as 
powers, potentials and liabilities which may exist without being actualised.”230 Reflecting on the 
intransitive ontology of these mechanisms, Archer proposes that “only on the metaphysical 
assumption that some things are necessary and at least relatively enduring can we reasonably set out 
to practice science or study society.”231  
 However, reality is nonetheless changing, as “social structures provide resources that enable 
individuals to act, as well as placing limits on individual behaviour.”232 These social structures are, 
therefore, not deterministic or preclude human agency. For Williams, the key words are “relatively 
enduring,” for these structures or mechanisms are mutable, which frees critical realism “from the 
charge of over-determinism in which structures can never be changed and social agents are stripped 
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of social agency.”233 From this perspective, one of the defining features of society is its 
“morphogenetic nature,” or its capacity to change its shape and form.234 In this morphogenetic 
approach, “structures may be faithfully reproduced or transformed through the conscious awareness 
and critical praxis of social agents, both individually and collectively.” For Williams, in this approach 
the body/society relationship is better understood as balancing “structural conditioning and degrees 
of agential freedom.”235 This decoupling of structure and agency is done, not to abandon their 
articulation, but “to examine their mutual interplay across time; something which can result in stable 
reproduction or change through the emergence of new properties and powers.”236 
 For Archer, this provides “a resolution of the structure/agency problem in a manner which 
accords equal weight to each.” For her, our embodied nature as a “species-beings” limits who can 
become persons and what these persons can do; as agents, humans are able to transform social 
structures by creatively responding to their circumstances.237 The ontology of critical realism counters 
the linguistic indeterminacies of postmodernism/post-structuralism and enables us to critically 
analyse the social processes through which structure and agency shape each other. 
“In doing so, one is able to counter the over-socialised conception of the agent – a fallacy of both 
sociologists and disability theorists alike – and critically to explain variable outcomes at different 
points in time. For the realist, the essential factor which guarantees that social systems remain 
forever open is that they are peopled by agents and actors who possess a critical reflexivity and 
creativity toward the world in which they live.” 238 
 
 At this juncture, critical realism offers the promise of emancipation, where real bodies are 
capable of transcending real structures that impede the realisation of their natural tendencies.239 The 
ontological belief in mind-independent generative mechanisms, for Williams, “makes for the critical 
and emancipatory potential” of this approach. These proposals are similar to Freire’s 
“conscientisation,” or the struggle for liberation of the oppressed as mediated by a dialectical 
relationship in which the critical awareness of oppression must be acquired through praxis or 
“reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it.”240 This is seen by Hutchins as a critique 
to current academic debates on emancipation between idealism and post-modernism, where 
emancipation is seen as a substantive ideal or a register of freedom, identified with the discursive 
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notion of an imperative “to constantly transgress the boundaries of given limitation.”241 This 
theoretical emphasis on a dialectical relationship between structure and agency is key to 
understanding community resilience and as discussed above, was a source of inspiration in the 
development of my theoretical framework. Indeed, every community has its own structure (social, 
physical, and material resources and liabilities impact upon them). Communities also have social and 
cultural capital and can be resilient in the face of adversity. 
c. Epistemology – Relativism & Science as a Social Practice: 
 Novel ontological statements also demand the development of epistemological claims to suit. 
The ontological proposition of generative mechanisms or causal powers as ultimate objects of 
research creates a need to articulate how these mechanisms or powers can be studied. Proposed in 
tandem with one of Bhaskar’s critiques of positivism, the epistemic fallacy is a “tacit conflation of 
logical and natural necessity and the identification of the resultant concept with that of the a priori.”242 
It is configured in the inseparability243 or composite reading of the ontological and the epistemological. 
This limits the scope of causal generalisations as constant conjunction of events, and for Williams it is 
not a sufficient basis for inferring causality.244 What is required is the identification of generative 
mechanisms and, as such, in contrast to these empirical generalisations in which it is determined that 
there is nothing more to be known, critical realism proposes an “open admission of ignorance.”245 
With his work on structure and method, Sayer complements these propositions by articulating some 
signposts regarding the nature of critical realism and identifying several characteristic claims on the 
substance of reality and the ways it can be apprehended or understood scientifically: 
“The world exists independently of our knowledge of it. Our knowledge of that world is fallible 
and theory laden. Concepts of truth and falsity fail to provide a coherent view of the relationship 
between knowledge and its object. Nevertheless, knowledge is not immune to empirical check 
and explaining successful material practice is not mere accident. There is necessity in the world; 
objects – whether natural or social – necessarily have causal powers, or ways of acting and 
susceptibilities. The world is differentiated and stratified, consisting not only of events, but 
structures, which have powers and liabilities capable of generating events. These structures may 
be present even where they do not generate regular patterns of events. Social phenomena such 
as actions, texts, and institutions are concept dependent. We therefore have not only to explain 
their production and material effects but interpret what they mean. Although they [should] be 
interpreted by starting from the researcher’s own frames of meaning, by and large they exist 
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regardless of researchers’ interpretations of them. Science or the production of any other kind 
of knowledge is a social practice. For better or worse the production of knowledge influences its 
content. Knowledge is also largely linguistic, and the nature of language and the way we 
communicate. Awareness of these relationships is vital in evaluating knowledge. Social science 
must be critical of its object. To explain social phenomena, we must evaluate them critically.246 
  
 If the world is, in fact, real, even if we do not have direct knowledge of it, this knowledge is 
embedded in lenses that are theoretical and neither true nor false. This highlights the critical realist 
posture, that science is a social practice, and has prompted McEvoy and Richards to propose that this 
philosophy of science has a relativist epistemology, given its rejection of scientific observations as 
infallible. Scientific observations are viewed instead, as a product of ideological principles, conceptual 
frameworks, and social relations. This approach constitutes a reflexive stance on the production of 
knowledge, by suggesting that the process of research should commence with an analysis of the 
researcher’s own frames of meaning. Based on these claims, Sayer crucially reflects on the logic of 
scientific inquiry and the nature of philosophical truths by proposing that knowledge is necessarily 
determined by these generative mechanisms or causal powers that underlie all experience. While, at 
the same time, the nature of these is undetermined and “coincide under real world conditions to 
produce emergent properties that are contingent in time and space.”247  
 This complex simultaneous juxtaposition of necessity and contingency in critical realism is 
clarified by Sayer, who writes that “the relationship between objects and causal powers is necessary 
and the relationship between these and their conditions that “activate [or are activated by] the 
mechanisms is contingent.”248 According to Poland and others, the notion of contingency contrasts 
positivist notions of universal logical necessity, as it points to the uncertain nature of phenomena, that 
is, to the fact that a proposition may be true in some circumstances but not in others.249 However, 
according to Sayer, these generative mechanisms and causal powers are nonetheless identifiable 
through their effects. As explained in Chapter Two, this is achieved with retroduction, or the 
retrospective identification of mechanisms to account for observed phenomena250 and relations of 
domination and oppression.251 This nested, critical realist ontology, however, has specific 
epistemological ramifications in the way data were gathered and used to understand the local 
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Christchurch social context of recovery. My study therefore not only sought to gather data to describe 
and attach meaning to my observations and the observations of study participants and others (see 
Result Chapters Five through Eight), but to theorise about the underlying generative mechanisms or 
causal powers driving these observations on community resilience post-disaster housing recovery in 
Christchurch after the Canterbury earthquakes. This reflection is contained in Chapter Nine, where I 
describe how my framework contributed or not to my understanding of the research question.  
5. Democracy – The Constitutional State & the Will of the People:  
 I posit in my thesis that one of these generative mechanisms, or causal powers in the context 
of community resilience, is the democratic quality of the policy framework developed in the mitigation 
and aftermath of a natural disaster like the Canterbury Earthquakes. As explained, the social context 
of recovery in Christchurch holds a mobilised civil society against the backdrop of a top-down and 
highly limiting recovery legislation enacted and justified politically based on a national emergency. In 
the Shock Doctrine, Klein proposes that, national moments of crisis are abused by actors with special 
interests to impose controversial neoliberal policies, at a time of collective trauma when the citizenry 
is unable to mount an effective political resistance.252 
 At a macro-sociological level, the powers-based or critical approach that underlies my model of 
community resilience will naturally focus on formal institutions of governance like the structure or the 
architectonics253 of the liberal or democratic constitutional state254 and the policies enacted by its 
representatives on behalf of “the people.”255 In his review of Habermas’ “structural transformation of 
the public sphere,”256 Duelund provides a description of the ideal behind the modern/liberal 
constitutional state, a characteristic social institution of the Western World: 
“As a liberal bourgeois society developed in the eighteenth century, so too did a public cultural 
scene. Its image of itself was based on reason and rational experience instead of religious 
teleology. The enlightenment concept became the framework for reflection in art and politics. 
The individual became the pivotal point. The formation of the individual and his/her liberation 
from church coercion and predestination were a precondition for secular cultural education and 
the development of a modern society governed by cultural and political democracy. As a result, 
the role of the liberal democracy was to reflect and safeguard this modern view of culture as a 
human right. Not that the individual was to be barred from believing in and practising his/her 
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religion. It was, however, an individual right as a private citizen and not a compulsory tool of 
power politics. This was liberalism’s political message.”257 
  
 The concept of democracy, which accompanies the modern constitutional state, is supported 
by an ancient and complex body of work and is the constant preoccupation of philosophy, theory, law, 
and politics. However, the study of democracy is, above all, the study of political power and who wields 
it. There are many ways to view democracy and how we can ensure that the will of the people is 
reflected in the laws that govern them. These perspectives on democracy are discussed below. Indeed, 
democracy has been described as an “essentially contested concept,”258 because there is no consensus 
about what kinds of institutions are required to implement the democratic ideal. Nevertheless, in its 
most basic sense, democracy means “rule by the people”259 and asks how local and national 
governance institutions should be structured so that the people can rule?  
 For Held, in some contexts, like a small society or one like ancient Greece that only granted full 
rights of citizenship (for example, the right to vote) to exclusive members of its population, a 
democratic form of government can arguably be directly realised. In those societies, the main 
governing body (i.e., the entity that creates the main rules that individuals are required to follow) 
could take the form of an assembly comprised by the entire people (or all its citizens). Democratic 
theorists usually refer to this kind of governance arrangement as “direct democracy.”260 In large and 
complex societies, direct democracy is viewed more like an ideal and is not possible for practical 
reasons, except perhaps in small local contexts,261 as will be discussed shortly. The main way in which 
contemporary societies come close to the idea of direct democracy is through referenda, where 
citizens are given the opportunity to select among several policy alternatives, but not to discuss or 
deliberate about them in a formal context, like a popular assembly. In the contemporary world, these 
forms of direct citizen engagement in the making of political decisions is usually described under the 
umbrella term “participatory democracy,” “the idea that there should be substantial citizen 
participation in government decision-making.”262 Born out of the broad social changes in the late 60s, 
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this democratic arrangement is a critique of Twentieth Century liberal politics and a vehicle for a 
conceptual framework of “strong democracy.”263  
 Although no country in the world can currently be described as a direct democracy (even though 
some countries, like Switzerland, hold a relatively high number of referenda),264 most countries call 
themselves democracies because they see themselves as putting into practice what is typically called 
“representative democracy.”265 In a representative democracy, citizens do not participate directly in 
the making of their society’s rules but, rather, are given the right to elect a smaller group of individuals 
that are called to represent their interests in a national legislature.266 Representative democracies are 
sometimes supplemented by occasional referenda as, for example, is the case in New Zealand (even 
though, in many cases, these referenda are not binding of government).267 In the age of Brexit, the re-
awakening of far-right movements in Europe, and the election of Donald J. Trump as President of the 
United States, referenda have been increasingly the subject of critique by some in the liberal 
establishment (like Grayling)268 who propose that such mechanisms of direct democracy are a vehicle 
for “rancorous” populism and plebiscitary politics that feeds on an “uniformed populace” and the 
ideological distortions created through the lobbying efforts of special interests.269 
 Representative democracies are frequently described as “liberal democracies,”270 as they 
generally rest on the idea that those elected by the people to represent their interests must always 
respect the individual rights of different groups and minorities.271 These rights, not only include things 
such as the right to vote and the right to freedom of religion, but also property rights.272 
Representative democracy is often seen as a “second-best” form of democratic government.273 That 
is to say, since direct democracy cannot be exercised for practical reasons, the alternative is for citizens 
to elect a number of representatives that will act on their behalf. Although it provides “decisional 
efficiency,” for Strøm, representative democracy “also implies disadvantages such as ineffective 
accountability and a lack of transparency, which may cause informational inefficiencies”274 and “voters 
have to live with what elected politicians do.”275 Nonetheless, some authors argue that representative 
democracy has a number of advantages over direct democratic engagement.276 In particular, they note 
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that a representative assembly comprised of a relatively small number of individuals (who are 
frequently better informed about major policy issues than ordinary citizens), is better positioned to 
engage in robust forms of deliberation.277  
 Deliberation, in this sense, refers to a form of decision making where, instead of having people 
simply vote according to their existing preferences, requires policy makers to come to a decision only 
after being exposed to different positions and arguments.278 Referenda, for example, are frequently 
criticised for being devices that simply aggregate the votes of citizens, rather than giving them the 
opportunity to exchange informed arguments and views in a formal setting.279 For Elster, “deliberative 
democracy” refers to a democratic arrangement that promotes informed discussion and debate by 
the people and their representatives. He argues the result of these deliberative practices can be that, 
after being exposed to the reasons given by those in the other side of a debate, policy makers may 
change their initial position280 and, in some cases, reach consensus between initially incompatible 
policy alternatives.281  
 As noted above, representative democracy is generally seen as more compatible with 
democratic deliberation. However, most contemporary authors sympathetic to the direct 
participation of the people in political decision-making also accept the value of deliberation. In that 
respect, and echoing the premium placed on public participation by the concept of urban commons282 
(presented in the previous chapter), the aim of some contemporary democrats (described by Cohen 
and Fung as “radical democrats”), is to find a way of making our forms of government both deliberative 
and participatory. However, as the authors have noted, the problem is that “improving the quality of 
deliberation may come at a cost to public participation.” At the same time, “expanding participation 
– either numbers of people, or the range of issues under direct popular control – may diminish the 
quality of deliberation.” In addition, the complexity and size of modern society, Cohen and Fung argue, 
“limit the extent to which modern polities can be both deliberative and participatory.” Deliberation 
requires knowledge and interest about the issue at stake, and in many cases, these will be possessed 
only by a segment of the total population.283  
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 On the other hand, there are times and resource constraints that “make it undesirable for any 
particular area of public governance to be both fully deliberative and inclusively participatory.” It is 
just not possible for an entire people to constantly devote their time and energy to all political issues 
affecting their country. It is important, however, to develop more participatory democratic 
arrangements to channel the will of the people, particularly at the local level.284 With this goal, Cohen 
and Fung propose what they call “direct participatory deliberation,” which addresses this matter by 
building on “the distinctive practical competence that citizens possess as users of public services, 
subjects of public policy and regulation, or residents who have contextual knowledge of their 
neighbourhoods and ecosystems.” This approach would draw on the specific competencies of 
different groups of ordinary citizens and promote that they “deliberate and develop solutions to 
particular problems of public concern.”285  
 The authors also consider the mechanisms that would facilitate the implementation of this 
democratic approach. One such mechanism is to “randomly select small groups of citizens to 
deliberate on general political issues such as laws and public policies.” The idea is to multiply these 
small groups or “directly-deliberative institutions,” in areas such as education, social services, 
ecosystems, community development, and health services,” as a way of “creating opportunities for 
ordinary citizens to articulate directly their perspectives, needs, and judgments.” This mechanism 
would co-exist with the traditional institutions of representative democracy, as well as with 
referenda.286 When decisions are local in character and directly affect particular group of citizens, Fung 
has argued that a programme of “participatory devolution” could be developed, according to which 
officials close to the implementation of state decisions enjoy substantial latitude and citizens near 
them participate in the exercise of this public power.” Fung argues that such collaborative or 
partnership arrangements enhance a community’s decision-making power, as “citizens are close 
enough to state actions to feel its effects and understand their chains of causation.”287  
 Indeed, the more affected a community is by a policy, the more participatory these democratic 
arrangements should be. The creation of CERA after the Canterbury earthquakes had the opposite 
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effect, giving the Minister of Earthquake Recovery the last word in the decision-making process of 
what was the long-term urban renewal of New Zealand’s second largest city. Contrary to this top-
down policy approach most favoured by national governments after major natural disasters, radical 
democracy devolves288 a degree of direct decision-making power to communities and is consonant 
with a more bottom-up and community development-oriented approach to understanding 
community resilience. In reflecting on urbanism and the politics of ethical place-making, Mason and 
Whitehead argue that it should be committed to “political difference and the voice of the other and 
based upon resistance to the often undemocratic, and certainly narrow, political constitution of the 
agents of global neoliberalism.”289 Such participatory democratic arrangements in post-disaster 
recovery and urban regeneration in Christchurch will be discussed in Chapter Seven – Displacement, 
resilience, participation, and democracy.  
 With primary legislation like the Treaty of Waitangi (which is based on the principles of 
partnership, participation and protection)290 and the Local Government Act,291 by international 
standards New Zealand “possesses a rich culture of citizen engagement and public consultation.”292 
Public participation is also on its face present in the development of the country’s regulatory 
processes.293 However, the quality of this democratic arrangement has been questioned and described 
as “unsatisfactory,”294 “fraught,”295 and “difficult.”296 For Cornwall, the vague meaning of participation 
has “helped the promise of public involvement gain purchase, but it may be time for more clarity 
through specificity if more participation is to realise its democratising promise.”297 
IV. Concluding Remarks: 
 This chapter continued to chart my thesis’ path of deductive theory construction and presented 
a theoretical framework of community resilience and the people-centred foundations upon which it 
is based as a hypothesis to be later tested empirically. Because this is a multilevel and socio-ecological 
framework, the chapter describes the applicable theoretical concepts within each sociological level of 
analysis: individuals and their relations, their groups and communities, as well as their wider social 
context. In particular, as part of the framework’s sociological level of wider context, the chapter 
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discusses the framework’s critical framing and the theories of power and power relations upon which 
it is based. This includes a detailed discussion of my use of critical realism to enshrine power and 
power relations as ultimate objects of research, or the causal structures and mechanisms that 
generate phenomena. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of democracy, where I posit that its 
presence or absence can be characterised as such a generative mechanism, or causal power, in the 
context post-disaster recovery and urban resilience. I also discuss radical democracy as a participatory 
arrangement that aligns with my framework’s bottom-up and critical approach to understanding 




CHAPTER FIVE – PEOPLE, POSITIONALITY, PLACE & POWER 
I. Introduction: 
 
 In this chapter, I continue to follow the process of deductive theory construction by beginning 
to present the empirical data gathered to test my theoretical framework of community resilience. I 
discuss my findings from the case of Christchurch in relation to the framework’s micro-sociological 
level of analysis and the constructs describing attributes of individuals and their relationships. I 
present the empirical data describing participants as individuals within their own social settings. In 
connection with the theoretical framework, these empirical data are associated with concepts of 
positionality: place attachment, sense of place and community; and personal empowerment and self-
efficacy. The chapter presents the information about these concepts, as articulated by participants, 
together with my observations about the information offered. 
 In 2013, just as many Cantabrians were facing the prospect of living through a third year without 
proper housing since the earthquakes, I started visiting the city of Christchurch and nearby areas to 
carry-out fieldwork interviews with key informants about post-disaster housing recovery and 
community resilience. At the time, I expected a high degree of richness to the data that I was about 
to collect and felt a great deal of excitement with the fact that I was entering another phase of my 
research. Moreover, the prospect of interviewing these remarkable individuals, that had so kindly 
given me their time, in what was very much a bitter situation after the region-wide emergency, filled 
my heart with gratitude and overwhelming curiosity.  
 Who were these stakeholders? What were their experiences as residents of Christchurch and 
as key stakeholders in the process of recovery? How had they, their loved ones, organisations, 
communities, and clientele coped with adversity on such a large scale? What did they think of the 
strategy of post-disaster housing recovery up to date? What role should communities play in this 
process and what impact would this have on the city’s future resilience? Even with the prescience of 
these questions in my mind, suffice to say that I did not expect the vividness with which these 
individuals would describe a very poignant human picture of the process of recovery. 
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II. Positionality, Place Attachment & Sense of Place & Community: 
“I came from the mountains and the trees and the forest down to the city to try and make a 
difference in the place that I love.” 
 
 Here, I reasserted the methodology’s emphasis on positionality, or an analysis of where we are 
coming from, in relation to perceptions of community resilience and post-disaster housing recovery. 
For this purpose, participants were asked about their personal and organisational backgrounds at the 
onset of the interview and this provided greater insights into their frame of mind when analysing and 
interpreting their answers. Using triangulation, this information was set against other sources of 
textual data, as well as my personal experiences in the field.  
 The related constructs of place attachment, sense of place, and sense of community were also 
probed by asking participants about their perceived links to Christchurch and their communities. As I 
describe further described below, life-long residents of the city and those who moved there shortly 
before or after the earthquakes, felt a strong connection to the city and spoke of a culture of love for 
an urban centre with a very particular social context. All participants seemed personally invested in 
the process of recovery and urban renewal that was beginning to take shape. This is also associated 
with the constructs of personal empowerment and self-efficacy, also discussed together with the 
framework’s micro-sociological level of analysis. 
A. Personal Background: 
“I’m originally from Dunedin… Western Southland and Dunedin. I'm a southern girl.” 
 
Getting a sense of participants’ personal background was key to better understanding the 
context of their responses to the interview questions. As explained, understanding where a participant 
is coming from is essential from the perspective of the principle of positionality, an important element 
of qualitative research. Most of those interviewed were community service providers or members of 
the third sector. Others represented local and central government and academia. Participants’ 
personal backgrounds varied widely, but their strong attachment and their personal investment in the 
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city did not. Some key informants from both the public and third sectors were originally from 
Christchurch, or had lived there for a while. This was said by a council insider: 
“I live in Christchurch, have done all my life, apart from traveling overseas for a while with my 
wife. Love the city very much and I am very connected to the place and the people. I'm incredibly 
inspired by the passion that our Christchurch residents have, especially, for the environmental 
field, which is, of course, my passion as well.” 
 
As mentioned, this was also the case for several community service providers: 
 
“I've always lived in Christchurch apart from some years away. I work in Christchurch however. 
My home is in the West. My job, however, has always been in the central city.” 
 
“I live in Shirley, on the edge of the red zone, where the TC3 land is. I came to Christchurch in 
2001 to study, chasing my childhood sweetheart. She came up here. I'm originally from 
Southland. I studied geography and, following that, public health. Once I'd finished studying, we 
needed to do some major restructuring here and I ended up coming in to do that and stayed. 
And I married my childhood sweetheart. We wanted to move into the area that we were working 
in, to be a part of the community, not just coming in. We are here ever since.” 
 
Some in the third sector were locals but had only just moved to the city shortly before the 
earthquakes hit. One said “okay, I live in Christchurch. I’ve been in Christchurch for four years. I moved 
here a year before the earthquakes and I shifted to the city for this job.” Another one noted: 
“How did I come to live in the city? Well, I live in Christchurch City Council area, but I don't live 
in Christchurch city, as city. I live in Lyttleton Harbour. I talked about coming back to New 
Zealand for a very long time but couldn't work out where to live. I was away, and I knew I had 
to go soon because, otherwise, my children would be in high school and I would never come 
home. I looked at Auckland. I thought, no Auckland. I might as well just stay, too far away from 
my family, they're in the South. Wellington? How much do I like my job? Love it! But, is it 
important? No. Dunedin, can't. I didn't like Christchurch too much, too flat. Queenstown? No 
sea, need to be near the sea. Nelson? Too small. In the end, my mum took me on a drive over 
the hill one day. The sun was setting, coming over Dyer's Pass. As the sun was setting on all those 
beautiful hills in Lyttleton Harbour, I went, I can live here! It's next to a good-sized city. That's 
why I came to live in Christchurch.” 
 
Others lived with damage to their own homes and experienced the process recovery:  
 
“I have lived in Christchurch all my life and we have lived in our particular home for 43 years. We 
thought we might have to leave it. It was very difficult, but we didn't have to, so we are back in 
it, and that's being repaired now. We had three months out while they began the work, and now 
we are living with the trades’ people. We've been out for six months in total. We were out for 
three months after the earthquake because of land issues beyond us. We could go back and live 
in the cracks, and now we're back in again, after three months out for the repair.” 
 
These life experiences were bound to have an impact on participants’ perceptions of post-
disaster housing recovery and community resilience after the Canterbury earthquakes and were 
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important to record to better contextualise answers in relation to other answers and sources of data. 
These experiences reveal that participants felt like they belonged to the city and were active members 
of the social context under study. It is clear the earthquakes and the recovery process that followed 
had an impact on the participants, in their personal and relations’ lives, as well their experiences as 
key stakeholders in the recovery process itself. What role did they play? The answer to this question 
is found below in the section describing participants’ organisational background.  
B. Organisational Background: 
As explained, participants were also asked about their organisational backgrounds to address 
their positionality. These were diverse but reflected a strong personal commitment to the city’s 
wellbeing. Most key informants were recruited among community service providers and the broader 
third sector and were personally and professionally committed to social justice and the public good.  
“I always had an interest in social justice, always worked in social justice, often in all of my life. 
I always had an interest in social justice and child abuse prevention, and I'm on many boards 
associated with things that I'm interested in, like youth cultural development, the Council of 
Social Services, and many other groups, all with a focus on social justice.” 
 
“We came out in 1995, in a response to the mid '90s economic downturns, really, when a lot of 
beneficiary changes happened, and people were struggling. And they were asking the 
Community Minister for help. And that led to a food bank and a drop-in café and other things. 
And we grew from there. Today, we're a big organisation, providing a whole range of services. 
We got our food bank, but it's much bigger, and we've got a community meal once a week. And 
we've got community gardening, running programmes for people with intellectual disability, and 
a day programme for the elderly.” “Cultural work, we run an international play group and social 
English language classes and things around that.” 
 
“The job I was offered was with the social service arm of the church. They employed me to be a 
social justice enabler. The role is to be involved in, broadly speaking, whatever the church 
considers to be social justice issues that they want to get involved in some way other than direct 
service provision. My role has nothing to do with handing out food parcels to people who are 
hungry, but to ask questions about why they are hungry. Now we have a bunch of volunteers 
who come and go, as well.” 
 
Interestingly, one of these community representatives did not work in Christchurch, but came 
to the city after the earthquakes, to volunteer and study the process of recovery: 
“I was in Melbourne, working on activism and architecture. As that went on, I realised that 
Christchurch was the perfect place to start to study that topic. Also, there was solidarity. When 
there’s a disaster in your country you go back and help. At the beginning of 2012 I moved here, 
and I’ve been living here since then. It certainly feels like I’ve moved here, it feels like home.” 
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This participant had several organisational roles, linking the broader third sector with others:  
“I’ve got multiple hats. I’m a student, but also a designer, and a publisher and I’m a little bit of 
an activist or something, and they all mingle and talk to each other.” 
 
Another worked imprinting New Zealand’s unique multi-cultural perspective to the recovery: 
 
“My focus is with the education around the Treaty of Waitangi. I'm a treaty worker with an 
interest in strong sustainability and in strengthening the independent voice of NGOs in the 
rebuild. In 2016, CERA is going to go out of existence and what we're doing is having a forum on 
what's the transition going to look like? The NGOs, for a long time, way before the earthquakes, 
have been committed to working in a Treaty-based way. Basically, it boils down to 
acknowledging the relationship between tangata whenua, who are the indigenous people of 
Aotearoa, New Zealand, and the rest of us: tangata [people] te tiriti [of the Treaty]. People who 
are indigenous are tangata whenua, everybody else is the people of the Treaty, because it was 
the Treaty that gave the right to people to come in and settle in this land. If it's honoured… which 
our Governments [plural] are getting better at, but have not perfected it, and the NGOs are 
trying to provide some leadership about how to do that in a Treaty-based way. We talk about a 
Treaty-based multicultural future, which recognises the indigenous people and is predicated on 
strong sustainability.” 
 
Some members of the public sector, at either the local and central levels of government, 
emphasised the importance of urban sustainability and climate change: 
“I’m an advisor on urban development. I started working not long after the Local Government 
Act came into play and Canterbury wanted to do some work across all the councils. It was one 
of the hardest jobs I've ever had. Local government doesn't actually work together that well. 
They see it as a loss of their rights, rather than being collaborative for the community.” 
 
“I work for one of the local councils as advisor on sustainability. I've worked in planning for the 
city and its housing. I've got an ecological background and, because of my love of nature and 
the need for a more sustainable way of living, I felt that I had to work to try and change people's 
lifestyles and economic systems so that we had a more sustainable future. That was what really 
motivated me, the need for change and the opportunity there is now in Christchurch for 
changing, responding to those big issues of climate change, of sea level rise. Also, importantly, 
the fact that we are living in an unsustainable way. People feel isolated and we have to change 
to have a more sustainable future.” 
 
Someone in the public sector worked directly with housing in the case of Christchurch:  
“I'm a research analyst and I've been at the organisation for a long time. I've worked in housing 
research over the years. We had approached it to understand why the crowding and 
homelessness had increased? We went around talking to various agencies about what was 
going on in Christchurch, so I wanted to carry on and do a project to look at what was happening 
in housing using the data sources we had.” 
 
A community service provider directly spoke about the connections between housing, 
community, place attachment, and the importance of being embedded in one’s locality: 
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“What people want is a home, a community, not just shelter. One of the big disruptions in 
Christchurch was the reorganisation around education and of people's localities.” 
 
These insights into the impacts from the Canterbury earthquakes offer a multi-sectorial picture 
of post-disaster housing recovery and community resilience from participants that showed an 
understanding of the links between housing and personal, community, and urban resilience.  
III. Personal Empowerment or Self-Efficacy: 
A. The Reality of Adversity – Individual & Collective Trauma after the Disaster: 
Discussing the harsh reality of the disaster, the recovery and the impact this had on people, a 
member of the public sector reflected on the large scale of the disaster. The psycho-social impacts of 
the earthquakes took a toll on those interviewed and the vulnerable people they served: 
“The earthquakes have been a terrible experience. The ongoing and long nature of all the 
aftershocks and the damage to the city, and everything's been very taxing on everybody. In 
terms of the recovery process, if we had any idea how long it would take we probably wouldn't 
be able to cope. Somehow you do, because you don't know. Its taking longer and has been more 
complicated than I would have thought about. Yes, it's been very demoralising process.” 
 
Others from both the public and third sectors also spoke of the personal psychological trauma 
and the great social impact of the Canterbury earthquakes and subsequent aftershocks:  
“Clearly, the Canterbury Earthquakes were many – 10,000” and “the magnitude of the disaster 
was never contemplated and our response to it was not thought about.” 
 
“I don't think people realise just how awful it was.”  
 
“Just the loss of life was awful. It was just a shitty, shitty, horrible, horrible year.”  
 
“A lot of people around New Zealand don't understand how traumatic it has been for many 
people and how ongoing it is. The December earthquakes really hurt a lot of people because 
they thought they were over. And they were three in a row, and they got bigger. It was like, this 
is never going to end, and it was just before Christmas, and it was cruel. September, February, 
June, and December. Really, people think about us having one earthquake, but, we’ve had fifteen 
months of them, there were fifteen months of big earthquakes! They weren't rolly, they were 
shaky. I've been in earthquakes before. These didn't roll, they shook.” 
 
These revelations spoke of the devastation, not only of the city’s physical environment, but of 
the impact it had on the city’s social environment and the sense of uncertainty pervading the recovery. 
For a community service provider these impacts affected people in many aspects of their daily lives 
and this needed to be more closely analysed: 
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“I don't know if this much work had been done on that social side of things. A lot of women lost 
employment. That part-time employment that has subsidised the home, a lot of that stuff has 
gone. Like people who worked in the hotels, who worked as shop assistants part-time, all that 
stuff disappeared. Financially, a lot of people are a lot worse off. They hold little affection in 
helping people clean up silt, again and again.”  
 
Building on this discussion, a participant from the third sector went on to describe the problem 
from the perspective of the social and psychological need:  
“As an adult educator, I'm very interested in the literature of need, because there's a lot of 
response to expressed need, and we need very much to look at the dimensions of expressed need 
and acknowledge the hard work in identifying and perceiving the needs that are real needs from 
the plethora of expressed needs. In Christchurch there's a lot of attention to personal, 
psychosocial approaches to need, which of course, is vitally important, but not enough attention 
to the broad issues of need.” 
 
Indeed, this emphasis on inequalities and structural factors impacting people’s wellbeing is a 
theme shared by most participants, particularly in relation to the ability to cope with personal and 
collective trauma. The next section describes how these socially-engaged individuals have advocated 
and collaborated with other stakeholders to find solutions to some of these problems.  
B. Empowerment & Rising Above Adversity: 
“I've been involved with housing and tenancy; well, tenancy protection.” 
Although participants experienced and observed personal and collective trauma, they showed 
psychological resilience and worked intently to advocate for those less well-off and least helped by 
the recovery process. As discussed in Chapter Seven, this was particularly the case with housing which, 
as explained, has been described as a case of the inverse care law, or as an example of how 
government policies tend to support those better off, rather than the contrary.  
Some members of the third sector worked in tenancy protection and some even worked 
collaboratively with central and local government and other organisations to develop affordable and 
innovative solutions for post-disaster housing recovery: 
“We network a lot in my role here. We had a forum saying one of the biggest needs for 
organisations helping the community is housing for the people we're working with. That was the 
biggest issue. Most of us, their houses haven't been repaired or sorted out yet. And out of that, 
came a forum which would invite all the other church-based, faith-based organisations and 
anyone else interested in housing. That happened in July and from there, there was a need to 
sort of scope and map what's happening in the city. It has ended up being much broader than 
170 
 
just faith-based organisations, because the partnerships are going to be between Government 
and the wider community sector and faith-based organisations. There's lots of opportunities that 
we've identified.” 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, personal empowerment and intersectoral collaboration 
are essential stepping stones in the community empowerment continuum.  
IV. Concluding Remarks: 
 
 This chapter continued with the process of deductive theory construction and began to test the 
theoretical framework of community resilience proposed in the previous chapter by beginning to 
present the empirical data sourced with this purpose. In doing so, it has looked at the theoretical 
constructs pertaining to the individual and her relationships or the micro-sociological level of analysis. 
This included an analysis of participant positionality – operationalised in this chapter as personal and 
organisational background – as a glimpse into the world view of participants and of the social settings 
where their recorded perceptions and experiences are anchored. Participants had diverse personal 
and organisational backgrounds, but shared a strong commitment to the city and its people. This also 
revealed a strong sense of place or community among participants. The personal and collective trauma 
took a toll on people, but participants were empowered to advocate for a more inclusive recovery and 
individual and collective healing after what was a major disaster.
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When asked for their thoughts on the overall process of earthquake recovery to date, a 
community service provider exclaimed: 
 “That’s a good question, that’s a huge question. That’s what the whole city is always talking 
about, this whole process. It’s amazing, almost three years after the event that so many of the 
conversations are not so much about the earthquakes these days, but the state of the city.” 
 
 As suggested by this participant, this chapter as with the previous one, continues to present 
empirical data about the case study of Christchurch to test my theoretical framework of community 
resilience. I discuss my findings in relation to my framework’s macro-sociological level of analysis and 
the theoretical concepts describing attributes of people’s wider context, including their institutions 
and social norms. I continue with my discussions with key informants, this time exploring the overall 
policy and social context of recovery after the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. As before, 
these discussions were cross-referenced with my reading of relevant policy and media, and my 
experiences in the field.  
 As recorded in the Interview Guide presented in Appendix 2.3, I asked participants about the 
overall process of recovery, the role of central and local government, and why these roles had 
developed in this way, as grand tour interviewing strategies to set the tone for the more in-depth 
discussions about post-disaster housing recovery and community resilience presented in Chapters 
Seven and Eight. Participants talked of how society came together after the earthquakes and how this 
collective sense of solidarity started to fray, as tensions between central and local government began 
to manifest. As is probably the case in most contemporary political systems, some of these tensions 
were pre-existing, and related to the statutory functions of each level of government. However, in the 
case of Christchurch, the policy framework of recovery articulated after the earthquakes, where 
central government took over the functions of regional and municipal government (the Christchurch 




II. Recovery… We're Getting There: 
 
A. A City Coming Together, A City Falling Apart:  
 In the previous chapter, I wrote about people’s place attachment and sense of place/community 
and of how this love for the city1 brought them together to support each other and their communities. 
Indeed, it has been documented that right after the earthquakes, the process of responding to the 
disaster was imbued by a collective spirit and a “coming together” of different sectors of society. This 
was echoed by participants from different backgrounds and roles and corroborated through fieldwork, 
giving me an awareness of their perceptions. 
“Extraordinary. I wasn’t here for the crazy year when there was this unknowingness and the 
crazy series of earthquakes. But it sounded like the distinctions between the community sector, 
the private sector, and the local government sector were blurred. Everyone just rolled up their 
sleeves and got into it.” 
 
 At the onset of the disaster, central and local government and other social sectors (like the 
market and the non-governmental sector) seemed to work together well. A participant from the third 
sector mentioned that, “both local and central government just did a fantastic job.” This was also 
observed by another community representative: 
“An amazing job by central and local government, in the first instance. I mean, the magnificence 
of the people coming in and doing the emergency recovery stuff was amazing. The way people 
did pull together and joined, that was also amazing.” 
 
 Indeed, for a member of the third sector this early collaborative work was done competently: 
 
“Some of the recovery stuff probably has been done competently. Some of the stuff, a lot of the 
stuff around certainty, around risk in scientific terms, like the surveys of land stability and new 
structural requirements, and all that stuff, probably been done well.” 
 
 This was seen by several community service providers to be the case, even when central and 
local government “really had circumstances which they just weren’t prepared for, or anyone was 
prepared for.” For a member of the third sector, this uncertainty was a source of concern: 
“When you’re dealing with uncertainty… It has been done from average to appallingly. There’s 
a way of working with the Government’s mode of operation. They can deal with knowns 
efficiently and they’re very bad dealing with unknowns.”  
 




“Right at the beginning, in the first months, everyone pulled together, central and local 
government, the private sector, and the third sector. I don't know that that relationship on the 
face of it is that strong. However, human nature and ego has been what they are. They are not 
possibly as strong as needed.” 
 
A community service provider also indicated this was a source of increasing worry: 
 
“There’s a lot of frustrated and angry people. Sometimes, there was nothing to be done about 
it. But, one of the things that was probably most missing, was genuine collaboration across a 
huge variety of different stakeholders and sectors. Which means the interests of some sectors 
were addressed more prominently and quickly than others, which can lead to a lot of anger and 
frustration. Today, I don’t think there was any intentional maliciousness in isolating any one 
sector, but there is a lot of frustration getting rebuilding stuff done, when you felt like the needs 
of the people you are concerned about were being ignored.” 
 
 This led this participant to characterise the recovery as a “mixed bag.” 
“Reflecting on the recovery on this scale, it’s just so complicated. I feel like there are some things 
that have gone well, some things have gone poorly, and some areas in which I wholly didn’t feel 
like they’ve been done well. A big mixed bag basically.” 
 
B. Central Government – Taking Over:  
 
1. The Government Response in Context: 
 For another participant, this social division arose from pre-existing tensions between central 
and local government that “started to be revealed as we moved further in the recovery.” These 
tensions lie at the heart of New Zealand’s system of government. A representative democracy, the 
country is a constitutional monarchy with a unitary parliament and without a written constitution. 
This lack of constitutionally mandated powers makes local government “a creature of statute,” or, 
born out of primary legislation enacted by parliament.2 Since the formalisation of the relationship 
between the Crown or central government and tribal chiefs in 1840, the role of local government has 
evolved. Of relevance here are the political changes in the last 35 years.  
 Although socially liberal, from 1984 to 1990 the Fourth Labour Government3 embarked on a 
controversial economic liberalisation of the New Zealand welfare state.4 These reforms, termed 
“Rogernomics”5 for their ideologue, Minister of Finance Sir Roger Douglas,6 were a product of their 
time and associated with a strong belief in free markets and “Thatcherism.” With the end of the Cold 
War and the arrival of a new world order of increased economic interdependence, this neoliberal 
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political philosophy sought, in apparent contradiction, to centralise and “restore the state’s authority 
and free the economy of collectivism”7 in areas of service provision occupied by the government. This 
was achieved by espousing the idea that “industries and services should be owned by private 
companies, not by the state.”8  
 For Harvey, these reforms are neoliberal, or based on “a theory of political economic practices 
that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, 
free markets, and free trade.”9 Here, the role of the state is not that of a nanny, but that of ensuring 
personal freedom and promote individual responsibility for one’s own wellbeing.10 The role of 
government is not to be big, but to create and preserve the institutional framework that promotes 
individual freedom and responsibility These neoliberal government reforms, however, have now been 
associated with greater poverty and income and health inequality.11  
 For Kelsey, the dawning of the free market over Aotearoa and the “New Zealand Experiment,”12 
implemented a radical liberal structural adjustment programme, or free market reforms to promote 
economic growth through fiscal restraint or austerity.13 Indeed, Rogernomics also sought to roll back 
or centralise the state and privatise political power in the country. Indeed, the understanding was 
implicit that the benefits of these reforms would “accrue to the private sector,”14 with the well 
documented harmful social impacts on the poor that were to take place.15  
 Perhaps unhappy with these social impacts, from 1999 to 2008 New Zealanders voted for a 
more progressive Fifth Labour Government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Helen Clark. 
Notable for its social welfare policies, this Government also “introduced a new paradigm of local 
government, responding to what they saw as the previous governments’ privileging of efficiency over 
other values, such as democracy and equity.”16 The Local Government Act of 200217 (or LGA), defines 
the purpose of local government as “promoting the social, economic, environmental, and cultural 
wellbeing of its communities and enable democratic local decision making and action by, and on behalf 
of, communities.” This “general empowerment” fundamentally changed the way local authorities 
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operate in NZ.18 Importantly, guaranteed in the LGA is the right to broad public consultation, which 
ensures that residents are engaged in the process of urban planning.19 
 For its part, the Resource Management Act of 199120 (or RMA), devolved to local and regional 
authorities “responsibilities and powers for resource management,”21 without granting the fiscal 
means to implement it. Nevertheless, for Nolan the RMA still provides the public “a wide scope for 
involvement,”22 compelling local authorities to issue public notices and calls for submissions23 to “any 
person representing a relevant aspect of the public interest,” as per Schedule 1, Clause 8 (a).24 
According to Bennett and Colón-Ríos’ comparison of different legal jurisdictions, “it is hard not to 
conclude that public participation in environmental regulation has become more the rule than the 
exception.” In New Zealand, the RMA provides opportunities for popular participation “both in the 
preparation of planning documents and in the consideration of resource consent applications.”25  
Figure 6.1: Applying for a Resource Consent26 
 
 The Fifth National Government, in power during the earthquakes, again rolled-back the changes 
institutionalised by the Clark Government and, centralise authority over resource management and 
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development. Centralisation happened to the detriment of public consultation and the powers 
devolved to local government by the LGA and the RMA. This was sought in part through two Local 
Government Amendment Bills in 2012 and 2014, “constraining the purpose of local government” and 
“curtailing requirements on councils to consult and engage with citizens.”27  
 This centralisation was also particularly evident in the passing of the Housing Accords and 
Special Housing Areas Act of 2013.28 Central government was granted the power to open-up greenfield 
sites for increased suburban housing development. In the case of Special Housing Areas (SHAs), 
Section 9 (1) enables the Government to enact Orders-in-Council29 for each SHA.30 These Orders-in-
Council work outside the normal legislative mechanisms of representative democracy, substituting 
business-as-usual planning frameworks and resource consenting processes with a standards-based 
national planning template to cut red tape and speed up development, limiting public consultation 
and deliberation in urban and housing development. This process is established by the 2013 Act and 
the Housing Accords with territorial authorities.31 It is also established in Section 45 (2) of the Building 
Act of 2004, which sets out the process for applying for a building consent and states that “if an 
application for a building consent is accompanied by plans and specifications that contain design work 
[relating to building work], that is design work of a kind declared by the Governor General by Order-
in-Council to be restricted building work for the purposes of this Act.”32  
 Recently, the former Labour Minister of Housing and Urban Development, Phil Twyford, publicly 
stated that the policy of SHAs had, in fact, “actually generated a 5 percent increase in house prices 
and worsened the affordability of homes”33 in these areas. Nevertheless, the election of a Labour-led 
Government in 2017 did not result in the immediate repeal of the Act. As of February of 2018, MBIE 
administered the Act and its associated regulations,34 and the Government was “reviewing” whether 
to extend the application of the Act beyond 2019.35 
The much-debated 2015 Bill to overhaul the RMA would have made these changes apply across 
New Zealand.36 This is echoed by former Prime Minister Palmer, a constitutional lawyer, who views a 
national planning template as a positive development, but criticises the way in which this policy has 
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been legally implemented.37 In particular, greater ministerial control and centralised decision making, 
overriding local decisions, reduced opportunities for public participation in decisions affecting local 
communities, and an emphasis on speed, rather than quality, of decisions.38 
In addition to the ongoing use of SHAs and Orders-in-Council to speed up development, Labour 
proposed KiwiBuild, an ambitious accelerated housing development programme to build one hundred 
thousand affordable homes in ten years.39 This programme has also fostered collaborative planning 
with local governments such as Wellington and community housing providers, with expert advisory 
committees and the collaborative engagement of councils, iwi, and private developers to increase the 
supply of affordable housing. In addition, the new Government has expanded the role of central 
government in housing development through Housing New Zealand40 and created a new Ministry of 
Housing and Urban Development and an Urban Housing Authority.41  
More recently, these agencies were fused into one Crown Entity called Kāinga Ora.42 Much like 
the 2013 Act, the new policy also aims to “streamline planning and consenting processes,”43 
something arguably inconsistent with the spirit of devolution and the role of local government 
underlying the LGA and the RMA. This debate was renewed with the underperformance of the 
Kiwibuild policy and its reset in 2019. After the policy failed to reach its ambitious targets, Megan 
Woods replaced Phil Twyford as Housing Minister,44 the one hundred thousand home target was 
scrapped,45 and new strategies were proposed to address the issue of housing affordability like a rent 
to buy scheme to foster “progressive ownership.”46 After opposing measures to reform the RMA 
during National’s previous tenure,47 Labour is now developing a plan to “free up council planning rules 
to help fix our failing cities.”48  
It is important to consider whether this centralisation of governance over urban planning and 
housing development through extraordinary legal recourse to cut red tape has become normalised to 
address the problem of housing affordability in New Zealand. It remains to be seen how public and 
private interests can be served by this deregulation process without continuing to chip away at local 
democratic processes. Contrary to the significant steps it has taken to increase regulation of the 
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private rental market, the new Government, elected, in part, to address the country’s housing 
affordability crisis, has continued the use of Orders-in-Council, collaborative planning, and the 
development of a national planning template (now with more stringent standards, including energy 
efficiency),49 over business-as-usual resource and building consenting processes at a local level. This 
“constitutional entrenchment” of these reforms is characteristic of structural adjustment.50 
2. CERR Act (2010), CER Act (2011) & the Canterbury Earthquake Authority (CERA): 
Before becoming entrenched, the stage was set with the use of Orders-in-Council to speed up 
the recovery process after the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 to further the National-led 
Government’s political ideology of free markets. Evidently, this again meant rolling back the role of 
local government in planning and consenting based on a national emergency. This encroachment of 
local government was evident in the recovery legislation – the Canterbury Earthquake Response and 
Recovery Act (CERRA) of 201051 and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act (CERA) of 201152 – and 
the overall policy of housing recovery to solve what was termed a national crisis in 2013.53 This was 
achieved by Parliament by empowering central government with a legal mechanism to “facilitate 
recovery and remove unnecessary bureaucracy and legislative impediments.”54 This mechanism gave 
the Minister of Earthquake Recovery (Gerry Brownlee), the power to issue Orders-in-Council to amend 
legislation “as the situation demanded.” There was also a perceived need for a central government 
body (the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, or CERA) to coordinate with all parties in the 
recovery and “adequately address the novel problems” presented by the earthquakes.  
“The introduction of the overriding power of CERA has had a huge impact on this city. One that 
was necessary. CERA was absolutely necessary, I believe, to pull together the different strains of 
what was needed to address and meet the needs of the recovery.” 55 
In fact, the National-led Government’s position was from the start that “pre-existing legislation 
dealing with consent and building procedures was expected to unduly delay a rapid recovery from the 
effects of the earthquakes.” Thus, according to Gall the primary purpose of this recovery legislation 
needed to be to “minimise delay and cut red tape.” This was the case despite the democratic concerns 
over the legislation and the “curtailing of public involvement in both the legislative process and the 
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decision-making mechanisms in the Acts.”56 It was clear that the state of emergency57 and CERA’s 
extraordinary legal powers to issue Orders-in-Council to alter the business-as-usual planning 
frameworks were used to trial these market-based reforms and planning standards to speed up 
development to the detriment of local democracy and public consultation. 
This was echoed by a member of the third sector:  
“My theory is they initially went, ‘this is really huge, this is really important.’ ‘We need to have 
a control level of what’s happening at this part of the rebuild.’ Which makes sense, because it’s 
a huge amount of money. By doing so, and by putting someone like Gerry Brownlee in control, 
they never gave the rebuild enough freedom in all the recovery plans in CERA and CCDU. There 
has never been enough freedom for it to develop its own momentum, and to have the ability to 
make mistakes, and include people and acknowledge different voices. Because it’s been tied, the 
whole time, so strong, into the political story of National. It’s become this torturous, horrible, 
lying process, with a lot of their decisions where they can’t be honest about what’s going on. 
They don’t communicate what’s really driving things. They can’t admit mistakes at any point 
which are inevitable, because to admit a mistake meant that they did something wrong and that 
has political consequences. It is difficult and impacts very negatively on the population. Everyone 
distrusts them because you never get straight answers on anything and they’re very hesitant to 
include the public in the discussion.” 
 
 A community service provider saw the need for the creation of an organisation at the centre 
that could, at least initially, bring an overarching view of the process of recovery. However, the strains 
of what was needed were not necessarily pulled to address the question of housing in an integrated 
manner. A description of this policy approach follows. 
 The Parliamentary mechanism of urgency58 has been identified by leading New Zealand legal 
scholars as potentially detrimental to the democratic legitimacy59 of an act passed under these 
circumstances. Nevertheless, after the September 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes, Parliament 
enacted the Canterbury Response and Recovery (CERR) Act of 201060 and the Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery (CER) Act of 201161 through urgency, despite concerns from legal experts. This was later 
reflected upon by the Parliament’s Regulations Review Committee, which stated that following a 
major national emergency, the “introduction of special legislation under urgency may be wrought with 
difficulties and have unforeseeable consequences that need to be avoided.”62  
 Other concerns with this legislation are summarised below: 
 1. The act provided the executive with almost unlimited powers. 
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 2. There were inadequate checks and balances on the use of these powers. 
 3. The extreme powers were not proportional to the magnitude of the disaster. 
 4. Elements of the act were contrary to long-standing constitutional and democratic principles. 
 5. The act set a dangerous constitutional precedent. 
 6. The act was procedurally unsound.63  
  
 The Government also established the Canterbury Earthquake Authority (CERA), under section 
30 (A) (1) of the State Sector Act of 1988 by Order-in-Council,64 “to provide appropriate measures to 
ensure that greater Christchurch and the councils and their communities respond to, and recover 
from, the impacts of the Canterbury earthquakes.”65 To achieve this, the Authority shared formal roles 
and responsibilities with the local councils (Christchurch City and Waimakariri and Selwyn Districts), 
other Crown entities, and insurance companies.  
 It is important to note that this agency was created even though the Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Act of 2002 provided “for planning and preparation for emergencies and for response 
and recovery in the event of an emergency.”66 Indeed, after the emergency management phase of the 
disaster ended the recovery was led and coordinated by CERA and not by Civil Defence. The focus 
shifted away from the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy67 and its vision of a 
resilient New Zealand, “where communities understand and manage their hazards, and the 
community is the first level of response in the event of a disaster.”68 This was mentioned by a 
community sector participant. 
“They should have been organized to know what their processes were. Ironically, Civil Defence 
were the ones that had their processes sorted, but the Government didn't follow it. Ha, ha, ha. 
So ironic. They didn't follow the steps that Civil Defence already had in place. Instead, they 
appointed CERA. Anyway, the recovery is following their processes, so that means that 
Government leaders need to know what the processes are in advance to be prepared.” 
 
This course of action was described as an ineffective “make-as-you-go” approach: 
 
“I think that the problem with the natural disaster is that you get these organizations that get 
set up very quickly without a lot of thought put into how they should be doing things. It's kind of 
like a ‘do as you go’ It doesn't always work, especially when you are dealing with people.” 
 
 From policy advisors to community activists, this recovery statutory framework was described 
as inadequate to undemocratic.69 Now dis-established, the agency was equipped by Parliament, as 
noted above, with special,70 or broad law-making powers,71 of issuing Orders-in-Council – that is, 
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administrative decisions by the Minister for Earthquake Recovery that may alter the applicability of 
any act.72 In exercising this power, the Minister of Earthquake Recovery was subject to Section 74:  
“74 Procedure for recommending Order-in-Council 
(1) In making a recommendation under Section 71, the relevant Minister must— 
(a) Take into account the purposes of this Act; and (b) have regard to the recommendations of 
the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Review Panel. 
(2) The recommendation of the relevant Minister may not be challenged, reviewed, quashed, or 
called into question in any court.”73 
 
In 2016, this approach was also extended to the recovery after the Kaikoura Earthquakes. Gerry 
Brownlee was also able to issue Orders-in-Council74 with the enactment of the Kaikoura/Hurunui 
Earthquake Recovery Act of 2016.75  
For Hayward, “arguments to suspend democracy in the face of emergency” are not unique to 
New Zealand; and are increasingly common emergencies.76 Yet, for her the Christchurch experience 
“illustrates why suspending democracy in the face of a crisis, is misguided.” Indeed, Hayward makes 
the important point that “on our dynamic planet, cities will experience more global disasters of greater 
severity and these events will test the ability of our national, regional, and city governments to make 
decisions in a changing climate.” Furthermore, the author writes that “we need to find ways to 
maintain democracy in the face of disaster, otherwise we risk stripping future generations of their 
rights, to both a democratic and a more sustainable future.”77 
3. Other Relevant Examples: 
 Internationally, the use of emergency constitutional mechanisms for disaster recovery are not 
exclusive to the case of Christchurch. There are also recent examples in liberal democracies like the 
United States, where undemocratic statutory frameworks have been enacted to govern cities and 
territories in deep economic crisis and public debt. These rescue packages have been accompanied by 
the creation of executive boards with the power to implement structural adjustment programmes and 
get their finances in order.78 This was the case of the “man-made”79 water crisis in Flint, Michigan, 
where an unelected executive board made the fatal decision to change to the city’s water supply from 
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Lake Michigan to the Flint River to cut operating government costs, resulting in a mass exposure to 
lead contamination in the city’s drinking water.80 
 More recently, the same approach was applied to the US territory of Puerto Rico, where an 
economic crisis threatened the island’s bond market an executive board was appointed by Congress 
to take control of the island’s finances.81 The goal of this policy was to compel the territory to pay its 
public debt of $72 billion USD to private creditors, to the detriment of its other public obligations 
through the approval of a Fiscal Plan, over which the executive board also has final say. For Colón-
Ríos, this extraordinary recourse compromises even further the democratic status of the territory, 
stating that it “changes the ways in which political power is exercised in the island,” diminishing the 
rule making faculties of the executive and legislative branches of the territorial government.82 
 Things got even more dire for Puerto Ricans when Hurricane María swept through the island83 
as a Category 5 tropical cyclone in 2017,84 causing devastation not seen for over 100 years,85 killing 
thousands,86 and displacing hundreds of thousands more to the US mainland.87 Sadly, the 
extraordinary law-making powers conferred by Congress to the oversight board have been used to 
push austerity measures88 and neoliberal reforms, including proposed asset sales (like the PR Electric 
Power Authority),89 an educational reform that has closed down public schools in favour of the 
establishment of charter schools,90 a labour reform that significantly limits workers’ rights,91 and the 
enactment of a measure to use “a portion of the island’s sales and use tax (SUT, or IVU by its Spanish 
acronym) revenue” for the next forty years to restructure and pay the public debt.92 This emphasis on 
the payment of the public debt to private lenders over the immediate wellbeing of a population is 
another act of disaster capitalism, where a national crisis has been exploited by special interests “to 
impose controversial neoliberal policies, at a time of collective trauma when the citizenry is unable to 
mount an effective political resistance.”93 After a recent visit to the island, Klein expressed that “we’re 
seeing the strategy that we’ve seen in many other disaster zones, which is exploiting that state of 
shock and distraction and emergency to push through a radical corporate agenda.”94  
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 Probably not coincidentally, it was reported in early 2019 that, by declaring a national 
emergency, President Trump would be able to use the extraordinary executive powers granted by the 
declaration to divert funds appropriated by Congress for disaster relief in Puerto Rico to fund his 
signature policy of erecting a “big beautiful wall”95 in the country’s southern border.96 The resulting 
outcry by prominent politicians97 were quelled by the White House as the political battle over the 
government shutdown ensued. 98 In mid-2019, the US Supreme Court issued a ruling that allowed the 
Trump administration to redirect 2.5 billion dollars allocated to national defence by Congress, in order 
to fund the border wall.99 In September 2019, the Pentagon issued a list of 127 military construction 
projects that would be delayed on account of this ruling and the agency diverting 3.6 billion dollars to 
fund construction of the wall.100 Puerto Rico was one of the most affected jurisdictions in this list.101 
President Trump’s use of these emergency powers has raised eyebrows among liberals and 
conservatives alike.102 This was evident in the recent congressional rebuke of the legislation, with 
twelve Republicans breaking ranks with the President and joining Democrats to approve the 
measure.103 For these conservatives in the Grand Old Party (GOP), the measure would usurp the 
“regular order” in the appropriations process104 and the separation of powers among the three equal 
branches of government established in the US Constitution.105 
 Called by the liberal media a “manufactured crisis,”106 this policy of a wall is really a continuation 
of the failed US foreign policy in Latin America for over one hundred years.107 In her new book, Klein 
proposes that President Trump consciously uses the shock of his own victory as an “end-run around 
democracy” 108 and implement “a “corporate take-over of the government.”109 This is what she terms 
extraordinary politics, used to “suspend some or all democratic norms – and then ram the corporate 
wish list through as quickly as possible.”110 As we have seen, this conscious use of the shock doctrine 
by the Trump Administration has been most effective in rolling-back the reach of the Federal 
Government with the undaunted deregulation and privatisation111 in areas like the environment, 




4. A Climate of Command & Control – From Business-as-Usual to the Exception: 
The enactment of this recovery legislation and the creation of CERA was a determining factor 
shaping the recovery process. According to Salmon, after the February 2011 earthquake, it was 
evident that a “major resettlement programme would be required, with much more Government 
financial assistance and a perceived corresponding need to maintain direct financial control of this 
expenditure.”113 The impact of the centralisation of government authority over the city was to be 
something profound and tensions would not only arise at the organisational level, but also in the 
realignment of the jurisdictions of central and local government. This would, in turn, result in an 
erosion of democracy and representative government at a local level. This was perceived by a 
participant as having created an atmosphere of “command and control,” which the Government 
argued was necessary to enable a quick response to the unfolding national emergency. 
“There's been a very strong sense of command and control in the early phases of the 
earthquakes. That's probably appropriate, we had to make a lot of decisions very, very fast. 
There were many where we needed to find places to put waste material, where we needed 
to, at least, control access to the existing buildings that were dangerous… It's interesting, a 
lot of decisions and a lot of systems and processes had to be shut down incredibly quickly for 
us to respond to the critical, urgent needs of the earthquakes. The command and control 
approach was appropriate for that. That's really the sort of things emergency management 
seeks out clearly. That there's a direct line of responsibility to an individual.” 
 
For this participant, this approach inhibited innovation and participation in the recovery: 
“Since that phase has passed, however, we seem to have a command and control attitude and 
approach running the recovery, which is inappropriate. We need to be looking to more 
conciliatory, more collaborative, co-creation approaches where we can engage in the journey of 
recovery; the community and businesses, all on the same journey. Having an individual making 
decisions on behalf of the city is not the appropriate method, although is loosely aligned to the 
political process because it is part of central government.” 
 
As mentioned, CERA’s broad law-making powers were crystallised in the suspension of the 
business-as-usual urban planning processes at the local and regional levels of government. The normal 
course of local government was substituted by the development of these plans outside the normal 
and more accountable governance process and through a statutory state of emergency fostered by 
the creation of CERA. In fact, existing policy frameworks like the District Plan and the Greater 
Christchurch Urban Development Strategy (UDS) were put on hold in favour of new central 
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government-developed plans like the Recovery Strategy for Greater Christchurch,114 the Land Use 
Recovery Plan (LURP),115 the Blueprint,116 and the Christchurch Replacement District Plan.117 The 
development of these policies was facilitated by CERA’s faculties to edict Orders-in-Council.  
For institutional stakeholders, there were draw-backs to this command and control approach: 
“I actually think Gerry Brownlee's heart is in the right place. People are just afraid of him. The 
way that CERA has been set up is very bureaucratic. I don't think that Gerry gets good advice, he 
gets bureaucratic advice. I don't think he has an opportunity to talk to staff at all. From what I 
hear, he's briefed with the entire senior staff and he's briefed with the person who's providing 
him with the briefing, so there's no interaction, there's no conversation. People are afraid to 
answer questions and ask questions, so I don't know how he can make decisions. He's holding 
to things because his portfolio is too huge, and he is getting crappy advice.” 
 
5. Regeneration – Still Governed by the Exception: 
 
In late 2014 it was announced by the then Prime Minister, John Key, that CERA was to be 
absorbed by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) until the end of its mandate 
in 2016. This was welcomed by Minister Brownlee and Christchurch’s new Mayor at the time, Lianne 
Dalziel, as a significant step towards transitioning the city back to more democratic decision-making: 
“The message we've been getting from central government now is an increasing level of 
confidence in the council. It really does show they are seeing us as a partner in the recovery and 
moving very firmly in the direction of transition. It's welcome news for Christchurch and coming 
just a couple of days before the fourth anniversary of the first earthquake, it is timely. Having 
CERA as a departmental agency within the DPMC was a more appropriate structure for 
transition because it enabled a cross-agency perspective. It is a signal of a much more engaged 
process going forward. That is what the people of Christchurch are looking for.”118 
 
According to The Press, Dalziel also welcomed the establishment of an advisory group and the 
Government’s commitment to include community representatives in the group. This, however, 
“would allow CERA's functions to be wound back gradually.” Minister Brownlee noted:  
“As the recovery evolves, so, will the role of CERA, and we need to plan for transition and longer-
term governance. A programme of review to support the long-term recovery will soon get under 
way. Those elements included CERA becoming a part of the DPMC, an advisory group to develop 
a transition plan to hand over responsibility and powers from CERA to local government, other 
agencies, and a stocktake to remove or scale back some of the legislation's no-longer required 
powers. This is certainly not a winding down of the Government's commitment to the recovery, 
it's a recognition that with large parts of the recovery programme well underway, and some 
activities, such as the EQC-managed repair programme almost complete, we need to ensure 
we're focusing our efforts appropriately, and working on how some governance arrangements 




Key reinforced this gradual devolution of the Government’s role in the recovery, explaining that 
to ensure there was no “loss of momentum,” a central agency needed to lead this transition. He added 
that the DPMC now also housed the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management and that 
the Government was “keen that CERA and the Ministry work closely together so the lessons learnt 
from both the initial response and the recovery phases of the Canterbury Earthquakes are adopted 
permanently and shared widely.” Hosting CERA and the Ministry together within DPMC, according to 
him, would ensure this happened. The Labour Party Leader at the time, David Cunliffe, responded to 
the announcement by saying that it raised “several questions over how the advisory group would be 
selected and whether it would include local representation.”120  
 With the end of CERA and the enactment of the Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act of 2016, 
the Government thought to hand over power for the next faces of the recovery to local authorities. 
This Act supports the regeneration of greater Christchurch with the following objectives: 
 “(a) Enabling a focused and expedited regeneration process; 
(b) Facilitating the ongoing planning and regeneration of greater Christchurch; 
(c) Enabling community input into decisions on the exercise of powers under Section 71 and the 
development of Regeneration Plans; 
(d) recognising the local leadership of Canterbury Regional Council, Christchurch City Council, 
Regenerate Christchurch, Selwyn District Council, Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, and Waimakariri 
District Council and providing them with a role in decision making under this Act; 
(e) Enabling the Crown to efficiently and effectively manage, hold, and dispose of land acquired 
by the Crown under the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 or this Act.” 121 
 
 Nevertheless, it was reported at the time that, although this new Act meant local lead for 
Christchurch’s new rebuild authority, the Minister had the power to veto the decisions made by the 
new rebuild authority. This was reported at the time by the national press: 
“Brownlee is still in charge of the Christchurch rebuild. He has ceded some power in the new law 
that will lead the process through the organisation that will replace CERA. Regenerate 
Christchurch will succeed CERA and will have a significant say on statutory plans controlling 
things such as what will be done with the land in the residential red zone. Brownlee will retain 
veto powers, but they will be harder for him to use. Changes to the new law were made after 
opposition parties and the CCC expressed some disquiet over the original version. Now, 
Regenerate Christchurch will be involved in the planning process. It can make changes and 
recommend Brownlee approve or decline an idea.” 122  
 




“Under the old law this phase didn't exist. CERA made recommendations to Brownlee, but 
Regenerate Christchurch is different. It is a combined government-council entity with board 
members appointed by both. The council didn't have this much say in the planning process 
beforehand. It is this extra layer of consultation that makes a ministerial veto harder, because it 
will potentially be made in the face of a lot of advice. Under the latest changes, the Minister 
must give regard to Regenerate Christchurch's recommendations, and any plan will have also 
had consultation with the council, Environment Canterbury, Ngāi Tahu, and the Crown anchor 
project company Ōtākaro Ltd. Gerry Brownlee has previously said Regenerate Christchurch could 
become a fully council-led organisation before the end of its five-year lifespan.”123  
 
Nevertheless, the Minister had final say: 
 
“Another complicating factor is the condition that the Minister must approve a plan if it meets 
the purposes of the act. The new act has very broad purposes. Significantly, they include 
improving the environmental, economic, social, and cultural well-being, and the resilience, of 
communities. This line was taken directly from the outgoing Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Act. Arguing that a plan goes against such a wide, well-intentioned goal won't be easy. Other 
key ministerial powers, such as compulsory acquisition of land, amalgamating land and the 
power to suspend or revoke plans and bylaws, are largely the same as the earlier version of the 
bill but this time come with safeguards, including public consultation.” 124 
 
Indeed, although this Act created an advisory group or a board with local representatives, it 
gave the Minister “power to suspend, amend, or revoke all or part of an RMA document or other plan, 
strategy, or policy.”125 Moreover, this reservoir of power is available for the Minister and was 
implemented through the “continuation, amendment, and validation of certain Orders-in-Council 
made under Section 71 of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act of 2011 or continued by Section 
89 (2) of that Act.”126 Crucially, this meant power over the Christchurch Replacement District Plan until 
2021.127 When asked why this top-down organisational structure persisted in the process of recovery, 
an institutional stakeholder remarked the following: 
“Why has it continued? The structures were in place to be command and control led. That 
structure is in place, so it's an institutional reason. There are a lot of decisions that need to be 
made. There is, for example, some of the landowners in the central city fighting over different 
lots of land. Somebody has got to make a call on it. Things have got to be moved forward. There 
is a need to make many decisions.” 
 
The policy planning associated with this new, regeneration phase of the recovery process, is 
well underway and is aiming to be more consultative. Indeed, in September of 2018 it was reported 
that Regenerate Christchurch had spent over five-hundred thousand dollars on the red zone 
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redevelopment consultation.128 This large financial investment in public consultation was deemed by 
critics as exorbitant129 and occurring in a climate where democratic structures were compromised.  
Excluding the redevelopment of the Cathedral Square,130 Regenerate Christchurch was 
circumscribed to working with the regeneration of the residential red zone131 (the Ōtākaro Avon River 
Corridor,132 New Brighton,133 and Papanui134) and not within the central city (or any other land 
acquired by the Crown through CERA), the rebuild of which is centred on the anchor projects directed 
by Ōtākaro Ltd (as explained above). From a case study perspective, this fact is particularly interesting. 
It is not every day that a duly elected local government is this limited in its ability to represent the 
interests of its constituents and make decisions in the redevelopment of its own central business 
district (CBD). This is a continuation of an exceptional governance framework that has been described 
as “unfair to the public”135 and in profound detriment to local democracy. One example of this 
dynamic has been the council’s plans of rezoning 125 hectares of land in the Cranford Basin in Papanui 
in 2017 for the development of medium-density housing. This council proposal was being challenged 
by Ōtākaro Ltd because, according to them, it would diminish buyer demand for the much-delayed 
East Frame housing development.136 
C. Local Government – Gerry’s Gerrymandering: 
The recovery legislation enacted by Parliament after the earthquakes gave the central 
government extraordinary powers over the process, which in hindsight had a negative impact on the 
role of local government and civil society. So far, I have described how the Government’s approach to 
recovery weathered the sphere of influence of municipal and regional government. In fact, it was 
perceived by many participants that local government in Canterbury was greatly affected by the 
policies implemented by the central government after the earthquakes. 
“Local government had it very hard. They haven’t performed well, but it was a very difficult 
situation. No local government has the contingency to deal with that scale of disaster. You had 
a whole bunch of councillors who were elected soon before February 2011, who had no sets of 
skills, a top-heavy bureaucracy, a Chief Executive who had done a deal with the Mayor to take 
control and keep the council out of it, and a Minister who could take their powers away at will, 
who was overbearing and bullying. Given all that, they probably did well and, if you look at a lot 
of the big decisions they made, they made the right ones. council staff have been amazing. Given 
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the weird bureaucracy at the council, the on-the-ground staff worked extraordinarily.” 
 
1. Regional Government – The Takeover of ECAN: 
 For participants in the community and third sectors, this concern over the limits to local 
government stemmed from the creation of CERA and from the pre-earthquake Government 
takeover of the regional council, Environment Canterbury (ECAN): 
“Local government has been fraught because of the regional council takeover issue. It's 
communication that's lacking and a lot of it hasn't been good, with local government.” 
 
 This was pointed out by a third sector representative as a threat to local democracy:  
“It was before the earthquake when our regional council was taken over by the Government, 
and ECAN members were appointed. A lot of people were concerned about the loss of 
democratic voice at that point. When CERA came in, there has been a sense, rightly or wrongly, 
that it too is appointed by the Government and the people of Christchurch have not had a say. 
With the commissioners in the city council (with many of its functions taken over by a central 
government agency that reports to one manager). That does undermine democracy in 
Christchurch and that people feel very frustrated by that, especially in the land control approach 
and the fact that CERA should be working more collaboratively.” 
 
For a local government insider this situation seemed to foreshadow more potential changes: 
 
“I wouldn't be surprised if we’re looking at amalgamation with the councils here as well, 
Christchurch, Waimakariri, and so on. It gives you an indication, because ECAN, of course, is 
under lock down as well. They're all political appointees. That's where things are going.”  
 
  Late 2016 ushered in a “slow” transition to democracy in ECAN: 
 
“Canterbury’s new look regional council hasn't even met yet but it's already being closely 
watched. The region is home to more than half of the country’s irrigated land and 
hydroelectricity storage. And six years on from when it drew protests by sacking the ECAN 
councillors, the Government is returning democracy by instalment. This year’s local body 
election was the first time since 2007 Cantabrians were able to vote for their regional council. 
There are now seven newly elected members who will sit alongside six government appointees. 
Five of the appointees were previously government-appointed commissioners and, while they 
are no longer directly accountable to Government, it definitely has an agenda.”137  
 
Upon announcing this development, the Environment Minister at the time, Nick Smith, spoke 
of the Government’s continued role: 
“The really important issue from the government perspective is to complete the work around 
improving the management of the water. We have left the new council with special powers to 
complete that water work and we would want to see all ten of those zone water rules completed 




But this ongoing use of appointed councillors and a central government-directed mandate on 
water management has prompted some observers like Hayward to contend that the current statutory 
arrangement presents a challenge to local democracy: 
“The gerrymandering of the ECAN election is not only unfair, but it is really risking bringing the 
Government into disrepute and making it more difficult, not easier, to manage water. Is it going 
to choose an experienced chair? Or a chair that has an overwhelming democratic mandate? Will 
they give someone who’s campaigned on their own merit a strong position on the table or one 
of the commissioners the Government’s previously known?” 139 
 
2. Municipal Government – The Council’s Ongoing Battle for Control: 
As a territorial authority, the CCC is responsible for housing and city/regional planning.140 
However, for a community member, these power dynamics affected the role of local government, as 
CERA took control of the strategy to rebuild the CBD and directed the council to rework its own District 
Plan. Indeed, after the earthquakes, both institutional and community stakeholders observed that the 
council was “in a bad space.” This was remarked by a community service provider: 
“Looking to the council, there was a real concern in terms of the whole building consents thing 
taking a long time. On one hand there was a pressure to get stuff happening, but also that whole 
concern about if you consent stuff that turns out to not good, will there be a liability to the 
council? There's a bit of paralysis happening. The council was in a difficult position.” 
 
Characterising the council as being powerless within the central government-led recovery 
governance arrangement, a member of the third sector reflected on the Minister’s role in it: 
“It is the biggest forced land purchase in New Zealand history, that is happening with almost no 
public or media discussion around it. They’re just in complete control. They’ve got this 
extraordinary bit of legislation. Without Gerry, the council decided to hold off on a decision and 
he just said, ‘if you don’t get on to it, I’ll pass it.’ If anything, it was relayed that the council got 
no real ability to do anything because of Gerry. The Government can just overrule them, and 
pretty much it will. Some in extraordinary leadership positions in the Government have given 
themselves giant powers to do this stuff, and not really playing the game. It’s unfortunate 
because it’s the worst. If they had stood back and just let the council and the private sector get 
on with it, we would probably be seeing a lot more, many more interesting things happening, 
and the council would have had its toes dipped and they could have played a bigger role. As it 
is, the Government, they’ve taken over and they’ve not done much with it. Again, because of the 
complete lack of public discussion. There might be some interesting things, but who knows?” 
 
This perspective was echoed by a participant working with local government: 
 
“Do you mind? Sorry, I don’t see it as leadership because there’s no conversation. To be a leader, 
you must inspire and bring together and get the best out of people. Isn’t that what good 
leadership is? Well, I don’t feel that is what’s happening.” 
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For this council insider, these problems were also due to the council’s size compared with the 
Selwyn and Waimakariri District Councils (as explained, also now under the purview of CERA): 
“In terms of local government, it was very difficult, particularly for Christchurch, compared to 
the smaller councils because they were smaller and seemed to be able to work together with 
CERA better. What seemed to happen with Christchurch is that they can't because it is so large. 
That is why things perhaps didn't work as well as they could have.”  
 
A participant from local government posed that these difficulties were due to the council’s 
inability to adapt and surrender its jurisdiction to the new governance arrangement for some early 
failings in its interface with CERA and the private sector. This was manifest in the 2013 “consent crisis,” 
where the council was stripped of its accreditation to issue building consents and a Crown manager 
was appointed by central government to manage the process.141 For a participant in local government, 
this affected the capacity of the private sector to innovate: 
 “The private sector hasn't been allowed to be so innovative because the council has really 
dampened a lot of that spirit, just by taking too long to make decisions, being too restrictive 
around the City Plan. It's old-fashioned and doesn't deal well with things like a disaster. Look, 
The Colombo is a good example. She wanted to put another layer on top, which was residential, 
and she had to have extra car parking and so they wouldn't let her do it.” 
 
This was also the position of a community service provider: 
  
“All of those things were unhelpful. That, coupled with the difficulties with consenting – that 
people were really trying to do a fast job to get things going and they would suddenly run into 
this massive roadblock of a bureaucratic process that was set up for business-as-usual, pre-
earthquake, and hadn’t adjusted well to how to do things in an emergency. I don’t even know if 
that’s anyone’s part because no one really knew that it was going to be the case. Suddenly, 
consenting processes became expensive and long-winded, and that slowed a lot of things down. 
Perhaps that the business-as-usual, bureaucratic process could have helped early on.” 
 
 This participant, at the time, laid some of this blame at the doorstep of Tony Marryatt, the 
council’s former Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who wanted to bounce back and return to business-as-
usual” and later resigned because of the problem with building consents:  
“Tony may have been a good person in ordinary times, but he was a terrible leader in terrible 
times. He has created enormous problems for the recovery, preventing staff moving into CERA, 
which got filled-up with bureaucrats from Wellington who have no understanding of the city. It 
is my view, it may not be accurate… Knowledge of the city, knowledge of networks, and 
connections, and how things got done just weren't there. Now what worries me is that the big 
thinkers, the broad thinkers, the innovative thinkers, have all gone and we are left with the 
technocrats and the bureaucrats. Tony Marryatt wanted just to go back to September of 2010, 
he wanted only to go back to how we were. It's all about control. That had a lot to do with what 
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happened and, when February had struck, that just got exacerbated. A lot of other work opened 
up in different places, and all that skill set just started to dwindle, move away.” 
 
For this participant, if the council had adapted to these changes, it would have been in a better 
position to influence the policy of recovery developed by CERA: 
“Here is an opportunity to use all these strategies, to think strategically about all the work that 
we've done on the strategy perspective and implement it, but no. The council did an integrated 
recovery planning guide and there was a city health profile being developed at the same time. 
So, there were people looking at recovery from a civil defence perspective. It was taking the 
document and turning it around from a recovery perspective.” 
 
 This was the case “before the election.” After the 2013 council election, it was perceived by 
participants representing both the community and institutional sectors that “the council was finally 
getting its act together.” Several community stakeholders saw this as beneficial for broader-based 
engagement with geographical communities and the third sector: 
“The change in council – there's suddenly an openness.”  
 
“This last election is helping, the new Mayor does respect the work of the voluntary sector.” 
 
Council support for the city’s transitional architecture movement was particularly highlighted: 
“We can talk about the transitional movement, and of how innovative, and all that stuff… It all 
is, but the huge amount of the money has come from the council, to make sure that happens.”  
 
III. Concluding Remarks: 
 
 This chapter has continued to test my theoretical framework of community resilience by 
presenting additional empirical data, this time about people’s wider context or the model’s macro-
sociological level of analysis. The chapter included an analysis of the institutions and norms governing 
Christchurch’s recovery process. I discussed the role of central government and the creation of CERA 
and Regenerate Christchurch, co-opting the role of local government (regional and municipal) and its 
impact on participatory democracy. This took the shape of structural adjustment and market-based 
reforms substituting business-as-usual planning frameworks and resource consenting processes with 
a standards-based national planning template to cut red tape and speed up development, limiting 
public consultation and deliberation in urban and housing development. 
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 This chapter continues to probe my framework of community resilience, by broadly describing 
the policies of post-disaster housing recovery after the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 and 
the key informants’ perceptions of these policies. As previously discussed, housing is a key social 
determinant of health and wellbeing, but it is also space, a place, and an object of status and market 
speculation. This prompted me to view housing from the perspective of the social and ecological 
dimensions and the sociological levels of analysis described in my framework of community resilience 
– the micro (individual and relationships), meso (community), and macro (wider context) level.  
 To visually guide the reader in this description of the recovery, below I have included a map of 
the city illustrating the liquifaction vulnerability after the earthquakes across the district. 
Figure 7.1: Tonkin & Taylor’s Liquifaction Vulnerability Study1 
 
 These in-depth interviews with key informants took place from 2013 to 2014, just when the 
reality of a significant housing shortage in Christchurch was becoming increasingly evident. The 
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interviews echo this reality and convey the experiences of communities and the broader third sector 
in these difficult times. The interviews also underscore my argument that the Government used the 
Canterbury earthquakes and the emergency legislation enacted to address them to impose renewed 
structural adjustment reforms. These changes rolled back local government and liberalised the 
housing industry to create what was described by government as an market-led or insurance-led post-
disaster recovery of housing.  
 The narrative synthesis that follows touches on the main themes arising from these interviews 
in relation to housing recovery policy developments, as well as related media coverage, and my own 
analysis and personal experiences as a professional stranger in the field.2 Some of the themes explored 
are: the policy of a market-led or insurance-led approach to post-disaster housing recovery; the 
devastating impact on affordable housing (including, social housing, the cost of private rental housing, 
and temporary housing); the impact of these policies on the city’s most vulnerable people; and the 
opening-up of greenfield sites for suburban development (rather than large-scale and more 
sustainable efforts to support renewed urban living).  
II. The Policy of Post-Disaster Housing Recovery: 
A. So… the Non-Recovery of the housing sector: 
 
“That's a very good conversation, isn't it?” 
 
 This section offers a grand-tour perspective, asking key informants for their general reflections 
on the recovery of housing after the Canterbury earthquakes, before heading into a deeper discussion 
of the key events and the specific policies that guided this process of recovery.  
 Housing was a major contributor to the ongoing sense of adversity for people after the 
Canterbury earthquakes. A community service provider explained that the issue of housing recovery 
was very important to the city’s residents and their personal and community resilience. This social 
services insider went on to offer a glimpse into what had happened:  
“So much housing was lost and, when the red zone issues came through and people had to shift 
out, more housing was lost. There wasn’t enough housing anywhere to replace it. Demand is 
way higher than supply and so rent started going through the roof. In some quarters of the city, 
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there were good landlords that didn’t take advantage of that. There were other quarters where 
rent suddenly went up 300% or 400%.” 
 
 These thoughts painted a troubling picture and were echoed by participants from different 
backgrounds, who consistently remarked that the earthquakes had a crippling impact on the city’s 
housing stock. There was also a consensus that housing recovery in Christchurch was a huge, big, 
complex, and multi-faceted problem. A public servant in central government, for instance, stated that 
the recovery process was “a very difficult thing for everyone. Even at the beginning, people didn't 
realise the magnitude of the situation and just the extensiveness of the damage.” 
 “So much housing was lost,” remarked a community service provider. In the residential red zone 
alone 8,000 to 10,000 homes were eventually demolished.3 Additional housing was also needed to 
accommodate the rebuild workers, who were flowing in large numbers by 2013/2014 to work in the 
city. On this issue, a third sector stakeholder noted that the fact that there were forty-two thousand 
new migrant workers in Christchurch now created itself a housing issue. Many participants from 
disparate backgrounds pointed to some of these issues as major factors in the widespread shortage 
of housing. For some community and third sector stakeholders, this was widely seen to be a significant 
source of ongoing distress for the people of Christchurch and was compounded by the Government’s 
structural adjustment approach to recovery, at a time when demand for homes clearly surpassed the 
supply of housing stock available.  
“There are big issues. You've got a lot of damaged housing where the insurance companies are 
either paying out and people are just taking the cash and running, so the housing stock is not 
going to be repaired. It's going to be bought by people who will rent them out and run them to 
the ground, so you have people living in bad housing. But those people won't necessarily 
complain, because it's cheaper than renting anywhere else. So, yea, difficult situation. You've 
got the people who haven't been able to settle insurance claims, and it's going to drag on, and 
on, and on. And so, you're just sort of stuck in limbo, if you like. And they keep saying, oh, we'll 
have it all settled by this date. You just laugh, you know its not. I realise I haven't mentioned EQC 
yet. I've done well. Don't get me started.” 
 
 A more detailed discussion on some of these issues and this market-led or insurance-led 




B. The Market-Led & Insurance-Led Approach to Post-Disaster Housing Recovery: 
1. The Market Will Provide:4 
“The market will provide… All those things come with a Government that says, that's okay, that 
the market will provide. If Gerry Brownlee truly believed that was not in our best interest, he 
would have done something about it.” 
 
 This was expressed by a member of local government when asked about the seemingly 
contradictory approach to the climate of command and control created by CERA, the Government’s 
economic ideals and the unprecedented level of insurance coverage for earthquake-related damage 
coalesced to yield the previously mentioned market-led or insurance-led approach to post-disaster 
housing recovery. In Chapter 6, I explained how this disaster recovery policy approach revealed the 
Government’s political objective of reintroducing structural adjustment reforms, in line with their 
ideology of economic liberalisation. The next section explains how the insurance side of this approach 
was implemented and how it was perceived by participants.  
2. An Insurance-Led Recovery of Housing:  
“The insurance is about putting back what was there, not actually improvement.” 
The insurance-led post-disaster recovery of housing after the Canterbury Earthquakes was at 
the centre of the National-led Government’s approach to addressing the problem. This approach 
revolved around homeowners, EQC, and the private insurance and reinsurance companies. The level 
of insurance coverage for damage to housing after the earthquakes was unprecedented at an 
international scale.5 In contrast to other natural disasters around the world, ninety percent of the 
overall earthquake damage in Canterbury (including housing) was covered by insurance.6 The New 
Zealand Parliament concluded that the insurance costs of the Canterbury earthquakes far exceeded 
the cost of all previous disasters, and that there were more claims as a result of these earthquakes 
than from any other insurance event in the country.7 At the time, it was reported that for insurance 
companies, the major earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand costed a record NZ$483 billion in 2011, 
more than double their total claims in 2010, and triple the average in the last decade. These economic 
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losses were higher than Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Just the Christchurch February 2011 aftershock 
added NZ$16.5 billion to insurers' claims pay-out for the year.  
In line with its structural adjustment approach (discussed in Chapter Six), the Government 
bailed-out AMI Insurance in 2012. Deemed “too big to fail,”8 AMI had not purchased enough 
reinsurance to cover almost 2 billion in earthquake-related claims. A new publicly-owned insurance 
company in 2012 – Southern Response Earthquake Services Limited9 would be “responsible for settling 
claims by AMI policy holders for Canterbury earthquake damage which occurred before 5 April 2012,” 
the date AMI was sold to IAG.10 
“The $1.8 billion of earthquake claims of troubled Canterbury insurer AMI Insurance are to be 
taken over by the Government which might eventually be left with a bill of $120 million or more. 
That was part of the deal announced yesterday in which AMI will be split up. In April AMI secured 
a $500m Government guarantee but it has not drawn on that. Australian insurance giant IAG 
has not ruled out job cuts at AMI Insurance after the announcement it will buy the struggling 
Canterbury insurer for $380 million, but not its earthquake claims. But IAG, is pledging to provide 
home insurance to all AMI's existing customers when their policies come up for renewal or 
customers want to transfer the policy to another property.”11 
 
The social justice implications12 and moral hazards13 of such bailouts have been raised after the 
global financial crisis of the last decade and the accompanying economic austerity,14 which has 
devolved into deep cuts in public spending across the world’s liberal democracies. Moreover, some of 
the management strategies of Southern Response were viewed critically by the media and by 
opposition Members of Parliament:  
“Crown-owned Southern Response [SR] has paid staff $3.29 million in bonuses for settling 
earthquake claims quickly. SR took over AMI Insurance's earthquake claims after the 
Christchurch earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. A report of the Parliamentary Finance and 
Expenditure Committee, released on Thursday, reveals SR paid the money to staff based on a 
staff member's throughput – number of build completions or cash settlements – and a 
qualitative assessment of their performance. They said some members were concerned the 
incentives could mean staff cleared claims quickly but unsatisfactorily for the customer.”15  
 
The Government relied on EQC and its Natural Disaster Fund.16 EQC is a Government-owned 
entity and provider of primary natural disaster insurance to owners of residential property, Founded 
after the Wairarapa Earthquake of 194217 during the birth of the New Zealand welfare state, 
McAneney and others describe EQC as a “government-sponsored natural disaster insurance pool” or 
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a “residual market mechanism” that has reinsurance,18 or the “insurance of insurance companies,” 
whith the “added benefit of providing financial resources external to the local economy.”  
For the authors, the role of EQC is seen internationally as a case study and as an “important 
factor in the reconstruction of Christchurch.”19 This reality was recognised by a community 
representative, who said, “I'm really thankful we have EQC because it’s the only place where land is 
insured.” However, this insurance-led approach was perceived by other third sector participants as 
testing the personal resilience of claimants and their families. According to these participants, for 
affected property owners, this approach was not a “walk in the park,”20 as the Government’s core 
response, the Home Repair Programme (led by EQC, the private insurance companies, and Fletcher 
EQR21), was low-quality and often left people feeling “stuck in limbo.” For a community service 
provider, EQC was simply not ready to take on the immensity of the challenge it confronted: 
“It was just systems, and processes, and things not being in place. This is the first time EQC has 
been tested on a massive scale and the structure by which they insure is an issue. They pay for 
the first hundred K, and then it's over to the insurance company after that. When it would have 
been much simpler if it was just a percentage they covered. Then, the insurance companies could 
have done the assessments themselves – they had the experts that could do that – then, they 
would have sent the invoice to EQC. Done. EQC didn't even need contact with the claimants. That 
would have made a big difference.” 
 
For these participants, although some “people have good stories about EQC, other people have 
had long and agonising waits to try and get stuff done – it's just been very frustrating.” The following 
was said by another community service provider: 
“Insurance, they've just been utterly useless. I mean, talk about not having consumer focus 
whatsoever. They take money for years, and years, and years, and when it comes to the moment 
that they are there for, the purpose they were originally created for, they run for the hills. They 
can blame it on EQC if they want to, but it's more than that.” 
 
This led this participant to question the Government’s entire approach: 
 
“Really, it shouldn't be insurance-led, it should be resident-led and community-led. The insurance 
companies should be a passive contributor, they could be coming to the party quickly and saying, 
this is the damage, and this is what we're owed, what you want to do with it? Instead, it’s more 
the other way, you must fit our repair programme, and you must do it this way, because it's the 




It was understood by participants from diverse organisational backgrounds that the insurance 
claims process was made more difficult by the many subsequent aftershocks and the damage that 
resulted. An institutional stakeholder explained that, although he thought “the policy of dealing with 
those who were affected least first was wrong, because the earthquakes were ongoing,” he didn’t 
know “how they could have done anything else.” The many aftershocks, compounded with the 
damage caused by liquefaction and lateral spreading, created considerable uncertainty about the 
timing of insurance settlements and dramatically altered how new constructions could be carried out. 
Arguably, this should have been considered at the onset of the recovery, as strong aftershocks are 
common after major earthquakes. The ground kept shaking and this uncertainty did not mesh well 
with the Government’s insurance-led approach. As noted by a local government insider: 
“When we had the first earthquake, people were not aware that we would have another 10,000 
earthquakes coming along. We started planning to build back the city, but getting continual 
successive earthquake after earthquake, the insurance companies, of course, walking away from 
the city for a period of about a year, saying that they weren't going to repair any dwellings or 
commission buildings until the earthquakes stopped.” 
 
For a community service provider, this was a very complex problem: 
“The insurance companies took such a hurt, that they were wanting to stop building quickly after 
the earthquake. Insurance companies just said, we’re not going to insure you. It was sort of too 
big of a risk, and it wasn’t worth their time. And so, people understandably said, well, we’re not 
going to build it, until we can get insurance. Yeah, you’re right, that did slow things down a lot. 
What’s essentially a community problem, for that to be totally dominated by the profit-driven 
demands of companies that aren’t even Christchurch-based, that’s incredibly problematic. What 
you do about that? Is hard, because no one is going to build without insurance. Very early is, 
there were all sorts of groups like resident’s associations that started protesting about the 
behaviour of EQC and insurance companies, and all that kind of stuff, and I totally hear what 
they were saying. There were individual cases that were really, obviously, absolutely disgusting. 
However, there was no one saying, this is how we could do it. It shows how complex the problem 
is. You can’t force a company to insure a building in an area that’s had a major earthquake and 
that’s likely to have more. If you’re not going to insure, no one is going to build, if no one is going 
to build, this recovery slows down.” 
 
Moreover, it was observed by stakeholders with diverse organizational backgrounds that, 
although the Government relied on EQC as the main agency to carry-out this approach to housing 
recovery, the agency was ill-prepared for a disaster of this scale:  
“The EQC process has been difficult because it wasn't set up to handle a major disaster and they 
had to build it up.” 
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“EQC weren't geared up for their purpose. They should have been able to handle a massive event 
like this. And, they didn't have the systems in place. They didn't know what to do. They sent out 
random people to assess houses who had no qualifications, no understanding of insurance and 
what people's rights were under their insurance policies, and it's just a big mess. And so, they've 
been evaluating, and evaluating, and spending millions of dollars on wages for professionals to 
come and reassess, and reassess, while people sit in a cold home.” 
 
“I know they only had nine staff and all that sort of stuff prior to the earthquake, but did they 
not think that Wellington was going to be a big earthquake? So where were the procedures in 
place? Where was the preparedness that Civil Defence had in terms of response?” 
 
This led an institutional stakeholder to question the quality of management at EQC: 
“From a general EQC perspective, people are absolutely horrified by the poor management 
structure, the inability to think strategically and work out a process, and the really poor project 
management. If I was to really criticise Gerry Brownlee… He is the Minister of EQC, and he has 
not done his job on that. He's been a much better Minister for Earthquake Recovery than 
Minister for EQC, and he has been let off the hook by the media who have not really hammered 
hard about the poor process and the poor management of EQC.” 
 
In 2016, the Government remained happy with the EQC Home Repair Programme.22 Taking a 
cue from the New Zealand Insurance Council (NZIC),23 the Government went on to adopt a “no worse 
off than you were before” approach, where insured homes were repaired or replaced to their existing 
condition before the earthquakes struck.24 This approach was perceived as a piecemeal strategy of 
individual claims and in 2018 is still ongoing. For a community stakeholder, this approach negatively 
affected the long-term resilience of local housing:  
“It’s not a matter of just getting back those houses as it was, it’s a matter of using this 
opportunity to build some resilience and some smarter, and safer, and healthier ways of living. 
In that sense, recovery is a dangerous word because it sounds like someone getting over being 
sick when it’s something much more fundamental than that.” 
 
Similarly, for an institutional stakeholder “pushing people back to a situation that is no worse 
than they were before is flawed” because it precludes betterment. 
“If you look at the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, part of their approach to recovery 
includes betterment, which is why the council has the Build Back Smarter programme, because 
it insists on being smarter. This Act talks about building resilience, about improving the way 
things were, and about risk reduction, using the rebuilding, the recovery of a city to reduce future 
risks, whether that be earthquakes or sea level rise, or whatever. Having an insurance-led policy 
undermines that ability to add quality and add resilience to the recovery”  
 




“Insurance-led approaches always deal with the results after the event. It's about cleaning up 
the mess at the bottom of the cliff. What about making buildings stronger so that they don't 
have to be torn down? This is a lesson for the whole country Cleaning up after the fact is useful. 
We need it, but we also need to reduce risks before the events occur. We are very poor at taking 
a precautionary approach.” 
 
I asked about the issue of betterment and he expressed: 
“Betterment… I've talked about insulation, about the performance of a home. It's also about the 
quake resilience of a home. Insurance companies have been quite clear to homeowners wanting 
to make the foundations of their homes stronger. You've got a lot of old homes sitting on wooden 
foundations, the homes are sitting there and ultimately if there's a quite bumpy earthquake, 
they're bound to fall off those. Going under the house and putting wire from the foundations to 
the house, tying the house to the foundations, is seen by the insurance companies as betterment 
Which is true. You can say, the insurance idea is to put you back no worse than you were before, 
But, why wouldn't you? In an earthquake prone environment, you want to protect your 
infrastructure. The insurance companies and the Government are spending billions of dollars to 
fix up homes but not put in something that might cost, I don't know, $500 bucks to fix the home 
to the foundation? That's why I'm saying, build smarter. It isn’t about stuff like solar panels, it's 
not blue sky. It's about doing things smarter. Having insurance saying, no, that's betterment, 
okay, it's betterment but it's saving the Government and insurance companies if you do this.” 
 
The outcome was that insurance settlements were not necessarily invested in the repair or 
replacement of the housing stock. For this institutional stakeholder, this situation allowed “a whole 
lot of loopholes for opting out, taking the money, selling houses.” 
“People don't know what's happening. Houses have sold that are damaged, they're being rented 
out at the premium price. I really struggle with some of that.” 
 
 Although it was argued that this issue of cash settlements and as is, where is housing would be 
“better for economic recovery,”25 it is highly likely that it also took place for administrative and political 
expediency over any long-term recovery goals. As the 2014 national election was rapidly approaching, 
the Government needed to show momentum and the slow-progressing recovery was rapidly 
becoming a political hot-button issue. This was seen by a local government insider as an example of 
the need for a coordinated strategy for post-disaster housing recovery.  
“The role of EQC is not linked to a whole of government approach. They are focused on speed. 
We're going to end up with a leaky buildings-like legacy for Christchurch and it's because of 
EQC's policy to pay-out and not to repair. We need repaired homes. It's appalling when you can 
have an earthquake, have insurance, and just get paid-out and not get the home repaired. It’s 
just dynamite. That’s appalling, and it's just for political expediency rather than the good result 




 Moreover, the individualised claims-based approach that took place meant that the information 
on the outcome of any claim remained confidential and only between EQC, the homeowners, and 
their private insurance. Indeed, not even the council had access to this information. In 2016, in a mass 
valuation of the city’s housing stock, the council relied on Christchurch homeowners’ honesty. 
Homeowners were asked to register any damage that may affect their property’s value with Quotable 
Value (QV), to ensure a “fair and accurate” valuation.  
“The previous council revaluation round in 2013 saw all homes valued as if they were repaired. 
By law, the council must ensure its rating values for the 160,000-plus properties are as accurate 
as possible. This time, without a database of earthquake claims, repairs, or settlements, valuers 
will have to look beyond official sources of information and need owners to help. Council will be 
unable to make owners say whether homes are damaged. Details of insurance claims and pay-
outs are private between owners and insurers, including the EQC.” 26 
 
 These discussions and my observations allowed me to come to terms with the fact that New 
Zealand lacked a coordinated housing policy.27 The next section offers a more in-depth discussion: 
3. The Absence of an Overall Housing Recovery Strategy: 
“He who fails to plan is planning to fail.”28 
 
Residential property in New Zealand is a largely unregulated sector of the economy, with 
discussions of supply and demand largely confined to matters of monetary policy and not social 
need.29 This was commented upon by a community service provider: 
“It’s part of an overall strategy. That's one of the things that has not happened. A clear housing 
strategy. We have a lot of scrambling around and that's something that could be done a lot 
better. What do we have now and what do we need going forward? Doing a simple testing of 
that. It's like we’re not sure of what we hear. And we hear from lots of agencies and we hear 
from our own sources that there are lots of needs not being met.” 
 
To address the political pressure stemming from an ensuing housing crisis, the National-led 
Government sought to deregulate further, prompting Parliament to enact two new housing bills – the 
Social Housing Reform Act of 2013 and the Housing Accords and Special Housing Areas Act of 2013. 
With the Social Housing Reform Act, the Government declared that the state’s social housing stock 
was the wrong size and in the wrong place, to sell state houses as assets to what came to be known 
as community housing providers. Under these conditions, the Act expected social tenants to shift to 
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the poorly regulated private rental market,30 instead of providing security of tenure. These policies 
have now been rescinded by the new Labour-led Government. But, even though the building of new 
state homes has become a priority for the new Labour-led Government, there is significant need.  
The Housing Accords and Special Areas Act of 2013 aimed to reduce so-called regulatory red 
tape for development in previously identified special housing areas (SHAs), by bestowing on central 
government control over the power of local councils to issue resource management and building 
consents to developers who complied with a specific set of design standards within an SHA. This 
reform did little to bring an integrated view of the problem. By reducing the regulatory burden to 
private investors, the Government sought to incentivise the market to increase the supply of housing. 
Results were mixed, and any new housing stock has taken several years to come market.31  
Moreover, increased central government control over the problem did not culminate in a formal 
national plan or strategy for increased coordination among central government, local government, 
and the private and third sectors. In fact, after the 2014 general election, as the Fifth National 
Government sought to implement the 2013 Acts, it further fragmented its role and responsibilities 
over housing. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), had subsumed the 
functions of the Department of Building and Housing. Housing New Zealand (HNZ) had ceded key 
responsibilities of this ministerial portfolio to the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) to carry-out 
functions like the social housing waiting list and linking to other social benefits and entitlements 
schemes, like the Income-Related Rent Subsidy and Work and Income (WINZ). At a time when social 
housing tenants were being relayed to the private rental market through reviewable tenancies, the 
split of functions separated social housing from tenancy services, which were handled by MBIE.32 The 
resignation of former Prime Minister John Key in late 2016 and the Cabinet reshuffle that followed in 
2017 consolidated the portfolios of social housing and tenancy services in MSD, with social housing 
and a new Social Investment Agency.  
The science of housing construction and urban planning were left as parcels of MBIE. This 
included the creation of the National Science Challenge 11: Building, Homes, Towns & Cities.33 The 
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political move was accompanied by a curb in the Government’s non-interventionist policies in an 
election year. Critics argued that this approach effectively eliminated the ministerial housing portfolio. 
As of 2017, there was a public perception that the Government did not have a formal or long-term 
housing strategy. In describing a social housing initiative to build 100 to 140 “kitset” or modular 
homes, social housing groups said the plan was ad hoc and short term and that the Government did 
not have “a long-term plan to fix the housing crisis and much more effort should be put into a 10-year 
plan for housing.”34 Elected somewhat based on this discontent, the new Labour-led Government has 
sought to change this perception through the affordable housing development policy of KiwiBuild and 
a new Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.35 In 2019 the operational arm Housing New 
Zealand became Kāinga Ora – Homes and Communities. 
Study participants from diverse backgrounds viewed the National-led Government policies as 
the product of the lack of a whole-of-government approach to post-disaster housing recovery. That is, 
one that brought together insurance, land use planning, managed retreat from red zoned areas, 
temporary, social and emergency housing, the rebuild of the CBD, land acquisition, hazard mitigation, 
building and housing quality, and policies to develop new forms of higher density inner-city living, as 
well as other aspects like public health and social and economic recovery. Roy and Langford propose 
that whole-of-government measures avoid single-purpose organisations,36 where “services are 
oftentimes delivered through a network of providers organised around a common mission or 
programmatic outcome.”37 In Christchurch, housing was not as such, a common mission, but an 
outcome of uncoordinated actions of central and local government, state and private insurers, 
developers, building companies, and individual home-owners and housing investors. 
Importantly, in the case of Christchurch, housing-related policies seemed to be developed and 
implemented without an overall strategic sense of how they fitted together with population health 
and wellbeing and its social determinants. This is illustrated in the recovery legislation previously 
described and the actions of CERA after the earthquakes. Below are the acts that were identified in 
the CERR and CER Acts of 2010 and 2011 as susceptible to amendment by Orders-in-Council. Excluding 
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the Earthquake Commission (EQC) Act of 1993,38 major housing legislation, like the Residential 
Tenancies Act of 198639 and subsequent amendments, were not identified by Parliament for these 
purposes, despite clear evidence of major damage to the region’s housing infrastructure.  
“(3) The enactments that may be the subject of an Order-in-Council that does anything referred 
to in subsection (2) include (WITHOUT LIMITATION) the following: (a) the Building Act 2004; (b) 
the Cadastral Survey Act 2002; (c) the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002; (d) 
the Commerce Act 1986; (e) the Earthquake Commission Act 1993; (f) the Health Act 1956; (g) 
the Health and Disability Services (Safety) Act 2001; (h) the Heritage New Zealand Pourer 
Taonga Act 2014; (i) the Land Transport Act 1998; (j) the Land Transport Management Act 
2003; (k) the Local Government Act 1974; (l) the Local Government Act 2002; (m) the Local 
Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987; (n) the Local Government (Rating) 
Act 2002; (o) the Public Works Act 1981; (p) the Rating Valuations Act 1998; (q) the Reserves 
Act 1977; (r) the Resource Management Act 1991; (s) the Road User Charges Act 2012; (t) 
the Social Security Act 1964; (u) the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941; (v) 
the Transport Act 1962; (w) the Waste Minimisation Act 2008.”40 
 
 This significant legal clout and the responsibility over strategy, policy, and planning did not 
translate into a better coordinated approach to post-disaster housing recovery, contrary to what has 
been described as best practice in this field.41 This was the view of a council insider: 
“There’s a Central City Plan and a Transport Plan. Where's the Housing Plan, the recovery plan 
for the housing sector? I understand that's coming, but it's amazing that three years on after a 
major event we're thinking about what we're doing in terms of housing.” 
 
Asked why such an overarching recovery plan for housing had not been created, he continued: 
 
“Very good question. You'll have to ask somebody else that question. There is no good reason. 
I'm talking about a recovery plan for the housing sector. We talked about the holistic 
government view, joining the dots and having a clear policy direction about how they're doing 
housing. That's being thought through. By the time the plan is written, most of the insurance 
pay-outs will have been given. A, B, C, what are the policies?” 
 
 On the contrary, while many Christchurch residents were faced with the stress of living in 
earthquake-damaged homes, the monumental task of post-disaster housing recovery was put in the 
“back burner.” CERA and its Minister never gave themselves overall control of the process, deciding 
to leave the responsibility for it among the many other organisations that share housing as part of 
their portfolio (like, EQC, MBIE, Treasury, HNZ, MSD, and the CCC). As noted by a council insider: 
“I don’t see an overarching vision or direction. This is one of the problems that I have with the 
RMA. It’s very driven from the outside. Whereas I much more favour a normative approach 
where you have a vision, the community decides what it wants, and you work towards it. Not in 
a haphazard way of developing as opportunity arises.” 
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 This perception is shared by Salmon:  
“After the completion of the Recovery Strategy, further planning for the rebuild was not 
addressed in an integrated way but was divided into two separate planning processes. The 
central city was to be the subject of a special plan, while the rest of Greater Christchurch was to 
be covered by the Land Use Recovery Plan [LURP]. Moreover, while the council wanted to get 
residential development going in the central city, the Government had different priorities, 
considering it was more important to stimulate development across the region, even though it 
is the catalyst for investment in other places.” 42  
 
 As a result, many housing-related issues remained unsolved. For example, as discussed below, 
the rental market remained largely unregulated, even after it became apparent that there was a 
housing shortage in the city that gave way to increased rents, causing great hardship among the city’s 
most vulnerable. Such decisions were not made even in the face of major social dislocation. This was 
suggested by a community service provider: 
“The agencies perhaps have been a bit siloed in their responses. Housing New Zealand doing one 
thing, and MSD another, and council another, and CERA another, and Civil Defence another. A 
lot of talk needs to happen to work together and across sectors. In terms of housing, finding out 
that, you've got the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (or what I call the Ministry 
of Everything) – and Housing New Zealand is separate to that – but in MBIE they've got this 
Social Housing Unit, and it's the one now deciding the policy not Housing New Zealand. All these 
sorts of funny pockets of things happening that don't seem joined up and cohesive strategies. 
We need to get to the point where they are joined up and cohesive. And, where they will actually 
listen to the community first.” 
 
The central government focused on attracting international investment for its large-scale CBD 
anchor projects. This community service provider continued to argue:  
“The current National-led Government, they are not really interested. They are interested in big 
projects. They haven't identified housing, despite it being the biggest investment. They could 
have invested in housing and that would have had massive economic benefits for everyone.” 
 
Another community service provider expressed that “it's both needed, the growth and recovery 
of the CBD is important, but not at the expense of people's wellbeing.” A council insider reinforced 
the idea that post-disaster housing recovery was not coordinated, driven instead by an ideological 
neoliberal agenda of free markets: 
“People would have to understand their role in relation to housing policy. We don't really have 
a housing policy in New Zealand now. We used to, with Housing New Zealand, loans, and those 





4. Regulating Deregulation: 
 Instead of regulating from a people-centred perspective, the Government used its extraordinary 
powers to deregulate in order to incentivise private investment. As explained, the primary purpose of 
the CERR Act 2010 and CER Act 2011 was to minimise delay and cut red tape.43 This would involve a 
public response focused away from direct public investment in increasing the city’s affordable housing 
stock and exerting greater control over the market through mechanisms like a rental cap policy. The 
Government also appeared reluctant to create economic incentives to limit the perceived risks on 
investing in new typologies of housing for Christchurch (like medium-density, mixed-tenure, 
customised industrial design, and prefabricated housing). Arguably, greater emphasis on funding 
these housing types could have sped up recovery and offered more affordable and sustainable 
approaches earlier, other than the greenfield alternatives. Participants perceived this as not leading 
to a sustainable recovery of housing for all sectors of society in Christchurch.  
 Instead, critics have argued that this strategy emphasised economic recovery and not housing 
recovery more specifically – that is, securing investment and liaising with businesses, labour, 
insurance, communities, and NGOs to ensure a higher quality and more equitable end-result. In so 
doing, the Government seemed to favour regulation versus action or to regulate deregulation, that is, 
create a policy framework that would cut red tape and incentivise speculative housing development 
in a less regulation-encumbered market. This was done in the hopes of attracting private investment, 
at times, to the detriment of the public interest in having a more comprehensive housing recovery 
approach. So far, there is evidence that these de-regulatory efforts have had some impact in 
incentivising the market into speculative development. However, as it will be further discussed below, 
this increased development has not consisted necessarily of high-quality affordable housing and has 
happened mainly in greenfield sites outside of the city. For an institutional stakeholder, this approach 
was not appropriate in a disaster context: 
“You can achieve a fantastic result with the market, provided you can lock in those efficiencies 
and catch those economies of scale. If it's left to the market without doing that, you don't get 
economies of scale. You get price escalation and you get poor quality.” 
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5. The Private Sector – Ready to Lead? 
It was clear from the interviews that the EQC and the insurance and building industries were 
not seen as able to cope with the task of leading the recovery. EQC and other insurers were perceived 
by community and third sector stakeholders as “overwhelmed” and as acting without a customer 
focus. The building industry was perceived as lacking the trained human resources or the necessary 
scale to address the magnitude of the problem. Indeed, these short falls, together with increased 
migration to other urban centres like Auckland and Wellington, helped to create a nation-wide 
housing crisis that made it more difficult to consistently deliver results, in both the repair of existing 
earthquake-damaged homes and the development of affordable housing stock.44 For a community 
service provider, the Government relied on this approach to housing recovery even though, like 
everyone else, the private sector was also affected by the earthquakes. For a participant in central 
government, this was the case for small local business: 
“Some people just left the city. There's an ongoing challenge for the small businesses. Anything 
that gets rebuilt will probably have higher rentals, and some people have just had to relocate.” 
 
She offered a sad anecdote that succinctly illustrated the trauma of the earthquakes: 
“I know of a restaurant owner who had one building demolished, his son was killed in the 
February earthquake, he built another building and that got damaged in the June one. I'm not 
sure what happened to him, but people have had multiple blows. For some businesses and 
people, it's been very difficult. Lyttleton has really struggled. There's a lot of damage there and 
a lot of things that went. People for a while were scared to go to Lyttleton because they had to 
go through the tunnel and there was so much damage.” 
 
In the aftermath of the disaster, the private sector found itself divided. On the one hand, some 
stakeholders suggested that there was some private sector flight – “I'll take my insurance money and 
run.” Nevertheless, others thought the private sector was resilient and able to adapt in the face of 
adversity – “there was a lot of adaptation, it was a huge challenge and a lot of decisions were made 
quite quickly.” Indeed, in many respects, participants saw the role of local businesses as important 
and positive in the process of recovery, as risk-averse international investors failed to commit to the 
rebuilding of the CBD through a foreign investment in the Blueprint’s anchor projects. A community 
service provider noted how this investment did not come through: 
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“In terms of the Blueprint, it’s interesting in that Plan A has failed completely. There haven’t 
been apparently any international investors coming to Christchurch. In that sense, what has 
been built is entirely being driven by local, private landowners, and developers. They are, at least 
according to them, not making anything out of it. They are just doing it because they care about 
Christchurch. In that sense, there has been an amazing response in the private sector, where 
they could have just walked away and said, there is no money in it for us.” 
 
For a local government participant, this too was the case: 
 
“Some of it has been fantastic. If you think about it, some of those people who want to see 
recovery in Christchurch and who are working hard. That's the private sector working well.” 
 
 A community service provider went further and commented on the need to develop more 
formal links between the private sector and communities and social enterprises: 
“In terms of the private sector integrating with the community sector, I'm not sure. That's more 
in the social enterprise area, where people have been kind of awakened to the meaning of life, 
if you like, after such a big event destroyed what they thought was concrete, or they lost loved 
ones and things, and it has made them rethink what's important in life. And so, that has put the 
focus on some of that social enterprise stuff.” 
 
 However, community and third sector representatives were hesitant to view the private sector 
completely in a positive light, describing how some corporate interests exerted their influence over 
the National-led Government, to the detriment of community and third sector participation in the 
process of recovery. Describing their perception of the housing industry or Housing Inc, some 
participants proposed that developers and property investors had acted contrary to the public good 
in exploiting their connection with the central government and its market-led political platform:  
“The private sector’s role was that everybody started to look after their own needs and the more 
capacity they had, the easier it was to get that done. The way it always works is that people you 
know become significant in getting your needs met the fastest. A businessman who has had his 
building damaged, his workplace damaged, and his home damaged is going to do everything he 
can to get his building sorted out on this square piece of land. Which means it is a lot harder to 
get a broader conversation about the community we want to develop. You can have as many 
great ideas as you want about the way the central city is going to look, but each parcel of land 
is designed by the owners – and they’ve got rights to their own parcel of land. That’s what 
they’re focused on and, the extra energy they have is going into their home.” 
 
“The private sector essentially outside Christchurch responded with a lot more philanthropic 
giving. Inside Christchurch, it just responded as you would anticipate by doing whatever it could 
to get it self-sorted out as fast as possible. But there is inevitable collateral damage in what 
people don’t consider. Does that make sense? I know I’m trying to do it in a way that sounds 
really fair to what I observed happening.” 
 
As discussed below, this led to problems and inequalities in terms of the social reach of the 
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Government’s approach to post-disaster housing recovery.  
6. The Market of Post-Disaster Housing Recovery: 
 
“It seems that the Government has done a very right-wing approach and just stood back and 
said, I will let the market sort it out. That’s been a bit of a disaster and that’s where a lot of 
pressure is going on certain segments of the population.” 
 
 This was noted by a member of the third sector, with another one remarking, “it has just been 
left to the market.” Indeed, this approach was consonant with the National-led Government’s 
tendency of running the state like a corporation, of advancing a public policy based, ultimately, on 
how that policy would impact on New Zealand’s “rock star economy.”45 But, who benefits? It was New 
Zealand’s largest building companies (Mike Greer Homes, Fletcher Living, Ngāi Tahu Property, and 
Stonewood Homes) who figured most prominently in the process of post-disaster housing recovery to 
date over new and more innovative and common housing typologies. Some of these are listed in 
Appendix 7.1: Affordable & Innovative Housing Solutions. 
 The private rental market remained largely unregulated at a time when the local social housing 
stock was highly compromised. These issues provoked discontent from institutional and community 
stakeholders alike. This discontent was directed at how some in the industry behaved after the 
earthquakes, with a community service provider stating “well, they are involved with being putting up 
the rents, anything else that they've done?” It was also expressed that, “the role of the private sector 
has been to behave like the private sector,” and that “there are a lot of people using the earthquakes 
to make lots of money” and doing “more of the old, which is greenfield housing development, using 
the opportunity of the earthquake as an excuse to having that land freed up.” 
 It was perceived by a diversity of participants that some businesses exploited the lack of local 
democracy to win “the blessings of a Minister who continues to deny that there is a crisis in the 
housing sector at all, and the insistence that the market will take care of that.” This was perceived as 
a barrier by a community service provider because “if you have a Minister of such a powerful 
organisation like CERA, who continues to deny rather than actually engage and promote a different 
way of delivery is only impossible.” A council insider expressed the following: 
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“The private sector? It depends. Do you mean developers within the city? Do you mean the 
development community in terms of suburban type development? Some of the big suburban 
developers have utilised the system. Preston's Road was put through, that was to be declined, 
but they used the cracks to push it through. Not through a process, it was pushed through under 
CERA. So, some private developers have used the earthquakes to get their way quicker. There 
has been a lot of speculation from a broader city development perspective. But development 
contributions, new greenfields development, new civilisation does not pay its way. We pay for 
that; we current rate payers pay for their own private profit, subsidised by the rest of us. 
Externalities? They don't take them at all into account, and there goes the problem because we 
don't actually do the analysis properly and we don't do the cost-benefit fully.” 
 
 This participant saw this policy affecting the long-term resilience of the city’s housing stock: 
“I've seen lots of homes being built that are absolutely shoddy. For example, Mike Greer Homes, 
not saying he's one of the bad guys, but he could have spent a lot more money at the start 
getting good designs. Get those designs really honed, beautifully done, clearly smart designs, 
and roll that out across the city. Because he's going to be dealing with 5,000 homes and he's 
doing 1,000 homes in a year, it's worth spending a bit of time up front to get the quality, then 
roll it out. I see that we're getting poor quality homes built to the minimum code and failing the 
Building Code too. It's about the quality of design and the quality of installation. That is just 
appalling, we are building the slums of the future. Yes, the market can provide some good 
results, but they need to be helped to do that.” 
 
This was echoed by a member of the third sector:  
 
“There are massive problems with the way we live in housing in New Zealand and they were pre-
existent to the earthquakes. It’s not a matter of just getting back those houses as it was, it’s a 
matter of using this opportunity to build some resilience, and some smarter, and safer, and 
healthier ways of living. In that sense, recovery is a dangerous word because it sounds like 
someone getting over being sick, when it’s something much more fundamental than that.”  
 
 These perceptions were echoed by the media. In late 2016, it was reported that “opportunist 
builders, dodgy steel, and shonky standards create new building crisis worse than leaky homes.”46 For 
example, “one third of Mike Greer Homes built in Canterbury after the earthquakes did not pass 
inspection or met the minimum requirements of the New Zealand Building Code.”47 Stonewood 
Homes went into receivership, leaving customers “stranded for years,”48 and was taken over by the 
Chow brothers,49 better known for their adult entertainment business, and not as housing developers. 
The repair work by Fletcher Building is now retreating from the residential market50 and its EQR 
division was not well regarded by customers.51 Indeed, in 2018 it was reported that the EQC “botched 




C. The Significant Impact on Affordable Housing:53 
 After the Canterbury earthquakes, “house prices rose by about 30%, with rents increasing 20% 
a year between 2012 and 2014.”54 Many participants agreed this was a real problem and saw a number 
of contributing factors: the significant loss of social housing and private accommodation in the lower-
end of the rental market (like the old boarding houses that were lost near the CBD); increased demand 
from relocating businesses, rebuild workers, and home-owners seeking temporary accommodation 
while repairing and rebuilding their homes; a small temporary housing programme; and a generalised 
lack of affordable and higher density housing development. A community service provider called for 
“a rental housing strategy, because one of the things that was revealed was that nobody knew what 
was available or how would one know what was needed.” 
 Help, it was hoped, would come with the signing of the Christchurch Housing Accord, after the 
enactment of the Housing Accords and Special Housing Areas Act of 2013. Giving a positive spin to the 
announcement, Christchurch Mayor, Lianne Dalziel, said that the “acute shortage of affordable 
housing in Christchurch will only be solved by the CCC and the Government working together.” The 
signing of the Accord "represents progress, and we look forward to receiving the views of our 
community.”55 According to reports, this collaboration was centred on the following actions: 
“Under the proposed Accord, the Government will invest $75 million through a new Christchurch 
Housing Accord Fund, and the council $50 million in a new housing entity which will act as a 
catalyst by encouraging private investment in housing developments. The Accord also 
establishes a Joint Housing Steering Group that will report monthly on progress of the residential 
building in Christchurch and any areas of concern arising from the implementation of the Land 
Use Recovery Plan or the impact of the regulatory environment on development. The 
Government plans to develop two villages totalling 180 homes on council-owned land in 
Colombo and Welles Street. The proposal is for the council to sell the land at fair market value 
and for the Crown to defer payment.”56 
 
Although some key progress targets were missed in implementing the Christchurch Housing 
Accord,57 it can be argued that the city’s post-disaster regulatory framework and the pre-existing close 
working relationship between the Government and the council (because of the existence of CERA and 
the Government’s takeover of ECAN), allowed the implementation to progress more smoothly in 
Christchurch58 than Auckland.59 This was partly a result of the Government’s experience using its new 
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legal powers to issue Orders-in-Council and compel local government to revise their urban 
development plans in accordance with the Accord. Still, there was much room for improvement. For 
example, a member of the third sector stated: 
“It would have been good if large blocks of land were freed up quicker. A few developers realised 
that, although they had a big parcel of land, they would add properties slowly on to it and that 
would keep demand so high that people would be competing for those places.”  
 
1. The Loss of So Much Social Housing: 
 For a community service provider, of huge importance was the fact that the Canterbury 
earthquakes had a terrible impact on social housing with “the interruption to Housing New Zealand 
delivery and the loss of council housing.” She added: 
“Predictably, social housing waiting lists have grown, suggesting that rental shortages are 
affecting the most vulnerable. At the end of 2013, there were 400 people on Housing NZ’s 
waiting list now administered by the Ministry of Social Development, and 150 in the top priority 
category of CCC’s social housing waiting list. For both agencies, this category includes people 
who are homeless, or have been told they need to vacate their home, household type, inability 
to access other housing, and vulnerability. Numbers in the top priority waiting list category are 
at least three times the pre-earthquake number.”60 
 
 This was also pointed out by other institutional and community stakeholders who stressed the 
major damage to the local social housing stock that was already “coming to the end of its usable life” 
and needed to be redeveloped. Howden-Chapman and colleagues paint a stark picture of the 
earthquake damage to the city’s social housing stock: 
“Housing NZ lost 330 of its 5,771 units in Canterbury and estimated that 5,000 units needed 
repair. It has committed to building a house a day, or 700 units by the end of 2015, in a policy 
designed to improve the housing problems of low-income social renters.61 However, it remains 
unclear whether these houses are being built to be on-sold or retained as state house rentals. 
Although the Minister of Housing has made it clear that the Government does not consider large 
scale property development as part of Housing NZ’s core business,62 the agency has been using 
its asset base and organisational capacity to encourage compact, mixed-tenure developments 
in Christchurch. In September 2013 three two-bed room units were the first new dwellings to be 
built by Housing NZ after the earthquakes. Construction of a mixed-income development at 399 
Manchester Street has begun; eleven of the houses will be Housing NZ rentals and the rest will 
be sold privately.63 There is a lack of clarity about the Government’s policy aims in these 
developments where more of the housing in on-sold than managed as social rental properties. 
In the context of unmonitored housing deprivation and a dire shortage of low-income rental 
housing, Housing NZ’s dual objectives of building predominantly for sale and secondarily for 
rental are unlikely to have the desired equity effect of significantly reducing housing insecurity, 




 Early in the recovery, at the time I conducted these interviews, the overall Government 
response was viewed as lacking by many study participants. However, eight years after the 
earthquakes, HNZ has a much more comprehensive long-term building programme and its role has 
been expanded by the new Labour-led Government.65 In 2018, much of this stock was in the works 
and social housing waiting lists remained high.66 In 2013, when I spoke to participants with 
connections to central and local government, they offered the following: 
“In terms of central government, it did some things well but a bit more decisiveness around 
social housing and providing support for people was needed. It would have been nice to have 
had a wider response in terms of social housing, that's been a bit of a let-down.” 
 
“Housing New Zealand… Too slow, not thinking about process, how to refurbish, reuse, get 
people's home back up and running. There are too many empty Housing New Zealand houses 
waiting to be fixed with no one in them when there's a housing shortage in the city.” 
 
A community service provider was particularly concerned for the most vulnerable: 
 
“I don't see evidence of a policy around how people who are outside the criteria for social 
housing, including community housing, how those people are going to be housed.” 
 
 As property owners themselves, both Government and council waited to settle their insurance 
claims on their assets in social housing, before embarking on a serious re-development programme. 
This was pointed out by another community service provider:  
“On Emmett Street, it is largely Housing NZ plus what they have sold over the years and is 
privately owned. All the private owners are there, whereas all the state houses were boarded 
up, largely. And, only a few of them have been fixed and are usable again, despite the damage 
to them being minor. And yet, we have got people living in caravans, on the streets, in cars. 
We've got multiple families living in tiny two-bedroom homes, sleeping in the garages, and stuff. 
Just up the road where a house was demolished. They're just living in camper vans on the site. 
That's just the way. We've got housing that could have been low-cost to be made accessible. 
Someone there hasn't been listening.” 
 
 In mid-2016, Housing NZ announced the completion of their repair goals.67 But, in the midst of 
a nation-wide homelessness and housing affordability crisis, Housing NZ was paying a dividend to the 
previous Government,68 which was keen to accomplish the political promise of a budget surplus in an 
election year.69 After it was reported that Housing NZ was facing financial difficulty,70 in a policy U-
turn, the Government announced that Housing NZ would no longer need to pay a dividend to the 
Government and instead build or buy 5,000 houses over the next 3 years.71  
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 For its part, the CCC was the “second largest provider of social housing in New Zealand, with a 
stock of over 2,600 houses, and of these, about 440 were evacuated due to earthquake damage.”72 
The replacement of these units has been slow, largely due to insurance-related issues.73 This was a 
concern for several institutional stakeholders: 
“I'm utterly appalled. Here was an opportunity for the council. A lot of the housing is coming to 
the end of its usable life and it needs to be redeveloped. What do you do when you redo your 
house after 30 or 40 years? Do it up, rethinking how it could be integrated. There was some 
thinking about it prior to the earthquakes, but post-earthquake, the management of it has been 
terrible and needs to be better. ”  
 
“The City Council has got huge problems. Their social housing must be entirely self-funded, they 
don't get any Government money, and there's no rates money going into it.” 
 
“The council, they are in a really difficult position because they're looking at their financial goal. 
That could also raise the question if the council continue to have social housing? They might 
challenge whether they continue to invest in it. That is one of the challenges they are having. I 
can't see the council just getting out of social housing, but whether they are going to be able to 
invest in it, there would be the space. There is an initiative with the Salvation Army and the 
council's given some land to them to build a little bit of social housing. There's possibly the 
potential to carry on and do some more of those things partnering with other agencies.” 
 
At the time of the interviews, the Government’s Social Housing Reform Programme was 
incipient, and the signing of the Christchurch Housing Accord did not take place until 2014. The 
council’s social housing unit was entirely self-funded through local authority rates and, according to 
The Press, its finances came under scrutiny and this revealed it had been losing “between $2m and 
$3m a year.”74 This situation was reflected upon by a community service provider who commented on 
the policy changes to the social housing sector with the passing of the Social Housing Reform (Housing 
Restructuring and Tenancy Matters Amendment) Act of 2013.75 Indeed, these changes were worrying 
and so were the complexities involved in the implementation of the reform in the context of recovery, 
where the population in need was even more vulnerable.  
“One of the great tragedies that's unfolding as we speak is, of course, the new housing 
restructure in Government and how that has now undermined the social housing by taking away 
the security of tenure for so many.” 
 
 A local government insider stated that the “third sector has a very small stock,” noting: 
 
“Ultimately, the Government is looking at growing that third sector and there'll be more 
community housing. It probably depends on how much funding is available. This will put pressure 
216 
 
onto social housing in the city. Some people are in very difficult situations, who need social 
housing. Because there's that limited supply, and the fact that there's stuff to be rebuilt and 
repaired, they are limited, now, as to where they can put them.” 
 
For a community service provider, there was some promise to this new policy approach: 
  
“I like the idea of partnerships with providers to build housing. That’s acknowledging that 
community is important, and we must have some wrap-around support. That’s valuable.” 
 
 As part of these policy initiatives, the council began revitalising its social housing stock. From 
2014 to 2016, it had built 45 new social housing units and committed more than $20 million for 
repairing and rebuilding homes. At the time, The Press reported the following: 
“The council has already spent $26.5m since January 2013 repairing and rebuilding units after it 
was forced to embark on the massive programme when more than 450 units were put out of 
action following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. Some 230 units have been or will be 
demolished. Before the quakes, the council, New Zealand's second biggest landlord, had 2649 
units and as at October 2015 it had 2285. The goal was to have at least 2366 units (another 81) 
open by 2017-18 and the council said it was on track to achieve this. The council has been under 
pressure to get as many units open as possible after demand for affordable housing in 
Christchurch increased after the quakes.”76 
 
This process came together in the formation of a new charitable trust that would act as a 
community housing provider within the framework of the Government’s Social Housing Reform 
Programme. To mark the occasion, The Press gave it special coverage:  
“A charitable trust has been set up to run the CCC's social housing service and assume 
responsibility for the day-to-day running of the service, including managing tenancies and 
setting rents, in the second half of this year, although that has yet to be finalised. Under the 
proposed arrangement, the CCC would retain ownership of the housing stock – about 2270 units 
– but lease them to the trust, which intended to register as a Community Housing Provider with 
the Government. CHP registration would allow the trust to enter into a contract with the Ministry 
of Social Development to house people from its waiting-list and receive the associated Income-
Related Rent Subsidy. The new trust would play a key role in financially securing the council's 
social housing service. With access to funding and subsidies not available to the council, the trust 
would help to ensure a stable future for tenants while acting as a catalyst for the building of new 
housing units in the city.”77 
 
 In an Interview with Rebuild the Future Christchurch, the present Mayor of Christchurch, Lianne 
Dalziel,78 seemed highly committed to the success of this plan. Noting that the earthquakes had 
created a housing shortage in the city, she stressed that housing was one of the council’s top priorities. 
The Accord, she maintained “it’s very significant in that it acknowledges the seriousness of the current 
housing shortage in the city and proposes a way forward.  
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“It is important the developments build communities, not just houses. The new housing entity 
will secure the sustainability of the council’s involvement in social housing and most of our 
tenants will be better off. The council also needs to formally request Christchurch City Holdings 
provide $50 million over three years for the investment in the new housing entity.” 
 
 By 2016, the new organization had begun identifying excess land for such developments and 
formulating a new social housing plan for the city. It was reported that the council identified 33 
properties which it planned to transfer to its social housing portfolio as compensation for the loss 
of 113 units that were red zoned following the 2011 earthquake.79 Even though the new Labour-led 
Government rescinded the Social Housing Reform Programme, this change in policy excluded the 
Christchurch charitable trust, which allowed the trust to continue to receive Government funds.80 
The shortage of social housing in New Zealand’s major urban centres prompted the Government 
to announce in 2015 a $2 million boost to emergency housing for 120 beds. Nevertheless, in early 
2016 this was “yet be allocated.”81 This funding was to be awarded to “social support organisations” 
as Emergency Special Housing Needs Grants82 for the homeless or the severely housing deprived being 
housed in motels across the country.83 When it became increasingly clear that previous funding levels 
were not enough, in mid-2016 the Government announced a further $41.1 million funding boost for 
New Zealand’s emergency housing providers “to allow them to focus on providing more support for 
vulnerable Kiwis, rather than fundraising for beds.”84 Shortly afterwards, it was reported that 
“homeless people are finding themselves thousands of dollars in debt to Work and Income [WINZ] for 
money loaned to them to stay in motels”85 and that WINZ would not wipe-out these debts.86  
 In late 2016, it was reported in the local press that these motel services had very strict eligibility 
criteria and were also guided by the principle of reviewable tenancies87 espoused by the Social Housing 
Reform Programme. By the end of the year, much of the initial funding had not been used after 
community housing providers nation-wide “didn’t apply for funding because it only paid for beds, and 
not the services and staff needed to manage them.”88 In early 2017, there were calls for the process 
of granting funding to have greater transparency.89 Giving the overwhelming impact of the 
earthquakes in the region’s social housing stock, however, these measures came late in the recovery 
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process and “at the bottom of the cliff,” more than five years after the disaster. In 2013, the 
Christchurch Tenants’ Protection Agency, an important advocate for housing needs in the City 
conducted a survey of their clientele who were experiencing the impact of this social housing shortage 
and dramatic rent increases. The survey found clients were experiencing difficulties “finding suitable 
housing; feelings of stress, worry and fear of the future; and being unable to afford food, doctors’ 
visits, heating and electricity bills, or extras such as holidays or clothes.”90  
2. Private Rental Housing – The Wild West: 
 For Madden and Marcuse, everyone needs and deserves housing. But, internationally “our 
homes are being transformed into commodities and profit has become more important than social 
need.”91 This makes social inequalities in urban centres increasingly acute, because those on lower 
incomes are driven to pay more for lower quality housing. In addition, the authors contend that 
communities are increasingly faced with the “violence of displacement and gentrification,” and decent 
housing is mostly “for those who can afford it.”92 As discussed further below, this global trend of 
housing inequality is manifest in New Zealand’s ongoing housing crisis and was exacerbated in 
Christchurch and nearby districts after the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. 
 Participants of different backgrounds agreed that, after the earthquakes, there was “an 
absolute shortage of rental accommodation in the city.” This was reflected upon by a council insider, 
who said that the question of post-disaster housing recovery “it's really, again, multi-faceted:” 
“We have a shortage of housing and we all know what those reasons are. We have a market out 
of control, we have housing lost which traditionally housed the people who were in the most 
peculiar situations before. Many of those properties have been taken over by people providing 
housing for the rebuild workers. Those people are now in camps and are disenfranchised. People 
have been put out and there is nowhere for them to go to. There's the issue, and one that's not 
acknowledged or looked at very closely. That is, the number of residential properties and stock 
that's been taken over by business or indeed the community sector because, of course, they lost 
their businesses in the earthquakes and have re-established themselves in the suburbs, in the 
homes that were traditionally for families. It’s one of our fears and what we know with that is, 
of course, that many of those businesses may not relocate back into commercial sites because 
they've actually established themselves nicely in those suburbs and in those houses.” 
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 In 2012, the rental crisis was at a “breaking point”93 and resulted in an increase in the price of 
private rentals, displacing those on lower incomes, who could no longer afford the escalating “market 
rents.”94 This situation was summarised by Howden-Chapman and colleagues: 
“The destruction of so much housing, and particularly low-income housing, has exacerbated the 
problem of rent affordability. According to tenancy bond data the number of rental properties 
fell by about 19 percent between December 2010 and December 2012. Incoming workers have 
also increased the demand for rental housing. The shortage of rental properties has led to a 
sharp rise in rents. The 2013 Census showed that the median weekly rent paid by a one-family 
household in Christchurch city was $320, up 39 percent since 2006, almost double the rate of 
inflation 19.2 per cent during this period. Rent rises have made access to affordable and decent 
rental housing particularly challenging for people on low incomes. The number of bonds lodged 
for low-cost rentals less than $300 per week fell from about 900 per month in 2010 to about 362 
per month by mid-2013.”95  
 
 For a community service provider this was related to the fact that the private rental market in 
the city remained highly unregulated private rental market: 
“From my perspective, and from certainly a housing perspective, the Government did not take 
enough measures to protect the interests of the citizens of Canterbury People need to start 
understanding that New Zealand is no longer the New Zealand of the fifties. It is now a New 
Zealand where we must look very much at housing in a different context, and the Government 
must lead that conversation. Not just by talking about social housing or community housing, or 
creating more housing with labelling, but by looking at rental housing in a legitimate way for 
people to live without labelling and that all people, whether you are rich, poor, or not actually, 
can live free of labelling in a secure home. In terms of shifting that culture of expectation, there 
needs to be a lot more work done around the emphasis of protecting the rental sector.” 
 
 This impact on the most vulnerable led to questions about a lack of equity in the Government’s 
approach to post-disaster housing recovery. Community service providers – who were attending to 
the needs of the vulnerable undergoing this acute state of housing insecurity – saw the private rental 
market in the city as a source of concern.96 Many perceived the situation compounded by the 
Government’s restraint in regulating the rental market, even though it was called for by the New 
Zealand Human Rights Commission.97 For a member of the third sector, there was a need “to take 
some of the pressure off the housing market” and “have some regulatory intervention rather than 
assuming that the market was the best mechanism after a massive disaster.” For this participant, 
intervention could have taken the shape of “rental price freezes.” When asked about the possible 
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implementation of a rental cap policy, however, not all participants agreed. Community service 
providers were vocal about the need for an intervention given the market’s behaviour:  
“We called right at the beginning for a rent stabilisation or rent capping, the rental knockouts. 
We recognised that one of the major issues unfolding was a shortage in housing which has 
proven to be the case and that one had to protect and give some security to the residents by 
putting rent controls. That never happened and what's come to pass is, of course, the biggest 
issue for the housing sector in Christchurch, the cost of rental housing in the private sector. Of 
course, the general opinion is that you don't interfere with the market, there is no political will. 
What they fail to look at is the overseas research that shows very clearly that rent capping 
doesn't result in landlords or owners being disadvantaged, in any way at all and, in those 
centres, the residents get protection. They get security of tenure. You get a stable community. 
Very cost-effective for Government because, in actual effect, security creates an environment of 
more certainty and more opportunity for community development and healthy outcomes. It just 
makes absolute sense, but it's never solved that way.” 
 
“That would be a pretty good idea. In terms of how much they can increase the rent, and have 
it tagged to inflation, yeah, because currently they are profiteering. I mean, the capital gains tax 
would be good too. A financial transaction tax, and no GST and income tax, would be the best 
solution. They can tell themselves, it's just the market, and they're just doing what is logical in 
the market. But it is a moral decision and it would be good to get that in law.” 
 
“It's probably a good move, we need something to deal with the fact that the rental market is 
becoming a really lucrative affair for people. Now, I know rates are going up and all, but we 
need to do something to stop speculation is the housing market. The rental business is becoming 
such a good business, that investors are coming in to buy houses as an income generating 
exercise. They're coming in, many of them from overseas to hold the housing stock for their own 
gain. It doesn't do anything to reduce the price of rentals and, also, it doesn't do anything about 
increasing home ownership.” 
 
A public servant too, worried that some were making a profit using the misfortune of others:  
  
“It certainly seems a bit sick that there’s a big housing shortage and land-owners and property 
owners are able to put up their rents, because of a market thing. It’s not like interest rates have 
gone up, or the costs have gone up. Again, that’s just the poor who get affected by that, because 
they’re the ones that get locked out.” 
 
However, a community service provider was on the fence about such an intervention: 
 
“I don’t know. That’s probably a housing expert and economist that would have to weigh in on 
it. I remember I suggested it in a meeting. We had a meeting with Labour MP Phil Twyford, who 
said that they’ve looked at that and it causes a lot of weird flow-on effects. But there are places 
like New York that have rental caps. It can’t be entirely ridiculous, because a lot of successful 
cities have them. I would have thought it would have been appropriate for a very short period, 
maybe a two or three-year period, but I don’t know what the consequences are.” 
 
At the same time, some institutional stakeholders were opposed to such a big intervention: 
 
“I'm just not sure how that would work. With these things, supply is more important than trying 
to keep a cap on rental. One of the other issues is that landlords have had is increased costs. 
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House insurance has gone way up. You wouldn't want to completely not let people put up the 
rent, because they are facing raised costs. I would want to know what the mechanisms of a 
rental cap policy would be, and how long it would be for, and how well it would work, before I 
say it's a good idea or not.”  
 
“I can't see how you could control the market to that extent. That's a big intervention. You'd be 
laughed out of the room! If you look at the social housing the council provides, they provide 
housing at an agreed discount off the market rate. It might be that CCC rents their social housing 
stock at 70 percent off the market rate. What we're not doing is we're not putting a cap on that 
market rate. We're saying, the market can decide. Supply and demand, which, as you've already 
seen, has led to price escalation. The council will be discounting that percentage to provide 
affordable housing to residents. They agree on the policy. The key is agreeing the discount. As I 
said before, that’s an entirely different approach.” 
 
Another institutional stakeholder recommended a Rental Housing Warrant of Fitness (WOF)98 
like the one proposed by He Kāinga Oranga at the University of Otago (Wellington):  
“It’s not just about a rental cap. The warrant to fitness is important too, given how many 
substandard homes are being let out, at high rental costs. When homes have been damaged 
and they’re being rented out at higher rental costs – when compared with what was pre-
earthquake rental costs – but are more expensive to heat, the long-term cost to tenants is 
greater. There’s some real inequality issues there.” 
 
This was also the case for a member of the third sector: 
 
“The warrant of fitness for rental housing is very important and I saw in the paper this morning 
that they are piloting it and that’s a very good start.” 
 
 Only in 2017, has the Tenancy Tribunal imposed greater penalties on “slum landlords.”99 With 
the change in Government, Parliament enacted the Healthy Homes Guarantee Act of 2017, to 
establish healthy home standards for the private rental market.100 But, why did the Government, with 
all the extraordinary law-making powers of CERA, resist imposing greater control over the private 
rental market, even when presented with evidence of sharp price increases and the social wellbeing 
consequences associated with unaffordable housing? This resistance is consistent with the 
Government’s structural adjustment approach to recovery policy.  
 However, my reading of the recovery policy suggests that CERA by itself could not have imposed 
a rental cap even if it wanted to. Tenants in Christchurch, in a way, existed in a legal black hole. The 
reason is related to the approval of the Residential Tenancies Amendment Act (RTAA) of 2010, just 
one month after the September 2010 quake and the enactment of the CERR Act. As stated earlier, 
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CERA had been given extraordinary legal powers to contend with disaster-related issues. These 
powers took the form of the Minister’s ability to issue Orders-in-Council to make changes or invalidate 
any law. But the RTAA of 2010 exempts Schedule 1 (the section of the Residential Tenancies Act of 
1986 that references the number of days that must elapse before rents can be increased),101 from 
being amended by an Order-in-Council. Below, the text of the Act in which Section 87 of the RTAA of 
2010 repealed Section 141 of the RTA of 1986: 
“141. Schedule 1 may be amended by Order-in-Council 
[Repealed] 
Section 141: repealed, on 1 October 2010, by Section 87 of the Residential Tenancies 
Amendment Act 2010 (2010 No 95).”102 
 
Enacted without much fanfare, the RTAA 2010 went to great lengths to regulate boarding 
houses but allowed the market to continue to regulate itself by the principles of supply and demand, 
at the time of a nation-wide housing crisis. With this, Parliament seemed to protect the private rental 
market from the broad law-making powers of previously enacted recovery legislation in detriment of 
the public good. This policy of deregulation was not itself repealed by Parliament when it enacted a 
new recovery law after the February aftershock (the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act (CERA) of 
2011). In fact, as suggested in Chapter Six, this policy of deregulation is reaffirmed by CERA in its 
recovery strategy, which did not award a specific role in post-disaster housing recovery, leaving it 
instead to other Ministries and the property industry.  
Moreover, there was little the Tenancy Tribunal could do.103 Because the earthquakes had a 
devastating impact on the city’s housing supply and the market was out of whack with a supply 
shortage and overwhelming demand, the rents being charged were market rents, described in Section 
25(3) RTA 1986 as “the rent that, without regard to the personal circumstances of the landlord or the 
tenant, a willing landlord might reasonably expect to receive and a willing tenant might reasonably 
expect to pay for the tenancy, taking into consideration the general level of rents for comparable 
tenancies of comparable premises in the locality or in similar localities.”104  
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 As explained earlier, the Government’s policy also had a significant negative impact in the 
quality of private rental housing, as properties were not bettered or upgraded and were left 
unrepaired under terms of insurance, which left people no worse off than they were before the 
earthquakes and provided pay-outs that were not necessarily re-invested in the repair or replacement 
of properties. These houses were sold-off to investors who listed them as is, where is.  
 In mid-2015 (nearly five years after the first earthquake), it was reported by The Press that the 
rental market had begun to cool down and turn in favour of tenants. With so many Christchurch homes 
repaired and rebuilt, “rental properties were taking longer to lease”105 and landlords were finding it 
“tougher” to let-out their properties.106 By the end of 2016, there was a reported “U-turn” in the 
Christchurch housing shortage, with landlords reportedly failing to “lure” tenants with deals like “a 
$1000 cash-back offer, rent-free periods, and no letting fee,” a far cry from the post-quake rental 
shortage, when people were priced-out of the rental market and “found living in garages, cars, and 
crowded rooms.”107 Local Government bond figures revealed that the average weekly rent was now 
$380, down from $435 in early 2015.108 By early 2017, Christchurch landlords were routinely lowering 
rents and their expectations due to a reported “oversupply” of rental properties, as new houses were 
built and earthquake-damaged houses were repaired or otherwise put back into the market and as-
is, where-is properties were being listed as rentals.109  
 This is not necessarily a happy ending to the story of post-disaster housing recovery of the city’s 
private rental market. While there may not be a current shortage in the rental market, these 
improvements do not negate the experience of the many who were ill-housed for nearly six years or 
had to leave Christchurch for other cities, never to come back. In addition, there is a significant 
vulnerable population living in non-resilient as is, where is, houses110 that are cracked, cold, and 
mouldy. As mentioned above, it is not currently possible to track if these houses were repaired or not 
by QV or the council, because cash settlements were deemed confidential between owners, EQC, and 




3. A Token Temporary Housing Programme: 
“Not a word was spoke between us, there was little risk involved. 
Everything up to that point had been left unresolved. 
Try imagining a place where it’s always safe and warm… 
Come in, she said, I’ll give you shelter from the storm. 
I was burned out from exhaustion, buried in the hail, 
poisoned in the bushes, an’ blown out on the trail, 
hunted like a crocodile, ravaged in the corn. 
Come in, she said, Ill give you shelter from the storm.’”111 
 
 From a disaster response and recovery perspective, temporary housing is essential to 
safeguarding the basic humanitarian need for shelter. Internationally, the fulfilment of this need has 
been linked to the “humanitarian imperative,”described in the Code of Conduct of the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as “the right to receive humanitarian assistance, 
and to offer it, as a fundamental humanitarian principle, which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all 
countries.” Internationally, best practice dictates that the provision of shelter, in the form of 
temporary housing for those displaced, must be available to everyone and begin immediately after a 
disaster and in the longer-term recovery phases with the provision of permanent housing solutions 
for all those affected. Shelter “is about human dignity, safety, and privacy” and ensures these essential 
aspects of life for affected populations, while more complex and long-term solutions to housing 
recovery can begin, as part of a continuum of care112 or continuum of housing security. 
 The heat in the private rental market was further fuelled by a small public investment in 
temporary housing after the earthquakes. After the initial disaster response phase, emergency 
shelters and welfare centres were closed, which limited people’s housing options. The Government’s 
programme, the Canterbury Earthquake Temporary Accommodation Service (CETAS), was a joint 
venture between the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE) and the Ministry of 
Social Development (MSD) but, interestingly, not CERA. Consistently described as limited, this 
programme offered temporary accommodation assistance, financial assistance, and relocation to a 
“temporary village,”113 but only for homeowners whose insurance claims provided cover for 
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temporary accommodation, while they carried-out “essential earthquake repairs” or explored more 
permanent housing options.”114 A member of the third sector reflected on her own experience: 
“As for temporary accommodation, we were very lucky, we knew of a place, it was very 
expensive, but we didn't have to pay because our insurance policy unbeknownst to us had a 
figure and paid for the accommodation. I'm appalled at the prices, just appalled. If you're paying 
for it as an item out of a weekly budget, it's just impossible.” 
 
 Considering the shocking state of the region’s housing stock after the earthquakes, alarmingly 
this programme built less than two hundred houses in four temporary villages. This tokenism was not 
lost on a community service provider: 
“What temporary housing programme? You're talking about the villages they've set up? The 
villages are basically for people who were better off before the earthquake and were well insured 
and could afford to go. Also, they were away from the communities where the people are. It's 
better than nothing, but people want to stay near to where their actual property is, to take the 
kids to school, those sorts of things. There is a group of families that live close to each other and 
looking at the potential there to purchase a house together, locally, that they can take turns 
moving into while all the houses are repaired, because you do want to stay in your community. 
There haven't really been those sorts of options provided and I don't think they've thought very 
imaginatively. Like, they've just, essentially, built permanent houses rather than thinking, can 
we build relocatables more cheaply and energy efficient and warm.” 
 
 According to a member of local government, early on, after the initial disaster, the Government 
also invested in trailers with little uptake: 
“Immediately after the earthquake, they came up with a scheme of getting a whole bunch of 
motor homes, and shifted all the motor homes into one area, no one moved into them. It must 
have been difficult. I wonder often if there were other schemes that they were unwilling to try 
because of the failure of that. That was such a waste of time that it’s hard to hold that failure 
against them. Although perhaps, they could have, again, been more aware of the fact that we’re 
not individuals living in houses. We’re communities that want the space of communities. Instead 
of shifting all of those to one place, like Henley Park, maybe having them in clusters and 
neighbourhoods. People would have taken it up on them, but people didn’t want to move away 
from their neighbourhood support. It’s a mixed bag. There are some things that the Government 
is trying to do which seem like good ideas. There are other things that they’re doing, which 
clearly don’t seem to be helping.” 
 
 Perhaps this intervention should have catered to this innate desire of people to stay in their 
communities, as evidenced by international research on “group houses” for Japanese elderly after the 
Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 show.115 Trailers could have been placed in people’s back yards, 
on the curb side, or in neighbourhood green spaces near people’s homes and neighbours to support 
social cohesion at a distressing time when people need each other more. This could have taken the 
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shape of small, but high quality granny pods that could have been placed and later transported to 
holiday parks or green field sections or sold as tiny homes in the open market. There are several 
examples and it was something discussed by a member of the third sector, who said “It’s like land has 
a monopoly on housing because it’s so attached.” On the “decoupling” of housing and land,116 the 
participant added the following: 
“There’s talking about doing housing and a cheap lease on land in the city and do the minimum 
amount of water and sewage that we would need to live on it. Build these high quality, small 
movable houses on the site, and move them around as there’s land availability. You wouldn’t be 
able to get a loan, so it would be interesting. If you decouple the idea of property and housing 
from land, that is potentially radical. The financial stability of land disappears from the equation, 
or it becomes more dynamic. You almost create a market and, if someone charges too much for 
land, you can shift your house to a different site.” 
 
 By all measures, the response to the housing damage was not commensurate with the evident 
damage to housing in the city, despite CERA having the legal authority to do more. Section 44 – 
Temporary Buildings – of the CER Act of 2011 establishes that: 
(1) Despite any other enactment, the chief executive may — 
(a) erect or authorise the erection and use of temporary buildings on any public reserve, 
private land, road, or street and provide for their removal; and 
(b) Validate the erection and use of any temporary building on any public reserve, private 
land, road, or street and provide for its removal, and in that case the erection and use 
of the building (whether it occurred before or after the commencement of this Act) 
must be treated as having been authorised by this section. 
(2) No building consent or resource consent is required for the erection or use of any 
temporary building under subsection (1). 
(3) If practicable, the chief executive must consult the relevant road controlling authority 
before exercising a power under this section in relation to a road. 
 
 In late 2013 (more than three years after the earthquakes), there was an acknowledgement of 
the need for more temporary accommodation in the Canterbury Land Use Recovery Plan (LURP): 
“Temporary accommodation is needed for rebuild workers and for householders whose homes 
are being rebuilt. This demand competes with demand for permanent rental housing. The likely 
scale of the temporary accommodation demand is difficult to forecast, but it is expected to 
increase sharply from early 2014, with peak demand occurring by 2016. Although some demand 
is being met through construction of new homes, a significant portion is being met by households 
sharing homes or taking in boarders, housing made available by residents who have left 
Christchurch permanently, and purpose-built worker accommodation, and other commercial 
accommodation. District plans have already been amended, by directions made under CER Act 
powers, to enable further development of temporary accommodation. A shortfall while 
rebuilding proceeds and will place increasing pressure on the existing rental stock. To alleviate 
this, the LURP makes further amendments to the City Plan to complement the measures already 
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taken. These will enable owners of existing dwellings to provide rental accommodation by 
converting individual dwellings into two units [in the Living 1, Living 2, and Living H zones] or by 
using an existing family flat as an independent residential unit.”117 
 
 As explained above, some of this need was also catered for by MSD through emergency housing 
grants for motels. There is no clear answer for the insufficient provision temporary housing. But 
several factors may have come to play, including a perception from institutional stakeholders that 
there was no desire for intensification and that temporary housing was of low quality, that there was 
no demand for it, and that investment should have been directed toward permanent housing 
solutions. While international best practice recommends that “accelerated reconstruction of high 
quality, permanent housing is preferable to temporary housing,”118 a more adequate response in 
terms of temporary accommodation would have offered respite to many. The delivery of temporary 
housing after disasters needs to be up scaled in New Zealand. During the Kaikoura Earthquake of 2016, 
the Port Hills fires, and the Edgecumbe flooding of 2017, those evacuated went to designated shelters 
and encouraged to stay with family.119  
D. The Disproportionate Impact on the Most Vulnerable: 
The Canterbury Earthquakes had the biggest impact on the most vulnerable and reinforced 
existing social inequalities in the region. This was reflected upon by an institutional stakeholder: 
“One of the major issues is that, whenever you have a disaster, one of the groups that gets 
totally left out are the people in social housing. One of the unseen groups in social housing is the 
private rental market social housing equivalent. The people that are already in fragile housing, 
like a young person dropped off from family care at seventeen, that’s going to find it difficult to 
get into social housing until they’re eighteen, and if people don’t really like you, why want to 
rent if they have a lot of choice. The bottom end of the market; everything gets pushed down. 
People in wealthy houses just want to rent somewhere for a while this is getting fixed. Suddenly, 
if they are competing with the people who are in the affordable rental market, those people are 
pushed further down. And there’s competing for space, where NGOs are out of their buildings 
so they’re competing for rental space. I don’t know what the solution is, except that when 
conversations continue around the need to just let the market do its own thing, you need to be 
aware that the situation is distraught for those at the bottom of the heap.” 
 
 In their assessment of the state of housing recovery after the Canterbury Earthquakes, Howden-
Chapman and colleagues state that “the evidence of inadequate housing is alarming” and contend 
that the market or insurance-led approach to post-disaster housing recovery is an example of “the 
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inverse care law,” a term used to describe social care that is “disproportionately accessed by the 
wealthy.” They argue that, even though the care provided was not viewed by those who accessed it 
as of high quality, this policy was directed at home owners and excluded those on low-incomes who 
were more likely to be renting and, therefore, ineligible for core services, like EQC’s Home Repair 
Programme.120 According to the authors there was also increased household crowding, which can 
increase stress levels and the risk of infectious disease.121 Finally, the authors point to increased 
homelessness or “severe housing deprivation,” as key evidence in support for their argument of social 
inequalities in the recovery of housing: 
“In 2012, MBIE estimated that there has been a rise in homelessness or severe housing 
deprivation following the earthquakes, with people living precariously in cars, tents, camping 
grounds or crowding in with other households; an estimated 5,510 – 7,400 people were living in 
such insecure housing, up from 3,750 before the earthquakes.122. These estimates have now 
been confirmed by the 2013 Census, which showed an increase in households living in motor 
camps or mobile dwellings [1,122 in greater Christchurch, a 57 per cent increase in 2006, against 
an increase of 6 percent nationally], as well as an increase in households living in improvised 
dwellings [264 in greater Christchurch, a 35 percent increase since 2006, against 9 percent 
nationally]. There has also been an increase in households sharing accommodation, including 
garages, with a 44 percent increase in two-or-more family households in greater Christchurch 
since 2006 [2.5 per cent versus 1.7 per cent], twice the national increase.123  
  
 For both institutional and community stakeholders, the Government did some things right, “like 
stepping in straight after the earthquakes and giving support to people who had lost employment.” 
Nevertheless, they perceived the Government’s post-disaster housing recovery policy (with its links to 
homeownership and insurance coverage) as a major driver of the exacerbation of social inequalities 
after the earthquakes. A third sector stakeholder stated that she was “appalled at the lack of attention 
to housing for marginalised people” and another institutional stakeholder commented that there was 
“a lot of hardship around housing, especially for people who were renting, where rents have gone up 
in enormously, and there are people struggling.” This was the case, particularly, in the absence of 
greater directed social assistance to those on low incomes in an out of control private rental market. 
Indeed, across the board, participants perceived there were “winners and losers” in the process of 
post-disaster housing recovery. A member of the third sector reflected on why this was the case:  
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“If I was bringing up a family on a limited income, I'll probably be living in a garage. It's appalling, 
there’s a possibility that they would be facing another winter. We ourselves went through three 
winters, but we were renting a nice place. I just think of the possibility that there are going to be 
people who are facing another winter in their cracked houses. I know people in their seventies, 
they wear long johns and jerseys and have to have the heater on, because their whole house 
was open to the full winds. It was cold, and they were mountain equipped people, they have the 
gear, and a lot of people just don't have it. The husband gets asthma and the wife was really 
worried about his possible health issues. I'm glad they don't have to face another winter, but I 
feel for the people who do. The housing issue just must be a Government priority. The issues are 
different in a city that has a cold winter, it's very urgent to do something about the housing 
issue. It's probably the priority, because if people could get their housing settled, they would 
begin to rebuild their communities. People are facing having to shift again, it's just appalling.” 
 
The assistance given primarily to homeowners was expected to trickle down to tenants with 
low incomes living in the private rental market, but this was not necessarily the case as unrepaired 
homes were being rented out at premium prices. Again, a more strategic, Government-led approach 
to post-disaster housing recovery, one that viewed residential development as an essential part of a 
city’s overall infrastructure, would have likely captured this important flaw. This was pointed-out by a 
community service provider: 
“The market now dictates that the land in this area is worth a lot more and so the private 
landowner looks to maximise their profit, which is understandable. The collateral damage of 
that is a huge amount of people, who had a strong sense of community, and now they no longer 
have that community supporting them and they’re out in the cold.” 
 
 Looking to the long-term effects of these calamities, the city is now becoming more gentrified. 
This was perceived by an institutional stakeholder: 
“I know there was a lot of concern with the inner-city east. There were a lot of boarding houses 
there and people who were living there. Once the boarding houses went, there was nowhere for 
those people to go. They were trying to include social and affordable housing in the City Plan. 
One of the things that happened when I look through the research is there has been a decline 
and deprivation around the city, probably because some people left. Also, there's been 
employment opportunities. There’re some people who maybe never had jobs who are now being 
employed and perhaps getting good wages on some of the low skills work around town. There 
have been some advantages and opportunities for people.” 
 
Of concern for a local government insider was the wellbeing of people living with disabilities: 
  
“Some of the stuff that’s coming out about old and disabled people being moved out, and the 
consequences of that, and losing their homes is terrible. But, if your home is damaged and you’re 
disabled, you must leave. You can’t change some of that, that’s just the disaster.” 
 




“A particularly vulnerable population, is people with chronic illnesses or disabilities. This 
population tends to have low incomes, and some also have special housing needs, making 
housing accessibility even more challenging. While New Zealand signed the UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2007, addressing the special housing needs of people 
with disability has not been a high priority in Christchurch. Accounts suggest that people with 
disabilities have coped largely with the help of family, friends and community service providers, 
who had to do more for this population with budgets that were already thinly stretched.124 There 
is a commitment to universal design principles in new state houses, but we do not have 
information about the proportion of existing state houses or private rental housing that have 
accessibility features.”125 
 
In 2016 it was revealed by the Ministry of Social Development's annual Household Incomes 
Report that income inequality had not increased in the past decade, but that people were spending 
more of their pay on housing. The lowest 20 percent of earners, the report stated, spent more than 
half of their income on housing in 2015, 29 percent in the late 1980s.126 In 2015, then Prime Minister, 
John Key, in announcing a new $1 billion fund for loans to councils to support new housing 
developments, conceded that “rising house prices inevitably affect minorities.”127 
E. A Question of Human Rights: 
The difficult plight and inequalities bared by the city’s most vulnerable prompted me to raise 
the question of human rights in the context of this post-disaster housing recovery policy and the right 
to housing in New Zealand’s statutory framework. For many participants, this policy of post-disaster 
housing recovery excluded those on low incomes that were priced out of the market. From a 
democratic perspective, it seems problematic that housing policy is so exclusively organized by the 
needs of those who own property. What about the rights of those who don’t? Non-property owners 
are also residents of the city and the country in which they live in and should also have a voice. For 
Rogers, “tenants have a right to live in healthy homes and New Zealand has several laws that try to 
protect that basic right, but these laws are complex, spread out and hard to use and there are some 
key pressure points where the law undermines tenants’ rights and that needs to change.”128 According 
to him, one of these key pressure points is the jurisprudence established in 1997 by the High Court 
case of Lawson v. Housing New Zealand:129 
“Mrs. Lawson was a state housing resident who argued that the right to housing was a 
mandatory relevant consideration for Housing New Zealand in raising state housing rents. The 
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High Court responded, whether NZ has fulfilled its international obligations is a matter on which 
it may be judged in international forums but not in this Court. The right to housing had no 
influence on its interpretation of the statutes empowering Housing New Zealand. The Court 
considered the principle set down by the Court of Appeal in Tavita v. Minister of Immigration130 
that the Crown’s international obligations are mandatory relevant considerations for public 
decision-makers. However, it was enough that the principles that underlie the right to housing 
were considered, even though the right itself was never discussed by Housing New Zealand. The 
High Court took a narrow view of its role and stood back from taking any responsibility to protect 
Mrs. Lawson’s right to housing.”131 
 
A Joint Stakeholder Submission on the human rights impacts of the Canterbury earthquakes for 
the 18th Session of the Human Rights Council, concluded that the ongoing nature of these issues 
exemplified the limitations of the current framework for the protection of the right to housing. . It also 
made the following recommendations:  
“Amend the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act [BORA] of 1990132 to provide protection for the right 
to housing. Review EQC’s prioritisation policy to ensure that those with the greatest need are 
prioritised. Amend the Residential Tenancies Act [RTA] of 1986 so that it is premised on a rights-
based approach to housing and promotes the realisation of the right to housing within the 
landlord/tenant relationship. Consider imposing rent control measures in the aftermath of 
natural disasters. Encourage the CCC to develop a housing strategy for vulnerable people. 
Amend the RTA so that charging a letting fee to tenants is prohibited and notices for tenants to 
vacate the property must be given with reason. Explore extension of the Housing Warrant of 
Fitness system to all rental properties. Ensure that social housing is suitable for individual 
tenants’ needs and includes a range of housing stock. Collect statistics on inquiries to Housing 
New Zealand to identify unmet need. Provide more access to temporary housing to meet urgent 
short-term need. Draft a national strategy to respond to the problem of homelessness. Ensure 
that opportunities to improve the built environment are taken during the rebuild.”133  
 
 Additional recommendations are made by Bierre and others. For them, “the 1947 Housing 
Improvement Regulations could provide the basis for the Rental Housing Warrant of Fitness.”134 For 
Rogers, “tenants can prevent their landlord from renting their home out again before bringing it up to 
housing health standards and this gives tenants a new tool against abusive landlords. Tenants can also 
take their landlord to the District Court if the house’s condition poses a danger to their health. For the 
author, “this gives tenants and tenant advocacy groups a chance to raise the profile of housing health 
issues and create legal precedent to give more certainty for tenants in the future.”135 
 So far, this discussion has highlighted how the needs of those on lower incomes were both 
disproportionally displaced by the Canterbury earthquakes, neglected by official responses and 
disadvantaged by the recovery policy, the workings of the housing market, and the distribution of 
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insurance cover across city residents. The next sections address the impact of the disaster and the 
policies of recovery in the city’s urban form. 
F. Disaster-Induced Urban Sprawl & the Myth of the Compact City: 
1. A Doughnut for a City:  
“There was an opportunity to re-develop some of the inner-city areas more effectively, and that 
would have made it a much better city. It would have supported a lot more of those sustainability 
outcomes and health outcomes around walking, and site planning, and urban village stuff – 
walkability, proximity…” 
 
This was said by a council insider, when we discussed the delay in bringing back residents to the 
central city. After the earthquakes, the major damage and the uncertainty in the rebuild of the 
Christchurch CBD led residents and businesses to adapt and move to the urban periphery and the 
outer suburbs of the city. As a community service provider explained: 
“They have been very innovative in terms of realising they can operate without a city centre. 
Christchurch has kept rolling since the earthquake, which has surprised everybody when those 
stats came out. Despite the ten thousand red-zoned homes and many of more hundreds of 
homes that have been unliveable… And yet, the city grew, and the regions grew even more, 
which is, probably, partly people coming in for the recovery as well. They've realised that we can 
function without a city, without all the offices and everything in the city centre. So, they have 
had to operate differently.” 
 
Salmon proposes that a “striking feature of post-earthquake Christchurch is its transformation 
into a so-called “doughnut city,” a term describing a municipality where “suburban sprawl dominates” 
and there is a “diminished city centre.” Poignantly, in the evenings, the central city was literally a black 
hole. The author described the destruction and significant demolition of the CBD, as something widely 
regarded as a short-term situation. That is to say, the extensive damage caused by the earthquakes 
had to be cleaned before rebuilding started. 136 
For Salmon, this doughnut hole feature was facilitated by CERA taking over the urban planning 
processes, particularly of the City or District Plan. Given the time it took to develop a draft central city 
plan, the construction of new houses and offices took place outside the urban core and people moved 
where these new developments were.137 Salmon explains that the plan to develop a strong central 
city centre was to be facilitated by the re-establishment of Government departments in the CBD. 
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However, “the other part of the doughnut story – the very dispersed pattern of residential settlement 
and business locations that has now become established, and the associated reliance on commuting 
by car” will be a challenge to the resilience of Greater Christchurch.138 
This was perceived as contrary to what had been a clear political mandate for a compact city, 
with an improved system of public transport and increased residential density. This mandate was 
reflected in the Greater Christchurch Urban Development Strategy (or UDS),139 which involved “major 
foresight, planning, and public consultation exercises.”140 This was observed by Salmon, who briefly 
summarised the more consultative policy process in the development of the UDS, in contrast to the 
Government’s top-down approach with the Blueprint: 
“The purpose of the UDS was to provide for Greater Christchurch a clear strategic direction over 
the next 35 years for what the city and peri-urban development was to look like. This included: 
where future housing was to occur; where to develop or enhance social and retail centres of 
activity; where areas of new employment were to occur; and how transport networks were 
integrated to service these areas. The UDS was drawn up under the Local Government Act by a 
special committee comprising Regional Council [ECAN], Christchurch City Council, Selwyn and 
Waimakariri District Councils, Transit New Zealand [now the NZ Transport Agency, NZTA]141 and 
Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, later referred as the UDS partners. The UDS was adopted by each of 
these partners, who were obliged to take a series of implementing actions under other statutes, 
including the Resource Management Act [RMA] which regulates land use. This was in 2007, 
three years before the first earthquake.”142 
 
The undemocratic take over and dramatic change in the direction in the planning processes 
promoted the development of new, disaster-induced urban sprawl. The suburban expansion was 
compounded by the Government’s market-led approach and its preference for greenfield 
development. Some participants from the public sector saw this as compromising the long-term 
sustainability and resilience of the city: 
“In terms of new builds, I know there's been a step-up in suburban. Prestons has come under 
strain. Wigram is working, but I personally struggle with some of that stuff. It's classic 80s 
suburbanisation, with garages in front, small sections, and fences up, all round. It's poor housing, 
it's poor. I don't think it's particularly sustainable.” 
 
“There's been all this development out at Rolleston and Pegasus, and around the outskirts of the 
city. It just means a less sustainable city. The traffic issues that I suppose people have been 
having coming in from the north, it's very congested. There's no rail, there's only buses, and most 
people tend to use their cars to come in. In the long run, it's not good for the shape of the city. 




A similar view was expressed by a member of the third sector, who stressed the focus on short-
term decision making. For this participant, this was an inevitable result of relying on the market and 
moving the “real costs onto the future generations and the environment.”  
“There’s urgency and an obvious need for housing. Unfortunately, what’s happening is that’s 
driving a whole lot of short-term decision-making and you’re not getting the long-term 
considerations about where people should really be living and how they should be living. The 
market’s doing what it knows how to do very well so, they’re rolling out what they do, rather 
than what needs to happen. It’s a classic problem of the market.” 
 
2. A Demolished Heritage: 
 
“My absolutely strong position is that the old dungers, no matter what their connection, are 
going under the hammer. Old stuff, if it’s got any damage at all, needs to be got down and got 
out because it’s dangerous and we don’t need it. The city is going to look very, very different 
once all the demolition is completed. But I think there is real urgency now to get that done. I 
think most of the sentiment around buildings has gone as people realise that there is not a lot 
of hope for most of these buildings.”143 
 
 These were the pronouncements of Minister Brownlee about demolition after the February 
2011 aftershock. At the time, the CBD was cordoned off to the public. Security barriers and army 
personnel were extensively used to restrict access and protect private property.144 In 2014, I visited 
Christchurch for a book launch and, leaving the cocktails, I hailed a taxi and asked the driver to please 
give me tour of the CBD before taking me back to my hotel. Even though we could only drive around 
certain streets (as others were blocked), what I saw gave me a graphic reality check of the challenges 
to the city’s urban form and the stark impacts of the earthquake damage, the demolitions, and 
insurance and market-led recovery policies that were so radically transforming this collective space. 
What was once the vibrant town centre of New Zealand’s second largest city, was now a dark space, 
cleared of heritage buildings to make way for the anchor projects. Brad and Nicholson paint a vivid 
picture of this new void urban landscape: 
“Prior to the earthquakes one of the most interesting and vibrant parts of Christchurch’s urban 
structure were the laneways within central city blocks. Originally these were built to provide 
service access, particularly to industrial buildings. With the decline of these industries the 
warehouses were converted to a mixture or retail, hospitality, and residential uses providing 
vibrant and highly popular precincts. Many of these areas were either destroyed by the 
earthquakes or are tied up in insurance claims.”145 
 
 Eventually, more than seven hundred buildings were demolished using Section 38 of the CER 
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Act, which gives the chief executive broad powers for this purpose: 
“(4) If the chief executive gives written notice to an owner of a building, structure, or other 
erection on or under land that demolition work is to be carried out there.  
(5) To avoid doubt, works under this section may be undertaken on or under public or private 
land, and with or without the consent of the owner or occupier.  
(6) To avoid doubt, this section does not override any requirements for resource consents or 
building consents that may apply to works under this section, but any such requirements may 
be varied by Orders in Council made under this Act.” 
 
 According to Gates, a Section 38 notice gave CERA the power to demolish (and charge owners 
of dangerous structures for the cost of demolition) or order owners to take down their buildings. With 
CERA’s extraordinary legal powers, the Section 38 notices bypass normal planning laws, which involve 
consultation and appeal rights. Although the CER Act was repealed in 2016, for Gates, the legacy of 
Section 38 endures.146 For an interviewed member of the third sector, these heritage buildings were 
viewed by the Government as “in the way and they bowled them,” although “they were lovely and 
being restored.” For another third sector participant this demolition policy was not consulted upon 
and the Government and the people of Christchurch had not had the “big conversations” needed to 
collectively establish what to do in such cases:  
“They’ve never done those because it’s like we need to get on with it. But it’s three years, and 
they’re still demolishing the city, and still no real serious housing developments have opened. In 
terms of downtown, it’s been catastrophically an insurance thing because it’s not building 
damage that’s linked to the demolitions. The buildings were undervalued before the quake and 
the insurance level of the buildings was higher than the value of them so they’re going to stop 
the transfer money and demolish the buildings. That’s one. It’s not so much that the city was 
completely screwed and all the buildings were unsafe, it’s just that there was some damage and 
it was easy if the insurance companies get a flat pay-out, the building owners get more money 
than they would have if they had sold the building on the market. The Government gets to hurry 
up the process because a demolition is quicker than a repair. Then they get all the economic 
development of a new build when it comes through. I don’t think anyone really thought 
through… That’s a rational decision-making process on a site by site basis, but I don’t think 
anyone, or the Government never really protected the urban impact of it. Which is, my God, 
eighty percent of the city’s just been demolished, what does that mean? I don’t think they never 
really got it. It means this weird, crazy environment and its 1,492 buildings demolished. That’s 
an extraordinary loss of heritage, of urban fabric.”  
 
 Thus, for this participant, this policy did not take into account people’s views on other aspects 
of recovery like the city’s history, saying “half the heritage buildings in the city got demolished” and 
“there was no sense of the public value or worth of any of the heritage buildings:” 
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“One great mistake they made was the haste to demolish things. If there wasn’t an immediate 
business case for saving, it was down. Three years after the quake, they keep promising to do a 
heritage plan and they still haven’t produced one. There’s been no comprehensive process of 
evaluating what the city wants and what should be kept and what shouldn’t, which is horrific. 
It’s too late now unfortunately. Every building got decided on the property owners’ logic.” 
 
The magnitude of it all was not lost on a participant council insider: 
 
“Of course, if the city council staff had proposed the plan that the Government has proposed, 
we would be laughed out of the room. Imagine saying to the city council, “we are not going to 
repair the town hall, we are going to demolish the town hall, we are going to build a new town 
hall, then, we are going to buy about half of the central city, and lock it up as green fields. There 
is no way that the council staff would have ever said that. The Government's plan has gone way 
further than we could have ever done. I think it's very, very impressive. It’s aimed at having that 
walkable, liveable city. What happened in the meantime, however, was that private interests to 
deliver a city that meets that standard have slipped, have fallen. What's been built are glass 
boxes which don't look very inspiring. People are feeling that the vision of the Share an Idea 
campaign is not being delivered in what they see on the ground.” 
 
3. Land-Use Planning – Deciding on Peri-Urban Development & Intensification: 
a. The Land-Use Recovery Plan (LURP): 
One of the key outcomes of this new CERA-led planning processes after the earthquakes was 
the LURP. When confronted with the complex problem of land use planning, the Government’s policy 
of a market-led approach tried to chart a middle ground that promoted the development of greenfield 
sites, while identifying areas for increased intensification closer to existing urban nodes. According to 
Salmon, early-on CERA established the Recovery Strategy for Greater Christchurch, which relied on 
freeing land by opening-up large new greenfield areas that would enable more developers to enter 
the market and build housing that was more affordable.147  
The LURP used the Tonkin and Taylor’s liquifaction vulnerability assessment148 and was meant 
to operationalise this goal “by providing direction for residential and business land use development 
and rebuilding across Greater Christchurch for a 10 to 15 years.” This had the objective of providing 
certainty to those who were moving from red zone properties and assist businesses in their decisions 
of where to rebuild or relocate.”149 In doing this, this regulatory framework seemed to pilot or trial 
what was later rolled-out nationally with the enactment of the Housing Accords and Special Housing 
Areas Act of 2013. As explained in the previous chapter, central government would now have the 
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power to roll-back the reach of local government and designate and open greenfield sites for 
increased suburban housing development. In the case of Special Housing Areas (SHAs), this 
designation process relies on a set of design standards and is also facilitated by the enactment of 
Orders-in-Council.150 The LURP established this criteria to select sites for development: 
“These greenfield areas link to existing communities and support efficient expansion of 
infrastructure networks and services. The need to avoid natural hazards and environmental 
constraints has also been considered in selecting the areas. Limits on the location and area of 
land made available for greenfield housing development will ensure that recovery resources are 
managed effectively and efficiently, and the vitality of the central city and existing suburban 
areas and centres is supported. Some areas at Kaiapoi, Prestons and Halswell have already been 
zoned for new housing through CER Act powers. Councils will amend district plans to rezone 
further greenfield priority areas for housing as necessary to meet demand and in alignment with 
the provision of essential infrastructure”151 
 
Much like the SHAs, the LURP sought to cut red tape with the Enhanced Development 
Mechanism (EDM). This is further clarified by the Christchurch Housing Accord of 2014:  
“Upon commencement of this Accord, the council will have the legal ability to recommend the 
creation of Special Housing Areas to the Minister of Housing under the Housing Accords and 
Special Housing Areas Act of 2013. If the Minister of Housing agrees, the recommended Special 
Housing Areas could be established by Order in Council, enabling the council to access the 
powers available under the Act to streamline resource consent and plan change approvals. 
However, the LURP is intended to reduce pressure on house prices by enabling a greater supply 
of greenfield land and brownfield developments, as well as enabling greater intensification. The 
LURP contains an EDM for sites that meet certain size and other criteria. The EDM works in much 
the same way as a Special Housing Area, by allowing the council to fast-track approvals for 
housing developments that meet the criteria. Therefore, it is unlikely that any SHAs will be 
required under this Accord, however the opportunity to use these provisions of the Act remains 
if the provisions of the LURP do not create the regulatory environment required to support the 
provision of affordable housing.”152 
 
Indeed, all Housing Accords have as their basis the same Act and it has been interpreted by the 
Christchurch Housing Accord that the “opportunity remains” to use the provisions of the Act to 
propose greenfield sites for new housing by third parties like developers. Because after the 
earthquakes the city was left with large swaths of liquefaction-damaged land, ECAN, with guidance 
from the UDS and the LURP, surveyed the land available for housing before the Christchurch Housing 
Accord came into force. This gave Christchurch and nearby districts and advantage compared to other 
councils. Importantly, Salmon describes the process of how the LURP came about: 
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“The spreading of Greater Christchurch through greenfield developments was decided on by the 
Government before the LURP was drafted, and the central city was side-lined into a separate, 
slow-moving planning and development process. Therefore, the major practical significance of 
the LURP in relation to the UDS lay in its determination of the extent of residential intensification 
allowed in the suburbs of Christchurch City during the rebuild, and the level of planning control 
to be exercised over that intensification. Minister Brownlee directed the Canterbury Regional 
Council to prepare the LURP in November 2012. This involved considerable public 
consultation,153 including receiving comments on a preliminary draft during March-April 2013. 
A finalised draft was submitted to the Minister in July 2013. A period consideration further 
discussions between the Government and the UDS partners followed.”154 
 
I spoke about the LURP with participants. A representative from local government pointed to 
the top-down planning approach employed in its development: 
“The timelines for the development of the LURP were very, very short. Really short. It started 
November 2012, with some of the people who worked on the UDS, so they did have a good 
background in everything. But the timeframes that were put on them were hard. It was clear 
from the recovery strategy that they needed to have some impact assessment, so ECAN 
organised what became an integrated impact assessment. There was a consultation, and it was 
sorted out in February 2013.”  
 
Another council insider thought the LURP was “very, good,” but others in this sector were not 
very positive about its overall direction: 
“Personally, the LURP doesn't help, although it makes mention of greening the grayfields, but 
it's a swamp, a reuse of land. The LURP missed the boat completely and utterly. It failed, and it 
was very driven by RMA regulation. That's a problem.”  
 
This was attributed by this participant to the LURP’s approach to urban planning: 
 
“It's a classic New Zealand issue and an urban planning issue. You can do urban development in 
two models. The first model is zoning – district plans, the classic RMA process that we have, 
density regulations, and urban design. That's where we're currently at. Or you can look at the 
model of strategic infrastructure, where you're looking at the city, you’re looking at 
infrastructure, and you're looking at the centres and how they relate. The network of centres 
within a city that relate to each other, and the transportation that goes between those, and how 
that functions. So, where housing and employment are in relation to each other. I actually think 
how we zone stuff is creating this crappy North American housing thing that, to me, is just 
outdated, car driven, unsustainable, and it just doesn't help us socially as people.” 
 
Her view underscored the perceived need for an overall action plan, or a more comprehensive 
strategic approach to post-disaster housing recovery in Christchurch: 
“The LURP fell into that trap of thinking about it as a regulatory process and not as a strategic 
process. Where with the LURP was the vision, if you like? Here's the city, here's the red zone, this 
is the number of people we have who need to relocate. Where was the thinking about how we 
re-use what we've got, from a strategic and spatial perspective? So, the LURP failed to look at it 
from a spatial, whole urban view to me.” 
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As such, she viewed the LURP as a wasted opportunity to make the city more compact, saying 
how can we link the eastern suburbs to the central city? And here was an opportunity to open those 
big avenues out to the east and bring them into the city spatially and consolidate.” 
Another participant from local government viewed the LURP in a positive light but expressed 
concern that this approach to planning “only got you so far, especially when you're talking about new 
ways of doing things, best practice, and holistic outcomes on the ground.” For this participant, those 
things can be achieved through collaboration between the public, private and community sectors. For 
him, this gap was addressed by the Canterbury Sustainable Homes Working Party, which includes 
organisations from central government (agencies like ECCA, MBIE, Housing New Zealand, and ACC), 
industry organisations (like BRANZ, Beacon, Life Mark, and Home Star), and NGOs (like Tenants 
Protection, Community Public Health, and Community Energy Action).155 
b. Implementing the LURP – Awatea Green & other Greenfield Housing Developments: 
 
A key housing construction project developed under the LURP’s regulatory framework was the 
Awatea Green housing development. In 2016, MBIE and Fletcher Living inaugurated the first houses 
opened at the affordable housing development. This was widely reported at the time:  
“The first houses at the Awatea housing development in Christchurch were opened this morning 
by Housing Minister, Nick Smith, who welcomed today’s milestone as further progress in 
improving the supply and affordability of homes in the city. The Government’s priority for the 
post-earthquake housing market in Christchurch is increased supply with a focus on new, quality 
homes priced for people on modest incomes. The Awatea housing development will deliver a 
total of 238 homes once fully completed in 2018, with 40 per cent of those below $400,000. Of 
the first completed homes in Stage One, 22 will be priced between $350,000 and $390,000. The 
affordable price range is in line with the $450,000 house price cap for the Government’s 
HomeStart scheme, which provides grants of up to $20,000.”156  
 
This development was presented as an exemplar of what could be achieved with this policy: 
“The combination of the housing developments at Awatea, Welles, and Colombo Streets,157 and 
the Government’s 600-home initiative at Riccarton Racecourse will deliver a total of more than 
1000 new houses for Christchurch. The completion of these projects in the pipeline means that 
Christchurch will soon have the safest and warmest stock of private, state and community 
housing in the country. This is a testament to the collaborative efforts made by central and local 




Community sitting and transport oriented-development were also considered, and the homes 
to be created where described as sharing green spaces, walkways, playgrounds, and a cycleway to the 
city. They would also have access to schools, shopping, entertainment, sporting facilities and would 
appeal to families with growing children, those starting out, and empty nesters.159 
In what was described as a “paradox,” it was reported in 2017 that these affordable homes were 
not selling and that there was a generalised “cool-down” of the Christchurch property market that, as 
above, had also affected the private rental market. In 2016, the market “was oversupplied and freshly-
built terraced houses were sitting empty and unsold in the suburbs.” An article in The Press and 
described this situation as follows: 
“Christchurch, the city once desperately short of houses after thousands of them were wrecked 
by the earthquakes, had a lot more accommodation than it used to. According to raw consenting 
data from the Christchurch City Council – location, builder, value, type of consent earthquake or 
business as usual, and intended use – to build a picture of the marketplace shows a clear vision. 
There was a major rush, mostly by the group home builders,160 to build a lot of houses quickly, 
and they’re building them; they’re building them flat out… All these development companies are 
month after month submitting 20-30 consents each for essentially spec housing. The numbers 
have tapered off as of late, the council peaked in 2014 at the more that 3200 consents issued – 
about 270 a month –before drifting back down to just over 2100 last year and 2017 is tracking 
below that. The damage has already been done. There will be a correction, the number of 
buildings and the total number of dwellings being built will fall off rapidly, because we’ve got a 
major oversupply now and potentially that effect could run on for the building sector in 
Canterbury for the next two, maybe, three years.” 161  
 
So, apparently, demand for this suburban housing was not as strong as thought by policy makers 
and developers and the market did what the market does, it boomed and busted:  
“Then there is the data, Government valuer QV’s latest monthly average house values for each 
region against last February and Christchurch does not do well, in the bottom 11 spots for value 
increase. People have gone somewhat berserk in building new, to try and fill that housing void. 
Some of the bigger companies in Christchurch grew exponentially, hired more and more people 
and that was only ever going to be for about a three-year sweep. Now we’re seeing the reverse 
of that where building companies are actively downsizing. That’s well known. Nobody wants to 
shout that from the rooftops, because it’s not a positive business outlook, but it’s 
understandable. If you don’t, any gains you’ve made through the building boom, they’re just 
going to be lost in your overheads. In October 2014, there was a warning of the dangers of over-
building, saying that this phenomenal house building pace should alert us to the fact that, 
whereas in the past it takes only a few builders struggling to sell their new-builds to signal an 
end to the cycle, this time could be different, it may take large contractors not being able to sell 




 A description of the policy of urban housing intensification for social and community housing in 
particular – The Community Housing Redevelopment Mechanism (CHRM) follows.  
c. The Comprehensive or Community Housing Redevelopment Mechanism (CHRM): 
As explained, the LURP contained a provision for residential intensification and affordable forms 
of housing by also identifying land suitable for that purpose. The plan contains “areas of residential 
development where a significant proportion of the housing is owned by social and community housing 
providers.” The plan emphasised the “vital service” provided by these third sector organisations in 
“supplying housing for some of the most vulnerable communities in greater Christchurch.” As with 
Housing NZ and council-owned social housing, this housing stock was damaged in the earthquakes 
and needed to be redeveloped. The plan described this situation as a “significant opportunity to 
improve the overall amenity of these areas and provide more effectively for the needs of vulnerable 
people in greater Christchurch by delivering modern, well designed, efficient and comfortable homes.” 
As shown below, the mechanism, again, relied on a new set of planning standards that limited the 
council’s role in the resource and building consenting process:  
“This redevelopment mechanism establishes planning provisions for these that contain clusters 
of social or community housing. Redevelopment will be required to comply with site size and 
urban design criteria to maintain amenity and ensure integration with the surrounding 
neighbourhood. Further opportunities for affordable housing and expansion of the rental 
housing supply are provided by the wider infill and intensification package.”163 
 
The plan sought to address the limits placed on local democracy with the introduction of this 
new set of planning standards, by promoting consultation with iwi, community housing providers, as 
well as central and local government.164 Still, a council insider with strong insights into this planning 
process maintained that “all that this Comprehensive Development Mechanism plan does is it 
confirms where social housing locations are.” Interestingly, the major sticking point in the debate over 
the approval of the LURP was not the opening of greenfield sites, but that of intensification165 and the 
approval by council of this Comprehensive Community Housing Redevelopment Mechanism from 
2012 to 2013. This was also commented on by the previous participant:  
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“I just want to make this point clear. I personally don't think people want density. Personally, 
people don't want to live in more dense homes. What they want, in my view, is that village 
lifestyle, knowing your neighbours, walking to the shops, walking to the park, enjoying their 
neighbourhood. Density is one way of getting that. It's a way of having people live near parks, 
near shopping areas, and community centres, to give you that quality of life.” 
 
After significant “to and from,” Brownlee, as Minister of Earthquake Recovery, threatened to 
use his extraordinary law-making powers to issue Orders-in-Council to approve the LURP, 
notwithstanding the objections of council over CERA’s plan for intensification.166 This culminated in an 
agreement between the parties that ended in the adoption of the LURP at the end of 2013.167 
d. Learnings from the LURP: 
The LURP was effectively the closest thing to an overall strategy of post-disaster housing 
recovery in the case of Christchurch. Nevertheless, participants from the public sector were sceptical 
and described the policy as “a start, but still very piecemeal” and suggested that, in practice, 
intensification faced increasing “roadblocks” and “was not taken up as readily as the development of 
greenfield sites.” These roadblocks increased the likelihood of a less compact city. The plan’s focus on 
intensification around existing shopping malls was a concern for a council insider who said this was 
“the sort of thing that you believe in on principle, but I wouldn't like to be next to it myself.”  
“Now, the council is writing the City Plan or District Plan for the whole area. A question was 
asked, should people live near shopping malls? Intuitively you'd say, well, that's okay, except 
that there are specific… Should people live in shopping malls near which neighbourhoods? Do 
you want people living near these places? I don't think council does. Council can have people 
living around them, sure, but the better place to live is around the nearby park, or the nearby 
stream, or the nearby amenity that is close to those shopping centres. I don't want to have a city 
with higher density around shopping malls. Imagine the social consequences of that, imagine 
the lifestyle of that. You've got people who use their cars to go to work. On the weekend, because 
they live next door to the regular mall, they spend all their time buying stuff and eating junk 
food. It doesn't resonate with me as a Christchurch village.”  
 
The council insider continued by presenting evidence for other approaches:  
 
“The survey for the City Plan puts the question to people who came back saying it should be 
around amenities, not around shopping. If you are going to have people living around a mall, 
you need to have a park and other forms of amenity that support living in a denser community. 
I'd much rather see density around Hagley Park. I'd much rather see density around the East 
Frame, the frame around the city. That makes pure sense. You've got a beautiful place right next 




The implementation of the LURP was reviewed in 2015 and in terms of its outcomes for 
greenfield residential land, the assessment found the following: 
“Implementation of LURP actions has increased the supply of greenfield land for urban 
development in Christchurch. The projection for household growth in metropolitan greater 
Christchurch 2012 to 2028, which accounts for additional demand for earthquake relocation and 
temporary housing demand, is 40,850 households. The data indicate that the supply of land 
exceeds demand and there is likely sufficient greenfield land available for residential 
development to meet demand in greater Christchurch for the next 10 to 15 years.”168 
 
 However, the LURP review found the following in terms of its urban intensification objectives: 
 
“Actions in the LURP supporting intensification have been difficult to implement and monitor. 
The ramp-up of the rebuild has generally taken longer than envisaged. As a result, the realisation 
of opportunities for redevelopment has also been delayed. Actions in the LURP made 
amendments to further enable and streamline opportunities for comprehensive development. 
The inclusion of the Enhanced Development Mechanism and Comprehensive or Community 
Redevelopment Mechanism provisions in the operative Christchurch City Plan have created a 
more enabling planning regime for 126 and 379 hectares of land respectively. However, the rate 
of intensification is lower than was anticipated in the LURP.” 
 
 This review argued for the development of a central government-led Christchurch Replacement 
District Plan to promote and accelerate urban intensification, against the wishes of some in the council 
and its ratepayers. As noted in the review report itself: 
“The local councils have also made amendments to their planning documents to better enable 
and encourage redevelopment or intensification within existing urban areas. These amendments 
will create an additional opportunity for the market to boost the supply of housing and mixed-
use developments. The Christchurch Replacement District Plan process, together with work-
streams underway through complementary initiatives, will provide further planning certainty 
and address the role public agencies can play in facilitating and enabling residential 
intensification and assisting housing affordability. Given these processes and work-streams are 
underway, it is considered too soon after the LURP gazettal to know if the current low trends of 
intensification will continue, or whether the rates will increase.”169 
 
After the 2016 council elections, the re-elected Mayor of Christchurch, Lianne Dalziel,170 called 
for more housing in the CBD and the city’s suburbs to be fast tracked: 
“Christchurch's newly re-elected mayor wants to fast-track development in the suburbs and 
accelerate plans to have 20,000 people living in the central city. These moves will help 
Christchurch become a 21st century city. A day after winning the mayoralty race by a 
massive 62,095 votes over rival John Minto, Dalziel laid out her priorities for the next three years. 
She wants to work with the private sector and the Government to see how more people could 
be encouraged to live within the four avenues. The Crown has a target of having 20,000 people 
living in the central city by 2024, but Dalziel wants to achieve that goal sooner. We need a 
thriving dynamic central city. There was huge potential for different styles of central city living 
to be developed, including apartments, townhouses, family homes, and affordable 
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housing. Dalziel wanted to address homelessness as well. I don't want to live in a city that 
accepts homelessness, we need to tackle that. Dalziel was also focused on the suburbs and 
wanted to see development in areas including Linwood, Woolston, and Bishopdale fast-tracked 
using the Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act.”171  
 
The Mayor acknowledged the end of CERA’s reign and the renewed role for the council.172 More 
recently, after being criticised for not consulting with residents concerned about intensification of 
social and community housing clusters,173 Housing NZ has espoused greater engagement in its new 
developments. In 2018, it was reported that the agency opened its largest-ever Christchurch complex 
to three tenants occupying the first phase of a 37-unit development, “as it continues to build beyond 
pre-earthquake stock levels to meet growing demand.”174 Despite these positive developments, the 
debate over intensification of social and community housing areas remained.175 However, it was clear 
that Dalziel wanted an even more democratic urban planning process, “giving communities more 
power to make decisions in their areas and the council to allocate budgets to community boards, so 
they could set their own priorities and decide what facilities they wanted in their community.”  
This democratic openness also meant changes to the Cost-Sharing Agreement176 between the 
Government and the Christchurch City Council. These discussions were “re-started after being put on 
hold until after the election.” In the spirit of more democratic openness, the Mayor expressed that a 
“refreshed” agreement “would be debated by the council in public.”177  
e. Development of New, Inner-City Living – A Missed Opportunity:  
 
 This led members of the public and community sectors to say there was a “missed opportunity” 
early in the recovery to develop more affordable and sustainable living typologies. For a third sector 
participant that missed opportunity was a result of the urgent need for housing and the “short-term 
decision-making” that took place in the uncertain early years after the earthquakes: 
“There is urgency and an obvious need in housing and, unfortunately, what is happening is that 
it is driving a whole lot of short-term decision-making and you’re not getting the long-term 
considerations about where people should really be living and how they should be living. We’re 
not getting the game-changing approaches to housing that could be happening in terms of stuff 
like pre-fabrication and large-scale rollouts in housing typologies that are different; on medium 
density stuff or corporative housing types. There is a whole other stuff they could be trying which 
isn’t happening because we need to get on with it. Unfortunately, that’s probably building a 
reason for the low-quality, short-term stock of housing.” 
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 In his detailed account of the planning process in Christchurch, Salmon summarises what 
happened with the development of new, inner-city living: 
“The council’s plan for the central city, informed by public engagement and a vision of a liveable, 
compact city, was replaced by a central government plan stripped of its detailed planning rules 
while adding anchor projects and a major land acquisition programme. The disagreement 
between the Government and the council over the type of plan that should be put in place, and 
the delay that resulted, caused a window of opportunity for early development to be lost, 
especially for residential development, with an impact that may last for many years. However, 
other issues also contributed to this outcome, including: the perceived safety of building in the 
central area; lack of local market experience in residential apartments; the impact of the land 
acquisition programme on land values and hence business viability; ongoing delays in a city that 
had experienced disaster. Overall, the feeling was that residential development in the central 
city would be a long-term process.”178 
 
 This was not consonant with the Crown and council’s desire to attract large numbers of inner 
city residents and to create a vibrant city.179 In 2016, The Press reported that bringing 20 thousand 
residents back into the CBD was the city’s “next problem.”180 The need for inner-city living was echoed 
by an institutional stakeholder who discussed some of the factors faced by the council: 
“The council is looking at mixed-use for the central city as well. Clearly, having urban living is 
critical to having that more walking, cycling, for the central city. Mixed-use is one of the policies 
for the CBD, but it's been poorly taken up. Most of the developments so far in the city are all 
commercial. The council is struggling to get living in the city centre or around the edge of the 
city centre because the price of land is so high. It links to another whole story of how the recovery 
is unfolding. For example, the Government has bought half of the central city for its East Frame 
and for its anchor projects, and it's locked up that land, which pretty much means the remaining 
land, the value of that land is so high that developers are finding it very hard to put anything on 
it at all, which can hamper recovery.” 
 
 Consistent with the above, Salmon points to the on-going development of a new District Plan 
and the Government’s quest to use the earthquakes to implement structural adjustment reforms and 
change existing urban planning rules. For Salmon, the approval of the Blueprint brought to the surface 
a fundamental difference between the Government and the council. The council’s desire for detailed 
planning to create a liveable city was not rooted in politics, but in the city’s civic culture. In contrast, 
the Government’s view “appeared to be that the reconstruction of Christchurch provided an 
important opportunity, if not a necessity, to throw off prescriptive planning frameworks in favour of 
enabling market outcomes. This stance was reinforced by a vocal business lobby.”181 As discussed, 
eventually the Government rejected the “people oriented” plan proposed by the council and took 
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over the planning and development of the CBD with the use of CERA’s emergency powers. This fact 
brings up the question of disaster capitalism, or the use of the Canterbury earthquakes and the 
extraordinary legal powers bestowed on the Government to address the national emergency to 
implement ideologically driven market reforms to the housing industry. 
f. Another Life, Another Wife – New Planning Rules & Cutting Red Tape in the CBD: 
  
 According to Hall and others the delivery of the CBD recovery plan was not straight forward. 
Indeed, it took almost two and a half years to identify the facilities that had to be developed in the 
CBD, the places in which they would be built, the partners that should be involved, and the estimated 
public expenditures. The announcement of the CBD recovery plan was followed by expressions of 
interest to attract private investors for the anchor projects that were to dot the CBD landscape and 
around which purpose-built districts would arise.182 For a council insider, this planning isolation of the 
CBD from the rest of the Greater Christchurch was problematic and not integrated to broader urban 
development goals for the region, saying: “that’s what my problem with it, that it doesn’t think 
holistically over what it wants as a vision for the central city” and “when I say central, I don’t mean 
the CBD, I mean Christchurch Central the electorate.”  
 For the purpose of developing these new planning frameworks, in 2012 CERA created a 
dedicated organisation called the Christchurch Central Development Unit (or CCDU).183 "Essentially, a 
super-council," the Government “was now firmly in the driver's seat.”184 A member of the third sector 
took issue with the management and direction of CCDU, because it reflected the top-down or 
command and control approach to recovery established by CERA: 
“CCDU is a very good example of the way the disaster that is being run. On top of the 
politicisation, what’s been bad is the appointment of the same people. The head of CCDU should 
have been someone from overseas or someone who’s an expert in post-disaster urban design 
and governance. Instead, they employed the person that oversaw the demolition of the city, who 
is a town clerk from Timaru, who is obviously reasonably skilled at project management. But the 
only design input really has been this Hundred Day Plan that they did with a bunch of designers. 
This enormous disaster of years of delayed decisions, and bad implementation, and badly run 
contracts, and poor design process, and no public consultation, and you never hear anything 
about it. Plus, they refuse to publicly discuss anything, all you see is propaganda media releases 
that things are on track. But if you talk to anyone on the inside, it’s just this constant wave of 
new crises and disasters.”  
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 A local government insider was also concerned, expressing that “there’s been good work done 
down in the CBD, I have no doubts about that, but how many staff are they now? four hundred? tell 
me, what are they doing?” In exercising its new special planning role, CCDU produced several planning 
frameworks, including first and foremost the Christchurch Central Recovery Plan or Blueprint,185 to 
guide the rebuilding of central Christchurch, “one of the most ambitious projects in New Zealand 
history,”186 as described by Salmon: 
“The Blueprint eventually produced by the CCDU on 30 July 2012 borrowed much from the city 
council’s proposed plan but stripped out the detailed planning rules. The concept and broader 
features of a strong city core were retained and reinforced, including by the creation of a framed 
and more compact CBD through a land acquisition programme backed by compulsory 
acquisition powers. There was to be Government funding of some major central city anchor 
projects, including a convention centre. Certain liveability assets, including a riverside park along 
the Avon River, were retained. Politically a sense of unity and momentum behind the Blueprint 
was created, but its implementation quickly ran into difficulties, many of them caused by the 
long gestation of a plan for the central city.”187 
 
 Participant reactions to the Blueprint were mixed with a public servant saying, that “the heart 
of that idea was good,” and “you need to create a city where people want to be at.” If you don't do 
something like it, “the whole thing will move outwards and there will be no central city, and the city 
would lose its character.” At the same time, this key informant was at odds with some of the content 
of the Blueprint, particularly against some of the “big-ticket and expensive” anchor projects:  
“Some of the stuff which I don't agree with, like the covered stadium, I don't think we can afford 
it. Stadiums never make any money, there's been a lot of research done about stadiums around 
the world. Personally, some of the expensive projects should be dumped in favour of not selling 
off too many assets and not delaying other essential things. I don't know anyone who supports 
the idea of a covered stadium. Especially when you look at the expanses and the cost to run the 
stadium, it just doesn't seem a sensible approach.”  
 
 The Blueprint was supposed to pick up where the broad public consultation process of the 
council-led Share an Idea public consultation campaign188 left off, but this was not necessarily the case. 
A significant community engagement programme, Share an Idea, used online tools with other 
traditional public consultation approaches to gather “106,000 community-driven ideas from around 
21% of Christchurch residents.” It was put together by the council and formed the basis for the initial 
draft Central City Plan in 2011.189 For Ombler and colleagues, Share an Idea was a success, “not only 
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in terms of the participation rate, but also as a visionary way for the residents of Christchurch to feel 
hopeful in the immediate aftermath.”190  
 Ombler suggests that the democratic will of the people of Christchurch manifested in the Share 
an Idea consultation was translated into the Blueprint.191 This was clearly not the case. After all, the 
Blueprint was created by a central government that suspended business-as-usual planning conducted 
by the council, severely affecting the democratic stance of municipal and regional government. Why 
move away so abruptly from this policy so early in the recovery processes? The fact that this happened 
and CERA put aside policies like the broadly consulted upon draft City or District Plan and took years 
to draft new plans before bringing post-disaster housing recovery out of the back burner was a 
problem for participants in both central and local government. There are questions about the timing 
and the need for these reforms, about process versus outcomes, and the limits imposed on local 
democracy and public consultation. For a third sector participant this “was too top-led and not enough 
considered what people wanted” and “was too dictatorial.”  
 This was particularly the case with the policy of developing large scale anchor projects. Indeed, 
by 2014, The Press reported that the Blueprint had been out for 17 months, “but progress towards 
anchor projects like the Innovation Precinct seems stalled” and asked if the dream of the recovery 
strategy was “evaporating.”192 With the end of CERA, these “Crown-led” initiatives will now be under 
the purview of Ōtākaro Limited, and not the council, as expected.  
g. The New Housing Standards of CCDU’s “A Liveable City:” 
 The imposition of structural adjustment reforms was evident in CCDU’s residential chapter to 
the Blueprint. CCDU’s A Liveable City streamlined the consenting process and limited public 
consultation for residential intensification within the CBD, on the basis that a “vibrant and thriving 
central city needs the support of the people living there.” In place of business-as-usual planning 
processes, this plan established a series of standards that developers needed to meet to benefit from 
a streamlined building and resource consenting processes. According to CCDU, these standards 
provided “certainty for investors, developers, designers, and homeowners with a clear assurance of 
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minimum standards of amenity, but without constraining flexibility to provide housing that varies in 
design, pricing, and quality above this minimum standard.” The standards included: 
1. Measures to provide amenity for owners and occupiers of the dwelling such as: 
a.  minimum unit sizes. 
b.  location and size of outdoor living spaces. 
2. Measures to manage the interface with neighbours and the public realm such as: 
a.  height, setbacks and recession planes. 
b. fences and landscaping. 
c. a minimum of 20 per cent of the site must be provided for landscape treatment.  
d. at least one native tree for every 250 square metres of the site area. 
3. Non-residential activity in the central city residential zone will be restricted and must  
 complement the needs of residents. 193 
 
However, this approach of setting standards in favour of reduced local government control over 
the design and quality of new housing developments in the CBD received a mixed reception. The 
suspension of business-as-usual planning processes poses a democratic challenge to local 
government. It also too begs the question of why were these structural adjustment reforms prioritised 
over more direct intervention in the housing market? Why were CERA’s broad legal powers used to 
facilitate these market reforms instead of other priorities like temporary and social housing for the 
most vulnerable? This plan did not require developers to pass on the reduced costs of less regulation 
and red tape on to the consumer and therefore did not necessarily make this new housing stock more 
affordable. This was pointed out by a representative from the public sector: 
“More social housing in the central city is a good idea. There was a concern that it doesn't just 
become elite housing, but that it's more mixed in with some affordable housing, as well. If you 
get more people living in a city, it's a more vibrant city.” 
 
h. The Residential Anchor Project – The Green or East Frame Neighbourhood: 
 
 As of 2018, these new planning standards are being trialled in the development of the Green or 
East Frame Neighbourhood. This neighbourhood will be developed in a piece of land acquired by the 
Crown on the east side of the CBD and will be the key project bringing housing to the central city by 
Fletcher Living,194 chosen for the $800 million development195 to the chagrin of local developers.196 
For a member of the third sector the acquisition of this land represented a great opportunity, but 
raised more questions about the accountability of the planning process: 
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“The East Frame is an enormous opportunity to do different housing types and involve different 
sectors of the community. We just need to get rid of this Government before they build and sell 
it all. The East Frame is a classic example, an amazing story. During the Hundred Day Plan, the 
designers went and realised that there’s no edge to the city. And, to get a quick, dense 
development of the city, to become properly urban, they thought they needed some edges. They 
were like, why don’t we put a park along the east and south? The original suggestion was a 
twenty to fifty meters-wide park. The developers saw that and went, great idea, but what we 
should do is make it a whole block wide and it can become a land bank. Basically, the 
Government buys up a lot of property to protect property prices while identifying the 
developments that will happen. A fifty-metre design idea became a two hundred and twenty-
meter wide park, misrepresented in the Hundred Day Plan as being all green, when there was 
always the idea that it would be developed. They’ve never communicated how that idea had 
evolved and changed since it was launched. Now, the drawings are coming out where it is about 
eighty percent developed. Again, there’s no discussion.” 
 
When asked to reflect on why this had happened, he continued: 
 
“What’s happening is that Treasury is putting the heat saying, we’ve spent enough money, now 
we need to start getting some money back. CCDU is starting to go, where can we maximise, 
where can we get as much money back from this process as possible, because we’ve spent a 
billion dollars buying out land? All those apartments, they’re trying to maximise the profit from 
them. They’re just trying to find developers that will give them the maximum return on those 
sites. It’s so infuriating and none of it is being discussed in public.”  
 
These concerns for transparency were also noted by a community service provider: 
 
“Many liked that Green Frame. That was just an amazing idea. It was kind of obscene in some 
ways, because it was portrayed as if that was going to be a permanent thing. I mean, if you read 
it carefully, it was clear that it wasn’t. But it was perched as if this Green Frame was what we 
were doing with our city, and we’re going for a green city with this great reserve. In fact, it seems 
to have been a way of acquiring a whole lot of land to make sure no one built on it for a 
significant amount of time until some of the rebuilding happens in the inner-city, which puts the 
value of all of that property through the roof, and they are left holding on to this way more 
valuable land that they can sell off. They were always intending for that frame not to be 
permanent. For they not to have made that clear to people, that was a bit unethical.” 
 
As it lies on Crown land, this anchor project also came under the fold of Ōtākaro Limited.197 But 
fears of a cool-down in the market impacted the speed of construction. In 2016, it was reported that 
the residential anchor project was already “much delayed.”198 The developer, Fletcher Building, was 
“biding its time, waiting for an opportune moment to deliver 900 central city apartments and 
townhouses to the market.” The first 20 terraced homes were expected in 2017 and 40 more were 
scheduled for that year. The company, which by now was in the middle of an economic 
downturn,199was trying to portray itself unconcerned, saying this was a “unique opportunity to provide 
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an inner-city development of a size and scale not seen in Christchurch before” and this came with the 
capacity to create a “micro market with fluctuations in both demand and prices.”200  
This delay has persisted but, as of 2018, progress was becoming more and more visible. In 2017, 
it was announced that green spaces within the development would open in 2018.201 Later that year 
the plans for 122 homes was revealed202 and by the end of it the first 22 apartments were “starting to 
take shape.”203 2017 also brought a change in Government to a Labour-led coalition who wanted more 
accountability from the developer and the integration of the anchor project to its new national 
housing and urban development policy.204 With this change, the delays, and Fletcher’s economic woes, 
the development had once again changed names to One Central.205  
i. Breathe – The New Urban Village that Never Was: 
Early in the recovery, much stock was placed on the Breathe competition, or The New Urban 
Village. Described as a residential demonstration or exemplar in Latimer Square, at the edge of the 
Green or East Frame neighbourhood, the development aimed to implement new forms of more 
affordable and higher density inner city housing that would bring people back to the central city.206 
King documented what happened:  
“The Breathe briefing imagined a central city that would be repopulated, highly liveable, and 
sustainable. The new housing envisaged by the brief would be mixed-use, architecturally 
distinctive, of higher density, and better connected than the largely split business/suburban 
Christchurch of before the earthquakes. The brief reinforced that this was a once-in-a-lifetime 
opportunity to build an exemplary twenty-first century city. The one-hectare site proposed for 
the competition would provide the people of Christchurch with an innovative example that 
would lead the way for the development of new housing in the revitalised central city.”207 
 
However, for the author, there is a need to reflect upon the process and what it achieved. It 
was clear from the number and quality of the entries to it that the architectural community embraced 
it as a great platform to investigate and explore ideas about the making of contemporary cities. For 
King, the vision embodied in the competition was not translated into effective higher density housing 
solutions because if they were entirely left to the market. For the competition to be more than an 
“ideas generator,” the Government needed to stand behind the brief and participate in the creation 
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of the new city.208 This did not happen, and The Press reported that “the time, money and effort of 
almost 60 national and international groups have been wasted by the Government.”  
“CCDU recently called time on commercial negotiations with the winning group after it failed to 
secure funding to build its timber-clad complex on the former Charlie's Backpackers site in 
Latimer Sq. Negotiations had been ongoing for more than two years. Since the announcement, 
two finalists have called for the project to be offered to runners-up but a CCDU spokesman has 
now confirmed there was no intention to revisit the competition.”209 
 
In late 2016, it was reported that Gerry Brownlee wanted a new residential development built 
on a block formerly earmarked for the failed Breathe urban village in Christchurch. The Crown-owned 
company Ōtākaro Limited, it was also reported, “is remaining tight lipped about the future use of the 
land north of Latimer Square, formerly occupied by Charlie's Backpackers.”210 In mid-2018, Ōtākaro 
Limited was calling again for expressions of interest to redevelop the site. Nevertheless, Breathe’s fate 
suggested another “lost opportunity”211 to conceive new forms of urban living early-on in the 
recovery, as emphasised by a third sector stakeholder: 
“There was an opportunity to get people living in the city, living differently, and using the 
Government’s role to experiment with types of housing and different ways of community 
building and getting a hold of a diverse range of people living in the city. The saving grace there 
is that it’s such a long project and there’ll be not just this Government moving but, hopefully, 
there will be two or three government changes, and you’ll get reviews and changes in that time. 
The extraordinary lack of public debate around all this is just amazing.”  
 
j. The Evidence-Based Ideal – Christchurch & what Could Have Been: 
 
 For Ancell and Thompson-Fawcett, the central concern of planning is “how to make cities good 
places for people to live in and historically, many planning theories and practices have been based on 
this premise.” Theories of sustainable urban form are the most recent development in this tradition, 
and include the notion of the compact city, new urbanism, and transit-oriented design. This approach 
promotes the crafting of cities that are good places for the city as-a-whole and for its individual 
components, including housing. Using Christchurch as a case study, the authors aimed to apply a 
“conceptual model of the social sustainability of medium density housing.” This model is comprised 
of a pyramid of fundamental, intermediate, and ultimate needs. Fundamental needs are understood 
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as including housing affordability and housing quality, while intermediate and ultimate ones include 
transport, facilities, neighbourhood quality, and relationships in the community.212 
 Internationally, much work is devoted to the development of evidence and guidelines for 
sustainable development of urban growth, in line with increasing human need, hazards, and the long-
term realities of global warming and climate change. According to McPhearson and others, “more 
urban areas will be built in the next 30 years than ever before and growing settlements will increase 
demand for infrastructure, food, energy, water, and housing.” For the authors, if this projected urban 
expansion is met it will breach the limits set by the 2015 Paris climate agreement. They argue that 
there is a need for a concerted strategy to develop the scientific evidence necessary to guide humanity 
in this adaptation and urban development process in a sustainable way.213  
 As with many other initiatives of global interest, steps have been taken by the United Nations 
and its partners to address it. This was the case with the recent Habitat III.214 This notwithstanding, 
there is a need to bring more scientific input into these frameworks.215 The New Zealand Centre for 
Sustainable Cities has developed a framework of sustainable urban development, together with case 
studies linking housing, transport, and health.216 On what should characterise an evidence-based 
policy for post-disaster housing recovery, Howden-Chapman and colleagues remark that “apart from 
higher standards, the rebuild provides an opportunity for new, innovative construction techniques, 
and new materials and designs should be carefully evaluated.”217 They add: 
“Natural disasters such as earthquakes provide an opportunity to rebuild more sustainable 
housing, the design and location of which can help to mitigate climate change, as well as being 
better adapted to the more extreme weather events that climate change brings. Resilient houses 
are energy efficient: occupants should be able to heat and cool their homes without experiencing 
fuel poverty [i.e. spending more than 10 percent of household income on energy] or causing 
pollution.218 In New Zealand, higher quality housing has been positively associated with higher 
neighbourhood resilience, even after adjusting for neighbourhood socio-economic 
deprivation.219 As most injuries requiring hospitalisation occur in the home, housing should be 
rebuilt with fewer known housing injury hazards,220 and should follow universal design 
principles. Moreover, housing should be built to create and enhance the local community, which 
like the indoor environment, has been shown to affect health and wellbeing.”221 
 
 Contrary to relying on an evidence-based approach, the Government privileged the market over 
the science. Even if frustrating, market-led housing recovery policies now offer a point of departure. 
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Although MBIE and others offered guidance on “repairing and rebuilding houses affected by the 
Canterbury Earthquakes”222 and “sustainable building and construction,”223 this market-led or 
insurance-led recovery did not yield all the innovation in new housing typologies that was needed to 
satisfy the post-disaster housing needs and the future resilience of the region’s housing stock. This 
was a real source of concern for community and third sector stakeholders, who also viewed the 
earthquakes as an opportunity to create a more liveable city and develop new housing typologies, at 
scale. On this issue, a member of the third sector stated: 
“That’s a real failing of how they’ve approached it, there is so much opportunity. That is the 
disappointing thing about it. There was a real opportunity to reconfigure the way that people 
live in terms of housing in the city and start doing a lot more innovative housing projects. That 
might happen to a small scale. But largely the response was, we just need to open up greenfields 
and get houses built as quickly as possible and that’s exactly what happened.” 
 
Small, but potentially important, building innovations could not attract the kind of investment 
and were slow to come to the market. Housing New Zealand had the capacity and the experience to 
do so, but only recently has been allowed to take bigger strides to increase their housing stock. 
Without Government shouldering some of the financial risk, this policy of post-disaster housing 
recovery failed to incentivise segments of the market that, through new technologies in industrial 
customisation, have made inroads into providing affordable housing at a large scale without the 
inefficiencies of traditional approaches. If the building industry had been upscaled in the recovery 
process, as the situation clearly demanded, New Zealand could have been better prepared for the 
present housing affordability crisis. The consequences of this strategic policy failure were deemed 
important by a member of the third sector, particularly for higher-density urban living: 
“We’re not getting the game-changing approaches to housing that could be happening in terms 
of stuff like pre-fabrication and large-scale roll-outs in housing typologies that are different, on 
medium density stuff or corporative housing. There is a whole other stuff they could be trying 
which isn’t happening, because we need to get on with it. Unfortunately, that’s probably building 
a reason for the low-quality, short-term stock of housing. There have been about 10,000 houses 
that will be demolished out of around 190,000 houses in the city, that’s a big percentage of 
demolitions. Another approach might have gone, let’s immediately start doing some large-scale 
development in the city and collect that percentage of the population. But they just immediately 
fast-tracked the opening of suburban sites, because that’s what we know how to, and we can 




For a community service provider, there was nevertheless innovation:  
“But this sort of innovation has been bubbling away. It's been done on very minimal resources. 
And if the Government had gotten fully behind this stuff, we would have seen incredible things 
by now. But it is beginning to happen.”   
  
 Both institutional and community or third sector stakeholders were asked about their preferred 
approaches to post-disaster housing recovery in relation to in-fill vs greenfields development, mixed-
tenure, medium-density, modular housing, and the “decommodification” and self-organisation of 
housing as a common resource224 and other ways of moving beyond the market and the State,225 as 
well as the perceived barriers and opportunities to implementing these approaches.226 A local 
government insider gave the following example:  
“Another one, to give you an example, is the Viva Group, where they are looking for 200 people 
wanting to live in a different style of living, having a more communal approach, a village 
approach. Well, we've just got to set about designing that. They all met, and I was part of the 
workshops where we had some principles laid out to us by a designer. They basically, over a 
period, designed the neighbourhood that they wanted to live in, the idealised neighbourhood. 
Now they're looking to find places to put those ideas. It's self-staffing.”  
 
A community service provider also offered a very interesting case, stating: 
 
“WikiHouse is making housing that can be constructed affordably and by people that are not 
necessarily trained. It's kit-set, using plywood for the main frame, and a system where you can 
download it from the internet, and you take it to someone, and they'll just cut it out. It's trying 
to make locals able to construct their own housing. So, it would apply to developed as well as 
developing countries. It's coming out of the UK originally. It's an open-source hardware project. 
Everyone thinks of opensource as being software, but no. This is saying, how can we design 
housing that people can access cheaply and develop further and put back up for other people to 
do the same? The New Zealand team is currently leading the world in terms of progress and 
have a prototype and they are working on cladding and foundation systems and build a few full-
size structures to put through the testing for building consent.” 
 
III. Concluding Remarks: 
 
 This chapter continued to present the results of my data collection efforts, this time about the 
policy of post-disaster housing recovery after the Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. In doing 
so, the chapter provides additional support to my argument that the Government used the Canterbury 
earthquakes and the emergency legislation enacted to impose renewed structural adjustment reforms 
that rolled back local government and liberalised the housing industry.  
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 The narrative includes a description of the Government’s market-led and insurance-led 
approach to post-disaster housing recovery, the loss of social and affordable housing and its impact 
on the most vulnerable, and how the strategy resulted in increased urban sprawl and a lack of 
innovation in the development of different and more compact housing types. I also attempted to 
convey the Government’s absorption of local government powers and the democratic implications of 
its policy decisions. The chapter proposes that strong state action and markets are not necessarily 
opposites and can complement each other, in that state action can be used repeatedly and pre-
emptively to shape the contours and processes of housing markets. 
 Because there was not a comprehensive strategy for post-disaster housing recovery that 
brought together the summative of all the different actions undertaken, it was hard to get a complete 
picture of what was the housing need was and if the road taken was the most appropriate. More 
research and an integrative evaluation of this endeavour is much needed. After all, housing was and 
is the largest recipient of earthquake-related investment.  
 What was achieved by the Government’s market-led or insurance-led approach to housing 
recovery? Much, for sure, I am confident. But, unsold new housing developments in suburbia cannot 
be equated with the actual need for housing at this time or at the onset of the recovery. Indeed, “the 
houses being built in Christchurch today are not the same as the houses destroyed by the earthquakes, 
and this difference is likely to be the continuing source of housing stress for many households for 
many years to come.”227 In an analysis of consents from 2010 to 2014, Johnson reveals that “the 
average house built in Christchurch in 2014 was 180m2 in floor area, costing on average $302,000 to 
build and with land costs as well, this would mean that a new house in Christchurch will be priced 
between $450,000 and $550,000 and for comparison, the average house price in Christchurch 
immediately before the earthquakes was around $310,000.”  
 Moreover, are demand and need the same thing? Was this type of housing really “affordable” 
and the right type of housing needed? What about the most affected and less served by this approach 
to post-disaster housing recovery, the city’s most vulnerable, where these the houses they needed? 
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What had happened to them all these years of being ill-housed? Had eight years taken its toll? And, 
why was this suburban glut not predicted by the policy makers? In his analysis of building consents, 
Johnson indicates that “11,500 dwellings were destroyed in the Christchurch earthquakes of 2010 and 
2011 and new house construction activity since suggests the rebuild over the past two years will soon 
replace this lost housing stock, with a total of 10,589 consents for new dwellings issued within the 
Greater Christchurch area of Christchurch City and the Waimakariri and Selwyn Districts.”228 Wright 
offers some answers to the questions posed above: 
“How did it come to this? The first answer is earthquake insurance money finally caught up with, 
and overtook, the market. In the meantime, claims were settled, and some damaged stock 
repaired. An unforeseen element of this was the brisk trade in as-is, where-is houses – 
earthquake casualties that were uninsurable write-offs but apparently liveable. Landlords 
snapped them up and, in a stressed rental market, had no problem finding tenants. The by-
product was Christchurch’s housing stock ended up not as depleted as first though. Market 
forces were also promoting even more building, The Reserve Bank’s loan-to-value ratio [LVR] 
restrictions on banks’ lending to home buyers exempted new builds.229 A home buyer generally 
needed a 20 per cent deposit, but a home builder could get finance with much less and 
Christchurch, in the middle of an insurance-driven building bonanza, didn’t need that kind of 
encouragement. None of these trends are easy to reverse and changing the direction of a 
construction market is like turning around an oil tanker. It takes time. All this may put the brakes 
on some prospective developments, but others must be fulfilled.”230 
 
 To this, I would add that the housing stock will be of lower quality and of compromised 
resilience and a hazard to the public’s health. After all, these as-is, where-is houses are in the market 
and people are living in them, with the health and safety risks that they entail. And the fact that the 
extent of this problem has not been tracked publicly is a source of concern. The firmly established 
links between housing and wellbeing, compel me to ask if some of these actions were, nevertheless, 
taken too late. It has been more than seven years and putting housing in the backburner and taking 
years to impose market-driven reforms to existing planning frameworks before starting a more 
aggressive rebuild of the housing stock has been cause for much hardship for the displaced and ill-
housed Cantabrian population. Again, the humanitarian imperative requires that we audaciously 
identify more short and medium-term solutions to the garages, cars, and tents that housed the 
vulnerable before other long-term housing solutions came online.  
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 To foster community resilience people should remain emplaced in their neighbourhoods and 
with the people and organisations that support them and should have a say in the urban planning 
processes that affect them and their communities directly. In the case of Christchurch, this should 
have been considered more carefully in the post-disaster housing recovery policy-making process. A 
major natural disaster like this is a one-in-a-lifetime event that caused a level of trauma to the city’s 
residents that they will likely never experience again. As discussed, post-disaster housing recovery and 
urban regeneration must be people-centred and not market-led. Why a market-led approach was, 
nevertheless, implemented with such ideological zealousness?  
 A critical perspective reveals how the weighty statutory power of the New Zealand state was 
used in detriment of its liberal democratic traditions to push through structural adjustment reforms, 
protecting the economic interests of some New Zealanders over others. The Government allowed the 
property industry to reap the economic rewards from the housing shortage created by the 
earthquakes and did not provide enough temporary and social housing early in the recovery.  
 Cash insurance pay-outs may have helped property owners and insurers ease the difficulties of 
the claims process but created more problems for the vulnerable who are now renting as is, where is 
housing at a premium price. In addition, by usurping local governance to limit public consultation in 
housing development, the Government implemented a new regulatory framework that cut red tape 
and appealed to investors and promoted greenfields development, scrapping the country’s long-
standing tradition of strong local government and the role of the people of New Zealand in shaping 
their urban landscapes for years to come. These far-reaching policy decisions also had deepening 
consequences for communities. The next chapter looks more closely into these connections between 
housing and the community resilience and at how communities were impacted by the earthquakes 











“We live in an established community. A nice neighbourhood with tree lined streets. The people 
all know each other and hold regular street gatherings at school, with local parents. It's a 
wonderful village atmosphere, where we can walk to what we need daily; the store, 
supermarket, doctor, and a bike ride to the city to work. People in Christchurch are looking for 
that lifestyle where they have a strong community connection and an ease of living. We had a 
lot of feedback along those lines.” 
 
 This was reflected on by a council insider, as the interviews turned to the role of communities 
in the process of recovery. The loss of so much housing had a palpable impact on the wellbeing of the 
city’s population1 and entire, formerly socially resilient,2 neighbourhoods and communities. This, in 
turn, affected people’s social capital and the bonds and networks upon which they relied on, at what 
surely was a most desperate time. This chapter presents my discussions with participants about these 
issues, and the social mobilisation of communities and the third sector in the process of recovery. 
With this, I aimed to provide empirical evidence in support of my framework’s meso-sociological level 
of analysis and the concepts of social capital, small mutual groups, and community participation and 
empowerment. In addition, the chapter continues my exploration of the concept of democracy, an 
integral part of the framework’s macro-sociological level of analysis. 
II. A Picture of Community Resilience: 
A. “Between the City & the Sea” – The Managed Retreat from the Residential Red Zone: 
“In the red zone, whole communities there just disappeared.” 
 
 This was the reaction of a community service provider when we began discussing the residential 
red zone, now the Otākaro River Corridor,3 where the land sunk due to severe liquefaction4 and is now 
more prone to ongoing flooding from the Avon River and sea-level rise. A vastly populated area along 
the Avon in the eastern suburbs of the city toward the sea, it underwent the implementation of a 
managed retreat policy after the Canterbury earthquakes. That is, a coastal adaptation and hazard 
mitigation strategy to allow the shoreline “to move inland, instead of attempting to hold the line with 
structural engineering.”5 This land was so damaged by liquefaction that at the time the Government 
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determined that it was “unlikely it could be rebuilt on for a considerable time”6 and questioned 
whether it was insurable. This was expressed at the time by a long-time community service provider: 
“It was a complex situation. The worst that speak of it mention examples like a property that 
was lightly damaged, so insurance wouldn’t cover a rebuild, but they still had to shift off. The 
red zone was always going to be difficult. There was always going to be unhappy people. 
Perhaps they could have communicated and had people in on those conversations.” 
  
 Howden-Chapman and colleagues report that this policy of managed retreat resulted in the 
eventual loss of eight to ten thousand dwellings.  
The 2013 Census counted 16,953 empty dwellings in greater Christchurch, an increase of 9,828 
(138 percent) since the 2006 Census.7 Most of these empty dwellings (14,556) were in 
Christchurch city and in the severely affected, socio-economically deprived eastern suburbs.8 
These houses not only represent personal and financial loss, but also the scale of ongoing social 
disruption. In some cases, people have had to move many times, experiencing one of life’s most 
stressful events,9 while others continued living in damaged houses.”10  
 
A member of the third sector referred to the extraordinary character of the implementation of 
the managed retreat policy: 
“In some ways it’s been quite good. The whole thing is interesting, because it’s one of the few 
successful strategic retreats that’s happened around the world. To get 95% of people to 
voluntarily leave their houses at a large scale and have that almost entirely resolved in under 
three years is amazing. Even if it was done a bit bullish. That’s almost entirely off the back of 
insurance saying, all these parts of the city we’re not going to insure anymore, you work on a 
way to deal with that. In that sense, it provided the model for how some of the climate change 
stuff and people movement.” 
 
 A local government insider expressed mixed feelings about some of the causes and 
consequences of the retreat: 
“I know someone who was red zoned, and they said that once they moved out, it was so much 
better in the aftershocks. That the land was unstable, and it was terrible. It was better and they 
were glad to get out. I know someone else who was a real gardener, who was heartbroken. They 
had a beautiful garden and are now leading a campaign to save the garden. On the other hand, 
people did have closure. Whereas someone else in Mount Pleasant, they are stuck with their 
section and they are having to go there, and look after it, and tidy it up, and try and sell it. They 
are trying to get a reduced amount of money for it because, the retaining wall needs to be fixed. 
They would have been better to be red zoned. For some people it's probably worked out. For 
other people it's been heart breaking and difficult.” 
 
 Overall, however, both government and community members thought the creation and de-
population of the residential red zone was “inevitable” and that “at least now there is certainty.” 
“In terms of clearing out some areas, that was probably a sensible response. Basically, a lot of 
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Christchurch is not good land, so taking some of the worst land out was sensible.” 
 
“The creation was inevitable. The emptying-out was, therefore, inevitable. That is necessary for 
some of that land to be re-categorised.” 
 
 Moreover, for both government and community representatives, the red zone also represented 
an important “opportunity to provide Christchurch with something wonderful,” a “Garden of Eden”11 
connecting the city to the sea. 
“The issue will be to make something of it that is positive for the future, so that people who've 
been displaced can come back to their land and see it's been created as a public park. The idea 
of a park from the city to the sea is a superb idea. I hope that it will be a corridor of indigenous 
trees, so that native birds feel at home, and people would feel that at least there was something 
come out of this dreadful experience. A vision for the future of the city to help the people who’ve 
been displaced from the red zone.” 
 
“It’s exciting because that’s what will define Christchurch as being different from other cities. 
You’ll have this very large amount of land along a river quite close to the city, between the city 
and the sea. It offers an incredible ecosystem, restoration, cultural, public amenity, and potential 
housing opportunities.” 
 
For this last community representative this also represented an opportunity for inter-sectoral 
collaboration between the public, private, and community sectors:  
“It’s too big for one Government to run and there’s heaps of stakeholders to be involved. Avon-
Ōtākaro has gathered all the different groups to negotiate. Because you’ve got the river, you’ve 
got a whole lot of different sporting groups. You’ve got a massive potential to reforest the 
wetland systems. There’s a group that wants to put fruit trees. There’s big potential for that. 
Universities should be involved in a research capacity. You’ve got all the residential associations 
that live close or used to live there, they need to be part of the process. You’ve also got so many 
layers of government, no one can take control. You’ve got CERA, and there’s regional 
government, and there’s the city council. Who knows what will happen with them?” 
 
 For a member of the third sector, this managed retreat “it’s probably one of the things that the 
Government did quite well in the long-term” and “internationally it’s being watched as an important 
case study.” However, the policy did not go far enough to make the city more resilient: 
“There’s a lost opportunity around strategic retreat from areas that have also sunk. There are 
some parts of Christchurch now that get flooded with heavy rains and high tides, because the 
water table is not what it was, the water table has risen. Some parts of Christchurch are almost 
at sea level, if not less. But there was an opportunity to make Christchurch more resilient to 
future climate change effects and they have not taken that.” 
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 A council insider argued the red zone policy had exacerbated the problem of housing 
affordability in an already over-heated market through the Government’s land acquisition programme 
and the demolition of over ten thousand homes: 
“The way that the homes are being demolished so fast off the red zone just placed greater 
pressures on housing demand and raised the price of housing elsewhere in the city. They're 
undermining the thing you're trying to do, which is create affordable housing. You've just taken 
out 10,000 homes and added to that demand, which has driven up the price. We've got to leave 
people in the homes that are liveable for a bit longer and give more time, so that the prices in 
the whole market don't overcook.” 
 
 There was controversy as to why the undamaged homes were demolished and not re-located. 
According to this council insider, this was due to restrictive title encumbrances in the city’s residential 
areas. She explained that “covenants that are on new land also prohibit using relocated homes.” The 
relocation of houses in different parts of the city, he added, was not seriously looked at but would 
have been very positive, because a relocatable home would cost a third of a new one.  
 For a community representative, it was “not managed well at all.” Issues with the way this policy 
was implemented also arose with a council insider saying, “you can ask, and maybe the question we 
never asked, what do people want?” Asked why this was the case, they reiterated the lack of 
democratic decision-making that had characterised the recovery process to date: 
“I would suggest the cost/benefit analysis on that is poorly done. The relocation of homes should 
have been looked at more seriously. Why wasn’t it? This goes back to the discussion around 
engaging the community. It's a back-room decision. A back-room decision has been made and 
the community wasn't engaged, industry wasn't engaged, nobody knows the costs/benefits, 
very few people involved. There are some groups in the city that are keen to see relocated houses 
and there's been a bit of a movement of late to see that. The council is going to try with the 
owners of the homes in the next year to relocate and to put the homes on council land in the 
form of affordable housing, not social housing, but affordable housing. But this needed to 
happen a year ago, two years ago. This should have been part of the strategy for the demolition 
of the red zone. Your question is why isn't it? I have no idea.” 
 
 This absence of democracy in the way this managed retreat policy was conceptualised and 
implemented was also a source of concern for a member of the third sector: 
“It was an incredibly bullying, misleading way to do it, where they went to property owners and 
said, your house is now on a red zoned and we’re going to offer you the value of it as it was in 
2007. In fact, if you don’t take the offer, you’ll get your services cut and you won’t be able to get 
insurance, but, hey, it’s only an offer. They should have been more honest about the fact that it 
was a forced buy-out. But that has different legal consequences, which they weren’t prepared 
263 
 
to go down. That was bullish. They did get ninety-five percent of people agreeing, but it’s 
basically because no one wanted to lose all their money. 
 
 For this member of the third sector, the policy of manged retreat also excluded the community 
and its representative organisations from the decision-making process: 
“They refused to deal with the community groups. Early on, the representative associations, they 
wanted to find out the land information and they wouldn’t give it to them, because they just 
wanted to deal very legally with each individual property owner, rather than saying, here’s the 
information, therefore we’ve made this decision. Some of the land condition reports were 
released eventually, but they were never explained. They had a set of criteria, but they never put 
any writing on the criteria, or stated how the criteria was met with the information. That should 
have been more transparent, so people understood the logic that led to the area being red-
zoned. Probably people would have accepted it more.” 
 
 A participant with a background in the public sector also commented on this lack of 
transparency in the way the managed retreat policy came about: 
“I don’t understand how the policy was drafted. It came from a Tonkin and Taylor report about 
what land was safe and what wasn’t safe, in terms of costs to rebuild. The biggest thing is, where 
was the policy outline about the red zone and what that meant? The same has happened in the 
Port Hills too, especially in the rock fall areas. There’s a whole lot of stuff that is just not clear, 
it’s not transparent, and it hasn’t been explained. Why? It’s the structure of CERA and the way 
Gerry works. But, it’s a risk-averse approach by bureaucrats in Wellington.” 
 
This was also obvious too for two members of the third sector: 
 
“It was about the information that wasn't provided, and the decision-making processes weren't 
transparent and didn't consult the community. They've made decisions that were illogical, like 
not giving people options. They could argue that it was necessary, but it was incredibly unfair, 
because people made massive amounts of money out of it, because they got paid-out way more 
than what they paid for their property, whilst a number lost out massively, because they weren't 
a rebuild and the insurance company valued their home as repairable at some ridiculously low 
cost. It was either, accepting the Government offer, or else.” 
 
“This Government, particularly Gerry, doesn’t trust other people’s intelligence. He doesn’t think 
that releasing information will lead to much good because they’ll just misuse it and not 
understand it. They’re very politically savvy, that if you can keep stuff out of the public, it keeps 
trouble away. The whole thing is just do what needs to be done and leave as little out as possible. 
When you do release stuff, do it substantially and make sure it’s cleverly released.” 
 
 Clearly, this was not CERA’s official position. The Government’s EQ Recovery Learning 
platform,12 in their assessment of social recovery after the Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, 
contends that “CERA engaged with communities where the Crown had offered to purchase red zoned 
earthquake damaged residential properties.” In 2014, a Joint Stakeholder Submission to the 18th 
264 
 
Session of the Human Rights Council, recommended New Zealand to explore targeted bridging finance 
or assistance for vulnerable red zoners, to consider the feasibility of voluntary land swap 
arrangements in future large-scale natural disasters, to treat owners of vacant land and of uninsured 
properties in the red zone equitability and offer them 100% of their land’s 2007 RV, and to ensure the 
Christchurch City Council treats the owners of all uninhabitable properties equitably.13  
 In 2015, in a decision favouring the plaintiffs of the Quake Outcasts case,14 the New Zealand 
Supreme Court exercised “the third source of government power”15 and ruled that “the Government 
had not properly considered the CER Act of 2011 and its purpose of ensuring social, economic, cultural, 
and environmental wellbeing” when it made the reduced offer for the plaintiffs’ properties. The Court 
also pointed to the “lack of consultation” in formulating the reduced offer and the delay in extending 
it as there were “relevant factors” that should have been considered, along with the “very difficult 
living conditions in the red zones.”16 
 Hayward argues that “community resistance to managed retreat is an indicator of the 
complexity of the political challenges that underpin climate change problems.” Adapting to climate 
change, she maintains, requires more than prescriptive policy solutions; it requires decision makers 
“to rethink democratic processes if they wish to foster deeper community resilience to climate 
change.” For her, “this includes revisiting concepts of scale in decision making, procedural justice, and 
linkage between local, regional, national and international governments, citizens, non-governmental 
organisations and the private sector.”17 In late 2016, Regenerate Christchurch finally signalled the start 
of a process for determining what would become of the red zoned lands. For Smith and Smyth, 
the Draft Outline for the Ōtākaro/Avon River Corridor Regeneration Plan is a “plan for a plan,” and a 
“start that should be celebrated,” as it seeks to make the process of recovery increasingly more 
engaging and participatory, in light of past events. 18 
 As part of this engagement process, Regenerate Christchurch conducted a Community Needs 
Assessment, a survey of 400 resident and non-residents to which sought to identify community views 
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on what are the most important aspects of the regeneration of the Ōtākaro Avon River corridor. These 
views were summarised as follows:  
“79% identified the safety of communities in the regenerated areas as an important need; 75% 
identified the protection and enhancement of unique landscapes and indigenous wildlife and plants as 
an important need; 66% identified an attractive and well-designed urban environment as an important 
need; 64% identified the transport system meeting the needs of the community living in and around or 
visiting the regenerated areas as an important need; 54% identified community connection and 
participation as an important need; 45% identified valuing Christchurch's culture and heritage as an 
important need; 47% identified that the regenerated areas should be a good place to work, visit, invest 
and do business; 39% identified range and choice of housing as an important need; Young people (aged 
15-24) want boldness, innovation and forward thinking in regeneration planning; and Children 
are the future users, leaders and residents of our city.” 19 
 
Importantly, as I proposed earlier, the authors also note that a lack of coordination and 
integration between this plan, the central city plan, and the broader plan for Greater Christchurch: 
“The geographical scope of the Regeneration Plan is confined to the red zone lands and included 
road reserves, waterways and riparian edges – a total of 535 hectares. Limiting planning to these 
lands alone will limit the true potential of the wider area and restrict possible integrated 
outcomes.” 
 
Of concern to the authors was also the short-term planning nature of the affair and the need 
for Government economic commitment to the realisation of the plan in the long-term. The authors 
emphasised the potential economic significance of the future of these lands for the country’s 
economy, and stressed the need that in any government analysis, “the true value of social, cultural, 
ecological, and environmental benefits must be factored.”20 
In early 2017, as required by the Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act, “the Minister 
supporting Greater Christchurch Regeneration, Gerry Brownlee, approved Regenerate Christchurch’s 
approach for developing a Regeneration Plan for the Ōtākaro Avon River Corridor.”21 He described 
himself as “cognisant of the concern that some have expressed that Regenerate have not achieved a 
great deal in their first 12 months of existence.”22 Nearing the end of 2018, Regenerate Christchurch 
released the new plan, titled the “Greenprint” for public consultation.23 
B. A Population Shift from the City’s East to the West: 
“There’s two Christchurches now. There’s the people on the west, who, overall, have not been 
very affected. If you come in from the airport, you wouldn’t know there had been an earthquake, 
till you get to the central city. People out there don’t feel affected and so they're a bit intolerant 
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of people who are struggling. The consequences of the population shift, which is around twenty 
per cent of the population of Christchurch, is not seen as important. It’s not seen as an electoral 
issue. They're seen as, oh, yes, there's about twenty percent of the population that’s struggling.” 
 
 This was the perception of a local government insider when asked about the population shift 
for the city’s east to the west. Below, I examine this post-disaster demographic phenomenon and its 
impact on the city’s future resilience. It has been reported that around 7,000-8,000 people left 
Christchurch immediately after the February of 2011 earthquake and by June 2012 the population had 
declined another 1.5 per cent.24 This was likely due to the continued aftershocks, the large-scale 
damage to housing, and the uncertainty and slow-progressing recovery that followed. Howden-
Chapman and colleagues establish that “primary health organisation data show distinct population 
flows out of the central city and eastern suburbs, which have seen the most dramatic population 
decline, into the growing western and northern suburbs.” These figures were later confirmed by the 
2013 Census. Concern for this situation was offered by a community service provider:  
“There's a migration to other areas and there's re-establishment of many who have left. The 
consequence of that is that other areas are going to be impacted. And we've already seen it, 
their resources are being stretched. 
 
For a member of the third sector this shift was an opportunity to enhance urban resilience: 
“In the short-term, it’s been a population shift, but it will be interesting to see what happens in 
the long-term. I would imagine in the long-term the east it’s a nice place to live. It’s close to the 
city, there’s big nature reserves and the river. It becomes a potentially amazing place to live. You 
just get a much more interesting thing happening on the east.” 
 
Conversely, for a community service provider this was a lost opportunity in terms of resilience: 
 
“Some of great opportunities were lost in the red zone because, if you can't live in the place, you 
can't rescue the place. Opportunities, for re-growing housing in communities in some of those 
areas, that's not going to happen any time soon.” 
 
 For a member of the third sector, the most vulnerable would be affected by displacement: 
“The consequence is already happening. I see it where I live in the north west. There is now a 
slight division, because you've got people coming in who are disadvantaged to the areas where 
people are better advantaged. It's dividing the community rather than bringing it together. The 
haves and have nots just continue as always, and the ones who have not, struggle and move. 
They'll be forced out because they are outsiders. People are unwell and without the social 
connections and social service providers alongside of them, they must be feeling isolated and 
even more vulnerable. Even if they are in a so-called better area, it is not their environment. 
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Those better areas don't have the same community feel, so the whole community thing is 
completely different depending on where you go.” 
 
In addition, it was perceived by another member of the third sector that this shift would 
contribute to the suburbanisation of Christchurch and emphasised the need to rebuild the CBD: 
“There’s a need to re-establish the central city to reconnect the city with itself because, now, 
there is nothing that connects the city.” 
 
This was seen by a council insider as having a huge impact on transport: 
 
“The population shift clearly had an impact on transport. It's diabolical now, I can imagine it's 
only going to get worse. The movement across town of vehicles is just atrocious. At the peak 
hours, our streets are just locked down, they're gridlocked. In fact, it's almost pointless to take 
your car. I can't make it any better other than the fact that the Police work overtime.” 
 
C. Forced School Closures: 
 With these demographic changes, the Government closed and merged schools throughout the 
city, even though public consultation had indicated that the school communities were opposed to 
such changes, which they characterised as undemocratic. According to Hayward, the merging and 
closing of schools was particularly negative. After referring to research that shows that for children 
coping with disasters maintaining supportive social networks is highly important, she maintains: 
“The action of New Zealand’s Ministry of Education officials to use the moment of the emergency 
to reorganise the school system, despite extensive community grief, was deeply disturbing. 
Schools are often the frontline of support for many families and children and teens in disaster. 
These changes removed crucial support at the time it was needed most.”25 
 
 This issue of arbitrary school closures was also of concern to participants in government and 
the community sector alike. A community service provider recounted this: 
“They've done bizarre things like closing the schools. Shirley Primary School is the only primary 
school left open in this area in the east or that's not being relocated. Kids have been in the library 
of the school because they haven't had any classrooms available because they’re overcrowded. 
They've brought in four pre-fabs into what was a small school area. They're losing ground space, 
the recreation space, and yet they've closed the local Richmond School, which had tons of space 
and minimal earthquake damage. Its roll until the earthquakes was climbing and it would have 
kept climbing had they not been told that they were going to close. And everyone goes, why 
start your kids there? They didn't wait for the demographics to come out from Statistics New 
Zealand before making their decisions. These areas, there's lots of families, it's more affordable.” 
 




“In terms of schools, people are under so many pressures from work, their homes are damaged, 
the streets, the whole neighbourhood's damaged. Everyone is saying, we need to look after each 
other, and have more stability and take care of each other. The Government comes in and closes 
twenty schools. All that upheaval and disruption for the students. You could have seen from a 
recovery viewpoint that should leave those schools where they are for a time. A best option 
would have been to wait. Once the communities have resettled, we'll redo the schools, to give 
the students more stability and the mums and dads can meet at the corner and the school gates 
and share their stories, instead of what they're doing. Now, they almost drive across town to 
their relocated schools from closer ones to find a new place for their kids to go. It creates so 
much more disruption when the Government could have said from a recovery point of view, no, 
we've got to leave those schools alone, give people more time to work out where they should be 
living and the school they might go to.”  
 
The situation was also alarming to a public servant: 
 
“Some of the consequences that make me angriest is the lack of understanding around some of 
the decisions of shutting schools down. I know there’s a population shift, but the Ministry of 
Education didn’t know enough about the changing demographics to affect school zones. One 
intermediate, it was there, it was working, fully functioning as an intermediate school. And it all 
seemed to be in the poorer parts of town.” 
 
For other participants in the public sector, this showed the influence of neoliberal ideology: 
 
“Centralising schools is part of that Government neoliberal ideology. It's more efficient to have 
bigger schools. We can lose overheads, so we'll use the earthquakes as a motivation to do that. 
Clearly, some of the school populations have moved, so clearly over time some form of change 
needed to happen on the schools. In some places, the schools that have been closed were not 
earthquake damaged on the west of the city. That just doesn't make any sense at all. In fact, 
that's where people are moving. More people are moving out to the west to get away from the 
east and they close the schools?”  
 
“I can’t help feeling there’s an underlying philosophical change that’s happening from the 
Ministry that is not very transparent at all. It comes back to this community and resilience. Why 
are we making schools bigger and school zones bigger, so children can’t walk anymore? Walking 
to school is important for kids. It’s this bigger is better. It’s not always the case. This is about 
saving the Government money but, does it save it in the long term? What are the long-term 
projections around kids not walking to school? We’re not linking health and social outcomes to 
big decisions that are being made.” 
 
 According to Hayward, Canterbury children and teens suffer disproportionately high reported 
rates of mental illness as well as youth suicide.26 This is still a matter of concern. In early 2017, it was 
reported that schools in Christchurch were still “struggling to support children showing signs of quake-
related stress and some schools cannot afford to hire social workers to help them, and when they 




D. Its the People, Stupid28 – Impacts on Social Capital & Infrastructure: 
Looking at community resilience from a people-centred perspective, one could argue that, for 
ideological or otherwise unknown reasons, the Government’s approach to post-disaster housing 
recovery radically undervalued the social and people aspect of the urban landscape. By adopting the 
policies described in this and the previous chapters, it contributed to the erosion of the social capital 
and social infrastructure that had so magnificently served the city and its people after this major 
disaster. The following was expressed by a participant with a background in local government:  
“Yes, we talked about some people losing their sense of culture about where they belong 
because, it was found in the Urban Development Strategy that the culture of Christchurch is 
about where you live. People in the north, love the north. The south love the south. Westies are 
Westies, and Easties are Easties. People who are multi-generational in those areas have their 
connections there. By shifting, people lose their connections to where they feel they belong.”  
 
Breaking-up communities and excluding them from taking a more active role in the recovery 
decision-making process, directly affected their social networks and capacity to act. Even when these 
social networks were relied upon to serve the public coping with the impacts of the earthquakes, it 
was evident to public and community sector participants alike that the Canterbury Earthquakes and 
the recovery process that followed, caused considerable social disruption and a significant impact on 
the city’s social infrastructure and wrap around services. For example, a council insider stated: 
“Stability… The council talked about it to the schools, workplaces, homes. About the social 
disruption that's been caused by the recovery process.” 
 
For members of the third sector, this was also the case: 
 
“Families have been split.” 
 
“On the east, there were a lot of community services provided, because there were a lot of 
vulnerable people. Those vulnerable people have moved across town, but those services haven't 
moved with them. Now you've got groups of vulnerable people and they are living in areas where 
they don't have the services that they need.”  
 
“Okay, it's a very good point, because it's not just about the housing, is it? It's about all the 
support services and these social connections that they that have also lost.” 
 




“There were people in communities and there was a real loss. A lot of people probably have 
moved as close as they could to those areas. People have tried to re-form communities where 
they can, and some people just left because they couldn't stand it anymore.” 
 
“It’s reducing our social capital and our community development and it’s making us shift much 
more into that 1980s, 1990s suburban city. That is sad.” 
 
 When asked about what was being done about this startling issue, a council insider said: 
“We have a long way to go. The Comprehensive Development Mechanism is making sure the 
housing is in the right place, it's the right quality, and it's supported by the public and social 
infrastructure. It's less to do with social capital and more to do with council infrastructure, I 
suppose. The council is co-locating a lot of services and facilities. That's another key thing that 
is happening across the city.” 
 
When asked to elaborate, the participant continued as follows: 
 
“What I mean by that is, for example, the new Halswell community centre. It’s going to have a 
swimming pool, library, meeting space, wellness, and maybe a local doctor who is nearby. You 
get in one place the things you need to get to. When you’re there you can also meet a social 
worker. The idea of co-location is going to be an important thing for the city. When you ask a 
question about population shifts and social capacity, having new facilities designed in a way that 
is more enabling and more customer focused, it would be very helpful. The places we are talking 
about are new greenfields and new suburban centres being created which serve a community 
better than they have in the past.” 
 
This seems to be what the council is trying to achieve by insisting on the development of 
medium-density housing as part of the Cranford Basin Regeneration Plan,29 despite concerns from 
Ōtākaro Limited, who are also members of the Regenerate Christchurch board.  
All this social upheaval notwithstanding, this last participant believed in the city’s strong sense 
of community and its capacity to rise above adversity: 
“The residents of Christchurch are very hospitable. I know that there is some social isolation in 
the city and, clearly, it's an issue. But overall, people are welcoming, we are a very close knit, 
connected city. When somebody moves to a new place, the neighbours pop out and say hello. 
You'd be welcome at the store and welcome at a new workplace. The council tried to make 
people feel welcome in their new environments, and that would help with the social aspects.” 
 
According to him, an example of this Christchurch hospitality was Project Lyttleton:30 
 
“We had the NGOs like Project Lyttleton happening all over the city. When you move to Lyttleton, 
you are greeted with a homemade bag with some homemade baking, a map of the area, and a 
resident standing in your doorstep saying, welcome to Lyttleton, is there anything we can do to 
help? That is part of Project Lyttleton's approach, which is just fantastic. It's borne out of the 
community garden that was there and the other social activities that were established. All of 
that has strengthened the social capital of Lyttleton hugely and makes people feel truly 
welcomed and collegiate to that place. There are other groups out there doing this sort of thing. 
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It would be lovely if we could have more of that. The council has been a great supporter of those 
sorts of groups and tried to help them establish.” 
  
Recent evidence has indicated that social connectedness was a key driver of community 
resilience and essential to “the informal response to the 2010/11 Christchurch earthquakes.”31 This 
was the case even though, as explained above, it was evident that the Government’s structural 
adjustment approach to formal post-disaster housing recovery and urban renewal worked against 
collective action, at a time of crisis when people need to be able to support each other more. 
III. The Role of Communities in the Recovery: 
A.  The Community & Third Sector – Filling the Gap: 
For both members of the public and third sectors, “the community bore a lot” and contended 
with more than its share when confronting the social adversities brought about by the Canterbury 
earthquakes and the long recovery process. However, this study reinforces that the communities were 
resilient and did “a bloody fantastic job” and “pulled massive weight,” according to both public and 
community sector participants. This was the case for a community service provider who added, “stoic? 
Ha, ha. We've had to do what we can with what we've got.” In 2018, it was reported that pressure 
resulting from the earthquakes “caused some Christchurch leaders to have a meltdown.”32 Not 
surprisingly, community groups, working together with agencies from all levels of government, were 
seen by a fellow community service provider as shielding people of what could have possibly been 
much worst. Still, they felt like these efforts were not being acknowledged: 
“I mean the Christchurch Community House stands as a good example. It housed all NGO 
groupings. Now, when we are looking at the recovery, funding has become an issue and it's 
taken this long to even get into a semi-permanent place for all the agencies. It's going to be 
years before all the agencies have located to a permanent site. But not in the CBD, not in the 
centre where we were traditionally housed, which was a very powerful position to be in for the 
delivery of our services. These are all of those subtle things going on at the same time.” 
 
 Indeed, the Canterbury Earthquakes will always be remembered by the outpouring of civil 
society that occurred. The many examples of social solidarity are found in the city’s Marae,33 its 
churches, and countless others in the broader third sector like the Student Volunteer Army,34 Greening 
the Rubble,35 Gap Filler,36 FESTA,37 the transitional architecture movement,38 and the many other 
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contributions made in the city’s collective wellbeing. According to Brand and Nicholson, Christchurch 
is “a literal hotbed of creative activity catalysed by natural disaster” and transitional architecture is a 
“powerful reminder that the urban form of any city is only a vehicle for the life and interaction of its 
citizens.”39 This was also noted by a council insider: 
“Clearly, a huge amount of work is going on. We have many NGOs that set up to look at 
opportunities to rebuild and respond to those concerns that residents may have.” 
 
For a member of the third sector, these events were a display of the community’s resilience: 
 
“There are groups like Gap Filler and Greening the Rubble. People came out of their cracked 
houses, joined with others. On an empty section that had been bulldozed they throw flower 
seeds in then up come the poppies. They put a piano in the middle of it, and somebody plays the 
piano and they dance. They put an old fridge and fill it up with stuff and people swap. These are 
ways of dealing with need at a local level, which make the housing situation bearable. The 
prefabricated building that has been put in our local community, because our community centre 
has been demolished, enables people to come out of their cracked houses and meet in the 
community centre, be warm, and have a cup of tea together. Not sit isolated in their cracked 
houses. The response to poor housing is a lot of social solidarity.” 
 
For Hayward, “the experience of Christchurch offers hope, in the form of innovative citizen 
actions which have sowed the seeds for alternative, more imaginative, and democratic responses to 
disaster recovery.” 40 This is because NGOs can work on the needs of the population without being 
constrained by government policy. There were so many NGOs that efforts took place to bring them 
together, as it was explained to me by a member of the third sector:  
“It’s huge. There must be hundreds of different agencies in all. One Voice, Te Reo Kotahi, a 
register that provides a channel of communication for NGOs, resident associations, communities 
of interest, and communities of identity, because the migrant communities were very strong in 
providing support after the earthquakes. The Canterbury Migrant Centre,41 did a wonderful job 
of opening its doors to migrant groups who were feeling the pressure. If you're in an earthquake 
situation and you're a refugee that's come from a traumatic background, it's a terrible thing. 
That open hand approach was welcomed by the migrant communities. People were cooperating 
and finding ways to talk to each other. You can go on the register and see where the Russian 
Cultural Society can be contacted, or the Women's Centre, or the Tenants Protection Association. 
By seeing the NGOs as touching localities, the groups who express their identity, and the groups 
that are expressing their interests, has given people a bit more of a rich fabric around them, as 
they feel supported after the earthquake.” 
 
 On this subject, a community service provider also expressed the following: 
 
“I was at a forum (that MSD, NGO meeting), where they were talking about leadership. 
Canterbury University is developing an MBA paper for NGO leadership. And some very good 
thinking going on, highlighting the importance of having the right people and key leaders with 
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the right perspectives. Globally, there's a massive move from hierarchical structures to 
community structures. Having run papers for the commercial private sector for years, suddenly 
they are running these papers for not-for-profit leaders and are realizing the actual wealth of 
leadership there is in the not-for-profit sector. That hasn't been heard before. Now they are 
encouraged by that and saying, you guys should be the ones that have the ideas of where to go 
into the future to get us out of this mess.” 
 
But by 2013, according to a member of the public sector, disaster fatigue was setting in: 
 
“Immediately after the earthquakes, there was quite a lot of extra Government support, food, 
and stuff that went in. After, that went away. Some of them have been struggling. Non-
governmental organisations, they've had their own challenges to what they do, and try to carry 
on with these services. They've done well, but they've struggled, there's fatigue.” 
 
Another member of the third sector commented on there being little funding for the third 
sector, particularly in the context of housing: 
“MSD were good in that they provided grants immediately after the disaster and the extension 
of contracts for a lot of agencies that they kept paying even if they couldn't fully provide services 
and were quite flexible. That was one good thing the Government did do. But those grants 
stopped far too soon, even though there were experts saying, the third year is the hard year. You 
reapply and get told, oh no, we're not going to fund your community work on reception because 
it looks like a permanent position now. We are only in the third-year post-earthquake. Ha! 
Because the thought was that increased capacity was needed to handle the post-earthquake 
problem. Anyway, we're saying give it another three years. However, we just haven't had the 
resources to re-establish and the Canterbury Community House was badly damaged, and those 
organisations have had to move multiple times. And, it's just exhausting, your capacity to do 
extra is much lower, and yet you're being called to do more, under more stress. Now there's 
small meetings to go to, with all the communication that needs to happen, and so it's been 
tough. And a lot of organisations aren't re-established yet. We were crying out for community 
facilities, and they were too busy worrying about stadiums and cathedrals that people only 
popped in for tourist interest and on Sunday morning. Support the groups that are the lifeblood 
of the community. Your play centres, and those sorts of things are where the lifeblood of 
community happens. And they were forgetting that. That's been difficult.” 
 
According to this participant, some of the most affected communities were underserved: 
 
“In the east we've found, that they've been very slow. We were one of the two facilities left 
usable after the earthquakes in our suburb. We were open just after. Seven other church and 
community facilities in the Richmond-Shirley area were knocked out and not usable, but the 
Government hasn’t provided one replacement facility. Only one other facility has reopened since 
being re-housed just around the corner, despite us telling them, this is the biggest issue, making 
space for community groups.” 
 
However, this participant perceived the community and the third sector as well networked 
before the earthquakes, and thus able to draw on those networks to work together. Indeed, for 
another community service provider, in terms of social service delivery, the third sector showcased its 
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pre-earthquake experience and strength: 
“People like the health sector, who had a very strong community focus, intentionally set out to 
engage with stakeholders in the community to work with them to place tenants and look at 
other issues. Having that trust was the most important thing. That was one of the most 
important aspects of how people were able during the disaster and in the recovery, build the 
relationships necessary for true, positive modelling of behaviour moving forward.” 
 
But community resources are not boundless and need to be nurtured so that they can be in 
place in the advent of adversity. This was emphasised by a community service provider: 
“Immediately after the disaster, everybody very quickly ran the response in a community-spirited 
fashion. Everyone looks after their neighbours. All the community barbeques come out. Everyone 
looks after each other in a way that just hasn’t happened for a long time in Christchurch. It didn’t 
matter what place in society you were in, everybody was looking out for everybody else. But 
inevitably that wears off, and because everybody has difficulties and dilemmas to overcome, you 
start focusing on overcoming your own dilemmas. If your own house has fallen or your own 
business has fallen, they become your priority. Unfortunately, what that means is when some of 
that community spirit goes away and everyone starts focusing on their own issues. The more 
social capital you have and the more ability you must advocate for your own needs, the more 
likely you are to get your needs fixed.” 
 
B. Community & Third Sector Engagement:  
“I don't think there is respect yet for the work of the third sector.” 
 
The CER Act of 2011 stated as one of its legislative purposes “to enable community participation 
in the planning of the recovery of affected communities without impeding a focused, timely, and 
expedited recovery.”42 However, the acceleration of the rebuilding process through Orders in Council 
(and through the adoption of primary legislation43) inevitably resulted in a decrease in the quantity 
and quality of community participation and, at the same time, in an increase in the power of other 
already-powerful stakeholders. This was observed by a member of the third sector:  
“In terms of the world of communities, of course, one feels that they haven’t had a lot of press 
and a lot of support from the Minister. That everything can be driven through the market it 
seems to get the Minister’s listen. If it's not market-driven, it seems to miss out. That's a 
perception and it's a fairly real perception.” 
 
 Moreover, it was perceived by both public and community sector participants that the 
Government failed to adequately engage communities into the recovery strategy in a formal way:  




“The way the recovery is taking place, apart from newsletters turning up in your mailbox or 
reading your newspaper, we're not engaging our community well. Most of the plans we're doing 
now are backroom discussions with stakeholders. Policy people writing out approaches, and 
putting out a whole document and saying, here it is, what do you think? Which is very hard to 
engage because the community simply can't get to the back that easily.” 
 
 As noted earlier, this was not the position of CERA.44 Indeed, CERA’s Community Engagement 
Framework aimed to “engage the community along a spectrum of participation to inform, consult, 
involve, collaborate, and empower and use a range of engagement methods and tools, recognising 
the diversity of community needs and skills, while moving as far and as often as possible toward 
empowerment.” But this strategy was implemented in a socio-political context where local 
government and democracy were affected by the statutory authority of CERA itself. This approach 
was contrary to best practice and the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy, with 
its vision of a “resilient” New Zealand, where communities understand and manage their hazards.45 
Importantly, this was pointed out by some community sector representatives:  
“The immediate relief effort was good. After, you need to start building resilience, particularly 
community-building. The Government neglected to see that. In the cycle of recovery, there are 
several things you need to do to bring the community along with you and that didn’t happen. 
They jumped from the relief effort to an ideological approach of what the rebuild should look 
like and neglected a huge number of stakeholders.” 
 
“Afterwards, a lot of experts came in saying, it needs to be community-based. There's heaps of 
research saying, the immediate response needs to be top down – Civil Defence. Just get food, 
emergency supplies, and stuff. But that needs to let go very quickly and become community led. 
While we were hearing lots of that and, in the community sector we are going yes, the decision-
making was the opposite. Instead, we had democracy taken away. We had an agency put in 
charge that could do what it wanted and decided to do that. It was very top-down, and you had 
conflict between the key decision-making agencies like the council and CERA.” 
 
 Nonetheless, for this participant, the community and the third sector proved resilient:  
“But what has sprouted, despite all that the community did lead stuff. We just said, they're not 
doing it for us, we need to do what we've got with what resources we have, which weren't big. 
Still, amazing things happened. Gap Filler, the Student Volunteer Army, all that kind of stuff has 
just been bubbling away. The community leadership has been important, and the collaborations 
that are happening across sectors.” 
 
A member of local government thought these social roles evolved as they did out of need:  
 
“That's the get. Ultimately, it's out of need. As individuals we've not been listened to so we need 
to join with others sharing the same concerns so we can form a group around that issue. It's a 
natural consequence of people not getting their views heard or feeling disempowered. If you are 
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organized, you can come together around those things.” 
 
C. Perceptions of Public Consultation: 
 As explained in Chapter Six, the LGA and RMA guarantee the public’s right to public 
consultation, but this right to public consultation was undermined by the policies of post-disaster 
housing recovery. Indeed, for Ombler and colleagues, consultation should be meaningful and an 
enhancement to the democratic character of the city.46 In some instances, it was perhaps not a lack 
of consultation itself (like the remarkable Share an Idea),47 but the intent of the undertaking. This was 
observed by a council insider: 
“If I reflect on the council's activities, very early on it ran Share an Idea. That campaign was one 
of the few examples in Christchurch where we reached out to our community and asked for their 
views ahead of doing planning. It said we've got to do some planning for the centre of the city, 
tell us what you think about how you move and how the city functions, the market, the cultural 
aspects. What do you want to see in terms of businesses, spaces, transport, and any other thing 
that people wish to talk about? It was framed in an enabling way, so that people could engage 
directly with that conversation and others that were happening. It all played out on the internet, 
people's comments were blogged and posted on social media. Having clips of people saying 
things and putting it out there. This is what you see, this is what you're telling us. It engaged the 
community in the conversation. We haven't done that since.” 
 
In contrast, National’s victory in the 2014 election was perceived as a vindication of the 
Government’s top-down approach.48 Why was this the case? This participant continued as follows: 
“One reason is the scale and speed at which things change. People feel two ways: one, this is 
going slow, and it should be speeding up; another one, this is too fast, and too much is happening 
at once. Why is this happening? We are very bad at complaining. We should be taking to the 
streets. People should be protesting, people should be marching, their voices should be of civil 
disobedience. The reality is people are exhausted, there's been so much going on. People don't 
have the energy and time to engage and complain. The political process has ground people down 
to say there's no point in their complaining. We'll make do.” 
 
As explained by Hayward, urgency was used in Christchurch to justify the limitation of 
participation, inclusion, and transparency in local decision-making. In her view, “lines of accountability 
became confused, opportunities for public deliberation were undermined and structures of local 
representation weakened.”49 A local government representative considered the consequences of this 
democratic gap in the process of recovery:  
“From a political perspective, Christchurch has traditionally voted for National, apart from one 
or two elections being for Labour. Some of that is going to change. There’s going to be some 
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interesting political ramifications around who represents whom in Christchurch and how people 
get represented in council. We’re redrawing some of that stuff.”  
 
Broad public consultation was also perceived by a community service provider to be substituted 
for a “stakeholder approach:” 
“This loss of sense of people having a say has been quite serious and the way we have responded 
to that is to develop the stakeholder approach.” 
 
“If you're a stakeholder you can come to the meeting. And that is not the same as a democratic 
approach. What has happened is that people to sort of said, we’re not going to bother, we'll just 
do our own thing. The disadvantage of that, in my view, is that it completely missed the 
opportunity that happened with the big earthquake in February, when so many people were 
thrown onto the resources of their local communities. A lot of community building went on, and 
a lot of response. And, when the city council very early on had Share an Idea, that drove some 
citizens to give their thoughts and work was done to pull those thoughts together. There is a 
sense that was just overridden by CERA. Now, CERA says it's taken it on board, and so forth, but 
there's no way of knowing.” 
 
Of concern for both public and community sector participants was how the Blueprint plan for 
the CBD came about. For a participant in local government, “it was almost poking a stick at the Share 
an Idea that the city did because that was ego-driven stuff.” A council insider added: 
“The partners on the Blueprint plan engaged the community, although it was stakeholder 
meetings, and the book came out and they said, what do you think? It's not Share an Idea but, 
bear in mind, people have limited capacity also to respond to some of these issues. Everyone's 
got their own lives to live. They're dealing with their home is buggered, their workplace is 
changing, there's scores of mud. All of that is in the background. When you're doing planning 
for these things, it's very hard always to ask the community to be deeply engaged.” 
 
 They saw this as having an impact on the democratic character of the recovery process: 
“This is bigger than all of us. The opportunity is huge. The scale of this disaster is huge in 
magnitude, and all the different conversations that need to be sorted out, it's far, far too big for 
one person to make decisions on all those things in an informed way. The upshot of that is we 
need to change the way that our recovery process is operating to be more engaging, to be more 
informative for the community and business and bring them in on the journey.” 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks: 
 
 This chapter sought to describe the picture of community resilience in the city after the 
Canterbury earthquakes through the eyes of participants and my own experiences in the field. As such, 
it aimed to empirically study my theoretical framework’s meso-sociological level of analysis and the 
concepts of social capital, small mutual groups, and community participation and empowerment. The 
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chapter assessed the impacts of the disaster and the policies of recovery in the city’s social fibre, and 
the process of community engagement on such policies. It described how the Government’s recovery 
policy relied on the community to provide key services while excluding its stakeholders from key 
decision-making processes. The next and final chapter explores what this means in terms of power 
and power relations, my ultimate object of research. 
279 
 
CHAPTER NINE – CHRISTCHURCH, THE POWERS THAT BE 
 
I. Introduction: 
 How to apprehend the seemingly most ethereal – the causal powers or generative mechanisms 
undelying our social interactions. Why reality is or isn’t? Indeed, many scholars struggle to understand; 
many precisely in relation to critical realism and its conception of the human condition. My study 
intently reflected on these questions as they applied to community resilience. After proposing a critical 
theoretical framework of community resilience and assessing its validity with a case study of post-
disaster housing recovery in the city of Christchurch, I still needed go beyond a descriptive excercise 
to hypothesise what these were, as presented below. 
II. The Causal Powers or Generative Mechanisms of Recovery & Resilience: 
 To demonstrate what can be accomplished by adopting a critical realist philosophy of science, I 
took my framework and my empirical insights to go beyond description and retroductively posit an 
explanatory programme to account for what was observed. I achieved this by applying the key premise 
of critical realism, that the ultimate objects of research are not observations, but the causal powers 
or generative mechanisms that underlie their manifestation. Through my interviews and other data 
collection, I probed the identification of these underlying powers and mechanisms to account for the 
implementation of what was described as a top-down disaster recovery policy and a lack of democratic 
engagement of communities. 









*Sense of Place & Community 





*Small Mutual Groups  




*Democracy & Participation 





 Table 9.1 summarises these powers and mechanisms, in terms of my framework’s three 
sociological levels of analysis. The sections that follow provide a narrative synthesis describing these 
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around the themes of human agency and people power, democracy, urban sustainability, social 
inequality, and neoliberal ideology. These powers or mechanisms are Christchurch specific, but can 
also be used to study other social contexts. This remains for further research. 
A. Human Agency & People Power: 
 To better understand the nature of power relations in the context of recovery, I relied on my 
participants’ personal accounts of the disaster and my other textual data from complementary 
qualitative research methods. Participants offered a glimpse into their world view and the social 
settings that grounded their perceptions and experiences. They had diverse personal and 
organisational backgrounds, but still shared a strong commitment to the city’s recovery and its people, 
revealing a strong sense of place or community. Thus, it was clear to me that the phenomenon of 
sense of place and community was a likely causal power or generative mechanism of disaster recovery 
and community resilience in my case study.  
 In Christchurch, social connectedness and the people’s love for their city brought them together 
to support each other after the earthquakes. The process of disaster response was imbued by a 
collective spirit and a coming together of different sectors of society. Even if personal and collective 
trauma took a toll on them, participants were spurred into action to advocate for a more inclusive 
recovery process and individual and collective healing. This narrative, highlighted the critical 
ontological premise of the nature of reality as a product of a morphogenetic dialectical relationship 
between social and ecological structure and human agency. In Christchurch communities were agents 
working to minimise the material and social impacts of a major event. Not only did these structural 
challenges stemmed from the natural disaster itself, but from the state and the policies it developed 
to address the recovery. Still, participants demonstrated psychological empowerment and personal 
resilience, which allowed them to resist and work under conditions of great adversity to continue 
providing services in the public good. This inner strength in the face of adversity can also be considered 




B. Democracy, Recovery & the Role of Central & Local Government: 
 This coming together of society was described by a participant as “extraordinary” and as if the 
“distinctions between the community sector, the private sector, and the local government sector were 
blurred and everyone just rolled up their sleeves and got into it.” Indeed, at the onset of the disaster, 
central and local government seemed to work together well. A participant from the third sector 
mentioned that, “both local and central government just did a fantastic job.” 
 However, soon the pre-existing contours social structure would soon begin to show again, and 
this coming together would not last. Government took over the recovery process through several 
significant legal changes. I analysed this statutory framework established to govern the process of 
post-disaster housing recovery and the threat of erosion it posed to local democracy and social 
participation. It prompted my reflection on the importance of democracy and public participation to 
the concept of community resilience and identify the presence or, in this case, the absence of these 
as a causal power or generative mechanism of recovery and resilience.  
 To understand this causal democratic deficit in the recovery more fully, I delved deeper into 
why the roles of central and local government developed this way by asking all participants how the 
different actors related to each other within the recovery statutory framework. From these reflections 
I hypothesised that it is likely that pre-existing tensions between central and local government in 
Christchurch are tied to the evolution of New Zealand’s political economy toward structural 
adjustment and reconfigured the jurisdictional control of the recovery, altering the social distribution 
of power in the process. This power imbalance also seemed to be embedded within the country’s 
parliamentary constitutional order and the role of local government as a “creature of statue.”50  
 Referring to the different social sectors involved and their role in the recovery process, a third 
sector participant stated that “they all do what they’re supposed to do, they all represent different 
groups,” when asked why some organisations held more power than others over the recovery process. 
This enabled me to hypothesise on some of the mechanisms that underpin this inequality. Firstly, my 
study points to the creation of CERA as an event that significantly altered the normal order of business 
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in the city. For a community service provider, this new political structure allowed those with influence 
direct access to the Minister of Earthquake Recovery, leaving others out:  
“There has been a shift in terms of who holds the power in those relationships now. CERA and 
the Government have such a strong influence on the direction of the recovery. Some of the bigger 
players are benefiting from that at the expense of some of the smaller groups who are continuing 
to deliver expert service and support, and may not be in the loop and receiving the recognition 
and attention that they deserve. I'm not saying that there have not been efforts. I'm saying that 
it's not always inclusive and certainly it isn't bottom-up.” 
 
Interestingly, a member of the third sector held a different and more positive perspective, 
saying that at least these extraordinary powers were being exercised judiciously: 
“I’m not entirely happy with all the things that have happened post-quake, but one of the nice 
things is there has been very little corruption. I’m sure, there’s bits and pieces, but it hasn’t been 
widespread like the whole situation you see in other disasters. That’s amazing! As much as I 
dislike the central government’s approach, they’re earnestly trying to do their best.” 
 
 The absence of traditional checks and balances in this governance arrangement, however, still 
threatened the recovery process’ accountability. For a member of local government “the magnitude 
of the disaster, combined with the speed, was “making it very hard to have all the conversations you 
need to get the best results.” In 2017, troubling reports of graft and conflicts of interest emerged of 
three CERA employees who used their position to advance their private business interests. The 
Minister said the accusations were “extremely disappointing” and the State Services Commission 
described the allegations as “very concerning and, if proven, a serious breach of the standards of 
integrity expected.” At the time, the Otago Daily News reported the following: 
“The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet has been looking into the allegations made 
to gain a better understanding of what took place. Based on the need to look beyond CERA, it 
has formed the view that there are grounds for a wider investigation, because New Zealanders 
need to be able to have trust and confidence in public servants and the public service. Declaring 
and removing conflicts of interest is a fundamental rule in state services and, if the allegations 
are true, they will shake at the foundations of the role of Government.” 
 
On the absence of democratic checks and balances, a community service provider expressed:  
“Because everybody is on the same boat, you don’t have the ability to be outside and make 
objective decisions about what would help most. You’re all wrecked up, which makes it harder 
to rise and lift your head up from your own issues to consider a broader picture. This is the reason 
that central government needed to play a smarter role in a slower recovery process, instead of 
jumping from relief to ideological decisions about rebuild that left some stakeholders feeling like 
they haven’t got a say in it. At that point, they needed to slow the conversation down and make 
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sure that everybody had a voice in this and felt like they were being listened to. When there’s 
been a huge trauma, that needs to go slow enough for everybody to reflect and talk together.” 
 
They continued on to reflect on Klein’s notion of the shock doctrine and disaster capitalism:51 
 
“That central coordination didn’t really happen. There was a whole emphasis from central 
government to just let the market do its own thing. But unfortunately, the market’s goal is 
profitability for individual stakeholders. That doesn’t address community development.”  
 
This argument was reinforced by a member of the third sector: 
 
“It has all turned into this weird government-led, almost disaster capitalism, rather than going 
back to the values of what the recovery is about, which is about community. How can this 
development inform those values?” 
 
An institutional stakeholder took a more positive perspective and saw the glass half full: 
 
“We're doing well, because if you read the disaster literature, we don't do badly at all. If you 
look at some of the other places that have had earthquakes of similar magnitude and 
destruction that have been in a smaller area, or that have had the resources around them, we 
have done much better. An entire city has been affected. In Christchurch, we're just at the end 
of the world and the entire city is destroyed. Put it into context. If you were to look at the whole 
destruction of New Orleans and you look at Christchurch, who's doing better? In terms of GDP 
and in terms of just the size of the issue. It was enormous. So from that perspective we're doing 
very well. From my reading, it helps being a lot more equal to begin with.” 
 
However, for this participant there was a caveat to this argument: 
  
“We are not a particularly equal city and, sadly, the less well-off tend to be hit the hardest. Not 
coincidentally really, the eastern suburbs were cheaper land because it was crappy land and so 
it got developed that way.” 
 
When prompted to reflect on what were some of the barriers for achieving a more equal 
recovery process? This participant remarked the following: 
“The barriers are Government barriers. The Government has let the insurance industry run this 
recovery. I think that is tragic. Tell me, where is the leadership in the city? It’s hidden behind 
closed doors, there’s not an open community discussion of anything at all. I think Cabinet is 
making a lot of the decisions. I think it has a lot to answer for.” 
 
This unequal treatment was ascribed to political ideology by a member of the third sector: 
 
“Very complex question. It's about who's in key decisions-making roles and their perspectives on 
the world. We have a Minister of CERA who is not empathetic, does not understand. Has a 
completely different worldview to most of us living in our communities, and he is not willing to 
listen. They've just been very much in that neoliberal world view.”  
 




Figure 9.1: Diagram of Power Relations 
 
C. Structural Adjustment & Post-Disaster Housing Recovery: 
 In Christchurch, the implementation of these policies of renewed structural adjustment gave 
shape to what came to be known as the market-led and insurance-led housing recovery, a series of 
explicit and implicit Government actions that relied on private and developer interests and the 
individual insurance claims process to recover the city’s devastated housing stock. This led me to view 
the ownership of residential property and access to public and private insurance as causal powers or 
generative mechanisms of this process of recovery. They were essential determinants of people’s 
ability to access the services of post-disaster housing recovery and without where far worse off. 
Theoretically, a liberal democratic government should represent and protect the wellbeing of its 
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constituents, not just the majority that elected it. This should be particularly the case after a major 
natural disaster as unforeseen and of the extraordinary scale as the Canterbury earthquakes.  
 Nevertheless, at the time the world was still reeling from the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and 
the New Zealand was in a recession. Housing was too big to fail and the market is structured around 
the high price of real property. To protect property prices, the Government never embarked in a 
massive house-building scheme, relying it extraordinary law-making powers to cut regulatory red-tape 
and incetivise developers to increase supply. The Government also relied on an under-regulated 
property market to offer shelter in the midst of a severe housing shortage. As explained, this was 
particularly devastating for those on low-incomes and those displaced from council and state housing 
in the private rental market forced to pay market rents.  
 By agency law, property industry professionals like real estate agents and property managers 
have a legal obligation or fiduciary duty52 to act on behalf of their clients to secure the best possible 
price for their property and only a duty of care to customers actively competing for a limited property 
stock. This competitive economic environment promoted the use of no-price or “hedonic” marketing 
strategies like auctions to promote bidding and increase the price of a property. Used on a massive 
scale in the country for the last ten years, the use of these property marketing staregies had an 
inflationary impact on the property as market and dramaticallty increased the commodification of 
housing on a national scale. But, when is it appropriate in a liberal democracy to temper the right to 
property to act in the common good? As explained, this question as it applies to New Zealand statutory 
framework remains for further research.  
 A participant with a local government background expressed dismay at the situation, explaining 
that the ensuing market-led recovery policy did not enable the asking of key questions like “what 
actually do we want our cities to look like? And “how do we want them to function?” Again, this 
revealed a lack of a whole-of-government strategic approach to the recovery of housing:  
“In terms of central government, it did some things well and other things…A bit more 
decisiveness around social housing and providing support for people would have been best. They 
did provide the temporary accommodation villages, but a lot of people had to sort stuff out for 
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themselves and some people were happy to do it. On balance, the response hasn't been brilliant, 
but it hasn't been terrible either.” 
 
According to this participant, this market-led ideology seemed at odds with the Government’s 
approach to the redevelopment of the CBD, if compared to housing recovery: 
“It’s interesting that they took that approach to downtown. It’s almost a very strong state-led 
programme. It’s almost a communist approach to city building. They saw the need to do that, 
probably because they were getting messages from investors that unless there was certainty, 
people wouldn’t invest, and it’s probably what drove it.” 
 
1.  The Insurance-Led Recovery – Increased Risks & Reduced Resilience: 
 
This lack of an overarching strategy for post-disaster recovery was particularly demonstrated by 
the issue of cash insurance pay-outs, which may have helped property owners and insurers ease the 
difficulties of the claims process but affected the resilience of the city’s housing stock. Now the city 
confronts the problem of as is, where is housing – houses that were not repaired and nevertheless 
rented at premium prices, with the health and safety risks that this entails. The extent of this problem 
has not been tracked publicly, and this is a source of concern from a public health perspective. The 
insurance principle of putting people in a position that is not worse off than they were before the 
adverse event and the issue of a lack of betterment (i.e. the tension between property owners and 
the council wanting to build back better and insurance companies seeing this as a capital improvement 
rather than remediation) was to blame for this observation.  
This unfortunate consequence of the insurance-led recovery introduces another causal power 
or generative mechanism: urban sustainability and environmental risk. This was the case for a local 
government representative, who maintained that the winners in this policy were those building “fast 
and shoddy because they're getting more, and more contracts.” The losers, on the other hand, were 
“the people, who live in those homes, because they're not getting the quality that they deserve.” This 
crucial flaw was also evident to both local government and the third sector participants: 
“The long-term effects of the insurance-led recovery… You've got people back at risk. You haven't 
taken the opportunity to avoid the risks or to mitigate and reduce those risks. You haven't taken 




When asked why this policy approach was taken, a local government insider expressed that it 
was born out of “political expediency.” 
“That's the reason that EQC is giving out pay-outs. The Government has said this is an election 
year and we need to make a good news story out of Christchurch and we are going to commit 
to EQC having all of its claims settled by the end of this year. The only way you can do that is by 
paying people out and not actually fixing homes. We are left with a legacy of homes that will 
not be fixed or very poorly fixed. Actually, it's downright naughty.” 
 
For a community service provider this was a source of concern: 
“Community resilience doesn't happen post an event, it's in place before. And that's what makes 
you resilient. You know who to ring when something happens because you already have the 
relationship, not going looking for it afterwards.”  
 
This participant argued that the magnitude of the event in insurance terms was such that the 
Government also feared insurance companies would exit the New Zealand market: 
But the Government also hasn't put enough pressure on the insurance companies to keep them 
line. The Government is scared that the insurance industry will stop insuring New Zealand or it 
will reflect badly on us internationally. They're stuck in that model and we should just bow down 
to them because those insurance companies own massive funds that they can use to attack 
countries, in hidden ways like attacking their currency and other things, just by moving 
investments around. And they still made profits this year moving their costs to other sectors. 
They are probably very scared of them and they are dependent on them rather than stand up.” 
 
2. Unaffordable Housing & a Lightly Regulated Private Rental Market:  
 
 The causal power or generative mechanism of real property ownership and security of tenure 
is also reflected on participant’s views on the crisis of housing affordability and the lack of regulation 
of the rental market in the city after the earthquakes. In a Weberian sense, I want to propose the 
ownership of real property as an essential variable in crafting an understanding of the power dynamics 
within the process of post-disaster housing recovery in Christchurch.  
 As explained in Chapter Seven, a current so-called oversupply of housing in the city cannot be 
equated to the actual need for housing at this time, or at the onset of the recovery process. Indeed, 
the houses built in Christchurch now are not the same as the houses destroyed by the earthquakes 
and are not affordable to those on low incomes.53 
“In terms of rental housing, one thing that has occurred is the types of dwellings that were lost 
in the earthquake were in the affordable end of the spectrum. If you think about the city, a lot 
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of the homes that went out to the east of the city, and especially the city centre as well, were 
more affordable, low-end, if you will.” 
 
A community service provider just expressed a sense that housing was “just not affordable:” 
 
“And it’s going to get worse? Of course, it's growing as we speak. There's just not enough houses 
being build fast enough.” 
 
  For a public servant, New Zealand’s rental laws created the conditions for the rapid increase in 
the price of private rentals in the city after the earthquakes: 
“One of the things that would be useful is security of tenure. One of the things that has been 
possible for less-than-reputable landlords, of whom there are a number, has been that if they 
want to get a different tenant, they can just kick their old tenant out and the old tenant doesn’t 
really have many legs to stand on in that regard. Because there is such a tight pressure on the 
rental market and there isn’t good security of tenure. That means that if someone is caught in a 
terrible place, at least they have a roof over their head as bad as that might be. Now, tenants 
are unlikely to complain about that, because if they complain, they might be considered a 
problem tenant and then the landlord gets rid of them, and someone else is willing to take their 
space, because it’s better than sleeping in the car. There’s a few things like that type of stuff like 
a warrant of fitness.” 
 
For a member of the third sector, by not addressing the issue of housing affordability directly 
with greater regulation, the Government’s bump up rent and temporary and emergency subsidies also 
had an inflationary impact on the property market.  
“All you’re really doing is subsidizing the landlords and property owners. If you didn’t do that, 
the rates would go down, because people just wouldn’t be able to afford to pay those rents. And 
that’s what needs to be happening rather than the Government coming in and basically “wealth 
transfer” to property owners. It’s quite a strange mechanism when you think about it. But again, 
I guess on the short-term, it’s fine because this is the problem now.” 
 
3. A Sprawled City: 
 The recovery was a missed opportunity to transform the New Zealand building industry and 
promote inner-city living and more, innovative, affordable housing solutions on a larger scale. This 
was reflected upon by a member of the third sector:  
“Why our housing industry has never advanced? It’s complete speculation, but I wonder if 
builders, developers, and the banking industry are all part of the mechanisms. They have made 
a lot of money off the way it is done. The economy has done well off the way construction and 
development works. I guess there hasn’t been much need to change it.” 
 
 A market preference for greenfields’ development contributed to increased suburbanisation, in 
detriment of the city’s sustainability and contrary to a pre-existing political mandate for compact 
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development54 and evidence of buyer demand for central city living.55 My observation of this increase 
in the city’s suburbanisation reinforced my identification of urban sustainability and environmental 
risk as an important causal power and generative mechanisms of community resilience. If community 
resilience is the goal of a disaster recovery policy, it is important to establish what will the impact of 
the latter on hazard mitigation and the city’s sustainable future. For a member of the third sector, this 
lack of innovation in the housing sector and the impacts it had on the city’s future disaster resilience 
was also, in part, a by-product of the Government not taking the lead in post-disaster housing and 
instead “allowing the market to do its thing:” 
“That’s the frustrating thing, Auckland and Christchurch should have been the game changers. 
This should be all the construction companies, the Government, and the developers go, okay, 
how do we do this differently? Can’t build quickly enough and it just doesn’t happen because 
we’ve just made it up as we’ve gone along. Yeah. It’s a shame they haven’t taken more of a 
leadership role with housing. I think it’s a huge lost opportunity.” 
 
As will be described below, this ideological exaltation of the virtues of the market can also be 
considered a causal power or generative mechanism of disaster recovery and community resilience. 
For this participant, the figure of the Minister of Earthquake Recovery was a metaphor for this 
situation given his constituency and his ideological frame of reference: 
“Particularly when you’ve got a Minister that doesn’t believe in climate change. That’s got to 
have an effect. He doesn’t have a problem, he loves cars. He doesn’t see a long-term issue with 
suburban sprawl, or that they might be building unsustainable infrastructure.” 
 
4. The Social Inequality of Christchurch & its Impact on the Most Vulnerable: 
 
 With this lack of innovation and Government intervention aimed at protecting the vulnerable 
in the housing recovery process came the hardship of those who could no longer afford to live in 
Christchurch. This convinced me that pre-existing social inequalities in the location where a disaster 
takes place are another crucial causal power or generative mechanism of recovery and resilience. My 
review of the literature in Chapter Three and my results in Chapter Seven propose that these 
inequalities are continued, if not reinforced, in the aftermath of a disaster. Indeed, as explained in 
Chapter Seven, the situation in terms of socio-economic deprivation and social mobility led Howden-
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Chapman and colleagues to describe this market-led approach as an example of the inverse care law. 
This was evident to a member of the third sector:  
“You just get the status quo continuing, which is inflated property prices and more people being 
kicked out of the market, and housing stock which is possibly not that resilient in the future. I 
think the danger for the downtown is that it’s not a place that enough people with different 
incomes live close to a meaningful urban environment. You just think with all the rich people 
living close to all these Government funded projects in the city and it being great for them and 
then the poorer population’s being shoved out in the suburbs. That’s a problem, because it is 
economic segregation, and it always is a sad thing.” 
 
This observation also made me reflect on the importance of the neighbourhood setting as a 
causal power or generative mechanism of recovery and resilience. Under ideal conditions, to foster 
community resilience people should have remained emplaced in their neighbourhoods and with the 
people and organisations that supported them. This led a community service provider to say:  
“There will always be winners and losers in a rebuild process and there’s nothing you can do 
about that. It was a massive traumatic event and we can’t pretend that everything’s going to be 
as it was. Some people, unfortunately, are going to end up losing out and some people are going 
to be doing a bit better. The problem is the way they’ve done it, by leaving housing which is 
something that impacts the most vulnerable. Leaving that to the market and playing no role 
meant that, although you’re doing some good things for business, for vitality, and for getting 
the city looking up, you’re excluding a huge number of people. It means that, the people that 
are going to come out better-off would have done okay anyway. All the people that are going 
to be worst-off were those that were most vulnerable and least able to look after themselves. 
One mark of the success of a recovery, should be whether the vulnerable are better-off or worst-
off at the end of it. My fear is that the vulnerable are worst off.” 
 
 The links between housing and wellbeing compel me to ask if the Government’s recovery 
actions were taken too late. The rebuilding of the housing stock was held off for over three years to 
implement these market reforms before starting an aggressive rebuild of the city’s severely damaged 
homes. This was cause for much hardship for the displaced and ill-housed Cantabrian population. For 
a community member the responsibility for this fell on CERA:  
“We are talking about CERA's role and what CERA could have done and may have done that 
would have ameliorated or mitigated some of the issues that we are absolutely facing.” 
  
There were serious consequences to these policies for a community service provider: 
 
“Most important consequences... I guess that people suffered, and people are still suffering. It's 
hidden because it's still behind closed doors. It might be behind a closed garage door or an 
overcrowded house. The people that have control over those issues don't see that, because 
they're not living in those communities. Out of sight, out of mind.” 
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 This is a point of importance for a member of the third sector:  
“It depends what country we want to live in, whether Government is there for who they 
represent. I’d like to think we live in a place where Government represents everyone, particularly 
the most vulnerable. That’s simple to me. If the most vulnerable ones are getting screwed over, 
we are not doing it very well.” 
 
For a community service provider, the Government made a moral choice when it implemented 
a policy approach that excluded the most vulnerable: 
“How we look after the most vulnerable in our society tells us what our moral values are, doesn't 
it? And we've been shown to be well short on that. And just the materialistic and profiteering 
nature of our current culture of consumerism is quite shocking. We're creating a very unequal 
society where there's a disenfranchised sector of the population about who people just say, well 
they just need to pull their socks up. But it is learned disempowerment that has been entrenched 
for generations now. It is the people that have profited out of the system, as well as those that 
are disadvantaged, that need to be the solution. It's not just them saying, oh, it's your own fault. 
So, it's important that there should've been an extra effort made by people with resources to 
assist those without. And I think it's a moral… They should feel a moral obligation to do so.” 
 
This pull-up-their-socks mentality was criticised by another community service provider: 
 
“Those people don't need a label they just need a roof over their head. The move from Housing 
New Zealand to MSD, means that you are going to have something wrong with you to get the 
housing with the social housing provider. There's nothing wrong with somebody who doesn't 
have enough money to live on the private rental market. The more you label people, the harder 
you make it for them to get their step on the ladder.” 
 
D. Community Resilience & Democracy: 
 They should also have had a say in the urban planning processes that affected them and their 
communities directly. As explained, the Government implemented a new regulatory framework to cut 
red tape and appeal to investors and promote greenfields’ development, scrapping the country’s 
tradition of local government and the role of the people of New Zealand in shaping their urban 
landscapes for years to come. These far-reaching policy decisions had deepening consequences for 
communities and the third sector who rely on local government to get their points across in urban 
regeneration. This observation was also illustrative of the presence or absence of democracy and 
participation as causal powers or generative mechanisms of recovery and resilience.  
 Chapter Eight described what happened to communities after the earthquakes, how they were 
engaged or not in the post-disaster housing recovery process, and what impact this had on this city’s 
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democratic character and future urban resilience. For an institutional stakeholder “it is important to 
have mobilized, engaged communities that can self-organize and talk collectively to the agencies and 
this makes that conversation much easier.” But for a member of the third sector, this was easier said 
than done given the barriers facing communities and their representatives: 
“About a year after the earthquake, I remember the third sector groups getting together and 
saying how are we going to get our voice heard by CERA? How do we get our voice heard in this 
conversation? They were sitting around talking about how to possibly get a representative, 
someone who got to sit at that table to talk about these things. It was mixed because the 
community workers had their own issues, but they were also working very hard. Their funding 
wasn’t increased, but the need just went through the roof. They collaborated well in lots of 
areas. Now, they don’t collaborate quite so well because they’re competing for the little bit of 
funding that’s available and are unable to advocate collectively in order to get their voice heard 
very early in the rebuild process.”  
 
Reflecting on the consequences of this participatory deficit, a member of the third sector 
concluded that this alienated the people from the process: 
“I think the disadvantages are mainly the alienation of the people from the process and that is 
very serious because, if people switch out of the policy process, they feel that they have no stake 
in their communities. This causes the loss of community solutions and people will be acting in 
their own self-interest, instead of turning to each other like they did after the quakes and serving 
the common good.” 
 
 Even in the absence of democracy, the case of Christchurch also shows that geographical 
communities, communities of interest, and the third sector were empowered to address the social 
impacts of the earthquakes. There have been many examples of leadership, with the third sector 
coming together based on common interests and revitalising the city, despite the governance 
framework created by CERA and the limits imposed on the government over the recovery process. 
This raises the question of whether the close ties of established communities (and their representative 
organisations) are socially robust enough to adapt in the face of major collective adversity and can be 
trusted to have a meaningful stake in a process that is also theirs. For me, this fact reinforces the 
importance of social capital and the need for small mutual groups and organisations to represent 
communities to work in partnership with other social sectors for a common good as other key causal 
powers and generative mechanisms of recovery and resilience. From a public health perspective, this 
is something to strive for. The Curitiba Statement on Health Promotion and Equity “embodies a spirit 
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of local and global commitment to democracy, equity, and justice” and “promotes social rights and 
health for all in an inclusive and sustainable world.”56 
E. The Perils of Neoliberal Ideology: 
 
 As discussed in Chapter Seven, post-disaster housing recovery and urban regeneration must be 
people-centred and not market-led. This was emphasised by a community service provider who said 
that “a lot of really important housing changes get made for weird legal reasons, rather than for what 
is the best outcome.” This highlights the role played by neoliberal ideology as another causal power 
or generative mechanism of recovery and resilience. Why was a market-led approach implemented 
with such zealousness? This critical and powers-based analysis revealed how the statutory power of 
the state was used to the detriment of the country’s liberal democratic traditions to push through 
reforms, preserving the economic interests of some New Zealanders over others. This was certainly 
the case for a community service provider:  
“Big business, the financial sector making money and the so-called mum and dad investors which 
is only the top twenty percent of income earners. They've got so much invested in the price of 
housing that they're just not willing to burst that bubble that will burst one day, so the longer 
you leave it, the worse it'll get. That's killing our housing, because housing's not being improved, 
when it's going up in value. Its availability is just being restricted.” 
 
 Interested in probing potential causal powers or generative mechanisms underlying the 
adoption of this market-led approach, I asked why this approach was still implemented by the 
Government. In response, both community stakeholders and public servants consistently described 
the market-led approach as an “ideologically-driven position that says, if you let the market do its 
thing, it will lift the economy overall and that will trickle down.” They added: 
“There is no doubt that we are the victims of central government ideology. The recovery of 
Christchurch has been an opportunity to drive the central government's agenda.”  
 
“Both central and local government took an ideological free market approach to the rebuild.” 
 
“They put a free market view of the world, that the market will provide. I don’t know what that 
means given the market isn’t anything apart from the rest of society. If you want to be cynical, 
a lot of individuals are maximizing their profits. I don’t know why that is going to support unity. 
That’s their philosophy of being non-interventionist. We have a thing about the nanny state.” 
 
In a similar vein, one institutional representative asked: 
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“What is the market? We tend to think of it as an entity. Who doesn’t? It’s a whole lot of 
individuals who are earning a living and making money. It doesn’t have a conscience, it doesn’t 
have a policy, and it doesn’t have a mandate for anything. So, why do we talk about it like it is 
something? The market is just a whole collection of individuals who are maximizing their profit. 
It’s risk-averse and what we need is some risk taking. That’s probably wrong with us leaving 
things to the market because why would you as an individual, apart from someone who is 
prepared to take a risk because they are very wealthy, why would you allow individuals who are 
risk-averse to manage the recovery? Yes, there should be Government intervention.” 
 
This lack of intervention was worrying to an institutional representative: 
 
“There may be an aftermath, because sustainability wasn’t a word that was allowed by Gerry. I 
don’t know why.” 
 
To another local government insider, this lack of intervention was a matter of fact. 
 
“You've got the wrong Government in place, if you want something like that. We've got a 
Government which is all hands-off, less government, all market. That has been the case over, 
and over again.” 
 
For a community service provider this was the case even when the Government was presented 
evidence that its intervention was needed: 
“The ideological position that they’ve taken has blinded them to the ability to look at evidence. 
There would seem to be a real reluctance for the Government to pay attention to research and 
science. I suspect that they just have an ideological assumption that you do whatever you can 
to boost the market. If the wealthy get wealthier, it is up to businesses to employ more people, 
and that will eventually trickle down.” 
 
For participants coming from the community and the third sector, this ideological position was 
a huge barrier to a more equitable recovery process: 
“It’s just an ideological position. They have an ideological preference for market-driven solutions 
to recovery and maximized profit.” 
 
Again, the Government’s insistence that that the market to lead the recovery was questioned: 
 
“It's interesting, isn't it, what they decide is government intervention and what isn't? People 
have this rhetoric that the market is this external force like gravity. But it's not, it's something 
we've created, and we make political decisions around how it's structured and whether we can 
intervene with that. The Government needs to realize that and say, it’s not providing housing, 
so we need to alter it so that it does meet the housing needs. Instead, the Government is just 
looking at how do we maximize profit for the commercial sector, when it's the wrong way 
around. It should be, how is the market providing for common wellbeing. You know, the common 
wealth, the common good.”  
 




“I cannot believe how stupid an approach that is. The market is fantastically great at some things 
in a situation that is working normally. What it has never been good at is looking after the needs 
of the most vulnerable. It’s just not the job of the market to do that and to stand back and say, 
well, now that we’ve lost everything, let’s just sit back and see if the market comes up with a 
way to not just to maximize profit. It’s just brainless.”  
 
In the end, for community and third sector participants this worldview limited innovation: 
 
“Barriers… It’s just people's worldviews. We're stuck in a rut in hell – ha, ha, ha – with how we 
see the world and not looking at possibilities. And within the political framework, we are stuck 
with this dichotomy of the left versus the right. That whole system is wrong, but that's the 
worldview that predominates. They don't think innovatively. They focus on economic growth.” 
 
When asked why the Government had nevertheless taken this approach, a participant explained 
the limits of representative democracy: 
“I guess because they’re a property owners’ Government. They’re the Government that 
traditionally represents the farmers, the well-off, and the wealthy. I guess, it’d be undermining 
its constituents.” 
 
III. Concluding Remarks: 
 
 This chapter applied my framework’s critical realist ontological foundations and went beyond 
what was observed empirically, to theorise plausible causal powers or generative mechanisms 
underlying my findings. What were these mechanisms or causal powers of post-disaster housing 
recovery and community resilience in Christchurch after the Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010-2011? I 
have identified some highlighting the importance of human agency and people power, democracy, 





CHAPTER TEN: SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
I. Introduction: 
 This last chapter of my thesis provides a summary and discussion of my study’s results, 
conclusions, and reccomendations for further research. As described, with this study I sought to gain 
greater understanding of the concept of community resilience from a critical social science 
perspective. I achieved this by developing a critical theoretical framework of community resilience 
that focused on the study of power and power relations as the ultimate object of research. I also tested 
this theoretical framework empirically by conducting a case study of post-disaster housing recovery in 
Christchurch after the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. This chapter starts with an analysis 
of the my qualitative research design’s performance and what were some of its key strengths and 
limitations. Next, the chapter summary of the results presented in the previous five chapters, 
describing participants and the social context and governance of the process of post-disaster housing 
recovery, the role of communities and the third sector within it, and the causal powers or generative 
mechanisms influencing my observations on post-disaster housing recovery annd community 
resilience in the city after this major natural disaster. 
 In summary, the case of Christchurch highlights that power, as expressed in the policies and the 
statutory framework governing the recovery, fundamentally impacts on the sustainability and 
resilience of the natural and built environments and the local populations uprooted by disaster. 
Indeed, in Christchurch the Crown’s top-down recovery approach propelled dramatic changes to local 
government. This centralised strategy was embodied in the creation of the Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority (or CERA). However, this centralisation of power over the recovery was not used 
to advance Government intervention in post-disaster housing recovery, but to restrain intervention in 
the private rental market and promote the deregulation of the business-as-usual urban planning 
frameworks that had been established by the region’s territorial authorities. In fact, in this thesis I 
conclude that this so-called market-led approach was a way for the Government to reintroduce 
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structural adjustment reforms and roll back the regulatory role of local government, in line with their 
perceived neoliberal political mandate. 
II. A Qualitative Research Methodology: 
 As explained, with this thesis I hoped to answer the research question of what is community 
resilience and how it is influenced by the democratic participation of communities as key stakeholders 
in the process of post-disaster housing recovery? To answer this question and critically examine what 
is meant by such an abstract concept required being particularly attentive to the power relations 
embedded in the governance of the process of disaster recovery and to the role played by 
communities when compared to other sectors of society within it. Based on this key theoretical 
premise, I developed a socio-ecological framework of community resilience and assessed its worth 
empirically, through a case study of Christchurch and the use of qualitative research methods. The 
data collected were analysed and presented in a narrative synthesis of textual data, a product of the 
thematic analysis of the semi-structured interviews with key informants, policies, media, and my 
experiences in the field. There were strengths and limitations to this methodological approach. These 
are further discussed below. 
A. Strengths of this Qualitative Research Design: 
 For Weingand, qualitative research is most effective to recognise “the importance of two 
perspectives of human behaviour: external and internal” (or emic and etic, as described in Chapter 
Two). Whereas quantitative research addresses external human behaviour, she argues that it 
“becomes silent when internal behaviour is to be the object of analysis.” In contrast, qualitative 
research is, according to Weigand, well attuned to address that internal, or inner perspective, which 
emphasises the study of “mental and social processes in the context of participation in an activity,”57 
and was much consistent with the goals of my study. According to Flick, qualitative research is of 
“specific relevance” to the study of social relations (like those involved in my study with its focus on 
power and power relations), “due to the fact of the pluralization of life worlds, the growing 
individualisation of ways of living and biographical patterns, and the dissolution of old social 
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inequalities into the new diversity of milieus, subcultures, lifestyles, and ways of living.”58 This was of 
particular interest in the rapidly-changing disaster recovery social context, like the one experienced 
by the residents of Christchurch in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquakes.  
 According to Flick, the goal of qualitative research is “to formulate such subject- and situation-
related statements, which are empirically well founded, is a goal which can be attained with 
qualitative research.” To achieve this, for Flick, qualitative research must have these features: [1] 
appropriateness of methods and theories; [2] a variety of approaches and methods; [3] reflexivity of 
the researcher and the research; and [4] the inclusion of participant perspectives and their diversity.”59 
Qualitative inquiry also has the capacity of involving “research participants in all phases of the research 
process – including the interpretation of findings.”60 This approach enabled my study’s capacity to 
engage directly with members of the community and the third sector and is consistent with the 
participatory spirit espoused by my framework of community resilience, proposed in Chapter Four. 
B. Limitations of this Qualitative Research Design: 
1. The Question of Generalisation: 
 A key limitation of this qualitative research design is related to the paradigmatic differences 
between quantitative and qualitative research, as referenced in other chapters. Flick, accurately 
describes the value premium placed on the disenchanting approach of quantitative research: 
“Traditionally, the social sciences have taken the natural sciences and their exactness as a 
model, paying particular attention to developing quantitative and standardized methods to 
clearly isolate causes and effects, to properly operationalize theoretical relations, to measure 
and to quantify phenomena, allowing the generalization of findings and formulation of general 
laws. [These] are made as independently of the concrete cases that have been studied. Observed 
phenomena are classified on their frequency and distribution, in order to classify causal relations 
and their validity as clearly and controlled for as possible. Studies are designed in such a way 
that the researcher's influence can be excluded. This should guarantee the objectivity of the 
study, whereby the subjective views of the researcher, as well as those of individuals under study 
are largely eliminated.” 
 
 This study did not presume to be objective and this is its greatest limitation, in the traditional 
or quantitative sense of the word. As explained, it still has a lot to offer, however. Flick continues his 
critique by arguing that despite the methodological controls, “influences from interests, social and 
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cultural backgrounds are difficult to avoid in research and its findings and these factors influence the 
formulation of research questions and hypotheses as well as the interpretation of data and relations.61 
Unlike quantitative research, which sets out to address this gap and understand phenomena in terms 
of generalisable trends and frequencies, qualitative research “seeks to determine the meaning of a 
phenomenon through description.”62  
 For Weigand, research is the “careful study and investigation, especially in order to discover 
new facts or information.” From this definition, she maintains, one cannot infer that research is 
necessarily connected to a process of quantification. In fact, for her, the phrase careful study and 
investigation speaks to “the thoroughness of the process rather than the methodology used,” and the 
discovery of new facts or information “is also methodology-neutral.” Accordingly, she concludes that 
there is nothing in that definition suggesting that “numerical analysis is required.” Why there is “such 
strong feeling toward the use of empiricism and statistical analysis, with academic opinion decidedly 
weighted in favour of quantitative research?”63 she asks. That is also a question of power relations 
between the proponents of these dominant and emergent paradigms. 
 As described in Chapter Two, my study, keen to transcend the question of generalisation as a 
research limitation, I used the quality and the rigor criteria proposed by Guba: “[1] credibility 
(triangulation, prolonged field stay, persistent observation; data confirmation with the participants); 
[2] transferability (abundant data collection, meticulous description); [3] dependability (overlapping 
data collection methods); and [3] confirmability (data triangulation and reflexivity).”64 
2. The Need for Māori Engagement: 
Another key limitation of my study was a need for a more systematic inclusion of Māori 
cultural approaches to sustainable communities in the research. The concept of community resilience 
strongly relates to the hauora oranga dimension of the notion of Vision Mātauranga, with particular 
salience to the wellbeing of Māori people and communities as housing is considered a key determinant 
of Māori health. My research could have explored initiatives like MBIE’s He Whare Ahuru He Oranga 
Māori housing strategy65 and to Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu’s tribal housing strategy, Tokona te Ao which 
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was established to address decreasing home ownership rates through creating opportunities in 
relation to social and affordable housing.66 These national and local housing initiatives consider how 
the built environment meets community needs as well as enables equitable access to wealth and 
resources for whānau to flourish.67  
As Māori trace their genealogy to Papatūānuku (mother earth), they possess a strong place-
based understanding of social and community wellbeing. These connections to the natural world 
impose relational obligations on Māori and others to protect resources (flora, fauna, and minerals) as 
well as communities within tribal regions. For many Ngāi Tahu who reside in their rohe, housing is 
associated with whakapapa (genealogy) and tūrangawaewae (identity). Housing is also associated 
with Kaitiakitanga (guardianship) in the sense that it is viewed as an intergenerational asset which 
should be cared for and handed on to future generations.68 The Māori view of housing, as embedded 
in their social, spiritual, and emotional values associated with land and community, should be further 
considered in the sudy of community resilience.  
Māori cultural knowledge relating to marae, wairua [spirituality], and family connectedness 
could also be drawn upon to promote community engagement and to enrich the development of my 
framework. Iwi and hapū have a knowledge and experience that constitutes a significant resource, 
which may be applied to innovation of the built environment as well as promoting thriving and 
sustainable communities.69 Further research should promote the development of a shared knowledge 
base on built infrastructure and design through engagement with iwi, private, and local authority-
based Māori stakeholders in the construction, urban design, and the land use planning sectors. 
III. Summary & Discussion of Results: 
 This summary and discussion of results broadly presents the findings obtained from all the 
sources of data used in this project and focuses on the role of communities and the third sector and 





A. A Theory of Community Resilience: 
 In Chapter Three, I started on the path of theory construction by conducting a qualitative 
systematic review and defining the range of phenomena under study to develop a theoretical 
framework of community resilience. With this exercise, I also developed a critique of the concept and 
how it can be interpreted from the perspective of power and power relations. In Chapter Four, I used 
this review to inform my creation of a new framework of community resilience and explain its people-
centred foundations. Because it is a multilevel and socio-ecological framework, Chapter Four also 
described the applicable theoretical concepts within each sociological level of analysis: individuals and 
their relations, their groups and communities, as well as their wider social context. In the words of 
Bendassolli, I used deductive reasoning to “posit” a theoretical description of the phenomena of 
community resilience and then pursued an “empirical reconstruction process,” to “reposition” data 
into an “existing theoretical network.”70 In this sense, my framework was useful to elucidate and 
organise the identified aspects of community resilience as a multi-level concept.  
B. Empirical Testing of Community Resilience Theoretical Concepts: 
 As explained, my critical theoretical framework of community resilience also guided the 
collection, analysis, and interpretation of data sourced empirically in my case study of Christchurch 
after the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. Describing the picture of community resilience in 
the city, I presented the outcomes of this analytical process in Chapters Five through Nine. A summary 
of those observations and how they relate to my framework follows. 
 Chapter Five began to present the empirical data gathered to test my framework. Thus, I 
discussed my findings from the case of Christchurch in relation to the framework’s micro-sociological 
level of analysis and the constructs describing attributes of individuals and their relationships and 
described participants as individuals within their own social and organisational settings. In terms of 
the framework, this analysis addressed the concepts of place attachment, sense of place and 
community and personal empowerment and self-efficacy. In summary, participants had diverse 
personal and organisational backgrounds, but shared a strong commitment to the recovery and 
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welfare of their city and its residents. This revealed a strong sense of place or community among 
participants. But the personal and collective trauma took a toll on people. However, participants also 
had psychological resilience and were personally empowered to advocate for a more inclusive 
recovery and individual and collective healing after what was a major disaster. 
 In Chapter Six, I discussed my findings in relation to my framework’s macro-sociological level of 
analysis and the theoretical concepts describing attributes of people’s wider context, including their 
institutions and social norms. To this end, empirically I explored the overall policy and social context 
of recovery after the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. In this sense, I explored the overall 
process of recovery, the role of central and local government, and why these roles had developed in 
this way. I analysed the role of central government and the creation of CERA and Regenerate 
Christchurch, co-opting the role of local government and its impact on democratic openess of the 
recovery. I proposed that this was a structural adjustment policy based on market-based reforms 
substituting business-as-usual planning frameworks and resource consenting processes with a 
standards-based national planning template to cut red tape and speed up development, limiting public 
consultation and deliberation in urban and housing development. 
 In Chapter Seven, I explored this theory delving deeper into this policy of post-disaster housing 
recovery to also analyse it as a concept within the ecological dimension of my framweork, at the micro-
sociological level of analysis pertaining to the wellbeing of individuals as a social determinant of health 
and as real property subject to market forces. I also explored housing in terms of individual 
relationships (the household) and the primary space were these relationships take place. As described 
below, housing is also presented as a key resource emplacing people in their neighbourhoods and 
communities, my framework’s meso-sociological level of analysis. My research also explored some of 
the structural, political and market forces affecting community housing at the macro-sociogical level 





Table 10.1: The Role of Housing in Community Resilience 
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 The key themes explored were the policy of a market-led or insurance-led approach to post-
disaster housing recovery; the devastating impact on affordable housing (including, social housing, the 
cost of private rental housing, and temporary housing); the impact of these policies on the city’s most 
vulnerable people; and the opening-up of greenfield sites for suburban development, rather than 
large-scale and more sustainable efforts to support renewed urban living. My analysis revealed that, 
because the recovery policy of housing lacked a whole of government approach that brought together 
the summative of all the different actions undertaken, it was hard to get a complete picture of what 
was the housing need was and if the road taken was the most appropriate.  
 These far-reaching policy decisions also had deepening consequences for communities. As 
explained, for community resilience to be fostered people should have access to decent housing with 
security of tenure and remain emplaced in their neighbourhoods with the people and organisations 
that support them. They should also have a say in the urban planning processes that affect them and 
their communities directly. In the case of Christchurch, these links should have been considered more 
carefully in the context of a people-centred recovery policy. In Chapter Eight, I explored these links 
more closely, by focusing on an analysis of my framework’s meso-sociological level of analysis and the 
concepts of social capital, small mutual groups (organisations), and community participation and 
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empowerment. The chapter, thus, assessed the impacts of the earthquakes at the neighbourhood 
level and the policies of recovery in the city’s social fibre and the role played by communities and the 
third sector in this effort.  
 Indeed, the loss of so much housing had an overall impact on the wellbeing of the city’s 
population with social dislocation and displacement, forced school closures and socially resilient 
neighbourhoods dismanteled in the Residential Red Zone. This affected the social capital of residents 
and the social bonds and networks much needed to face this period of collective adversity. This 
chapter also presented my observations on the massive social mobilisation of communities and the 
third sector in the process of recovery. As such, I explored the impacts of community engagement 
processes with the policies of recovery. I found that, while the Government’s structural adjustment 
recovery policies relied on the community and third sector to provide key welfare services, it excluded 
community stakeholders from key decision-making processes. The chapter again highlights the need 
for democracy, described as an integral part of my framework of community resilience. 
 Chapter Nine, explored what this meant in terms of power and power relations, the ultimate 
object of research of my critical theoretical framework of community resilience. Contributing to the 
development of qualitative research as a field of practice, this deductive theory building exercise went 
beyond the description of the phenomenon of community resilience, in order to pursue a “deeper 
reflection on the ontological status of the phenomena under study.”71 Indeed, for Bendassolli it is 
important “for researchers to focus more systematically on the rational justification of their practices 
in order to establish deeper dialogue with the philosophy of science and other disciplines with relevant 
perspectives on the nature of scientific knowledge.”72 
IV. Conclusion:  
Through this study, I have sought to gain a greater sense of the concept of community resilience 
from a critical perspective, paying special attention to power relations in post-disaster housing 
recovery in Christchurch. This led me to inquire into the dramatic changes in governance in the 
Crown’s top-down recovery policy. This emergency response centralised control over the recovery 
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process, but did not facilitate direct Government investment in housing development for those on low 
incomes. Rather, state power was used to issue Orders-in-Council to amend the law, to promote 
deregulation, to rescind the business-as-usual urban planning statutory framework and to instruct the 
regional and local councils to issue a new framework that introduced design standards and centralised 
decision-making over public consultation and deliberation.73  
In doing so, this policy eroded local democracy in favour of a central government-led approach 
to cut red tape and to attract private investment in the redevelopment of the city’s central business 
district and identified greenfield sites. Even with the misery brought upon the city’s residents by being 
ill-housed, CERA never took a hands-on approach to addressing it. This is how the National-led 
Government’s political ideology and the unprecedented level of private insurance coverage came 
together to produce a market-led approach to recovering housing. The opportunity was used by the 
government to introduce structural adjustment reforms centralising control over the council 
responsibilities and deregulate and liberalise the country’s building industry.  
Again, housing is a critical component of the social fabric74 and the local economy75 of any city, 
and its recovery is necessary for revitalising urban centres and communities alike in a post-disaster 
context. It is because of this that policy decisions like the ones to demolish or repair “must also be 
considered alongside initiatives aimed at fostering social and cultural sustainability”76 and preserving 
the social ties and infrastructure that existed pre-disaster. In Christchurch, these social processes have 
been dramatically altered. Ongoing dislocation of people has occurred because of the damage to the 
housing stock, as well as the managed retreat and dismantling of entire neighbourhoods in the 
residential red zone. Also, there were forced school closures, the loss of much of the city’s social 
housing, and a crisis in the private rental market that displaced those on lower-incomes to outer 
suburbs or to emergency housing without security of tenure. 
 Post-disaster housing recovery needs to go beyond private interests and promote the public 
good. As other disasters in the USA and Puerto Rico have shown, people need houses and communities 
need people. That is, urban populations need affordable and secure housing to be embedded within 
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a social context and develop a sense of belonging – a sense of place or community77 – and be engaged 
within their wider society.78 Decent housing79 needs to be considered an essential part of urban 
infrastructure80 and a key piece of the disaster recovery and resilience puzzle, a foundation upon 
which post-disaster urban renewal can begin to crystallise.  
  But, can a recovery policy assert community resilience when it restricts the ability of 
communities and the third sector to influence the decision-making process of a recovery strategy? 
With the recent mass shootings in two mosques in Christchurch’s central city,81 it is important to ask 
ourselves whether this approach to recovery contributed to the increased resilience, or the continued 
strain of a city that is now confronting another heart-breaking tragedy of historical proportions. It is 
clear that there was more than one way to recover housing after the Canterbury earthquakes 2010 & 
2011. That is, different, more sustainable and participatory plausible policy avenues were not taken 
in favour of a structural adjustment approach to post-disaster housing recovery after the Canterbury 
earthquakes. It is possible to identify possible causal powers or generative mechanisms that may 
account for the implementation of a top-down disaster recovery policy and the democratic 
engagement and resilience of communities. These should be further explored as measures to address 
the ongoing housing crisis in the country.  
V. Recommendations for Further Study: 
 From the start my thesis asked itself a blue sky question – how can we create more resilient 
societies by promoting more equitable ones? Further research will need to create comparisons with 
other cases (and other disasters)82 and do the same – ask itself key philosophical questions about the 
political system we live in. How can we ensure equity and democracy and still effect significant change 
onto our urban landscapes? Indeed, I argue that for a geographical community to be resilient it needs 
to exist in an open and democratic society and be able to advocate on its own behalf. How can a 
community still be engaged when the formal democratic processes have been compromised?  
 These questions and the development of a culturally-competent democratic community 
engagement model remains for design and further research under the korowai (cloak) of a Vision 
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Mātauranga. For further research also remains comparisons with other disasters and the social 
contexts of their jurisdictions. A particular focus of this analysis should be the use of emergency 
constitutional mechanisms internationally. 
 For a community to be resilient, it also needs an increased supply of affordable and decent 
housing with security of tenure for its people. How can we safeguard both the right to property and 
the common good? The Healthy Homes Guarantee Act 201783 and the Residential Tenancies 
Ammendment Act 202084 have gone a further than any other policy in addressing this issue in the 
private rental market. Home ownership still remains unreacheable to many. How can property prices 
be preserved high enough to sustain the country’s largest industry and afford people emplacement 
and peace of mind, as well as their homeownership dream? Research is needed into affordability and 
different property title regimes and progressive home ownership interventions. 
 A deeper reflection is also required on the right to property in New Zealand and how it can be 
tempered in favour of the common good, particularly in terms of access to decent affordable housing. 
The right to property is a strong moral grounding for common law in general and in New Zealand the 
right to property is a corner stone of the country’s liberal democratic political system. Nevertheless, 
the right to property is not a civil right guaranteed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.85 This 
has been the subject of much debate, as regulating it meant setting limits to the state’s capacity to 
exercise authority over it. This situation has also meant, however, that the New Zealand view of the 
right to property is expansive and, in the case of real property, sometimes at odds with the right to 
housing of every member of our society to live in a warm, dry, affordable home. A Foucauldian 
discourse analysis of the ideological propositions underlying this debate would be informative for the 



















HOUSING PRESSURES AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before deciding 
whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate we thank you. If you decide not to take part there 
will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for considering our request.  
 
What is the aim of the project? 
 
The series of earthquakes, which struck the region of Canterbury after September 2010, apart from the tragic 
loss of life, left 7,400 Cantabrians homeless, badly damaged the city’s central business district (CBD), left 
entire residential sections damaged, and dislocated whole communities.  
 
This study concentrates on the formation of partnerships for building of new affordable and social housing, 
because of its importance for well-being and health. It looks at the role of democratic community 
participation in housing renewal as an important strategy for improving health.  
 
This research project is focused on a case study of an exemplar project, 500 Houses for Christchurch, that 
has established a public/private/community partnership to address housing pressures in Christchurch. This 
project, which, is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a Ph.D. in Public Health, at the University 
of Otago, Wellington, is looking at the role of meaningful community engagement. 
 
What type of participants are being sought? 
 
We are seeking twenty to twenty five formal and informal stakeholders associated with the Canterbury 
earthquake recovery process. We are interested in learning about important aspects of the 500 Houses in 
Christchurch case study so we can increase our understanding of the process of forming and maintaining 
partnerships. We are recruiting participants with a letter of introduction and following up this invitation by 
email and phone.  
 
We want to talk to adults, older people and young people over 18 years of age and people of different ethnic 
groups from the public, private, and community sectors. No children will be recruited because the research 
question is not directly related to children. 
  
There will be no direct material benefit to you from taking part in the study, but you will be able to voice 
your opinions on the Canterbury earthquake recovery process. Light refreshments will be served at meetings 
and other project-related events. The study’s findings could potentially benefit the project design for 500 
Houses for Christchurch and others in the recovery process by developing strategies that give communities 






What will participants be asked to do? 
 
If you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to participate in one in-depth interview, lasting 
approximately forty-five minutes. The interview will be recorded and transcribed. We may also be 
participants and observers at public and project events, you may also be attending. 
 This interview involves an open-question technique. The general line of questioning includes the earthquake 
recovery process and housing pressures and community participation in general in Christchurch. The 
interview will be aided by a question guide, but much of the precise questions you will be asked are not been 
determined in advance and will depend on the way in which the interview develops.  
 
If, at any point, in the interview you feel hesitant or uncomfortable you have the right to decline to answer 
any question or stop the interview. Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project 
without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
There is a minimum risk of harm from participating in this study. Participants will not be exposed to any 
physical, psychological, emotional, or legal risks. Any risk is social in nature and relates to the possible 
breaches in confidentiality given the fact that the researcher will know the participants’ identities.  
 
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of it? 
 
There is a clear distinction between the data collected by the researcher through audio-recordings and the 
information that will be set out in the completed report. The data consist of people’s responses to interview 
questions. The data will offer insights into 500 Houses for Christchurch and the problem of housing pressures 
and community participation in the earthquake recovery process. The audio-recordings will be transcribed 
and used alongside the notes taken by the researcher at the time.  
 
Beyond participants’ names and contact information used solely for the purpose of recruitment, no other 
personal or health information will be collected for the study. During the course of an interview, the 
researcher will not mention the participant's name to the outmost extent possible. If there is an accidental 
mention of a participant's name in the audio-recording, it will be deleted from transcriptions.  
 
The results of the study will be published with only excerpts of transcriptions, which will not to include any 
identifiable personal information. When a quote from a response given by a participant to any question is 
presented in the report, the researcher will refer to participants as members of broad social categories like 
(but not limited to) community advocate, industry representative, academic, and public servant, ect. without 
mentioning his/her name or any other identifying characteristic. 
 
All participants will have the opportunity to view, correct, or withdraw the data that relates to them from 
the study. After the audio-recordings of interviews are transcribed the researcher will forward each 
participant a copy of their interview’s transcription for review. All participants will also be provided with the 
results of the study for further comment. 
 
The likelihood and seriousness of risk posed to participants will be minimized by encoding all identifiable 
private information. Each individual will be assigned a code that will not consist of their name or any other 
identifying characteristic. Codes will be used to identify all the data obtained from all participants, without 
exception. 
 
All physical and electronic data will be stored securely. Electronic files, including code keys, audio-recordings, 
and transcriptions, will be stored in a password protected computer. All paper-based data (field notes and 
print-outs of transcriptions) will be stored under lock and key. The data collected will be securely stored in 
such a way that only the researcher and her supervisors at the University of Otago will have access to it. This 
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safeguard will endeavor to ensure the greatest possible confidentiality and that no one else, but the above 
will have access to participant identities.  
Because of the magnitude and damage of the Canterbury earthquakes and the fact that the recovery process 
is one of the largest infrastructure projects ever undertaken in New Zealand, the data will be considered of 
historical significance and field notes and audio-recordings and their transcriptions are appropriate for 
permanent storage for the purposes of posterity in the Archives of the Department of Public Health, 
University of Otago, Wellington. 
 
Can participants change their mind and withdraw from the project? 
 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to yourself of 
any kind. 
 
What if participants have any questions? 
 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact either: 
 
Mrs. Graciela Rivera-Muñoz   and/or  Prof. Philippa Howden-Chapman 
Department of Public Health    Department of Public Health 
04-918-5762      04-918-6047 
gracielariveramunoz@gmail.com   philippa.howden-chapman@otago.ac.nz 
 
This proposal has been reviewed and approved by the Department of Public Health, Wellington, University 
of Otago.  
 
If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research, you may contact the Committee through 
the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph. 03 479-8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in 






















HOUSING PRESSURES AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. All my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request further 
information at any stage. I know that: 
 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Because of the magnitude and damage of the Canterbury earthquakes and the fact that the 
recovery process is one of the largest infrastructure projects ever undertaken in New Zealand, the 
data will be considered of historical significance and field notes and audio-recordings and their 
transcriptions are appropriate for permanent storage for the purposes of posterity in the Archives 
of the Department of Public Health, University of Otago, Wellington. 
 
4. The interview will be aided by a question guide, but much of the precise questions you will be asked 
are not determined in advance and will depend on the way in which the interview develops. If the 
line of questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may decline to 
answer questions and may withdraw from the project without any disadvantage; 
 
5. There is a minimum risk of harm from participating in this study. Participants will not be exposed 
to any physical, psychological, emotional, or legal risks. Any risk is social in nature and relates to 
the possible breaches of confidentiality given the fact that the researcher and her supervisors will 
know the participants’ identities.  
 
6. There will be no direct material benefit to you from taking part in the study, but you will be able to 
have the opportunity to voice your opinions on the earthquake recovery process. Light 
refreshments will be served at meetings and other project-related events. The study’s findings 
could potentially benefit the project design for 500 Houses for Christchurch and others in the 
recovery process, through initiatives that give communities a stronger voice. 
 
7. The results of the project may be published and available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity. 
 




............................................................................   ............................... 
(Signature of participant)     (Date)  
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APPENDIX 2.3: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
1. Could you please tell me a little about yourself? For example, is your home in Christchurch? If 
so, how did you come to live in the city? (These responses will offer some context to the 
experiences you have so kindly agreed to share today.) 
 
2. How would you like to be referred to? Please, broadly describe your position within your 
organization? What got you interested in this area and how did you come be in this role?  
 
3. Could you please reflect on the Canterbury earthquakes and your thoughts on the recovery 
process to date? 
 
a. What are your thoughts on the response of both central and local government? 
b. What are your thoughts on the private sector’s response? 
c. What are your thoughts on the community or third sector’s response? 
d. Why do you think these roles have developed in this way? 
 
4. Could you please share your thoughts on the recovery of the housing sector to date?  
 
a. What do you believe are the major issues facing the recovery of housing in Canterbury? 
b. What do you believe caused these issues? Why do you believe this is the case? What do 
you believe are the current and future impacts of these issues?  
c. Could you please reflect on the policies that have been implemented to address these 
issues by both central and local government? Specifically, could you please comment on 
the Comprehensive Development Mechanism (CDM), the revisions to the housing rules 
in the Land Use Recovery Plan (LURP)? 
d. Could you please offer your thoughts on emergency housing and the government’s 
temporary housing programme? 
e. How would you have approached the recovery of the housing sector? Do you have any 
ideas or preferences on how to go about it (social/affordable/mixed-tenure housing; 
innovative housing solutions; modular housing and customized industrialisation; in-
fill/brown-fields v. green-fields development; medium-density v. low-density housing)? 
f. What are some of the opportunities and barriers to implementing some of these 
approaches?  
 
5. What do you think about the policy of an insurance-led recovery of the housing sector? 
 
a. Could you please comment on the role of EQC, private insurance, and reinsurance? 
b. Could you please share your thoughts about the role of the market in the recovery of the 
housing sector?  
c. The central government appears confident that the market can provide the necessary 
solutions for the recovery of the housing sector in contrast to the strong leadership role 
it has taken in, for example, the rebuild of the central city. Do you have any thoughts 
about this discrepancy?  
d. What do you think have been some of the most important consequences of this policy? 
What are some of its advantages and disadvantages? 
e. Who has been targeted by this approach to recovery?  
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f. This policy is linked to home ownership and insurance coverage. As such, does this 
approach to housing recovery address the needs of all those affected? Why? Is this an 
important consideration in the context of recovery? Why?  
g. What do you believe will be the short-term, medium-term, and long-term effects of this 
approach? 
h. Could you please share your views on the viability of a rental cap policy?  
i. Why do you think the government has not levied greater control over the rental market, 
even on the face of a significant rise in the value of rents? 
 
6. Could you please describe your views on the creation and depopulation of the Christchurch 
residential red zone? 
 
a. What do you believe will be the consequences of the population shift from the City’s East 
to the West? 
b. What do you believe this population shift represents in terms of social capital and 
community development?  
 
7. What role (if any) should communities play in the Canterbury earthquake recovery and why? 
Do you believe communities have sufficient opportunities to participate in the recovery? Why? 
 
a. How do you think communities can be better engaged? Please elaborate. 
b. What are some of the barriers and opportunities in partnering with communities?  
c. What do you think of the consultation process so far? Please refer to specific examples 
like the Share an Idea campaign (CCC), the Land Use Recovery Plan (ECAN), or the 
Residential Chapter (CCDU), Schools (ME), and others? 
d. What role should communities play in consultation? 
e. How do you feel about the overall democratic character of the Canterbury earthquake 
recovery and why? 
f. How do you believe this democratic character has and will impact the recovery of the 
housing sector in Canterbury? 
 
8. Do you have any additional thoughts you would like to share? Is there somebody else in 
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